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[🇧🇩] Monitoring Bangladesh's Economy

[🇧🇩] Monitoring Bangladesh's Economy
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G Bangladesh Defense

Economic reading of BD's 2025 ordinances

Syed Abul Basher
Published :
Jan 27, 2026 22:58
Updated :
Jan 27, 2026 22:58

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In 2025, Bangladesh's interim government issued 78 ordinances covering labour rights, judicial procedures, digital security, and constitutional governance. These ordinances carry economic consequences. As economic activity is ultimately governed by law, changes in rules and institutions directly affect transaction costs, property rights, and investment incentives. In turn, these legal changes alter expected returns, risks, and bargaining positions.

Previously, to form a union, workers needed to meet a 20 per cent membership threshold. This meant that a factory with 100 workers required mobilising 20 workers, whereas a factory with 500 workers needed 100 workers to form a union. For medium to large factories, meeting this threshold was difficult, since employers could easily intimidate key organisers to prevent unionisation. The 2025 Labour (Amendment) Ordinance addressed this barrier by moving from a percentage-based rule to a fixed-number approach. Factories with 20-300 employees can now form a union with just 20 workers. This change came partly in response to criticism from the European Union (EU) and International Labor Organization (ILO), which argued that the percentage rule blocked workers from exercising freedom of association.

From an economic standpoint, this reduces the fixed cost of collective action. It shifts the Nash bargaining position of workers upward, allowing them to capture a larger share of firm surplus. The reform also raises penalties for unfair labour practices under Sections 294-295, increasing the expected cost of anti-union behaviour. The combined effect is to raise expected wages and job security, but also to increase unit labour costs faced by firms. Whether this improves stability or raises conflict is an empirical question, but incentives have clearly shifted.

Currently, Bangladesh's garment exports to the EU enjoy duty-free access under the Everything But Arms (EBA) scheme. After 2029, to continue enjoying preferential access, Bangladesh will need to qualify for GSP-plus, which requires compliance with labour rights conventions. Losing this status would impose tariffs of roughly 9-12 per cent on garments. This amounts to a negative price shock to Bangladeshi exports. Unless firms can pass costs to buyers, a 10 per cent tariff reduces exporter revenue and profitability by roughly the same margin. Since Bangladesh operates in a highly competitive global garment market, most of the burden would fall on domestic producers and workers.

The labour reforms should therefore be understood as an investment in market access. By raising compliance today, Bangladesh lowers the probability of a catastrophic trade shock tomorrow. In expected-value terms, modest increases in labour costs now can be justified if they reduce the risk of losing billions of dollars in export earnings later.

Belatedly, the Women and Children Repression Prevention Ordinance expanded the legal definition of sexual violence and strengthened penalties, while the International Crimes Tribunal (ICT) amendments made it possible to prosecute organisations, not just individuals, for political violence. These changes increase the expected cost of committing or tolerating violence. When legal protection is weak, violence and fear discourage women from travelling, working, or staying in school-reducing labour force participation and human-capital investment. Stronger enforcement can raise the return to education and formal work, particularly for girls. The same logic applies to investors. When organised political violence carries a higher legal risk, long-term investment becomes safer, lowering the political-risk premium built into interest rates and foreign investment decisions.

For too long, Bangladesh's judicial system has imposed high transaction costs on economic activity. It often took many years to settle commercial disputes, or sometimes they remained unresolved. As a result, capital was tied up, raising the effective cost of doing business. Meanwhile, arbitrary enforcement created legal uncertainty that discouraged formal contracting and long-term investment. The 2025 legislative reforms attempt to address these frictions by reducing delays and discretion.

Under the amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC), police are now required to identify themselves during arrests, prepare written arrest memoranda, and maintain digital records. The expansion of magistrates' fine-imposing powers will likely speed case resolution by allowing minor cases to be resolved without full trials. These changes not only reduce arbitrary enforcement risk but also increase the predictability of legal outcomes. Together, these reforms will likely lower state opportunism and the regulatory burden on firms and households.

