[🇧🇩] Reforms carried out by the interim/future Govts.

[Saif]

PM launches reform drive to ease business, attract investment

Prime Minister Tarique Rahman kick-starts a much-cherished reform drive to remove key bottlenecks to private sector and enhance ease of doing business with the cardinal goal of attracting fresh investment from home and abroad and accelerating job creation. The crucial move came at a high-lev

thefinancialexpress.com.bd

A much-hyped new govt move on economic front
PM launches reform drive to ease business, attract investment
Offshore finance mobilisation by businesses envisaged, FDI in banks, insurance to be allowed

Jasim Uddin

Published :
Apr 04, 2026 23:59
Updated :
Apr 04, 2026 23:59

Prime Minister Tarique Rahman shakes hands with a business leader during a formal meeting with the country's leading businessmen at the PMO in the city on Saturday. — Focus Bangla

Prime Minister Tarique Rahman kick-starts a much-cherished reform drive to remove key bottlenecks to private sector and enhance ease of doing business with the cardinal goal of attracting fresh investment from home and abroad and accelerating job creation.

The crucial move came at a high-level meeting with Bangladesh's top business leaders at the Prime Minister's Office on Saturday, where the government also activated the Private-Sector Advisory Council (PSAC) to steer a time-bound reform agenda over the next two years.

Chaired by the Prime Minister, the council will serve as a platform to align policy with business needs and ensure implementation of reforms to improve competitiveness and the investment climate.

After the meeting was over, talking to The Financial Express, Pacific Jeans Managing Director Syed Mohammed Tanvir said the PSAC has been selected as a sounding board for the HPM to capture ground-level realities of manufacturing in Bangladesh from local companies.

"The purpose is to help reduce the gap between business and government. Areas discussed include policy reform and simplification, improving policy quality, timely implementation, and better governance. At the same time, the focus is on identifying ways to boost competitiveness, open up new sectors, create quality jobs, and improve human capital."

He says the meeting was the first to discuss cross-cutting issues such as regulatory bottlenecks, energy, human capital, the NBR, logistics, exports, FDI, branding, new technologies, and finance.

The newly formed PSAC is scheduled to meet every three months to monitor progress, he adds.

Talking to the FE, M. A. Jabbar, Managing Director of DBL Group and a council member, said the Prime Minister directly heard business leaders' concerns during the nearly two-and-a-half-hour-long meeting.

"The focus was on improving the business environment to attract both domestic and foreign investment and generate employment," he says.

He notes that businesses flagged persistent bottlenecks, including complexities in VAT, customs, and income-tax administration by the NBR, as well as hurdles in business registration and renewal.

Logistical and financial constraints -- such as deep-sea port operations, airport capacity, high lending rates, and land and utility issues in economic zones -- also came under discussion.

The meeting also discussed a proposal to raise readymade garment (RMG) exports to $70 billion over the next five years.

Business leaders proposed measures to boost exports and achieve greater self-sufficiency in raw materials, focusing on sectors such as active pharmaceutical ingredients (API), automobiles, semiconductors, agro-processing, and light engineering.

Jabbar adds: the Prime Minister issued on-the-spot directives to address several urgent issues, with others to be resolved in phases under the reform roadmap.

PM Office officials say the Prime Minister emphasised the need for urgent and measurable progress in addressing long-standing structural constraints, including complex taxation, high lending rates, and inefficiencies in port and logistics systems.

The government will conduct a comprehensive review of existing regulations across sectors to identify over-regulation and eliminate overlapping authorities, with a focus on simplifying procedures and reducing compliance burdens.

A key strategy involves benchmarking reforms against peer economies such as Sri Lanka and Indonesia, aiming to adopt proven solutions rather than designing new frameworks from scratch.

During the meeting, business leaders proposed a more structured engagement mechanism between the private sector and key regulatory bodies, including BIDA, the National Board of Revenue (NBR), Bangladesh Bank, IDRA, and BSEC.

They suggested involving industry representatives in policy formulation, allowing businesses to present ground-level realities and provide feedback before regulations are finalized.

According to attendees, Prime Minister Tarique Rahman, whose party espouses wide-ranging reforms in governance and economy, welcomed the idea, signalling a shift toward stronger public-private coordination in economic policymaking.

To improve access to finance, discussions included enabling offshore borrowing for local firms and reviving the domestic bond market.

Plans are also underway to attract foreign investment in banking and insurance, aiming to strengthen financial depth and stability.

A major pillar of the reform recipe is transforming the NBR from a revenue-focused agency into a trade facilitator. Proposed measures include shifting from trade-based taxes toward domestic taxation, such as personal and corporate income tax and VAT, with trade taxes projected to fall from around 28 percent to 7.5 percent by 2035.

The plan also envisions eliminating advance income tax (AIT) and tax deducted at source (TDS), while modernizing tax administration through digital systems to broaden the tax base and enhance transparency.

Business leaders also flagged logistics and infrastructure gaps. Bangladesh spends an estimated 15-20 per cent of GDP on logistics -- nearly double the global average -- undermining competitiveness.

The government plans to expand and modernize ports, develop railways via public-private partnerships, and accelerate renewable-energy adoption, including incentives for solar power and private-sector investment in clean-energy solutions.

The meeting has underscored a broader economic shift from low-cost labour to a skills-driven, diversified economy. A new workforce-development framework will focus on technical skills and industry-oriented training.

Export diversification is also a priority, targeting $100 billion in export by 2030, with emerging sectors like semiconductors, light engineering, and outdoor equipment complementing traditional industries.

Foreign direct investment (FDI) received special attention, with the Prime Minister emphasizing the need to improve the overall investor experience and benchmark the ease of doing business against competitors such as Vietnam, Cambodia, and India.

Measures include easing visa regimes, improving airport and entry procedures, and launching a global branding campaign under a "Build in Bangladesh" narrative.

The discussion also highlighted new manufacturing frontiers and strengthening existing clusters, such as Bogura's light-engineering industry.

Business leaders welcomed the reform agenda but stressed that consistent execution and inter-agency coordination would be critical for success.

Among others, leading industrialists, including Syed Nasim Manzur, Managing Director of Apex Footwear, Ziaur Rahman of Bay Footwear, Ahsan Khan Chowdhury, CEO of PRAN-RFL Group, Abdul Muktadir, Managing Director of Incepta Group, Hafizur Rahman Khan, Chairman of Runner Group, Sohana Rouf Chowdhury, managing director of Rangs Group, and Arif Dowla of ACI Limited were present at the meeting.

