[🇧🇩] Political Activities of Awami League after the fall of Hasina's Regime

[Saif]

Date of Event: Nov 11, 2024

Source : https://www.thedailystar.net/news/bangladesh/crime-justice/news/secret-meeting-15-al-affiliated-members-held-coxs-bazar-hotel-3748421

‘Secret meeting’: 15 AL-affiliated UP members held at Cox’s Bazar hotel

A Cox's Bazar court yesterday sent 15 local union parishad members to jail after they were arrested around midnight from a programme organised at a hotel in the beach town's Kolatoli area.

According to the police, initially, 18 UP members were detained when a large group of them were holding a meeting at a hall room on the fifth floor of the Uni Resort Friday night.

Police later arrested 15 of them for "suspicious activities" under Section 54 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Confirming the matter, Jasim Uddin, additional superintendent of police, said, "If specific allegations are found against them, further legal action will be taken accordingly."

When they were produced before Cox's Bazar Senior Judicial Magistrate's Court yesterday afternoon, they were ordered to be sent to jail, said Md Golam Jilani, court inspector.

The UP members who have been sent to jail are local Awami League leaders.

They are Azim Miya, 35, Md Kayes, 42, and Mohammad Ali, 55, of Kauwarkhop; Kamal Hossain, 37, of Garjoniya; Jasim Uddin, 48, and Rubel Jaldas, 33, of Saharbil; Junaid Ahmad, 40, and Irfanur Rahman, 40, of Paschim Bara Bheola; Kafil Uddin Md Jahangir, 46, of Badarkhali; Belal Uddin, 40, and Shafiqur Rahman, 42, of Bamo Bilchari; Abul Kalam, 55, of Konakhali; Nazrul Islam, 35, of Kakhara; Shah Alam, 39, of Teknaf Sadar; and Mohammad Miah, 54, of Chowfaldandi.

According to the meeting participants, the gathering titled the "Role of Root-Level Public Representatives in State Reform, Democracy, and Local Development" was organised by the Bangladesh Union Members' Organisation (Cox's Bazar branch).

Around 70 representatives were attending the meeting when police, along with members of Anti-Discrimination Student Movement, stormed into the hall room around 9:00pm and detained 18 of the participants around 12:00am, they added

"The operation was based on information that Awami League-backed UP members were conducting a clandestine meeting. We are now checking whether any of the arresting are facing any criminal charges," said Cox's Bazar Sadar Model Police Station Officer-in-Charge (OC) Faizul Azim.

Zahir Ahmed, member of Teknaf Sadar Union Parishad, who was detained and later released, denied the allegation of holding a clandestine meeting, saying, "If it was supposed to be a secret, we wouldn't organise such a large gathering at a roadside hotel. We're being harassed."

Another attendee, Mohammad Salim from Moheshkhali, who was not picked up, said, "Representatives of all political affiliations were present. I strongly condemn the arrests of our colleagues."​

 

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‘গোপন বৈঠকের’ খবরে পুলিশ ও বৈষম্যবিরোধী ছাত্রদের তল্লাশি, ১৮ ইউপি সদস্য আটক

 

[Saif]

Anatomy of AL’s complaint to ICC

THE name ‘Bangladesh’ is not stranger to the International Criminal Court. It was one of the earliest signatories to the ICC Rome Statute and ratified the same on March 23, 2010. Publicly available information shows that the ICC received at least four communications containing complaints...

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Anatomy of AL’s complaint to ICC
Quazi Omar Foysal 14 November, 2024, 00:00

International Criminal Court. | Human Rights Watch

THE name ‘Bangladesh’ is not stranger to the International Criminal Court. It was one of the earliest signatories to the ICC Rome Statute and ratified the same on March 23, 2010. Publicly available information shows that the ICC received at least four communications containing complaints (institutionally known as Article 15 Communications or Communications) related to the recently ousted prime minister Sheikh Hasina and her associates, dated June 29, 2013, February 4, 2014, August 1, 2024, and October 28, 2024, respectively.