Similarly, under the new Civil Procedure Code (CPC), courts now accept electronic service of summons through SMS, voice calls, and messaging apps, allowing judges to hear more cases per day. Moreover, to discourage frivolous litigation, compensation for false claims has increased to Tk 50,000. Importantly, the separation of civil and criminal courts at the district level allows judges to specialise rather than handling both types of cases. Together, these amendments make contract enforcement faster and more reliable, freeing up capital and improving its allocation across the economy.

The economic payoff from these judicial reforms, however, depends on enforcement capacity. As of December 2024, Bangladesh faced a backlog of over 45 lakh cases. Unless the government recruits more judges, builds more courtrooms, and implements functioning digital systems, procedural reforms alone will not be enough. In economic terms, unless these rules are credibly enforced, the underlying transaction costs of doing business will remain high, and private investment and productivity will not respond.

A longstanding problem in Bangladesh is weak credible commitment. Independent institutions such as the judiciary, election bodies, and anti-corruption agencies have long been seen as politically captured, raising doubts about property rights and policy stability. The proposed constitutional reforms aim to disperse power more widely. A bicameral legislature with a proportional upper house would ensure continued opposition influence. Key oversight committees would be assigned to opposition members. A ten-year limit on the prime minister would reduce power concentration. Making the Anti-Corruption Commission a constitutional body would increase its independence.

Economically, these reforms function as commitment devices. Bangladesh's sovereign bonds have historically traded at spreads of 200-400 basis points above comparable economies, reflecting political risk. More credible institutions can reduce these spreads and borrowing costs.

Finally, the previous Digital Security Act (DSA) had created a climate of legal unpredictability. The new ordinance makes most offenses bailable while retaining protections against cybercrime. This is welcome for digital entrepreneurs as it lowers the downside risk. With reduced legal risk, the expected return to innovation rises. As software and IT exports depend more on human capital than physical infrastructure, legal predictability is a binding input into sectoral growth.

Bangladesh already has many good laws. But enforcement is the binding constraint. In economic terms, laws without enforcement are meaningless contracts. Unless labour inspectors, courts, regulators, and the ACC are adequately staffed and insulated from political pressure, the ordinances will not change incentives. Trade partners and financial markets respond to outcomes, not statutes.

The 2025 ordinances are economically coherent responses to Bangladesh's vulnerabilities as a trade-dependent, investment-constrained economy-attempting to improve labour credibility, reduce transaction costs, lower political risk, and stimulate innovation. If implemented credibly, these reforms can raise the expected return to investment and human capital, moving Bangladesh onto a higher growth path. If not, they will remain symbolic, and the economic risks facing the country will persist.​
 
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Tradable savings certificate on bond market

Published :
Jan 28, 2026 23:16
Updated :
Jan 28, 2026 23:16

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The liquidity crisis in banks stemming mainly from non-performing loans (NPLs) has long stoked the compulsion of exploring alternative sources of sustainable fund. Since foreign investment is hard to come by, the search for such alternative sources has become even more compelling. Now the Bangladesh Bank (BB) and business circle have hit upon the idea of making savings certificate tradable on the bond market so that corporate bodies can turn to the bond market for their financing needs. As reported from a seminar on 'Bond Market Development in Bangladesh: Challenges and Recommendations' held on Monday last, Bangladesh has a savings certificate market worth Tk6.0 trillion but, according to the BB governor, its size can be doubled if such certificates are made tradable on the market like the shares on the stock market. The capital market scams---not once but twice--- have left investors' confidence low and therefore the corporate credit needs can be met by pooling funds from tradable savings certificate.

There is nothing wrong with the rerouting of savings to productive sector provided that the task is done efficiently, guaranteeing security of the savings. Money does not grow automatically but only when it is made to roll for productive purposes. Bond market is as good as the robustness of the corporate world. In case of business slump, it also turns bearing like the stock market. People who invest money in savings certificates, unlike in the stock market, do so in good faith that the declared profit return is failsafe. A new dimension is added to the savings certificate with allowing it to be tradable on bond market. Infusion of savings certificates into this particular financing sector is expected to bring about quite a shift in the mobilisation of funds by private enterprises. The pressure on banks for funds will ease to some extent.

Corporate bodies with lower bond-market exposure will be encouraged to make their presence felt significantly in the bond market. The BB governor made it clear that the central bank will apply both push and pull factors to develop the bond market. In this connection, the BB will invite corporate bodies less exposed to bond market to a meeting to know about the latter's requirements for their active participation in the bond market. He adds that single borrower exposure limit must be respected. In that case, the corporate entities either have to 'go for overseas borrowing or look for bond and capital market'.