Representing the government were Finance and Planning Minister Amir Khasru Mahmud Chowdhury, Commerce Minister Khandaker Abdul Muktadir, Minister for Power, Energy and Mineral Resources Iqbal Hasan Mahmud Tuku, BIDA Executive Chairman Chowdhury Ashik Bin Harun, and Bangladesh Bank Governor Mostakur Rahman.​

 

[Saif]

Nahid Islam calls on prof Yunus, former advisers to take to streets on reform issue

Nahid Islam, convener of the National Citizen Party (NCP), has called on former advisers—including Professor Muhammad Yunus and former law adviser Asif Nazrul—to take to the streets to ensure the implementation of reforms. “We gave them power through people’s blood, but they have disappointed...

en.prothomalo.com

Nahid Islam calls on prof Yunus, former advisers to take to streets on reform issue

Staff Correspondent
Dhaka
Published: 04 Apr 2026, 22: 38

After returning to the country this Saturday noon following the completion of holy Umrah, Nahid Islam spoke to journalists at Hazrat Shahjalal International Airport in Dhaka. `Nahid Islam’s Facebook

Nahid Islam, convener of the National Citizen Party (NCP), has called on former advisers—including Professor Muhammad Yunus and former law adviser Asif Nazrul—to take to the streets to ensure the implementation of reforms.

“We gave them power through people’s blood, but they have disappointed us. However, to preserve whatever has been achieved, they too must come to the street,” he said.

He made these remarks while speaking to journalists upon his return from Umrah at Dhaka’s Hazrat Shahjalal International Airport.

Nahid Islam, who is also the opposition chief whip in the National Parliament, said that after securing a two-thirds majority in the election, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) is disregarding everything. He alleged that they are not accepting the verdict of the referendum, are offering new excuses, and introducing various proposals. Among important ordinances, 10 to 11 are not being brought to Parliament, meaning they will not be turned into law. Through this, he claimed, the BNP government wants to retain the previous authoritarian system where executive power remains absolute.

Nahid Islam said, “Dr Muhammad Yunus, Asif Nazrul, and other advisers who played important roles must take responsibility. They were the ones who introduced these ordinances. Now that these are being repealed, they must speak out. Dr Muhammad Yunus must break his silence.”

The NCP convener also alleged that the interim government handed over power to the BNP through “election engineering.”

He said it cannot be the case that these laws and ordinances will be repealed, reforms will not happen, and the former advisers will remain silent and return to their own careers.

“They too must face the court of the people,” he added.

Responding to a question about the situation in Parliament, Nahid Islam said, “What is happening in the National Parliament is a kind of drama. Discussions are being held on the President’s speech—who was not supposed to remain in office for so long.”

He added that the kind of discussions they want cannot take place in Parliament due to the lack of a proper environment, forcing them to take to the streets.

When asked whether Parliament has become ineffective, Nahid Islam said, “It is the ruling party that is making Parliament ineffective. We want Parliament to function effectively. Two elections have taken place—the referendum and the national election. The Parliament formed based on the national election is functioning. But another election, which was supposed to lead to the formation of a Constitution Reform Council, has been rendered ineffective by the BNP government. As a result, Parliament has already become half ineffective.”​

 

[Saif]

When reform becomes more power, less accountability

With the parliamentary politics once again becoming vibrant and engaging, a clear fault line is gradually emerging between the ruling party, BNP, and the opposition, Jamaat-e-Islami (JI).

www.thedailystar.net

When reform becomes more power, less accountability

6 April 2026, 09:00 AM

Kamal Ahmed

FILE VISUAL: ALIZA RAHMAN

With the parliamentary politics once again becoming vibrant and engaging, a clear fault line is gradually emerging between the ruling party, BNP, and the opposition, Jamaat-e-Islami (JI). Not too long ago, these two parties were political allies—both in government and in opposition—jointly leading street movements against the rise of authoritarian rule under Sheikh Hasina and her Awami League. Their eventual split largely stemmed from a redrawing of the country’s political landscape following the uprising against Hasina’s dictatorial regime, which ultimately consigned her party to political irrelevance.

Both parties have been victims of egregious abuses of power, including the criminalisation of state institutions under Hasina’s rule. They endured severe persecution—enforced disappearances, extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrests, fabricated charges, prolonged detention without trial, and brutal physical violence. At one point, their political futures appeared nearly extinguished due to the judiciary’s partisan alignment with the executive. In response, both parties championed sweeping reforms in governance and key state institutions, particularly the judiciary, security apparatus, and law enforcement, with a shared commitment to accountability and the rule of law.

In the newly redrawn political landscape, both parties continue to profess support for fundamental reforms, though their interpretations diverge significantly. The reform process initiated by the interim government led by Professor Yunus—through 11 thematic commissions and a National Consensus Commission—resulted in the July National Charter as well as 133 ordinances aimed at overhauling governance and state institutions. Subsequently, the newly elected Jatiya Sangshad formed a parliamentary committee that recommended legal validation of 98 of these ordinances without amendment. At first glance, such broad agreement might suggest an impressive level of political consensus.

A closer examination, however, reveals a far more troubling picture. The 13-member parliamentary committee also proposed that 15 ordinances be introduced in amended form, while 16 others should be deferred for further revision rather than presented as bills now. Most strikingly, the committee recommended scrapping four ordinances outright, three of which relate to judicial reforms widely considered essential for ensuring judicial independence. Reactions from the opposition alliance led by JI, as well as from prominent non-partisan civil society actors and rights groups, suggest that these decisions represent a significant step backward.

The committee report includes notes of dissent from opposition members but none from those on the treasury bench. Three opposition MPs formally objected to 12 ordinances. These dynamics point to a disturbing pattern: rather than exercising independent judgment, many lawmakers appear to have adhered strictly to party directives. Notably, the report omits mention of a ruling party MP who submitted a detailed letter opposing the decision to let certain ordinances lapse or be discarded. This raises concerns that Article 70 of the constitution—which restricts MPs from voting against party lines—is already being enforced, despite prior commitments by all parliamentary parties to limit the application of Article 70 to confidence votes and finance bills.

A review of the ordinances slated for approval, revision, or rejection suggests that the ruling BNP may be prioritising consolidation of power over accountability, contradicting its own 31-point reform agenda. Among the 98 ordinances likely to pass unchanged are provisions that expand executive authority, including powers to remove elected local government officials and discipline civil servants. Given Bangladesh’s history of partisan interference in local governance, retaining such provisions risks replacing elected representatives with politically loyal administrators—an outcome that diverges sharply from BNP’s stated commitments and undermines recommendations from the Local Government Reform Commission. Many of the remaining ordinances are administrative in nature and carry limited political significance.

The most contentious recommendation, however, is the decision to scrap three ordinances related to judicial independence, particularly those concerning judicial appointments and the establishment of a separate secretariat for the Supreme Court. These moves effectively revive earlier practices that allowed significant executive influence over judicial appointments and the lower judiciary. This is especially striking given that many senior BNP leaders, including Tarique Rahman and Khaleda Zia, have themselves suffered from what many describe as the weaponisation of the judiciary under the previous regime. There are also suggestions that elements within the bureaucracy have resisted the creation of an independent judicial secretariat—claims that the government should address transparently to justify its position.

Equally concerning is the apparent retreat from efforts to strengthen institutional accountability. The parliamentary committee’s recommendation to defer (meaning allowing to lapse) 16 ordinances includes key legislation such as reforms to the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC). Allowing this ordinance to lapse could effectively dismantle the current NHRC, which has arguably the potential to be the most effective in the country’s history, as its members include experts who have investigated over 1,500 cases of enforced disappearance while leading a different probe commission. Reports indicate resistance from security agencies and bureaucratic actors to empowering the NHRC, particularly regarding its authority to investigate abuses and operate independently.

