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LDC graduation and unfinished business of clean energy
AS BANGLADESH marks the International Day of Clean Energy this January, the observance arrives at a moment of unusual historical weight. In November this year, the country is set to graduate from the United Nations’ list of Least Developed Countries. This transition is widely framed as a marker...
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LDC graduation and unfinished business of clean energy
AS BANGLADESH marks the International Day of Clean Energy this January, the observance arrives at a moment of unusual historical weight. In November this year, the country is set to graduate from the United Nations’ list of Least Developed Countries. This transition is widely framed as a marker of success — a recognition of economic growth, improved infrastructure and rising industrial capacity. Yet the symbolism of graduation sits uneasily beside a less comfortable reality: Bangladesh is entering its post-LDC era just as the global energy system undergoes its most disruptive transformation in a century.Bangladesh travel guides
For decades, development in Bangladesh meant access — roads where there were none, electricity where darkness prevailed, power generation by whatever means could meet immediate demand. That logic is no longer sufficient. In an era defined by climate crisis, volatile fuel markets and diminishing concessional finance, development is no longer about whether power exists, but whether it can be sustained — economically, environmentally and politically. Bangladesh’s energy choices in the years immediately following graduation will determine whether growth remains resilient or becomes dangerously brittle.
The country’s energy landscape in early 2026 reflects both progress and constraint. Renewable energy remains a modest share of total generation, but its composition has evolved. Solar power dominates the green portfolio, driven by a mix of utility-scale projects and decentralised systems that continue to serve off-grid and hard-to-reach communities. Wind energy, long dismissed as unviable, has begun to register meaningfully following the operation of the Cox’s Bazar wind project, challenging earlier assumptions about Bangladesh’s wind profile. Hydropower, however, remains limited domestically, constrained by geography and the ecological costs associated with large dams.
More consequential than any single domestic project is the quiet shift now under way beyond Bangladesh’s borders. Electricity imported from Nepal’s hydropower plants through regional grid arrangements has introduced a new dimension to national energy planning. This development is not merely symbolic. For a land-scarce delta struggling to balance agriculture, settlement and energy infrastructure, access to clean baseload power generated elsewhere offers a rare structural advantage. Regional power trade, once discussed largely in theory, has begun to materialise as a practical tool for decarbonisation and energy security.
Yet the broader policy environment remains conflicted. The Integrated Energy and Power Master Plan, backed by international development partners, reflects a pragmatic but contested attempt to navigate uncertainty. By expanding the definition of ‘clean energy’ to include technologies such as ammonia co-firing, hydrogen and carbon capture, the plan leaves room for continued reliance on fossil fuels under the banner of technological transition. Critics are right to question whether this framing risks locking Bangladesh into expensive and unproven pathways while delaying a decisive break from imported coal and LNG. The reluctance to retire fuel-oil plants, often justified by grid instability and storage limitations, further underscores the tension between ambition and execution.
These tensions are not abstract. They manifest in three structural challenges that now define Bangladesh’s clean energy transition. The first is land. As one of the world’s most densely populated countries, Bangladesh cannot treat land as an expendable input for energy projects. Large-scale solar parks increasingly compete with agriculture, triggering resistance and project delays. This is not a technical failure but a political one: food security and energy security are being placed in false opposition. The more viable path lies above ground rather than across it. Rooftop solar, particularly in industrial zones, and agrivoltaic models that allow farming and power generation to coexist are no longer optional innovations; they are necessities. If renewable targets are to be met, they will be realised through dispersed infrastructure, not land-intensive megaprojects.Bangladesh travel guides
The second challenge is the grid itself. Bangladesh’s transmission system was designed for a different era — one dominated by centralised, predictable generation. Renewable energy disrupts that logic. Solar and wind fluctuate; grids must respond dynamically. Without significant investment in grid modernisation, digital management systems and battery storage, scaling up renewables carries real operational risk. This is not an argument against clean energy, but a warning against treating generation targets as sufficient in isolation. The transition will fail if infrastructure reform lags behind capacity expansion.
The third, and perhaps most politically sensitive, challenge is finance. Graduation from LDC status narrows access to concessional lending at precisely the moment when capital needs are rising. Clean energy is capital-intensive, front-loaded and increasingly exposed to currency volatility. As cheap finance recedes, Bangladesh must compete for private investment in a crowded global market. This reality exposes a deeper vulnerability: green transitions are not only technological shifts but credit-dependent processes. Without credible financing instruments — including well-designed green bonds and risk-sharing mechanisms — ambition will remain rhetorical.