If the push factor does not achieve the target, a pull factor will be applied to encourage them for exploring the untapped potential of the bond market. Under the system, incentives like cutting the bond-issuing timeline and costs; and revisiting tax treatment may be considered. Clearly, things are yet to be streamlined enough but the initiatives will gradually make clear how the landscape of mobilisation of fund from such alternative sources can be achieved. In that case, the need for regular and competent oversight by the central bank will be of utmost importance. Given the deplorable experiences of the capital market, the trading of savings certificates on the bond market will have to go by the prescribed rules for ensuring its compatibility with the local business environment.​
 
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Why Phillips Curve fails in Bangladesh

Abdullah A Dewan
Published :
Jan 28, 2026 23:08
Updated :
Jan 28, 2026 23:08

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In simple terms, the Phillips Curve proposes a trade-off: when an economy grows rapidly and jobs become plentiful, prices tend to rise faster; when unemployment is high, inflation tends to slow. In other words, a country may tolerate some inflation to achieve more employment or accept higher unemployment to stabilize prices. Developed in the context of relatively well-functioning market economies, this idea once shaped how governments thought about growth, inflation, and stabilization policy.

The Phillips Curve was never conceived as a mathematical law. It began as an empirical observation-a mid-20th-century British pattern linking unemployment to wage growth under specific institutional conditions. Only later was this relationship incorporated into formal macroeconomic models. As an empirical regularity rather than a universal rule, the Phillips relationship is inherently context dependent. Where labour markets are informal, price formation is distorted by non-market forces, and inflation is driven by external shocks or organized rent extraction-as in Bangladesh-the pattern has no reason to appear.

Time and technology have further weakened the relationship. Identified in the late 1950s, the curve emerged in an era of nationally bounded economies, strong trade unions, limited capital mobility, and stable industrial employment. Globalisation, automation, financialisation, and fragmented labour markets have since altered how wages, prices, and employment interact. Even in advanced economies, inflation has become less responsive to labour-market tightness as global supply chains, imported inflation, productivity shocks, and market concentration dilute wage-price transmission. In Bangladesh-marked by informality, external price pass-through, and non-market power-the structural distance from the original Phillips context is even greater.

Crucially, the Phillips Curve applies to economies where market forces dominate wage and price formation and non-market frictions remain limited. It is best treated here as a theoretical benchmark, not an empirical description of Bangladesh's inflation-employment dynamics.

In modern macroeconomics, this benchmark is formalized through the inflation-expectations-augmented Phillips Curve. In this framework, the short-run relationship between inflation and unemployment depends critically on expected inflation. Temporary demand expansion may reduce unemployment only so long as inflation expectations remain unchanged. Once workers and firms revise their expectations upward, inflation rises without delivering lasting employment gains, and unemployment returns to its natural rate. The long-run Phillips Curve is therefore vertical, reflecting the reality that inflation cannot permanently buy jobs. This expectations channel-central to policy credibility in advanced economies-already presumes functioning labour markets, coherent price signals, and institutional trust. Where these conditions fail, the Phillips mechanism does not merely weaken; it loses its operational meaning.

The logic behind the Phillips Curve is straightforward. When jobs are abundant, workers gain bargaining power, wages rise, firms face higher costs, and prices increase. When unemployment is high, wage pressure eases and inflation slows. For this mechanism to function, wages and prices must be set primarily through decentralized market interactions rather than administrative controls, cartel power, political interference, or coercive extraction. Once non-market forces dominate price formation, the inflation-unemployment trade-off collapses.

In Bangladesh, the Phillips Curve has never matured into a durable macroeconomic reality. It has appeared briefly and conditionally. Over the past twelve months, even under an interim government ostensibly freed from partisan compulsions, the curve has remained conspicuously absent. The reasons are not technical; they are structural, political, and institutional.