It is particularly troubling that a party with a significant number of victims of enforced disappearances now appears to accept national security justifications for limiting oversight. Such a position not only contradicts the spirit of the July mass uprising but also undermines fundamental human rights obligations. Mere pledges by the BNP to bring back these legislations with improved and stronger safeguards are least assuring, as such revisions could have been made during the ongoing process of validating other ordinances.

The opposition JI members of the committee are not without fault. Their revisionist proposals—particularly the suggestion to remove references to Jamaat-e-Islami, Muslim League, and Nezam-e-Islami as collaborators with Pakistani forces from the ordinance on Muktijoddha Council —are deeply problematic. This effort to sanitise historical wrongdoing avoids necessary accountability and reconciliation. A more responsible approach would involve acknowledging past actions and offering a formal apology. How JI’s allies, especially the NCP, a party born out of the uprising and led by its youth leaders, respond to such revisionist tendencies remains to be seen.

Kamal Ahmed is consulting editor at The Daily Star. He led the Media Reform Commission under the immediate past interim government.​

 

[Saif]

Reform an ongoing process, essential for economic dynamism: Debapriya

Dr Debapriya Bhattacharya, Distinguished Fellow at the Centre for Policy Dialogue (CPD), on Thursday described reform as a continuous process, emphasising its necessity for maintaining economic momentum. “Reform is not a static concept, it is an ongoing process. Just as blood circulation is

thefinancialexpress.com.bd

Reform an ongoing process, essential for economic dynamism: Debapriya

UNB

Published :
Apr 09, 2026 19:11
Updated :
Apr 09, 2026 19:25

Dr Debapriya Bhattacharya, Distinguished Fellow at the Centre for Policy Dialogue (CPD), on Thursday described reform as a continuous process, emphasising its necessity for maintaining economic momentum.

“Reform is not a static concept, it is an ongoing process. Just as blood circulation is vital for the human body, reforms are indispensable to keep an economy moving,” he said.

Debapriya was addressing a discussion titled “Bangladesh Reform Tracker and Relevance of Media,” organised by the Citizen’s Platform for SDG, Bangladesh, and the Economic Reporters’ Forum (ERF) at the ERF auditorium in the capital.

Speaking at the event, Information and Broadcasting Minister Zahir Uddin Swapan disclosed that the National Equipment Identity Register (NEIR) policy is set to undergo revisions.

Responding to queries from journalists, he said, “I discussed the matter with the adviser concerned four days ago when he informed me that an initiative has already been taken to revise the policy.”

The NEIR system is utilised by the government to enhance mobile handset security and curb the use of illegally imported or counterfeit devices by syncing International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI) numbers with the owner’s National ID and SIM cards.

Reflecting on the spirit of the student-led mass uprising, Debapriya noted that the movement has intensified the public’s aspiration for structural changes.

He urged politicians to prioritise the concept of reform, noting that current electoral manifestos have attempted to reflect both the necessity and expectations of such changes.

The eminent economist also touched upon the historical context of reforms in Bangladesh, recalling the post-independence reconstruction efforts, led by then Finance Minister Tajuddin Ahmad, through state-owned enterprises.

He further highlighted the contributions of former Finance Minister Saifur Rahman, stating, “His role in implementing two major reforms – the introduction of Value Added Tax (VAT) and the flexible exchange rate – will remain historic.”

The discussion was also attended by New Age Editor Nurul Kabir, The Financial Express Editor Shamsul Huq Zahid, Prothom Alo Online Editor Shawkat Hossain Masum, ERF President Daulat Akter Mala, and General Secretary Abul Kashem, among others.​

 

[Saif]

Politics and reform: Procedural crisis versus deficit of trust

Are political parties truly grasping the expectations of the people? Is the much-discussed July National Charter already showing signs of erosion even before its implementation? If judicial independence is to be ensured, it must be achieved through parliamentary oversight and constitutional...

en.prothomalo.com

Politics and reform: Procedural crisis versus deficit of trust

The controversy surrounding the repeal of the ordinance has brought us face to face with a fundamental truth: it is not merely what reforms are undertaken that matters, but how they are carried out that are of greater significance. Without ensuring procedural transparency and inclusive participation, even the most well-intentioned initiatives risk falling into a crisis of public trust. Nurul Huda Sakib and Md Ekramul Haque write on this.

Nurul Huda Sakib & Md. Iqramul Haque
Published: 13 Apr 2026, 21: 04

During the tenure of the interim government, a total of 133 ordinances were promulgated over a period of 18 months. Following scrutiny by a special committee, the Jatiya Sangsad (national parliament) approved 113 of these. Of the remaining 20 ordinances, four were repealed (including one that was repealed and subsequently re-promulgated), while 16 were not tabled in Parliament as bills. These 16 ordinances have since been recommended for further review, with a view to strengthening them and reintroducing them as new bills.

As a consequence, the legal validity of 20 ordinances issued during the interim government’s tenure has effectively lapsed. These include one related to the appointment of Supreme Court judges, two concerning the Supreme Court Secretariat, three relating to the National Human Rights Commission, two addressing enforced disappearances, and one pertaining to the Anti-Corruption Commission.

Under Article 93(2) of the Constitution of Bangladesh, an ordinance must be placed before Parliament within 30 days of the commencement of a parliamentary session and must be approved within that timeframe. Failing this, or if Parliament declines to approve it, the ordinance ceases to have effect. Accordingly, as these ordinances were not tabled in Parliament, they lost their legal force after 10 April. Some have already been formally annulled through parliamentary voting.

Against this backdrop, a number of critical questions have emerged in the public mind. Is the majority in Parliament pushing the ruling party towards unilateralism? Are political parties adequately comprehending public expectations? Is the much-discussed July National Charter, hailed as a symbol of reform and change, already losing momentum even before implementation? Beyond these questions, the repeal or suspension of ordinances warrants deeper analysis.

Not opposition to reform, but objection to process

The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) has consistently maintained that it does not oppose reform per se; rather, its objection lies with the manner in which reforms are being implemented. In practice, many reform initiatives undertaken during the interim government’s tenure have exhibited procedural weaknesses and generated controversy.

The core challenge lies elsewhere. A significant segment of the public does not fully grasp the intricacies of procedural debates; instead, they judge outcomes. As a result, the message reaching the public is not particularly favourable for the BNP.
For instance, under the July Charter, there was an initiative to secure approval for 84 reform proposals through a referendum framed around just four questions. This attempt to compress complex and multidimensional reforms into such a simplified format was not widely accepted, not only by political parties but also by segments of civil society. The BNP formally recorded “notes of dissent” on several occasions. From the outset, the party has stated that, if in power, it would implement reforms in accordance with its electoral manifesto and through established parliamentary procedures. Its position, therefore, is not anti-reform but rather pro-transparency and procedural legitimacy.

During the interim government’s tenure, ordinances were often promulgated in haste—on average, in less than five days per ordinance—without comprehensive parliamentary debate, public consultation, or meaningful dialogue with political stakeholders. Consequently, objections from the BNP and other parties have persisted.

