[🇧🇩] Mecca Pact & Bangladesh

[Saif]

Date of Event: Aug 24, 2026

Source: https://en.prothomalo.com/opinion/op-ed/q231rvn7mj

The question the Mecca pact has raised for Bangladesh

Altaf Parvez

Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Pakistan's Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif sign a joint defence agreement in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, 7 August 2026. Reuters

To Muslims, Mecca is much more than any city. It is significant that the rulers of Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan chose this city as the place to sign a defence pact. Even selecting Friday for the pact signing holds similar importance.

This trilateral alliance may desire a religious facade, something that Mohammed bin Salman, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and Shehbaz Sharif may have been hoping for. Such a religious facade might help them in terms of voter polarisation in their respective countries. While these rulers have done little to significantly curb the aggressors in Gaza.

Signing any agreement in Mecca on a Friday also shows the firmness of their commitment. Questions arise as to what exactly these countries seek to protect with this defence agreement? Does the convergence of these three mid-sized military powers bear additional significance for South Asia?

Strategic diversification begins on all fronts

These trilateral signatories do not share borders. Thus, it cannot be called a regional alliance. It can be assumed that Saudi Arabia's extra interest is what has drawn Shehbaz Sharif and Erdoğan to Mecca.

The rulers in the Middle East who have long relied on the United States to protect their thrones are gradually seeing that longstanding advantage come to an end. The royal families of this region have been safely ensconced in such a security arrangement for a long time. However, by challenging the US -Israel axis, Iran has shattered the old sense of security for Washington's Arab allies.

Many countries around the world have taken immediate lessons from this scenario. Everyone is reevaluating and rearranging their defence policies and strategies. Strategic diversification has started everywhere.

The Mecca Agreement is its first major manifestation. The harsh reality has brought these three distant powers closer. Moreover, without relinquishing decision-making freedom, all those involved in the agreement were able to add additional weight to their international image. Yet, Riyadh-Washington and Islamabad-Beijing ties persist. Turkey does not have to leave NATO either.

The economic backdrop of this agreement is also worth considering. Gulf countries serve as major centres for global capitalism. Iran's counterattack in the face of aggression has shaken down assets and investments in that area. Securing these capitalist centres is crucial for many. Hence, the Mecca Agreement does not solely involve the interests of three countries; it has a significant political economy component. However, more than the moment of the agreement, everyone is interested in seeing how much importance the three countries attach to utilising it. It's still unclear whether it will have a unitary command structure like NATO.

The Mecca agreement brings India and Israel closer

The conflict between Iran and Israel and the US and its consequences have set the backdrop for this agreement. All three signing rulers are more or less close to the US. For these reasons, many have wondered whether Iran was the intended counterpart to the agreement. Some may also have thought of Israel.

News emerged that just before the agreement was signed, the Prime Minister of Israel called the Prime Minister of India. Naturally, the question arises, how significant is this agreement for them? Particularly against the backdrop of India's adversarial relationship with Pakistan, has this trilateral military alliance created additional pressure for New Delhi? Will they, therefore, seek to join with someone else to enhance their ''defense'' capability.

The agreement states that if any of the three allies are attacked, it will be considered an attack on all three countries. This clause is similar to NATO's Article 5. This also means that in any future India-Pakistan war, Turkey and Saudi Arabia will stand by Islamabad. Or, in any Iran-Saudi military conflict, Pakistan and Turkey will fight against Tehran. Pakistan has already deployed some air defence systems and troops in Saudi Arabia. Prior to this trilateral agreement, Pakistan had signed another separate military agreement with Saudi Arabia in the previous September. The subsequent agreement is undoubtedly a significant advancement over the previous one.

Netanyahu calling Narendra Modi in front of the Mecca Agreement signing is certainly indicative. Photo: ANI

These are clear indications that military thinking and structure are set for upheaval in Asia. Pakistan’s Deputy Prime Minister has already said, "This agreement is open to other countries as well." After his statement, curiosity has arisen about which other countries might be potential partners.

The call from Netanyahu to Narendra Modi ahead of the Mecca Agreement signing is certainly indicative. Saudi Arabia, Turkey, or Pakistan is not currently facing any new hostilities. But they have taken the news of this military alliance of three Muslim-majority countries as a distant warning signal. This is equally true for Iran.

Turkey has competition with Tel Aviv in Syria and other places. Besides Iran, several Israeli politicians have recently labeled Turkey as a ''threat'' despite Turkey being their oldest diplomatic friend in the Muslim world. They also find the nuclear capability of Muslim-majority Pakistan to be ‘dangerous’. For these reasons, Tel Aviv has no reason to view this trilateral agreement favourably. On 9 August, the Jerusalem Post wrote, "The Mecca Agreement will further develop Israel-India relations." Both countries want to bring the UAE closer to the same goal.