The ICC re-emerged in Bangladeshi public discourse on November 8, 2024. This time, however, the communication was filed by an Awami League leader against the leadership of the incumbent interim government and the Anti-Discrimination Student Movement. While this communication may be politically motivated, its legal prospects merit careful examination under the law and practice of the ICC.

Before approaching the anatomy of the communication in question, it is pertinent to shed some light on its contents. Filed under Article 15 of the Rome Statute, this communication alleges that all advisers of the current interim government, including chief adviser professor Muhammad Yunus, as well as certain student leaders of the July uprising, are responsible for alleged crimes of genocide and crimes against humanity against Awami League supporters, minority community members, and police forces in Augusy 5–8. The communication reportedly includes around 800 pages of documentary evidence. Although no public documents are available for this communication, the communicator’s press release provides sufficient background to understand its legal prospects.

To begin with, this type of communication is intended to provide the ICC prosecutor with information on crimes committed within the Court’s jurisdiction. The ICC may consider investigating and prosecuting certain crimes in three ways under the Rome Statute: referral by an ICC member state, referral by the UN Security Council, and initiatives of the ICC prosecutor. In respect of the ICC prosecutor, Article 15 of the Rome Statute empowers him to initiate a preliminary examination based on information available to him.

As per the OTP’s Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations 2013 (2013 Policy Paper), the prosecutor may receive information from ‘individuals or groups, states, intergovernmental or non-governmental organisations, or other reliable sources.’ In fact, the ICC has a dedicated portal to receive such communications. While many Article 15 communications have been positively considered by the prosecutor, this process does not guarantee any action. Since anyone can submit a communication regardless of their connection to the alleged crime or the credibility of the claims, it is safe to assume that many such communications become unsuccessful as per the ICC standards.

At this point, the prospect of this communication warrants some scrutiny. The OTP, after receiving a communication, follows a four-stage procedure to determine its prospects as per the 2013 policy paper. First, the OTP assesses and verifies information on alleged crimes to determine if they fall within the ICC’s jurisdiction. Second, it conducts a detailed assessment to confirm the jurisdiction of the Court over the alleged crimes and identify potential cases, focusing on large-scale or systematic offences. Third, it validates if potential cases are serious enough and not being addressed by national courts, while also collecting more information on the crimes. Fourth, the OTP assesses whether starting an investigation serves the interests of justice.

If the prosecutor determines there is sufficient basis for a crime within the court’s jurisdiction and concludes that the proceeding meets the gravity of the offence and the interests of victims, he may initiate a preliminary examination. At this point, the prosecutor cannot automatically initiate a full-fledged investigation. Upon finding sufficient evidence through the preliminary examination, he must seek authorisation from the Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC, which may either approve or reject the request for investigation. If the prosecutor is unconvinced by an Article 15 Communication, he may choose not to proceed at any point of the four-stage procedure.

It is evident that the ICC takes considerable time before deciding to invest its time and resources in a particular situation. While some may view this Article 15 Communication as a promising start, there is little likelihood that it will pass all four stages outlined in the 2013 Policy Paper. Three areas invite particular attention. Three specific issues merit attention.

First, the Article 15 Communication may struggle to meet the subject matter jurisdiction of the Court, i.e., crimes under its jurisdiction. Though there is credible evidence of human rights violations after August 5, it is highly contested whether those events reached the threshold of crimes against humanity, let alone genocide. This raises questions about the adequacy of the evidence provided with the Communication to establish the contextual elements of these crimes and meet the required thresholds of the Rome Statute.

Given the plethora of disinformation and misinformation regarding the events in August 5–8, the OTP will face significant challenges in verifying the accuracy of the information. However, the ICC is already aware of the limitations associated with digital evidence. It is expected that the OTP will objectively assess and corroborate the submitted evidence with third-party sources.