For example, in the ordinance on the appointment of Supreme Court judges, the proposed “Supreme Judicial Appointment Council” limited government representation, prompting objections from the Ministry of Law. If judicial independence is to be ensured, it must rest on parliamentary oversight and constitutional balance—not on decrees issued by an unelected authority.

Similarly, the two ordinances concerning the Supreme Court Secretariat risk increasing bureaucratic complexity under the guise of administrative autonomy. Questions also remain as to whether increasing the number of commissioners under the Anti-Corruption Commission ordinance would genuinely enhance effectiveness or merely create avenues for political accommodation. The two ordinances on enforced disappearances have raised concerns regarding their practical viability, as they were introduced without adequate alignment with international conventions. Comparable procedural shortcomings are also evident in the three ordinances relating to the National Human Rights Commission.

Political scientists have long identified central reasons why reform processes fail: excessive ambition, disregard for local context, bureaucratic overreach, and a lack of political will. Recent experiences in Bangladesh reflect many of these dynamics.

Several reform initiatives undertaken by the interim government were not fully aligned with local realities. For instance, certain provisions within the Human Rights Commission ordinances could have generated new forms of contention within Bangladesh’s socio-cultural context. In other cases, there appeared to be a tendency to expand bureaucratic authority. Furthermore, the omission of important recommendations in revised ordinances raised doubts about the effectiveness of the institutions concerned.

The BNP government’s argument, however, is relatively straightforward: as the interim government was unelected, treating its ordinances as binding “decrees” runs counter to the principles of parliamentary democracy. The party supports the implementation of the July Charter, but insists that this should occur through parliamentary deliberation and a two-thirds majority, in accordance with Article 142 of the Constitution.

Moreover, given that a referendum has already been held, the referendum ordinance itself has effectively served its purpose and is no longer necessary. BNP leaders, including Secretary General Mirza Fakhrul Islam Alamgir, have repeatedly stated, “We will implement the July Charter in full, but with notes of dissent and through parliamentary procedures.”

This stance should not necessarily be interpreted as reluctance towards reform; rather, it may be seen as an effort to render the reform process constitutional, sustainable, and grounded in public ownership.

Public perception, social media, and reality

However, the core challenge lies elsewhere. A significant segment of the public does not fully grasp the intricacies of procedural debates; instead, they judge outcomes. As a result, the message reaching the public is not particularly favourable for the BNP.

Many perceive the party as being “anti-reform” or as retreating from its July commitments. Opposition groups have been capitalising on this perception, successfully promoting narratives—particularly through social media—that portray the BNP as resistant to reform.

This narrative is gradually shaping public opinion and may heighten the risk of future political instability. Compounding this are global economic pressures, energy shortages, and domestic economic challenges. Together, these factors are fuelling public dissatisfaction—an element that can be readily politicised.

Challenges and the way forward for the BNP

In the current context, the BNP faces multiple pressures. On the one hand, there is international scrutiny to uphold standards of human rights and good governance; on the other, there are pressing domestic economic challenges and rising public expectations. Balancing these is not an easy task.

In this context, several factors are important for the BNP; first, the party must clearly communicate to the public why certain ordinances or proposals have been repealed. This explanation must go beyond political positioning and be framed as a principled stance. For instance, in repealing the ordinance on judicial appointments, it could emphasise that judicial independence will be more robustly ensured through parliamentary processes, preventing the concentration of power in unelected hands.

Similarly, the ordinances concerning the Anti-Corruption Commission and enforced disappearances should be revisited, strengthened, and reintroduced as comprehensive bills to ensure genuine effectiveness in combating corruption and safeguarding human rights. Regarding the referendum ordinance, the BNP’s position is clear: implementation of the July Charter should proceed through institutionalised democratic processes, enriched by parliamentary debate.

Second, the party must strengthen grassroots engagement to rebuild trust with the public. It should actively counter the “anti-reform” narrative circulating on social media by presenting a coherent counter-narrative.

The BNP’s 31-point framework for state restructuring, its commitment to implementing the July Charter with notes of dissent, and its electoral manifesto must be clearly communicated to the public, including through grassroots mobilisation.

Third, international partners must be reassured that the party remains committed to implementing effective and credible reforms, albeit grounded in local realities.

The BNP must uphold its commitments to human rights, anti-corruption measures, and judicial independence in line with international standards, ensuring that Bangladesh’s economic partnerships and global standing are not undermined. Continued dialogue with political parties and civil society is also essential.

Fourth, the government must take visible steps to address immediate public concerns—particularly energy shortages, inflation, and employment. Public trust is closely tied to improvements in everyday living conditions. Reforms that exacerbate public hardship will prove politically counterproductive.

Fifth, the government should revisit the 16 ordinances, refine them through inclusive consultation, and reintroduce them as robust and realistic bills in Parliament. This process must incorporate grassroots perspectives, expert input, political dialogue, recommendations from national consensus bodies, and international standards. Such an approach would make the reform process more inclusive and sustainable.

Conclusion

The controversy surrounding the repeal of ordinances has brought into sharp focus a fundamental truth: it is not only what reforms are undertaken that matters, but how they are carried out is even more critical. Without procedural transparency and inclusive participation, even the most well-intentioned initiatives risk descending into a crisis of public trust.

At this juncture, the greatest challenge is not merely to sustain reform, but to ensure that it is anchored in public ownership, constitutional legitimacy, and long-term sustainability. Failing this, a procedural crisis may ultimately evolve into a deeper crisis of trust.

* Nurul Huda Sakib, President and Professor, Department of Government and Politics, Jahangirnagar University

* Md Ekramul Haque, Lecturer, Department of Government and Politics, Asian University of Bangladesh​

 

[Saif]

'High time for new Bangladesh govt to push reform through'

It's high time the new political government in Bangladesh with a vast majority began massive reforms in the unkempt financial sector immediately, suggests the International Monetary Fund after diagnosing regional economic problems. The IMF Director at the Asia and Pacific Department (APD), Krishna

thefinancialexpress.com.bd

IMF ON FINANCIAL SECTOR
'High time for new Bangladesh govt to push reform through'
Fund's Asia-Pacific Dept director makes suggestion

Syful Islam
Published :
Apr 17, 2026 08:38
Updated :
Apr 17, 2026 08:38

It's high time the new political government in Bangladesh with a vast majority began massive reforms in the unkempt financial sector immediately, suggests the International Monetary Fund after diagnosing regional economic problems.

The IMF Director at the Asia and Pacific Department (APD), Krishna Srinivasan, made the remark Thursday at a press briefing on Regional Economic Outlook for Asia and the Pacific, at the Fund's headquarters in Washington on the sidelines of the Spring Meetings of the IMF and the World Bank Group.

He mentions that he recently visited Bangladesh and met with the prime minister and the finance minister and other officials discussing dos for now on the economic front, as the Fund holds two due tranches of its funding package for the country.

"We had a good discussion in terms of the challenges the country faces. And, we made the point that (for) a new government with a significant majority this is a right time to undertake ambitious reforms," he says in reply to a query.