Under pressure of increased militarisation in South Asia

The Mecca Agreement has also posed new questions for Bangladesh. Should Bangladesh become part of such a coalition? Or, in response to increased Israel-India military proximity, what should be Bangladesh's course of action? Surely, policy makers in Bangladesh have already begun to ponder these questions.

The way the US-Iran conflict is coming to an end has helped create a strong and courageous image of Tehran in the Muslim world. To maintain leadership positions in Muslim-majority countries, Saudi Arabia and Turkey have entered a competition. They will continually seek Bangladesh as a partner to manage that rivalry. Turkey has shown a keen interest in enhancing military relations with Bangladesh for two to three years.

Simultaneously, the Indo-Pakistan military competition in South Asia is accelerating rapidly. Increased India-Israel closeness as a reaction to the trilateral agreement will undoubtedly intensify military rivalry in South Asia. As a side effect, we may witness numerous regional proxy wars.

Pakistan's economy was unable to sustain its vast military structure and manpower. Yet, its military personnel enriched with experiences from many wars. Saudi finance and Turkey's military industry could rejuvenate this. All three countries will benefit from this process.

In response, if advanced Israeli technology starts entering India's military framework, New Delhi's military capabilities will also reach new heights. Post-Mecca Agreement, the motivation to form a counter-military block among India's policymakers is increasing. Serious discussions about the trilateral defence agreement are underway there.

Such retaliatory agreements and coalitions will impact and pressure Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. These countries find it challenging to match the militarisation of larger powers. These nations have been floundering to address the economic crisis sparked by wars in the Middle East in recent months. Now ahead of them awaits a long-term militarily complex phase. Just as the Mecca Agreement directly connects Turkey and Saudi Arabia with the situation in South Asia, it has also driven Israel’s increased activism.

*Altaf Parvez is a researcher on history​

 

[Saif]

Should Bangladesh join Makkah defence pact?

The Makkah Joint Defence Agreement, signed by Pakistan, Türkiye and Saudi Arabia on August 7 2026, could become one of the most consequential new security arrangements in the Muslim world. Its central provision is straightforward: an armed attack against one member will be regarded as an attac

thefinancialexpress.com.bd

Should Bangladesh join Makkah defence pact?

(From left) Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Pakistan's Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif after signing a joint defence agreement in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, on August 7 2026 —Agency Photo

The Makkah Joint Defence Agreement, signed by Pakistan, Türkiye and Saudi Arabia on August 7 2026, could become one of the most consequential new security arrangements in the Muslim world. Its central provision is straightforward: an armed attack against one member will be regarded as an attack against all three. The governments concerned describe the pact as defensive, consistent with Article 51 of the UN Charter, and not directed against any particular country.

For Bangladesh, however, the real question is not whether closer association with three friendly Muslim states is politically attractive. It is whether membership would strengthen national security sufficiently to justify the military obligations, diplomatic repercussions and possible loss of strategic flexibility involved.

Strategic importance of the Pact: The agreement appears to serve several wider objectives.

First, it seeks to create a greater degree of regional strategic autonomy. For decades Middle Eastern security has depended heavily upon the United States. The new arrangement brings together complementary capabilities: Saudi financial and political influence, Türkiye’s large military and sophisticated defence industry, and Pakistan’s experienced armed forces and nuclear capability.

Second, it could strengthen collective deterrence. Although officially directed against no country, the pact inevitably affects strategic calculations concerning Iran, Israel and other possible regional conflicts.

Third, cooperation in defence industries may prove almost as important as collective defence itself. Türkiye possesses an expanding drone, missile, electronics and naval industry; Pakistan has significant missile, aircraft and weapons-development capabilities; Saudi Arabia can provide capital and procurement capacity.

Finally, the agreement may represent an attempt by major Muslim states to acquire greater security autonomy without becoming wholly dependent upon Washington, Beijing or Moscow.

Yet considerable uncertainty remains. Unlike NATO, the new organisation does not yet possess a mature integrated military command, permanent multinational force structure or decades of common operational planning. Publicly available details of specific military commitments remain limited.

Its credibility will therefore depend upon some difficult questions: 1. Would Pakistan actually fight if Saudi Arabia were attacked? 2. Would Saudi Arabia become involved in a Pakistan–India conflict? 3. Would Türkiye risk confrontation with a major power on Pakistan’s behalf? 4. Would all three interpret the expression “armed attack” identically?

Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal undoubtedly strengthens the psychological deterrent value of the arrangement. It should not, however, automatically be interpreted as a formal Pakistani nuclear umbrella over Saudi Arabia or Türkiye. Saudi officials have specifically stated that the agreement is not linked to nuclear ambitions or an arms race.