Bangladesh's macroeconomic history shows that the Phillips mechanism requires conditions the country rarely enjoys simultaneously. Inflation must be predominantly demand-pull rather than imported or supply driven. Labour markets must transmit tightness into wages. Monetary policy must credibly anchor expectations. Historically, none has held consistently. The only episode faintly resembling a Phillips-type relationship occurred in the mid-1990s, when growth accelerated, exchange-rate stability limited imported inflation, and food prices were subdued. Even then, the relationship was fragile. Floods, external shocks, and structural bottlenecks quickly overwhelmed it. Inflation resumed its familiar pattern-driven not by overheating labor markets but by food, fuel, logistics, and currency pressures.

The deeper reason lies in the nature of employment itself. Bangladesh's unemployment rate has always been a statistical mirage. With more than four-fifths of the workforce informal, open unemployment is neither a meaningful measure of slack nor a reliable transmitter of macroeconomic pressure. Underemployment absorbs shocks silently. Workers adjust hours, intensity, and survival strategies rather than bargain for higher wages. The Phillips Curve presumes a wage-price spiral; Bangladesh experiences a price-shock spiral instead.

Against this background, the failure of the interim government over the last year to engineer even a weak Phillips-type outcome should not surprise. Inflation remained elevated while employment conditions failed to improve meaningfully. Crucially, this inflation was not the kind policy stimulus could trade off against unemployment. It was driven by exchange-rate depreciation, global commodity pass-through, energy pricing adjustments, and-most corrosively-domestic market distortions rooted in corruption and extortion.

Here political economy matters more than textbook macroeconomics. Bangladesh's price formation mechanism is not competitive in the classical sense. Key commodity markets-rice, edible oil, onions, construction materials, transport services-are dominated by entrenched syndicates. These syndicates do not merely exploit shortages; they manufacture them. Hoarding, coordinated supply withholding, and price leadership ensure that even when global prices soften or domestic production improves, retail prices remain sticky upward. Inflation is therefore not a signal of excess demand; it is a tax imposed by organised rent-seeking.

The interim government inherited this architecture but lacked the coercive, institutional, and political capital to dismantle it. Administrative orders, moral suasion, and sporadic enforcement cannot break syndicates embedded in party financing, local power structures, and bureaucratic collusion. As long as extortion networks extract rents at wholesale markets, transport nodes, ports, and distribution chains, inflation remains structurally decoupled from employment conditions.

Monetary policy is equally constrained. Tightening credit in such an environment does not primarily suppress excess demand; it raises costs for small firms, traders, and consumers while leaving syndicate pricing power intact. Higher interest rates are passed on to consumers. Employment weakens, inflation persists, and the trade-off collapses. This is not a Phillips Curve failure of calibration; it is a failure of transmission. Fiscal policy offers no better lever. Spending restraint does little to cool food- and fuel-driven inflation, while expansion risks widening deficits without improving employment quality.

Corruption compounds the problem by distorting expectations. In a credible Phillips framework, workers, firms, and policymakers share beliefs about future inflation. In Bangladesh, expectations are unanchored because economic outcomes are routinely overridden by non-economic forces: toll extortion, selective impunity, and political interference. When prices rise, households do not interpret it as overheating; they interpret it as organized extraction. Such expectations harden inflation rather than soften it, rendering demand management ineffective.

What governs Bangladesh's inflation-employment dynamics is not a trade-off but a hierarchy. Prices respond less to labor-market conditions than to control over economic chokepoints-ports, transport corridors, wholesale markets, energy pricing, and regulatory discretion. Inflation rises not when workers gain bargaining power, but when syndicates exercise it. Employment expands not by tightening labour markets, but by dispersing risk across informality. In such a system, inflation is detached from prosperity and employment from productivity.

The past year reinforces a sobering conclusion. Bangladesh does not fail to achieve the Phillips Curve because policymakers misunderstand macroeconomics. It fails because the economy's institutional wiring does not allow the curve to exist. Inflation is not the price of prosperity; it is the symptom of governance failure. The Phillips Curve in Bangladesh is not merely weak; it is structurally displaced. It flickers briefly under benign conditions, then disappears under corruption, informality, and political capture. The interim government did not fail to bend the curve; it confronted an economy where the curve was never designed to function.

Dr. Abdullah A. Dewan, Professor Emeritus of Economics, Eastern Michigan University (USA); former physicist and nuclear engineer, Bangladesh Atomic Energy Commission (BAEC).​
 
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