Mr Srinivasan recalls the government side heard the IMF team's remarks and now "we'll wait to see how they react to that."

He also calls upon the government to provide required supports to people using the limited resources the country has, since people are now being hurt in Bangladesh due to war-induced shocks.

At the same time he urges Bangladeshi authorities to work for improving the revenue intake which is among the lowest in the world.

"In the case of Bangladesh, their revenue base is on the lower side, their revenue intake is on the lower side and so they are that much more hard-pressed to provide support. But, again, people are hurt in Bangladesh so it's even more important to use whatever resources you have to make it as targeted as possible," Mr Srinivasan says.

Replying to a query, he notes that apart from working hard to improve revenue earnings, Bangladesh also needs to take into account other impediments in the financial sector and so on so that they can get growth going over the near term and over the longer term.

Asked whether the IMF has additional financing packages for Bangladesh to offset the deficit created due to Middle-East conflicts, he replies like other Asian countries, Bangladesh is also affected by the energy shocks. The country imports a lot of energy, thus affected by the shock.

"We're working with the authorities in terms of policy support and on the programmes. Negotiations are ongoing and discussions are ongoing. So we'll have to just wait and see how those things pan out," says Mr Srinivasan about additional fund support.

He points out that Bangladesh has not done well in terms of revenue earnings rather it has slipped down over the last three years. "So, a lot of reforms are needed in Bangladesh both on the fiscal side, on the revenue side, and need to try to rehabilitate the financial sector and also needs exchange-rate reform."

Mr Srinivasan concludes that all the three pillars on which the US$5.5-billion lending programme was based there are many works to be done.​

 

[Saif]

Growth sans governance reform risks instability

Rapid economic growth, if not accompanied by governance reforms, may ultimately undermine development and trigger instability, economists warn during a review of Bangladesh's politico-economic milieus. The speakers came to such conclusion at a virtual discussion organised by the South Asian Networ

thefinancialexpress.com.bd

COST OF DENIAL OF MUST-DOS IN ECONOMY, GOVERNANCE
Growth sans governance reform risks instability
Economists warn during review of state of reforms

FE REPORT

Published :
Apr 18, 2026 08:31
Updated :
Apr 18, 2026 09:57

Rapid economic growth, if not accompanied by governance reforms, may ultimately undermine development and trigger instability, economists warn during a review of Bangladesh's politico-economic milieus.

The speakers came to such conclusion at a virtual discussion organised by the South Asian Network on Economic Modeling (SANEM) on Friday, as the country passes through crises and a rebound by turns.

Delivering the keynote titled 'The costs of denial: how economic growth undermines governance reform', Dr Shantayanan Devarajan, Professor at Georgetown University in Washington, DC, cautions that periods of strong growth often lead policymakers and international agencies to overlook governance failures.

"There is a tendency to focus on outcomes such as GDP growth and poverty reduction while ignoring the processes through which these results are achieved," he says.

This, the professor warns, can be "dangerous" if growth is driven by practices that undermine human rights or suppress civil society, raising questions about sustainability.

Drawing on global and regional experiences, he argues that the rapid growth seen in many developing regions between 2000 and 2015 "masked deep-rooted governance problems, which later contributed to political instability, declining investment and slower growth".

Commenting on the keynote, Dr Kunal Sen, Director of UNU-WIDER, describes the argument as a "provocative hypothesis", noting that economic growth can carry the seeds of its own reversal if governance issues remain unaddressed.

He observes that in regions such as Africa and South Asia, growth slowdowns after 2015 were closely linked to unresolved institutional weaknesses, which eventually led to instability and declining investment.

Dr Sen emphasises that sustaining growth requires a transition from closed, elite-driven economic arrangements to more open and inclusive systems. "Governance and economic reforms must proceed together rather than sequentially."

The discussion also featured noted economists Prof Rehman Sobhan and Dr Mustafizur Rahman from the Centre for Policy Dialogue (CPD).

Noted economist Rehman Sobhan opines that problems of poor governance arise when "power becomes concentrated in the hands of narrow elite, influencing the banking and financial sectors, businesses and politics".

He observes that the situation in Bangladesh has improved following the recent political changes, adding that a functioning democracy can help a country overcome such structural constraints.

Mustafizur Rahman, Distinguished Fellow at the CPD, notes that the processes through which economic outcomes are achieved have significant implications for the sustainability of growth.

He points out that while Bangladesh has experienced robust economic expansion, income disparities remain stark, with a wide gap between the top five per cent and the bottom 40 per cent of the population.

Moderated by SANEM Executive Director Dr Selim Raihan, the session underscores the need for transparency, stronger institutions and inclusive policymaking to ensure that growth remains sustainable over the long term.​

 

[Saif]

Tension over the upper chamber, referendum, and July Charter

After the July Mass Uprising, there was a strong demand for state reform. But how that demand translated in practice—through proposals, objections, and political bargaining—remains a complex story. This is the last of a two-part series.

en.prothomalo.com

Tension over the upper chamber, referendum, and July Charter
After the July Mass Uprising, there was a strong demand for state reform. But how that demand translated in practice—through proposals, objections, and political bargaining—remains a complex story. This is the last of a two-part series.

Riadul Karim
Dhaka
Published: 22 Apr 2026, 12: 04

Chief Adviser Professor Muhammad Yunus with leaders of different political parties at the signing ceremony of the July National Charter at South Plaza of National Parliament on 17 October 2025. Prothom Alo

After tensions surrounding the method of appointments to constitutional posts, the powers of the Prime Minister, and the role of the President, the focus of reform discussions shifted to a larger question—how the balance of state power will be constructed. At that stage, the discussions of the National Consensus Commission brought to the center the issue of a bicameral parliament, especially the method of formation of the upper chamber and its effectiveness.

From this perspective, the Constitutional Reform Commission considered the upper chamber as an “additional supervisory” layer. With the idea that this would reduce the absolute dominance and exclusive power of the ruling party in the lower house of parliament, or in parliament as a whole, the Constitutional Reform Commission proposed the formation of a bicameral legislature.

Almost all parties, including the BNP, agree on making the parliament bicameral. This commitment is also included in the BNP’s 31-point outline. However, there are political differences regarding the structure and powers of the upper chamber.

The proposal of the Constitutional Reform Commission was that elections to the upper chamber (Senate) would be held through proportional representation or the PR system. That is, in proportion to the votes a party receives nationwide in general elections to the lower house, that party would receive seats in the upper chamber.

On the other hand, the BNP wanted that seats in the upper chamber would be distributed in proportion to the number of seats a party obtains in the lower house. That is, it would be similar to the current method by which reserved women’s seats are allocated.

The formation of an upper chamber in parliament does not in itself establish balance. Rather, it will depend on the method by which the upper chamber is elected and what kind of powers it has. The proposal suggests that the upper chamber would mainly be given authority regarding constitutional amendments.