Navigating this terrain requires a recalibration of priorities. Regional energy connectivity must move from experimentation to strategy. Power imports from Nepal and, potentially, Bhutan offer scale without land conflict and stability without emissions. Solarisation of agriculture presents another immediate opportunity. Replacing diesel-driven irrigation pumps with solar alternatives reduces fuel imports, lowers farmer costs and delivers emissions reductions without new grid strain. These are not long-term visions but implementable interventions.
The ready-made garment sector, often criticised for its environmental footprint, also holds untapped potential. Bangladesh’s dominance in green-certified factories positions it uniquely to attract climate-linked investment. As global brands push for decarbonised supply chains, renewable energy infrastructure can become a competitive asset rather than a regulatory burden — provided policy frameworks actively support this shift.
Even nuclear power, contentious as it remains, cannot be dismissed from the conversation. In a system constrained by land and intermittency, the Rooppur plant will play a central role in reducing reliance on coal-based baseload generation. The challenge lies not in whether nuclear fits into the mix, but in ensuring that its costs, safety oversight and long-term waste management are addressed transparently rather than absorbed silently by the public.
Underlying all these debates is a broader question of justice. Bangladesh has contributed a negligible share of historical global emissions, yet it faces some of the harshest climate impacts. The clean energy transition here is not a moral exercise in global responsibility; it is a matter of national survival. It concerns the easy-bike driver dependent on stable charging, the factory worker whose livelihood hinges on uninterrupted power and the farmer whose harvest depends on affordable irrigation.
Graduation from the LDC category should not be mistaken for the end of vulnerability. It marks the beginning of a more exposed phase, where policy missteps carry higher costs and safety nets grow thinner. Bangladesh’s clean energy transition will not be judged by declarations or targets, but by whether it can deliver reliable power without deepening inequality or dependency. The turbines turning on the coast and the electricity flowing from Himalayan rivers signal possibility, but possibility alone does not guarantee progress. What comes after graduation will depend on whether energy policy confronts constraint honestly, or continues to disguise it as ambition.
James Rana Baidaya is a humanitarian and social development worker.
AS BANGLADESH marks the International Day of Clean Energy this January, the observance arrives at a moment of unusual historical weight. In November this year, the country is set to graduate from the United Nations’ list of Least Developed Countries. This transition is widely framed as a marker of success — a recognition of economic growth, improved infrastructure and rising industrial capacity. Yet the symbolism of graduation sits uneasily beside a less comfortable reality: Bangladesh is entering its post-LDC era just as the global energy system undergoes its most disruptive transformation in a century.Bangladesh travel guides
For decades, development in Bangladesh meant access — roads where there were none, electricity where darkness prevailed, power generation by whatever means could meet immediate demand. That logic is no longer sufficient. In an era defined by climate crisis, volatile fuel markets and diminishing concessional finance, development is no longer about whether power exists, but whether it can be sustained — economically, environmentally and politically. Bangladesh’s energy choices in the years immediately following graduation will determine whether growth remains resilient or becomes dangerously brittle.
The country’s energy landscape in early 2026 reflects both progress and constraint. Renewable energy remains a modest share of total generation, but its composition has evolved. Solar power dominates the green portfolio, driven by a mix of utility-scale projects and decentralised systems that continue to serve off-grid and hard-to-reach communities. Wind energy, long dismissed as unviable, has begun to register meaningfully following the operation of the Cox’s Bazar wind project, challenging earlier assumptions about Bangladesh’s wind profile. Hydropower, however, remains limited domestically, constrained by geography and the ecological costs associated with large dams.
More consequential than any single domestic project is the quiet shift now under way beyond Bangladesh’s borders. Electricity imported from Nepal’s hydropower plants through regional grid arrangements has introduced a new dimension to national energy planning. This development is not merely symbolic. For a land-scarce delta struggling to balance agriculture, settlement and energy infrastructure, access to clean baseload power generated elsewhere offers a rare structural advantage. Regional power trade, once discussed largely in theory, has begun to materialise as a practical tool for decarbonisation and energy security.