Could the Pact weaken or break apart: Its greatest structural weakness is that its members do not necessarily share the same principal adversary.

Pakistan’s traditional strategic concern is India. Saudi security priorities lie mainly in the Gulf and wider Middle East. Türkiye must simultaneously manage relations and tensions involving NATO, Russia, Syria, Iran, Israel, Europe and the eastern Mediterranean.

Military alliances are generally strongest when their members possess broadly similar threat perceptions. The Makkah Pact may therefore face difficulties whenever the interests of one member do not coincide with those of the others.

International reaction: India has particularly strong reasons to scrutinise the arrangement because Pakistan is a founding member. New Delhi has publicly stated that it is “closely following” developments. Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia maintains major economic and strategic relations with India and will probably seek to prevent the pact from becoming an explicitly anti-Indian organisation.

Israel is likely to view the combination with caution because Türkiye–Israel relations have deteriorated, Pakistan does not recognise Israel, and Saudi Arabia occupies a central position in Middle Eastern diplomacy. Yet Riyadh’s relationship with Washington and its broader Western interests make an openly anti-Israel military bloc unlikely.

The United States may adopt a mixed approach. All three members maintain important relationships with Washington and Türkiye remains a NATO member. American opposition would probably intensify only if the pact evolved into an explicitly anti-American bloc, facilitated nuclear proliferation, directly confronted Israel, or became strategically subordinate to China or Russia.

European governments are similarly likely to remain cautious but pragmatic.

Expansion of the Pact: Expansion appears possible. Pakistan has publicly stated that the Makkah Accord remains open to countries willing to uphold its principles.

Any enlargement, however, would require prospective members to accept genuine reciprocal defence obligations. The significance of the organisation would increase substantially if other major Muslim military powers eventually became associated with it.

Should Bangladesh join: There are substantial arguments in favour.

Bangladesh occupies a difficult geographical position, surrounded largely by India and sharing another sensitive frontier with Myanmar. It cannot match the military capabilities of much larger neighbours merely by increasing defence expenditure.

Association with Pakistan, Türkiye and Saudi Arabia could therefore offer: (a) stronger external deterrence; (b) access to defence technology and joint production; (c) diversification away from excessive dependence on one arms supplier; (d) greater intelligence, cyber and maritime cooperation; (e) enhanced security in the Bay of Bengal; and (f) greater diplomatic influence.

Bangladesh could also contribute significantly to the arrangement. As one of the world’s largest Muslim-majority countries, it possesses substantial armed forces, extensive UN peacekeeping experience and an important strategic location linking South and Southeast Asia with the Bay of Bengal.

There are, however, equally serious arguments against immediate membership.

The greatest danger is that Bangladesh could inherit other members’ wars. A renewed Pakistan–India confrontation, a Saudi–Iran conflict or a major Turkish military crisis could create pressure upon Dhaka to become involved in disputes far removed from Bangladesh’s immediate national interests.

Relations with India could also deteriorate. Whatever the present state of bilateral relations, geography cannot be changed. India remains central to Bangladesh’s border security, river-water questions, connectivity, trade and regional calculations. Formal Bangladeshi membership in an alliance containing Pakistan could therefore provoke diplomatic, economic or military counterbalancing by New Delhi.

Membership could also reduce Bangladesh’s traditional strategic flexibility. Article 25 of the Constitution emphasises sovereignty, equality, non-interference, peaceful settlement of disputes, international law and the UN Charter. A defensive alliance is not inherently incompatible with these principles, but Bangladesh should avoid treaty obligations that automatically surrender its independent decision on when its Armed Forces should enter a war.

China must also be considered. Beijing would not necessarily regard an organisation containing Pakistan as hostile, but Bangladesh should ensure that any new alignment does not undermine its important economic and defence relationship with China.

The economic dimension is equally important. Saudi Arabia was Bangladesh’s largest source of remittances in FY2025–26, while Bangladesh also depends heavily upon Western, Chinese and regional markets, investment and trade. A defence arrangement that strengthened military security but damaged exports, remittances or investment could ultimately weaken national power.

A more prudent middle course: Bangladesh should therefore avoid an immediate choice between full membership and complete disengagement. A better approach would be phased association. Dhaka could initially seek observer, associate or dialogue-partner status and expand cooperation in: (a) joint military exercises and officer exchanges; (b) intelligence and counterterrorism; (c) cyber defence; (d) naval and maritime security; (e) defence production and technology transfer; (f) humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

Before accepting a collective-defence obligation, Bangladesh should obtain explicit answers to several questions:

What legally constitutes an attack? Is military intervention automatic, or may each member determine its own response? Would the treaty apply to Kashmir or other disputed territories? Does it cover overseas deployments? How would Türkiye reconcile pact obligations with NATO commitments? Does Pakistani nuclear deterrence extend to other members? What are the mechanisms for withdrawal?