Second, the Article 15 Communication may face additional difficulties in establishing the ICC’s personal jurisdiction requirements. The names listed in the complaint are surprising, especially given that it alleges the interim government advisers’ responsibility for crimes that occurred prior to their appointments. Similar concerns apply to the ADSM leadership. This communication may presumably encounter insurmountable challenges in providing sufficient evidence to establish individual responsibility for these alleged crimes under the Rome Statute.

On another note, naming individuals in the communication is not an end in itself. The OTP first investigates the situation and subsequently, upon receiving a certain standard of evidence, moves to cases against specific individuals. Thus, naming the individuals in this communication does not serve any immediate legal purpose. It may be that this naming holds no significance beyond the press release.

Third, this communication will likely confront admissibility issues. Given that the International Crimes Tribunal in Bangladesh is investigating crimes committed on or before August 5, the OTP will certainly address the complementarity principle here. Moreover, it will also address the gravity of the alleged crimes, which is very high in the Rome Statute. The issue of admissibility of evidence will re-emerge in this context. Furthermore, the OTP will assess whether this communication serves the interests of justice or constitutes an abuse of process. In summary, this communication is unlikely to progress beyond the initial stages of the four-stage procedure. It is not an overstatement to say that this communication may never see the light of day.

Generally, Article 15 communications are kept confidential, with the ICC providing safeguards to ensure the privacy of the communicators and the safety of communicators. In this instance, however, the communicators have made the complaint public. Given the wiry legal prospects of this communication and the Awami League’s call for nationwide demonstrations post-US presidential election, this communication seems politically motivated, likely intended to rally supporters rather than genuinely pursue justice. To sum up, this communication may stand as yet another example of the ICC process being utilised for political purposes.

Quazi Omar Foysal is an international law expert, working at American International University-Bangladesh.​

 

[Saif]

Moral taint and the Awami League

THERE is little or no doubt that the recently ousted Awami League and its members established a horrific dictatorship in Bangladesh. The Awami League, as a party, and its leaders and workers, as individuals, were steeped in corruption and appeared as ruthless adversaries to their opponents. It...

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Moral taint and the Awami League
Mostofa Nazmul Mansur 17 November, 2024, 00:00

THERE is little or no doubt that the recently ousted Awami League and its members established a horrific dictatorship in Bangladesh. The Awami League, as a party, and its leaders and workers, as individuals, were steeped in corruption and appeared as ruthless adversaries to their opponents. It is difficult to overlook that this party and its leaders and workers looted and smuggled billions of dollars abroad and engaged in brutal and inhumane treatment, including enforced disappearances and killings of opposition party leaders and activists. In these acts, they employed government bureaucrats and the state police force. From Begum Khaleda Zia, the most prominent opposition leader, to grassroots activists, all became victims of the atrocities and inhumanity perpetrated by this party and its members. Thus, neither the party nor its leaders and workers can evade legal punishment or moral responsibility. Ensuring legal consequences for the party and its leaders and workers, as well as moral condemnation, is among the responsibilities of a civilised society.

Yet, were there not leaders and workers in this party who refrained from direct participation in corruption or atrocities and only wished to engage in politics? Although they may be few in number, such individuals likely did and still do exist. Should we refer to them as ‘good Awami Leaguers’ in contrast to ‘bad Awami Leaguers’? Undoubtedly, these so-called ‘good Awami Leaguers’ should receive legal protection, as they committed no crimes by law. But how should we view them from a moral perspective? What should be the nature of our social relationships with them? Should they be treated similarly to other good citizens, both ethically and socially? These questions have become especially pertinent in post-August 5 Bangladesh.

In determining the nature of our moral and social relationships with these so-called ‘good Awami Leaguers’ in post-August 5 Bangladesh, the philosophical concept of ‘moral taint’ becomes highly relevant. Philosophers like Thomas Nagel, Hannah Arendt, and Karl Jaspers have introduced the notion of moral taint in philosophy. Moral taint can be defined as a condition in which an individual or a group is morally compromised due to indirect involvement with, proximity to, or association with immoral actions, systems, or individuals — even if they are not directly responsible for those wrongs. This concept suggests that one’s moral character or standing can be affected by associations that carry ethical implications. Moral taint is not about direct accountability but rather about an ethical contamination or stain that arises from being connected to wrongs in ways that implicate moral responsibility.