Yet the broader policy environment remains conflicted. The Integrated Energy and Power Master Plan, backed by international development partners, reflects a pragmatic but contested attempt to navigate uncertainty. By expanding the definition of ‘clean energy’ to include technologies such as ammonia co-firing, hydrogen and carbon capture, the plan leaves room for continued reliance on fossil fuels under the banner of technological transition. Critics are right to question whether this framing risks locking Bangladesh into expensive and unproven pathways while delaying a decisive break from imported coal and LNG. The reluctance to retire fuel-oil plants, often justified by grid instability and storage limitations, further underscores the tension between ambition and execution.
These tensions are not abstract. They manifest in three structural challenges that now define Bangladesh’s clean energy transition. The first is land. As one of the world’s most densely populated countries, Bangladesh cannot treat land as an expendable input for energy projects. Large-scale solar parks increasingly compete with agriculture, triggering resistance and project delays. This is not a technical failure but a political one: food security and energy security are being placed in false opposition. The more viable path lies above ground rather than across it. Rooftop solar, particularly in industrial zones, and agrivoltaic models that allow farming and power generation to coexist are no longer optional innovations; they are necessities. If renewable targets are to be met, they will be realised through dispersed infrastructure, not land-intensive megaprojects.Bangladesh travel guides
The second challenge is the grid itself. Bangladesh’s transmission system was designed for a different era — one dominated by centralised, predictable generation. Renewable energy disrupts that logic. Solar and wind fluctuate; grids must respond dynamically. Without significant investment in grid modernisation, digital management systems and battery storage, scaling up renewables carries real operational risk. This is not an argument against clean energy, but a warning against treating generation targets as sufficient in isolation. The transition will fail if infrastructure reform lags behind capacity expansion.
The third, and perhaps most politically sensitive, challenge is finance. Graduation from LDC status narrows access to concessional lending at precisely the moment when capital needs are rising. Clean energy is capital-intensive, front-loaded and increasingly exposed to currency volatility. As cheap finance recedes, Bangladesh must compete for private investment in a crowded global market. This reality exposes a deeper vulnerability: green transitions are not only technological shifts but credit-dependent processes. Without credible financing instruments — including well-designed green bonds and risk-sharing mechanisms — ambition will remain rhetorical.
Navigating this terrain requires a recalibration of priorities. Regional energy connectivity must move from experimentation to strategy. Power imports from Nepal and, potentially, Bhutan offer scale without land conflict and stability without emissions. Solarisation of agriculture presents another immediate opportunity. Replacing diesel-driven irrigation pumps with solar alternatives reduces fuel imports, lowers farmer costs and delivers emissions reductions without new grid strain. These are not long-term visions but implementable interventions.
The ready-made garment sector, often criticised for its environmental footprint, also holds untapped potential. Bangladesh’s dominance in green-certified factories positions it uniquely to attract climate-linked investment. As global brands push for decarbonised supply chains, renewable energy infrastructure can become a competitive asset rather than a regulatory burden — provided policy frameworks actively support this shift.
Even nuclear power, contentious as it remains, cannot be dismissed from the conversation. In a system constrained by land and intermittency, the Rooppur plant will play a central role in reducing reliance on coal-based baseload generation. The challenge lies not in whether nuclear fits into the mix, but in ensuring that its costs, safety oversight and long-term waste management are addressed transparently rather than absorbed silently by the public.
Underlying all these debates is a broader question of justice. Bangladesh has contributed a negligible share of historical global emissions, yet it faces some of the harshest climate impacts. The clean energy transition here is not a moral exercise in global responsibility; it is a matter of national survival. It concerns the easy-bike driver dependent on stable charging, the factory worker whose livelihood hinges on uninterrupted power and the farmer whose harvest depends on affordable irrigation.
Graduation from the LDC category should not be mistaken for the end of vulnerability. It marks the beginning of a more exposed phase, where policy missteps carry higher costs and safety nets grow thinner. Bangladesh’s clean energy transition will not be judged by declarations or targets, but by whether it can deliver reliable power without deepening inequality or dependency. The turbines turning on the coast and the electricity flowing from Himalayan rivers signal possibility, but possibility alone does not guarantee progress. What comes after graduation will depend on whether energy policy confronts constraint honestly, or continues to disguise it as ambition.
James Rana Baidaya is a humanitarian and social development worker.