If the PR system described in the July Charter is introduced, no single party will have exclusive control in the upper chamber. As a result, the upper chamber will be balanced and will have comparatively broader representation of parties. Under this system, the possibility of any party achieving a single majority is low. To obtain a single majority, a party would need to secure more than 50 per cent of the votes cast in the lower house elections. In none of the acceptable elections in the country has any party secured more than 50 per cent of the vote alone. In the 13th national parliamentary election, the BNP received 49.97 per cent of the vote under the sheaf of paddy symbol.

The interim government gave special importance to forming the upper chamber through the PR system. A source of that government told Prothom Alo at the time that Chief Adviser Professor Muhammad Yunus personally requested the BNP to accept the proposal. But ultimately, the BNP did not accept it.

Powers of the upper chamber

The proposal of the Constitutional Reform Commission stated that the upper chamber would not have the power to initiate legislation. However, except for finance bills passed in the lower house, all bills must be presented in both chambers. The upper chamber will not be able to permanently block any bill. If the upper chamber holds a bill for more than two months, it will be considered approved by the upper chamber.

The upper chamber will be able to review and analyse a bill and approve or reject it within a specified time. If the upper chamber approves a bill, it will be sent to the President for assent.

The upper chamber will be able to reject a bill and send it back to the lower house for reconsideration along with recommendations for amendment. The lower house will be able to accept or reject the amendments proposed by the upper chamber in full or in part. If a bill passed in two consecutive sessions of the lower house is rejected by the upper chamber, and if the lower house passes it again in a subsequent session, then the bill can be sent to the President for approval without the approval of the upper chamber.

In the model preferred by the BNP, if any party has a simple majority or a two-thirds majority in the lower house, it will also have the same in the upper chamber. This would maintain the exclusive control of the ruling party in both chambers, which would thwart the objective of establishing balance.

Although the approval of the upper chamber is not mandatory for ordinary bills, the July Charter proposes an important role for it in constitutional amendment bills. It states that in the case of constitutional amendments, the support of two-thirds of the lower house and a majority of members of the upper chamber will be required. However, in this case, the BNP has a note of dissent. They are against sending constitutional amendment bills to the upper chamber and having them passed there.

In the model preferred by the BNP, if any party has a simple majority or a two-thirds majority in the lower house, it will also have the same in the upper chamber. This would maintain the exclusive control of the ruling party in both chambers, which would thwart the objective of establishing balance.

This difference of opinion emerged in the discussion of the Consensus Commission on 29 June last year. On that day, Mahmudur Rahman Manna, president of Nagorik Oikya, said that if the upper chamber is formed in proportion to the seats of the lower house, then it will become a “replica” of the lower house.

On the same day, Akhter Hossen, member secretary of the NCP, said that if the upper chamber does not have power, then it has no necessity.

Why the proposal for bicameral parliament

In its report, the Constitutional Reform Commission explained the rationale for proposing a bicameral parliament, stating that since independence, Bangladesh has been operating under a unicameral legislature. However, in fulfilling constitutional responsibilities, its effectiveness has increasingly come into question. Due to weak oversight of executive functions, weaknesses in representation, and various structural and institutional limitations, parliament has not been able to play an adequately effective role. Because of the dominance of the executive branch, meaningful parliamentary discussion and scrutiny have been noticeably limited. The culture of boycotting parliament by opposition parties has significantly narrowed the space for accountability.

It further states that the unicameral system has also been criticised for the rapid enactment of weak laws without sufficient review and effective debate. Due to the lack of parliamentary oversight and control, the ruling party has been given the opportunity to take oppressive decisions, which has facilitated arbitrary lawmaking and the concentration of power. In this context, the Fourth Amendment and the Fifteenth Amendment of the Constitution are cited as examples. In 1975, through the Fourth Amendment, the country shifted from a parliamentary system to a presidential system and introduced one-party rule in place of multi-party politics. And in 2011, through the Fifteenth Amendment, the caretaker government system during elections was abolished.

Considering these factors, the Commission proposed a bicameral legislature to address the structural and institutional weaknesses of the unicameral system.

How much will the Prime Minister’s power be reduced

Under the parliamentary system in the country, there is still no restriction preventing one individual from simultaneously being the Prime Minister, the Leader of the House, and the head of the ruling party. Many believe that this results in exclusive control over the government, parliament, and party being concentrated in one person. To bring change here, the reform proposal states that no individual, while serving as Prime Minister, can be the head of a political party and the Leader of the House.

In discussions with the parties, the Consensus Commission decided that the same person cannot simultaneously hold the positions of Prime Minister and party chief. About three-fourths of the parties agreed on this issue. However, the BNP and several other parties dissented. The BNP said that if a party wins an election, deciding who will be Prime Minister and who will be party chief is a democratic prerogative of that party. This is not a constitutional matter.

As consensus has been reached in the reform proposals, in some areas the power of the Prime Minister will be reduced to some extent. For example, the formation of the election commission. A selection committee composed of representatives from the ruling party, opposition party, and the judiciary will select the Chief Election Commissioner and other election commissioners. Those selected by the committee will be appointed by the President. The President will also be able to make direct appointments to the Human Rights Commission, Information Commission, Press Council, and Law Commission. Here, the power of the Prime Minister will be reduced to some extent.

There is also consensus that one individual may serve as Prime Minister for a maximum of 10 years in their lifetime. At one stage of prolonged discussion, the BNP had proposed this, and consensus was reached.

However, the BNP had a condition in this regard—that it would accept the 10-year limit only if the method of appointments to constitutional posts is not included in the constitution.

The interim government gave special importance to forming the upper chamber through the PR system. A source of that government told Prothom Alo at the time that Chief Adviser Professor Muhammad Yunus personally requested the BNP to accept the proposal. But ultimately, the BNP did not accept it.

There will also be some changes in the Prime Minister’s power in the declaration of a state of emergency. Instead of the “countersignature of the Prime Minister,” the provision of “approval of the Cabinet” will be added. The presence of the Leader of the Opposition, or in their absence the Deputy Leader, will be included in cabinet meetings related to the declaration of a state of emergency. Almost all parties, including the BNP, agreed to this proposal.

If the proposals regarding appointments to constitutional institutions described in the July Charter are implemented, the exclusive power of the Prime Minister will be reduced. However, the BNP has notes of dissent on these proposals.

However, regarding the proposal of the Reform Commission, former professor of Chittagong University Nizam Uddin Ahmed expressed dissent and wrote an analysis in Prothom Alo. His argument was that the position of the Prime Minister is being made insignificant. I mentioned his arguments in the first part of this article.

In response to Nizam Uddin Ahmed’s article, Supreme Court senior lawyer Imran Siddiq wrote an analysis in Prothom Alo on 28 March. He served as a member of the Constitutional Reform Commission.

In that article, while refuting Nizam Uddin Ahmed’s arguments, Imran explained why a balance of power is necessary and how it has been proposed. Explaining the proposals of the Reform Commission, he wrote that no power has been given to the President that would render the Prime Minister insignificant.

Imran further wrote that the National Constitutional Council would be composed of: three members from the ruling party, three from the opposition, and three neutral members—the President, the Chief Justice, and a member of parliament who does not belong to either the ruling party or the main opposition party. This balanced structure will ensure that no single group can control the entire council.