One’s morality can be tainted in various ways: (1) by being a member of an organisation that commits moral crimes; (2) by inheriting the moral burden of historical injustices (like slavery or colonialism); or (3) by being close to wrongdoings (proximity to wrongdoing). For example, an individual’s morality may be tainted by being part of a system, structure, organisation, or corporation that contributes to harm, even if the individual does not actively engage in harmful acts. Similarly, descendants of those who committed acts of slavery or colonialism may feel a sense of moral taint from their ancestors’ actions, despite their lack of direct participation. Additionally, simply being close to wrongdoing may invoke moral taint; for instance, witnessing harm and doing nothing, or inadvertently aiding another’s wrongdoing (such as unintentionally supplying resources that are misused), can give rise to a sense of moral taint.

From this perspective, it is clear that one’s morality may be tainted in at least three ways: (1) by being a member of an organisation that commits moral crimes, (2) by inheriting the moral burden of ancestors, and (3) by proximity to wrongdoings without resisting them. In this light, it appears that at least two of the conditions above — namely, conditions (1) and (3) — apply even to the so-called ‘good Awami Leaguers.’ Therefore, their morality too has been tainted. As such, they cannot claim to be regarded in the same way as other good citizens of Bangladesh as long as their morality remains tainted due to their affiliation with the Awami League.

Is there a way for them to be absolved of this taint? Certainly, there is. However, they must first acknowledge the crimes committed by the Awami League and its leaders and workers. They must recognise that the Awami League’s brutal and corrupt actions are punishable offences and that justice must be served for these crimes. Furthermore, they must express shame and remorse for being members of a party that committed such crimes and for being close to these wrongdoings without resisting them. They must seek forgiveness. By doing so, these so-called ‘good Awami Leaguers’ can transcend their tainted morality and elevate themselves to the status of other good citizens in the state. In short, the Awami League and the ‘bad Awami Leaguers’ must face punishment. If the so-called ‘good Awami Leaguers’ wish to be regarded as ordinary good citizens in society, they must acknowledge the crimes of their party and its leaders and workers, express shame and remorse, and seek forgiveness. In post-August 5 Bangladesh, there is no other alternative.

Finally, the concept of moral taint underscores the enduring impact of collective actions on individual morality, particularly in politically charged environments. In the case of Bangladesh’s post-August 5 reality, the onus lies not only on the perpetrators of wrongdoing but also on those who, by association, may carry a shadow of complicity. For ‘good Awami Leaguers,’ this moment calls for a deep moral reckoning, wherein they recognise the harm perpetuated by their organisation and seek genuine absolution through acknowledgement, remorse, and a commitment to ethical standards. Only by navigating this process of reflection and reform can individuals disentangle themselves from the past’s moral burdens and help foster a society grounded in justice, integrity, and unity. This journey is essential, not just for individual moral redemption but for the collective healing and progress of Bangladesh.

Dr Mostofa Nazmul Mansur is a professor of philosophy at Jahangirnagar University.​

 

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Post-Hasina Bangladesh: realigning parties?

CONFIGURATIONS of political parties in Bangladesh now carry multiple drifts — they are still inchoate after a long hiatus under an authoritarian stretch of 15 plus years. But the parties got a new lease of life since a populist revolt ousted prime minister Sheikh Hasina’s repressive regime. Now...