Above all, Bangladesh must ask:

Would the other members genuinely defend Bangladesh if Bangladesh itself were attacked?

Without a convincing answer, Dhaka could assume major obligations without receiving equivalent security in return.

Conclusion: The Makkah Joint Defence Agreement should not be dismissed as symbolic. Saudi financial power, Turkish military-industrial capability and Pakistan’s conventional and strategic strength give the arrangement considerable potential.

For Bangladesh, closer association could improve defence capability, technology access, maritime security, procurement diversification and diplomatic leverage.

But immediate accession to an automatic mutual-defence commitment would presently be unwise.

Bangladesh should move closer to the Makkah Pact, participate extensively in defence cooperation and carefully observe how its institutions and doctrines develop before considering full membership.

If the joint pact ultimately establishes a credible joint command and puts in place clear rules governing military intervention and protecting members from being automatically dragged into one another's bilateral conflicts, Bangladesh could consider full accession.

eventually become an important eastern pillar of a wider security architecture stretching from the Mediterranean and Arabian Peninsula through Pakistan to the Bay of Bengal.

The fundamental test must remain simple: the alliance should strengthen Bangladesh’s sovereignty without compromising Bangladesh’s sovereign right to decide when, where and why its Armed Forces go to war.

Lt Col Mudassir Hussain Khan (rtd) is a Bir Protik​

 

[Saif]

Joining Mecca pact could test Bangladesh’s foreign policy balancing act: Reuters

Analysts say joining a defence alliance with Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan could affect ties with competing regional and global powers

www.thedailystar.net

Joining Mecca pact could test Bangladesh’s foreign policy balancing act: Reuters

Analysts say joining a defence alliance with Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan could affect ties with competing regional and global powers

Star Online Report

From left, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif pose after signing a defence agreement in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, on 7 August. Photo: Saudi Press Agency/Handout via Reuters.

Bangladesh could consider joining the Mecca pact, a mutual defence agreement signed this month between Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan, a minister has said.

"If there is a security arrangement among Islamic nations in the Middle East, it is not unusual for us to consider participating. It is being viewed positively," said State Minister for Foreign Affairs Humaiun Kobir.

"They are inviting the leadership of Bangladesh, particularly Prime Minister Tarique Rahman, to come and participate," he told reporters on Monday.

A source in the Bangladesh foreign ministry told Reuters that Saudi Arabia had invited Dhaka to join the ⁠pact, but did not say when the invitation was made. The source sought anonymity as he was not authorised to speak to media.

However, when contacted, Foreign Secretary Asad Alam Siam told The Daily Star he is not aware of any invitation for joining the Mecca pact or any decision to join it.

The three Sunni Muslim-majority countries signed the agreement, modelled on NATO's collective-defence principle, in the Saudi holy city of Mecca this month.

They pledged that an armed attack on one member would be treated as an attack on all, amid heightened tension in the regional conflagration that has brought Iranian missile fire across the Middle East.

More than 90% of Bangladesh's population identifies as Sunni Muslim.

Asked for comment on the minister's remarks, the embassies of Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan in Bangladesh did not immediately respond.

Turkey, which has NATO's second-largest army, has said the pact with nuclear-armed Pakistan and top oil exporter Saudi Arabia was open to expansion.

Analysts say joining a military alliance would test Bangladesh's long-standing foreign policy of avoiding rival geopolitical camps to help it attract investment, expand exports and maintain economic ties ‌with competing ⁠powers.

The economy relies on exports of readymade garments, most of which go to Britain, the European Union and the United States, while remittances from millions of workers abroad, mainly in the Middle East, are a major source of foreign exchange.

Formal alliance membership could complicate Bangladesh's ties not just with India, but also China, Iran, Japan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Russia, the United Arab Emirates and the United States, said geopolitical analyst Kollol Kibria.

"These relationships would not automatically break, but once Bangladesh joins a military bloc, the question of which side Bangladesh is on becomes much harder to ⁠avoid," Kibria said.

The invitation comes at a delicate moment in Bangladesh's relations with India under the six-month-old government, despite efforts by both to ensure cordial ties.

Prime Minister Tarique Rahman has yet to decide whether to visit India, his spokesperson said this month, as Dhaka awaits New Delhi's response to its extradition request for Sheikh Hasina. Dhaka has previously called for a "propitious environment" for such ⁠a visit after Hasina spoke to journalists in New Delhi this month, a move criticised by Bangladesh.​