[🇧🇩] Judiciary of Bangladesh.

[Saif]

Post-July 2024 efforts at revamping judiciary

Bangladesh's judicial system has faced many challenges since the country's in dependence. The 1972 Constitution, for instance, established a Supreme Court and formally adopted the principle of the separation of the judiciary from the executive organs of the state. The development of the judiciary h

thefinancialexpress.com.bd

Post-July 2024 efforts at revamping judiciary

FE
Published :
Dec 17, 2025 00:53
Updated :
Dec 17, 2025 00:53

Bangladesh's judicial system has faced many challenges since the country's in dependence. The 1972 Constitution, for instance, established a Supreme Court and formally adopted the principle of the separation of the judiciary from the executive organs of the state. The development of the judiciary henceforth can be marked by some major changes. In 1975, the parliamentary structure country was replaced by presidential rule through the Fourth Amendment to the 1972's constitution. The move significantly curtailed independence of the judiciary and the Supreme Court's jurisdiction over enforcement of fundamental rights. The darkest chapter of the country's judicial history was the last 16 plus years when the judiciary was turned into a tool of coercion in the hands of country's autocratic regime.

The July 2024's upsurge and the political changeover that ensued saw efforts to revamp the judiciary and ensure its independence from the executive organ of the state. Notably, following the assumption of office by the interim government on August 8, 2024, the judiciary witnessed some positive developments. In this connection, on August 11, 2024, Dr Syed Refaat Ahmed was sworn in as the 25th Chief Justice of Bangladesh. Since then, he undertook certain steps to reform the judiciary. He is set to retire on December 27, 2025. Against this backdrop, on the eve of his retirement, the Chief Justice on December 14, reportedly, delivered his farewell address to the district judges, metropolitan sessions judges, chief judicial magistrates and chief metropolitan magistrates at the Supreme Court auditorium. There he dwelt at length on the measures he undertook during his tenure in office to revamp the country's judicial system. Especially, the points he highlighted are learnt to have included the reforms measures undertaken over the past one and a half years to implement the roadmap for judicial reform and overall development that was initiated. The other subjects that his farewell address to the judicial officials of the country, reportedly, included the ongoing judicial reforms, the expansion of technology-based services, improving the professional skills of judicial officers, ensuring transparency in court operations, enhancing the efficiency of lower court judges, facilitating easier access to justice for citizens, and providing key guidance to reduce case backlogs.

Notably, after taking office as the chief justice, he announced a historic roadmap for judicial reforms for all judicial officers. The roadmap outlined establishing a separate secretariat for the judiciary, drafting specific laws for judicial appointments in higher courts, creating specialized courts for the judiciary, preventing corruption, and implementing various other reforms. Over the past one and a half years, multiple reforms have been carried out in line with the roadmap. Evidently, the focus of measures undertaken has been to ensure that the judiciary can play its due role as the guardian of the constitution upholding peace, order, and fair rules for everyone, regardless of power or wealth. Having said that it would also be worthwhile to recall the not-so-envious role the judiciary played during the autocracy that had definitely been a blot on the nation's judicial landscape.

Notably, the Chief Justice, too, did not mince words, but was rather scathing in his observation about the role the judiciary sometimes played during certain political periods. During those times the judiciary was perceived as an undeclared accomplice to the unconstitutional exercise of power and misrule. Undeniably, in Bangladesh's progress, many distinguished judges earned deep respect through their wisdom, sense of sacrifice and moral courage. Yet, at times some judges have directly or indirectly sheltered misrule and participated in the acts of injustice. It is believed the hard work that has gone behind reforming the judiciary and establishing its independence during the rather short tenure of the outgoing Chief Justice in his office has been worth the effort. Let us hope, henceforth, the judiciary would strive to become, as the maxim goes, the last hope of the common man.​

 

[Saif]

A new chief justice at a crucial crossroads

When the new chief justice (CJ) took oath on December 28, 2025, he did so at a moment of acute constitutional importance.