According to Imran, including representatives of different organs of the state in this appointment process does not make it less democratic; rather, it makes it more democratic. The Prime Minister may not always be able to make decisions in appointments according to their own will. But that is precisely why the National Constitutional Council is necessary—to ensure that the appointment process remains fair and is not under the control of any single individual.

How much will the President’s power increase

In its report, the Constitutional Reform Commission said that in order to consolidate democracy, it is essential to make every institution of the executive branch effective and complementary to one another. To achieve this goal, a balanced relationship and effective empowerment between the Prime Minister and the President are extremely important.

The National Consensus Commission proposed increasing the President’s power in various appointments. It proposed that the authority to appoint the chiefs of the army, navy, and air force, as well as the director generals of DGFI and NSI, along with 12 institutions, be directly vested in the President.

In the end, it was decided that the President will be able to make appointments on his own authority, without advice or recommendation from anyone, to the positions of governor, the Human Rights Commission, Information Commission, Press Council, Law Commission, and the Energy Regulatory Commission.

However, in this decision, six parties including the BNP gave a “note of dissent” regarding giving the authority to appoint the Governor of Bangladesh Bank and the Energy Regulatory Commission directly to the President.

Accountability in parliament

To bring balance of power, it has been decided to make the legislature or parliament bicameral and to elect the upper chamber through the PR system. Here, the BNP has dissent.

The Reform Commission had proposed amending Article 70 of the Constitution to give members of parliament the freedom to vote on any matter except finance bills. However, after discussions, it was finally decided that members of parliament will be able to vote independently on any issue except finance bills and votes of confidence.

However, here the BNP had proposed to add two more issues—constitutional amendments and national security (wartime situations). That is, the BNP’s position is that MPs will not be able to vote outside their party on finance bills, votes of confidence, constitutional amendment bills, and national security issues.

Women’s representation

The Constitutional Reform Commission and the Electoral System Reform Commission proposed increasing reserved women’s seats in parliament to 100 and introducing direct voting there.

Although almost all parties supported increasing women’s representation, there were significant differences over the election method for women’s seats. In the end, the parties could not reach agreement on direct voting for women’s seats.

It was decided that in the national election (13th parliamentary election) following the signing of the July Charter, political parties would nominate at least 5 per cent women candidates out of 300 seats, though this would not be mentioned in the Constitution. All parties agreed to this except Islami Andolon Bangladesh, Bangladesh Khelafat Majlis, and Nizam-e-Islam Party. However, no party nominated 5 per cent women candidates in the last election. The BNP’s total women candidates were 3.5 per cent. And the current main opposition party, Jamaat-e-Islami, did not field a single woman candidate.

Implementing the July Charter with dissent effectively means that the fundamental constitutional reform proposals will not be introduced. In that case, how far the goals outlined by the reform commission—such as preventing the establishment of constitutional authoritarianism, resisting any form of fascist rule, and ensuring decentralisation and adequate empowerment of state institutions—will be achieved remains an important question.

Further decisions on women’s seats include retaining the existing 50 reserved seats and making necessary amendments to the Constitution. In the next (14th) parliamentary election, parties will nominate at least 10 per cent women candidates in the general 300 seats. In this way, until the target of 33 per cent women candidates is achieved, the minimum nomination of women candidates will be increased by 5 per cent in each general election.

However, Bangladesh JASAD, CPB, the Socialist Party of Bangladesh (Marxist), and BASAD took positions in favour of increasing women’s seats to 100 and introducing direct voting.

Caretaker government system

The Reform Commission proposed retaining a caretaker government system in the Constitution during elections. All parties agreed on keeping this system. There were also long discussions in the Consensus Commission regarding the formation process of this government. Ultimately, the July Charter described a 15-step process for forming the caretaker government. Among these, seven parties including the BNP have notes of dissent on several steps. Jamaat also has a note of dissent on one step.

There were doubts as well

There were doubts about how much unity could be achieved among political parties on the question of reform. Especially, there was concern that discussions might collapse over the issue of appointment procedures to constitutional institutions among the fundamental reform proposals.

For example, in the discussion of the National Consensus Commission on 29 June, the Commission’s vice-chair Ali Riaz said, “We had dreamed that on the martyrdom anniversary of Abu Sayed (16 July, 2025), we would all sign the July Charter together. But how far that will be possible in reality depends on the political parties. We now have some concern about this.”

On that day, NCP member secretary Akhter Hossen also expressed concern about how much consensus would be achieved on fundamental reform proposals.

He said that on the issues presented as the basis of fundamental reforms, the BNP and several other parties have disagreements. Even after hours of discussion, the issue remains unresolved. This is creating a space for concern.

Earlier, after one day’s discussion, Gono Odhikar Parishad president Nurul Haque told journalists, “Some parties here are completely rigid in their positions. If it continues like this, I do not see any possibility of unity until doomsday.”

On 29 June, BNP standing committee member Salahuddin Ahmed said that a national charter would be signed on the issues on which the parties agree. He said, “If we are forced here that we must agree on all these issues, that would not be right.”

From doubt to initial success

When the National Consensus Commission was formed, a major question that arose was whether it was at all possible to build consensus within the existing political culture. I myself had considerable doubts about this. I also observed similar scepticism among some members of the Consensus Commission at the beginning. In particular, after the first closed-door meeting of the first phase with a major political party, some of them became discouraged.

However, in the end, the National Consensus Commission continued discussions on reforms for a long period with 30 political parties together. It also managed to prepare a charter. From that perspective, this is undoubtedly a significant achievement.

Broadly speaking, three factors seem to have contributed to the initial success of these discussions. First, the talks began immediately after a mass uprising, when the desire for reform or change was still very fresh.

Second, although the participating parties represented right-wing, left-wing, and centrist ideologies, all of them were forces supportive of the uprising. The Awami League and its political allies were not part of these discussions.

Third, the main discussions or meetings of the second phase were broadcast live on television. As far as I know, this arrangement was made based on the experience of the first phase. The objective was to ensure transparency and allow people to see the positions of different parties on reform issues.

Ultimately, discussions between the political parties and the Consensus Commission concluded on 31 July last year with the aim of preparing the “July National Charter” based on consensus on reforms. After that, a third phase of discussions began regarding the implementation process of the July Charter. However, before finalising the implementation process, arrangements were made to sign the July Charter.

On 17 October, 24 political parties, including BNP and Jamaat, signed the charter at the south plaza of the parliament. Six parties, including NCP, did not sign it that day. Later, however, NCP and Gono Forum signed the charter.

Whether there would be dissent

There was political debate over whether dissenting views on various reform proposals would be allowed in the July Charter. Jamaat, NCP, and several other parties were opposed to including a note of dissent. Many political analysts were also against it, arguing that a note of dissent does not affect decisions—it merely records disagreement.

On the other hand, some argued that the charter should include only those issues on which consensus had been reached. For example, political analyst Zahed Ur Rahman opined that reform proposals carrying notes of dissent should not be included in the final July Charter; rather, it should be finalised only with issues on which all political parties agree (Prothom Alo, 3 August 2025).