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Post-Hasina Bangladesh: realigning parties?
M Rashiduzzaman 17 November, 2024, 00:00

Anti-government protesters display the national flag as they storm the residence of prime minister Sheikh Hasina deposed on August 5. | Agence France-Presse/KM Asad

CONFIGURATIONS of political parties in Bangladesh now carry multiple drifts — they are still inchoate after a long hiatus under an authoritarian stretch of 15 plus years. But the parties got a new lease of life since a populist revolt ousted prime minister Sheikh Hasina’s repressive regime. Now, they are optimistic, alive and thrusting. The expected contestants are mobilising resources for the future electoral race. Bangladeshis love politics even though their success in institution-building fell short of expectations on multiple occasions. Historically, parties ‘formed’ with a great ease in colonial and post-colonial Bengal; then, bulk of the outfits did not grow for long. Factional and personal rivalries are still so strong in Bengali political culture. Single-party domination, personalistic hegemony and the familiar dynastic claims characterised the rise and fall of parties in the past.

Among the squirming parties in the post-Hasina Bangladesh, I sense an ideological jolt. The Awami League-centric secular-liberal nationalism, with Sheikh Mujibur Rahman as the ‘jatir pita’ has lost its pitch since the July-August tectonic discontent. A fresh sense of patriotism is, however, yet to come out lucidly. It is even short of catchy slogans and rhetoric to attract public attention. Anti-Indian and anti-Awami League postures are the twins in the new mood in Bangladesh, which, of course, have their challengers — both internal and external. India is important to Bangladesh; on the other side, Bangladesh is too crucial for Indian security in the northeastern states. So, New Delhi might try to reinstate Hasina or her Awami League allies back in Bangladesh. Nostalgia for the bygone Hasina regime among her surviving beneficiaries is still amongst the Awami League leftovers, anxious to return to power by hook or by crook. The troubled Awami League will really have its own existential crisis if a band of its leaders, not directly associated with Hasina’s tyrannical regime, would jettison the old guards — the Mujib family — and recycle themselves as the new-fangled Awami League. Neither the caretaker regime nor the Bangladesh Nationalist party or Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami is ruling out such possibilities. The Awami League gained its historic thrust in 1971, which, of course, went adrift after the 1975 violent coup. Much later, it regained vigorously first since the 1996 election victory and then more solidly after the 2008 electoral triumph. Has the one-time mighty Awami League lost its previous momentum? Hasina’s prolonged autocracy destroyed a large and established party from within itself. Neither Mujib nor Hasina fully trusted the party although both used the party to climb the ladder of power. Mujib stabbed the party in the back by creating the BKSAL single-party system and Hasina preferred to rule by creating an oligarchy of corrupt businesspeople, crony politicians, sycophants, politicians, politicised bureaucrats, the police and henchmen.

Will post-Hasina Bangladesh wipe out the Mujib-Hasina brand of politics? In that case, the Awami League might lose its deceptive Indian patronage. India is the dominant power in the region and the regional actors are careful in dealing with the neighbourhood juggernaut. The Bangladesh Nationalist Party, now buoyant about its impending return to power, would avoid any direct confrontation with the next-door giant. Even the Jamaat-e-Islami has sent ‘soft’ messages to India. None of the leaders of those two major parties aggressively demanded the Awami League’s ban. Rumours floated that the Awami League leadership would change and it was willing to connect with the Bangladesh Nationalist Party for certain areas of common concerns. The Bangladesh Nationalist Party wanted legal actions and punishment for Hasina and her associates for their tyrannical intransigence and wanton deaths and destruction in July–August. So far, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party did not strongly demand the Awami League’s ban, but the leaders of the unbridled civil unrest denounced the Awami League as a fascist outfit that did not deserve a slot in a democracy.

A disconnect exists between the majority Bangladeshi parties and the student leaders who steered the furious anti-Hasina crusade. They want a radical change with a ‘revolutionary’ zeal by upending the entire post-1971 political narrative, including its historiography and the sense of identity. They condemn the Awami League’s exclusionary path and its alleged collusion with New Delhi to turn Bangladesh into a ‘vassal state’ of India. The time-worn Bangladeshi consensus, so long defined by the Awami League-delineated post-1971 chetana that deified the late Sheikh Mujib and sustained Sheikh Hasina’s prolonged tyranny is all but shattered since the July-August revolt. The conventional parties, including the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, the Jamaat and the lessor parties, would prefer to return to power soon by a majoritarian party rule or by sharing power by a coalition of like-minded parties. The smaller parties, however, want a proportional representation, which ordinarily gives better power-sharing opportunities to minor parties. The protest leaders and the smaller parties also want the proportional representation as a tool to fight against the single-party hegemony in Bangladesh. But the larger parties, both the Bangladesh Nationalist Party and the Awami League, are reluctant to give up the existing majority-style voting system. If Bangladesh switches to a proportional representation, the world of political parties will change substantially.