www.thedailystar.net

A new chief justice at a crucial crossroads

By Khan Khalid Adnan

FILE VISUAL: STAR

When the new chief justice (CJ) took oath on December 28, 2025, he did so at a moment of acute constitutional importance. Bangladesh is navigating a fragile democratic transition under a interim government, following landmark judicial decisions that revived the constitutional provision for a caretaker government during elections. Promises of judicial independence that have long existed on paper are now being tested against institutional reality. Public expectations are, therefore, high that the newly sworn-in CJ will uphold the rule of law, steering the courts through reforms that are long overdue.


The chief justice comes to the office with formidable credentials and a reputation for integrity. Educated at Dhaka University, where he obtained both his LLB and LLM, and later in the UK with a master’s degree in international law, he has served on the bench for more than two decades. Appointed to the High Court Division in 2003 and elevated to the Appellate Division in 2024, he has earned respect for legal rigour and restraint. Notably, despite his seniority and qualifications, he was overlooked for elevation during the previous regime and rose only after the political changeover, strengthening the perception that his appointment is grounded in merit rather than patronage.


That perception is reinforced by his judicial record. Earlier in 2025, he authored a strongly worded verdict criticising what he described as a “troubling trend” of judicial bias in favour of the executive, warning that such conduct was incompatible with constitutional governance. In open court, he has spoken with unusual candour about the historical marginalisation of the judiciary, observing that successive law ministers have shown disregard for judicial independence once in power. Such remarks are rare in Bangladesh’s judicial culture and have enhanced his credibility as a judge willing to speak truth to power. Upon assuming office, he issued firm directions to lower court judges to deliver judgments without delay and maintain professional discipline, signalling zero tolerance for corruption or complacency.

One of the most immediate challenges before the CJ is translating a historic structural reform into tangible institutional change. In November 2025, Bangladesh established a separate Supreme Court Secretariat, ending decades of executive control over judicial administration. Widely described as a milestone in the separation of powers, the reform places responsibility for postings, promotions, discipline and administration of the lower judiciary under the authority of the Supreme Court rather than the law ministry. This has the potential to transform judicial independence from a constitutional aspiration into an operational reality. But symbolism alone will not suffice. The secretariat must evolve into an effective administrative backbone capable of improving efficiency, accountability and professionalism within the courts.


The new chief justice now effectively oversees this nascent institution. That responsibility requires clear administrative rules, adequate resources, and resistance to bureaucratic inertia. It also requires vigilance against future executive encroachment, particularly since the ordinance established that the secretariat must still be ratified by the next parliament to become permanent law. The CJ must, therefore, demonstrate its practical value through measurable improvements. If it fails to deliver, the reform risks being dismissed as cosmetic. If it succeeds, it may become one of the most enduring institutional changes in the judiciary’s history.

Equally consequential is the Supreme Court Judges’ Appointment Ordinance, 2025. For decades, appointments to the higher judiciary were criticised for opacity and political influence. The new ordinance seeks to introduce a merit-based and structured process by establishing a Supreme Judicial Appointment Council chaired by the CJ. He now sits at the centre of the appointment process, with significant influence over who ascends to the bench. This offers an opportunity to rebuild public confidence by prioritising competence, integrity and independence.

The council has already recommended several appointments to both the Appellate Division and High Court, easing long-standing vacancies. However, the ordinance has also attracted criticism regarding the structure of the process, including the use of inflexible age criteria, as well as the concentration of decision-making authority within a limited institutional framework. These concerns do not negate the reform but underline the importance of transparent and principled implementation. The CJ’s conduct as chair will therefore be decisive. By ensuring openness and resisting informal influence, he can help turn a contested reform into a credible and lasting framework for judicial appointments.