According to sources concerned, the National Consensus Commission initially also considered excluding notes of dissent. Accordingly, the draft of the July National Charter was first sent to the parties without such provisions. Later, there was a plan to only mention which party had dissent on which proposal. However, BNP demanded that, in addition to mentioning dissent, a note be included stating: “However, if any political party or alliance secures a public mandate through its election manifesto, it may take action accordingly.”

A source from the Consensus Commission told Prothom Alo at the time that the commission did not agree with including such a note. But just before the signing of the July Charter, BNP took a firm stance on the issue. There was concern that BNP might refuse to sign if the note was not included. Eventually, to ensure that the signing ceremony did not collapse, the note was added.

Third phase on implementation mechanism

On the last day of the second phase of discussions on 31 July, several parties, including NCP and Jamaat, demanded discussions on the legal basis and implementation mechanism of the July National Charter. BNP stated that, according to the terms of reference of the National Consensus Commission, it did not have the authority to determine the implementation mechanism. However, if the commission chose to discuss it, BNP would participate.

Later, the Consensus Commission held both formal and informal discussions with political parties on the matter and also conducted multiple meetings with a panel of experts.

Initially, three different positions emerged among BNP, Jamaat, and NCP regarding implementation. BNP supported implementing constitutional proposals through Parliament within two years after its formation. Jamaat wanted the reforms implemented before the national election through a special presidential order or a referendum. NCP proposed implementation through the formation of a constituent assembly.

There was prolonged debate over the implementation mechanism. At one stage, political parties reached consensus on holding a referendum. However, BNP wanted the referendum to be held on the same day as the parliamentary election, while Jamaat, NCP, and some others wanted it earlier. At the same time, they remained firm in demanding a special constitutional order, while BNP argued that the President has no authority to issue such an order. It suggested that a gazette notification could be issued, followed by an ordinance to hold the referendum.

The Consensus Commission stated that the implementation mechanism would not be part of the July Charter. Instead, it would submit multiple recommendations to the interim government based on opinions from political parties and experts. On 28 October, it recommended two closely related alternative proposals to the government.

It states that, to implement the constitutional proposals of the charter, the July National Charter (Constitutional Reform) Implementation Order would first be issued, followed by a referendum, and if the “Yes” vote prevails in the referendum, a Constitutional Reform Council would be formed. Those elected in the parliamentary election would simultaneously be sworn in as Members of Parliament and as members of the Constitutional Reform Council. The council would complete the constitutional reform work within 180 days from the start of its first session. An alternative proposal states that if the council fails to do so within the stipulated time, the proposals would automatically be passed.

However, the commission’s recommendations also sparked political debate.

Implementation mechanism and issuance of order

On 13 November last year, the interim government issued the July National Charter (Constitutional Reform) Implementation Order. The provision for automatic constitutional amendment was removed. It was also announced that the parliamentary election and referendum would be held on the same day.

The order specified that a referendum would be held to implement the constitutional proposals of the July Charter. The referendum question was also fixed in the order. In presenting the proposals, notes of dissent were excluded on key issues such as the caretaker government system, appointment processes to constitutional bodies, formation of an upper house through proportional representation, and approval of constitutional amendments by the upper house. In other words, these proposals were to be implemented as outlined in the July Charter.

The issuance of this order also led to political disagreements. BNP had consistently argued that the President does not have the authority to issue such an order. However, it supported holding the election and referendum on the same day.

After the order was issued, BNP initially reacted against it but later did not strongly oppose it, giving the impression that it had accepted it. The party’s chairman, Tarique Rahman, also called for a “Yes” vote in the referendum.

However, after winning the election, BNP again opposed the order, describing it in parliament as “illegal” and “a document of endless deception by the interim government,” and made it clear that it would not take any initiative to implement constitutional reforms under this order. The referendum ordinance was also not approved in Parliament.

BNP stated that it would adhere strictly to the July Charter as signed, including the notes of dissent.

Why the referendum was held

The referendum was held mainly to approve two issues. Clause 3 of the Implementation Order states that, “for the exercise of the sovereign power of the people, this order and the constitutional reform section of the July National Charter shall be presented in a referendum.”

Clause 4 specified the question to be placed on the ballot: “Do you approve the July National Charter (Constitutional Reform) Implementation Order 2025 and the following proposals regarding constitutional reforms contained in the July National Charter?” (Yes/No):

(a) The caretaker government, Election Commission, and other constitutional bodies will be formed in accordance with the procedures outlined in the July Charter.

(b) The next parliament will be bicameral, with a 100-member upper house formed proportionally based on votes received by parties, and constitutional amendments will require approval by a majority of the upper house.

(c) The parties winning the next parliamentary election will be obliged to implement 30 reform proposals agreed upon in the July Charter, including increasing women’s representation, electing a deputy speaker and some committee chairs from the opposition, limiting the Prime Minister’s tenure, enhancing presidential powers, ensuring fundamental rights, judicial independence, and strengthening local government.

(d) Other reforms mentioned in the July Charter will be implemented according to party commitments.

According to the referendum question, notes of dissent by BNP on core issues—such as the caretaker system, appointments to constitutional bodies, structure and powers of the upper house, and amendment procedures—had no significance. These were passed as originally proposed in the July Charter, without including dissenting notes.

As a result, the referendum endorsed both the Implementation Order and the core reform proposals without dissent.

Before the vote, a source in the interim government indicated concern that BNP might secretly campaign for a “No” vote, which could result in rejection. Efforts were made to ensure BNP supported a “Yes” vote.

On 30 January, at an election rally in Rangpur, BNP Chairman Tarique Rahman urged voters to support both the party’s electoral symbol and vote “Yes” in the referendum in honour of the July Charter.

Referring to the interim government’s reform initiatives, Tarique Rahman said that day, “We have presented our reform proposals there. Broadly speaking, the proposals they have put forward are more or less the same as those we had presented to the public much earlier. There may be some differences with us on certain points. But if there are differences, we have not hidden them. We have openly told the people which ones we agree with and which ones we disagree with.”

However, after winning the election, BNP took a position against implementing the July National Charter Order and the results of the referendum. Home Minister Salahuddin Ahmed said on multiple days in the 13th parliament that since the first parliament began in 1973, the President no longer has the authority to issue such orders, and the July Charter Implementation Order is illegal.

The referendum ordinance issued under that order was also not approved in parliament. BNP stated that the referendum was conducted in a flawed manner, arguing that although there were four questions, there was only one option for answering.

However, BNP says it will fully implement the July Charter as it was signed, including the notes of dissent. Implementing the charter with dissent means that the core constitutional reform proposals will not be adopted. Instead, constitutional amendments will be made in line with BNP’s 31-point agenda and election manifesto.

Implementing the July Charter with dissent effectively means that the fundamental constitutional reform proposals will not be introduced. In that case, how far the goals outlined by the reform commission—such as preventing the establishment of constitutional authoritarianism, resisting any form of fascist rule, and ensuring decentralisation and adequate empowerment of state institutions—will be achieved remains an important question.

It also raises another question: how far such reforms are possible through changes in laws and regulations alone, without a transformation in political culture.​