The student leaders of the July-August upheavals opposed the main parties’ dynastic leadership, which turned them against both the ousted Awami League and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party. Both the parties carry the family names at their highest echelon. The simmering encounter between the Bangladesh Nationalist Party and the protest leaders was clear recently when the Bangladesh Nationalist Party turned down the student leaders’ demand for the Bangladesh president’s immediate resignation. Senior BNP leaders are trying to establish the party’s relevance to post-Hasina Bangladesh politics. BNP front runners are active in the media. Out of her contrived jail sentence, Khaleda Zia is looking for a better health care abroad and Tareque Zia, the BNP’s president-in-charge, is more visible on social media. More prospective candidates are lobbying for BNP tickets in the next election, for which no date came out so far.

Will the samanwaykari (coordinating) student leaders float a party, as the rumour goes on? Neither the student campaigners nor Mohammad Yunus’s cabinet, so far, produced a clear political vision about their future. Spectacular political changes resulted from the student-led protests in the bygone. I remember the massive events that goaded East Pakistan chief minister Abu Hossain Sarker’s government to resign in 1956. it was the Awami League leader Ataur Rahman Khan who headed the succeeding government. Now, the caretaker authority is running the administration until the next election.

There was a time when the digits of ‘1971’ carried the ‘short-handed’ message for pruning Jamaat out of politics, as I read this in the past. Now, Jamaat’s greatest achievement is that the party, as a movement, could survive undercover, when necessary, and still explode as a big blow to its political adversaries. Jamaat’s student front, the Shibir, has a place in the student samanway committee that has worked with Dr Yunus. The Bangladesh Nationalist Party has maintained its unity during its trying times. And now, it is the largest party in Bangladesh with bright electoral prospects ahead. No longer, dependent on the Bangladesh Nationalist Party’s mercy, Jamaat has moved from the periphery to the centre of Bangladesh politics. Islamic politics is not the monopoly of Jamaat although it is the largest party upholding political Islam in Bangladesh. A few can predict now if Jamaat will go to the poll alone or as a coalition of the Islamic parties. Smaller parties also hope for its share in the Bangladeshi arena of politics. The evolving configuration of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party and Jamaat will substantively impact the future Bangladeshi party politics.

What happened earlier this year ripped through the Bangladeshi psyche while people feel empowered by the populist stump that ejected the Hasina rule. That colossal uprising worked like a referendum against Hasina’s unbending authoritarianism and crimes against humanity. But the main discourse of the revolt is yet to appear as a coherent institutional expression. Which of the established parties would embrace the July-August protest’s counter-narrative? The perceived relief is that the Awami League’s archaic single-party ascendency is not on its brutal rampage in Bangladesh now. And the rhetorical temperature against the Jamaat and the old fear-mongering about Islamic terrorism have significantly subsided. Bangladeshis, however, still acknowledge that parties are the essential vehicles for the parliamentary democracy that they cherish so much. The lingering polarisation, periodic lawlessness, disagreements and discontent over constitutional and institutional reforms and the absence of a road map for the next election are creating a chasm between the parties and the interim regime. The fear of internal instability and external interference on different pretexts wrestles a necessary consensus before the return of an elected and stable governance.

M Rashiduzzaman, a retired academic in the United States, occasionally writes on Bangladesh politics and history. Parts of this essay draw from his forthcoming ‘Parties and Politics in East Pakistan 1947-1971: The Political Inheritances of Bangladesh’, Peter Lang, 2024.​