Beyond internal reform, the new CJ must guide the judiciary through sensitive constitutional and public interest disputes. In recent months, the Supreme Court has demonstrated an assertiveness unseen in years, restoring the caretaker government provisions removed in 2011, reaffirming judicial control over lower court administration, and addressing questions of judicial accountability. These decisions have served to reposition the judiciary as an active constitutional guardian, while also exposing it to political controversy. The CJ was part of the benches that made these decisions, reinforcing expectations that he would continue to defend constitutional principles even when doing so invited resistance.

Further challenges lie ahead as Bangladesh transitions towards an elected government. Disputes over electoral processes, accountability for past abuses, freedom of expression, and the rule of law will test judicial independence and restraint. Although the interim authorities have withdrawn thousands of politically motivated cases, deeper structural injustices remain unresolved. The CJ must ensure that courts remain forums for impartial adjudication rather than instruments of political retribution or protection. His repeated emphasis that the judiciary must never be politicised now demands institutional follow-through.


Perhaps the most daunting task confronting the new chief justice is the overwhelming backlog of cases. By the end of 2025, more than 46 lakh cases were pending nationwide. The country’s judge-population ratio remains among the lowest in the region, compounding delays caused by procedural inefficiencies and weak case management. The CJ has already emphasised discipline, timely judgments, and full utilisation of court hours. These measures are necessary, but not sufficient. Sustainable progress will require credible appointments, expanded judicial capacity, alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, and effective use of technology. The Supreme Court Secretariat can play a central coordinating role, but success will depend on consistent leadership.

The new CJ begins his tenure with rare momentum. Structural reforms, judicial assertiveness, and public goodwill have converged in a way few of his predecessors experienced. But expectations can be unforgiving. His legacy will be measured by the delivery of outcomes long desired by the nation: a judiciary that is independent in fact, transparent in appointments, efficient in administration, and capable of delivering justice within a reasonable time. At this crucial crossroads, Bangladesh needs judicial leadership equal to the moment.

Barrister Khan Khalid Adnan is advocate at the Supreme Court of Bangladesh, fellow at the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators, and head of the chamber at Khan Saifur Rahman and Associates in Dhaka.​

 

[Saif]

Preserve Supreme Court ordinances for judicial autonomy

The parliament’s ongoing review of the interim government’s 133 ordinances is perhaps the first real test of whether the July uprising has changed only the occupants of power, or the logic of power itself.

www.thedailystar.net

Preserve Supreme Court ordinances for judicial autonomy

1 April 2026, 12:00 PM

Khan Khalid Adnan

VISUAL: ANWAR SOHEL

The parliament’s ongoing review of the interim government’s 133 ordinances is perhaps the first real test of whether the July uprising has changed only the occupants of power, or the logic of power itself. The special committee reviewing the ordinances will reportedly place its report in parliament on April 2, with any ordinances not enacted within the remainder of the 30-day deadline lapsing automatically. Among the 133 ordinances, there are two that I think should be treated as non-negotiable democratic safeguards: the Supreme Court Secretariat Ordinance, 2025 and the Supreme Court Judges’ Appointment Ordinance, 2025. If the House lets either of these lapse or be compromised, it would not be preserving parliamentary supremacy—it would be restoring executive supremacy over the judiciary. That would be a grave mistake.

This decision cannot be made in a vacuum. The February 12 election came after a mass uprising that, according to the UN Human Rights Office, may have cost as many as 1,400 lives. The uprising was not a revolt against one ruler. It was a revolt against a system that had turned elections into rituals and institutions into extensions of the executive. As we now know, the destruction of the caretaker framework in 2011 did not produce constitutional normalcy, but rather three increasingly disputed elections while collapsing public faith. That is why judicial independence is not some elite legal preoccupation; it sits at the heart of why the old order fell.

The review judgment on the 13th Amendment should have ended any attempt to treat this as ordinary politics. In the full judgment released on March 12, 2026, the Appellate Division used language that should unsettle every MP. It referred to the abolition of the caretaker system as the “judicial murder of democracy.” It then went further. At pages 59 and 60, the court accepted the challenge over the discrepancy between the 2011 short order and the later full judgment, and observed that the 15th Amendment, enacted in the gap between the two, effectively signalled, even dictated, the fate of the caretaker system to the judiciary. More damningly, the court said the judiciary appeared to have buckled under legislative pressure. When a Supreme Court says an earlier constitutional judgment may have been bent by politics, the parliament cannot honestly say that proper judicial reform is not crucial.

Bangladesh has already paid the price of a judiciary seen as vulnerable to power. Former Chief Justice SK Sinha resigned amid intense government backlash over the 16th Amendment verdict and later sought political asylum abroad. In August 2024, Chief Justice Obaidul Hassan and five other Appellate Division judges resigned amid protests, leaving only one appellate judge in place. One may disagree with how those exits happened. But no honest observer can deny what they revealed: public confidence in judicial neutrality had been shattered. A judiciary feared by citizens and managed by the government cannot anchor a democracy.

That is why the High Court’s landmark ruling on judicial autonomy and the later issuance of the Supreme Court Secretariat Ordinance in 2025 matter so much. The court addressed a structural defect that has poisoned judicial independence for decades by restoring Supreme Court authority over the posting, promotion, and disciplining of lower court judges, and by directing the creation of a separate judicial secretariat. Without an autonomous secretariat, talk of independence remains theatrical. A judge may write a brave order, but if decisions on postings, promotions, discipline, staffing, and budget still remain on executive hands, the system stays compromised. Administrative dependence is political dependence in slower form.

The same logic applies to the Supreme Court Judges’ Appointment Ordinance. Bangladesh has spent years pretending that constitutional consultation was enough to ensure fair appointments, while everyone knew informal political filtering remained decisive. The 2025 ordinance at least creates a statutory framework and a council-based process for choosing judges, and appointments have already been made under it. This is not merely a theoretical reform. Its necessity has already received judicial endorsement. In Writ Petition No. 3936 of 2025, the High Court Division acknowledged defects in how the constitutional appointment scheme has worked in practice, noting concerns about non-merit based appointments and the resulting damage to the judiciary’s image. It recognised that the ordinance was introduced to address these shortcomings by limiting political influence, and described it as desirable for the “great interest of the nation,” while leaving room for parliamentary refinement (pp. 10-12).

Yes, the law can be improved. The parliament can debate stronger transparency rules, clearer criteria, public disclosure standards, and conflict-of-interest safeguards. It can question particular design choices. But scrapping or diluting the ordinance in any form would mean returning to opacity, patronage, and whispered vetting by the executive. That would be reform in reverse.

The argument that the parliament should refuse these ordinances because they were promulgated by an unelected interim government misses the point. The question is not who issued them, but whether the ordinances cure a documented constitutional illness. On that score, both ordinances do. One gives the judiciary an administrative spine; the other begins to shield appointments from naked political capture. Neither is perfect, but both are necessary. BNP now governs with a large mandate earned in the first genuinely competitive election in years. That gives it authority, but it also imposes restraint.

If the government wants to prove it is not merely the latest beneficiary of Bangladesh’s winner-takes-all state, it should pass these two ordinances, improve them if needed, and entrench them as part of a broader constitutional settlement. If it lets them lapse or be compromised, the message will be unmistakable: reform was useful as a slogan in opposition, but inconvenient when in office. Bangladesh knows what happens when courts are bent, intimidated, bypassed, or packed. It knows what follows when electoral legitimacy collapses and judges are treated as instruments, obstacles, or targets. The parliament should therefore preserve these two ordinances—if nothing else, as a debt to the July martyrs, to the voters who reclaimed their franchise, and to the future of constitutional rule.

Barrister Khan Khalid Adnan is advocate of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh, fellow at the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators, and head of the chamber at Khan Saifur Rahman and Associates in Dhaka.​