Bangladesh Defense
There will be no disintegration.
Gen Bakshi's fertile fantasies notwithstanding.
What India will ensure though is the military and economic well-being of its sovereign territory.
By force if necessary.
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India’s manipulative diplomacy
THE recent visit of India’s foreign secretary to Dhaka came at a time charged with transformative potential and stakes that are unrivalled. To Bangladesh, the July uprising is more than just a tectonic shift; it’s a declaration of people’s will against tyranny, it is a beacon for nations under...www.newagebd.net
India’s manipulative diplomacy
Abu Rushd, M Zakir Hossain and Salman Chowdhury 11 December, 2024, 21:43
THE recent visit of India’s foreign secretary to Dhaka came at a time charged with transformative potential and stakes that are unrivalled. To Bangladesh, the July uprising is more than just a tectonic shift; it’s a declaration of people’s will against tyranny, it is a beacon for nations under oppression, and it is a call for unification.
For India, it is a moment of truth that will say whether it can look beyond manipulative diplomacy and move in tandem with the winds of change blowing across South Asia.
The decisions India took during this visit will have an impact far beyond Dhaka; it will define how the world views the region’s largest democracy as it charts a delicate Indo-Pacific and grapples with its own domestic discontent.
Manipulative diplomacy vs transparent leadership
THE fact that India will allow Sheikh Hasina to make a public statement from its soil before this visit is deeply problematic. It reflects an attempt to use her voice as a veiled threat to Bangladesh’s interim government before this visit, something not befitting the world’s largest democracy; it is rather a page out of the playbook of wily authoritarian states.
There are reasons why this strategy backfires:
Generation resilience: The Bangladeshi youth who went out unarmed against live ammunition will not be deterred by pressure tactics. This is a generation that, still unarmed, has defied snipers and APCs; they scoff at manipulative diplomacy.
Loss of trust: It only increases the lack of trust between India and the people of Bangladesh, spoiling the goodwill the relation ought to have.
For India to secure its place as a good neighbour, it must abandon such antiquated policy and adopt an evenhanded, transparent policy working in harmony with the sovereignty and desires of Bangladesh.
Line in the sand
INDIA needs to realise that the way it is treating Sheikh Hasina and her ousted regime at present may cause irreparable damage to its relations with the interim government, future governments, and, most importantly, the people of Bangladesh. The time for appeasement is over. It is a diplomatic and moral necessity now to arrest Sheikh Hasina immediately and put a halt on her ability to incite further violence in Bangladesh. All the members of her regime now hiding in India should be properly investigated with actionable action against the persons found guilty of crimes against humanity. Extradition proceedings against them should commence without further ado. Only this will signal that the Indian government has respect for justice and human rights.
The interim government of Bangladesh is not an ordinary administration; it is a government born of the blood of the people. In the July uprising, more than 1,500 lives were lost and thousands more maimed. Among the dead were children as young as three, innocents caught in the crossfire of tyranny, irrespective of religious or political beliefs. This government is not bound by mere political promises but by an unshakeable obligation to those who gave up everything to free their nation from Sheikh Hasina’s autocracy.
For India to expect the same level of manipulability it once enjoyed under Hasina is a grave miscalculation. This government is not beholden to foreign appeasement or quiet deals; it is answerable to the people who fought unarmed against a regime armed to the teeth. Only if cooperation with India is prefaced by real deeds that demonstrate India’s commitment to justice and democracy will it be viable. Arresting Hasina immediately would be a stepping stone towards that, nothing less than that.
India’s reputation on line
INDIA’S support for the autocratic regime of Sheikh Hasina does not happen in a vacuum but is under intense international scrutiny, mainly from Western democracies and human rights organisations. Such actions run the risk of erosion of global standing for any country that aspires to be a formidable nation in the Indo-Pacific and a beacon of democracy.
Much of India’s hold in the Indo-Pacific rests on its democratic credentials, which are already in question. By continuing to support Hasina, whose rule has been marked by electoral manipulation, human rights abuses, and suppression of minorities, India sends a contradictory message. These developments are being watched very closely by Western democracies, most especially by the US, Japan, and Australia. India’s tacit approval of Hasina’s oppressive tactics could weaken its position in alliances like the Quad.
The reputation of India as the ‘world’s largest democracy’ is already under question due to rising authoritarian tendencies domestically. Supporting a leader responsible for the deaths of 1,500 civilians during Bangladesh’s July uprising further erodes that perception. Human rights groups like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have already documented Hasina’s brutal crackdowns. India’s tacit approval not only sullies its democratic image but also bolsters accusations of complicity in these atrocities.
International attention is not merely rhetorical; it has real-world consequences. Global advocacy groups can magnify this censure, shaping foreign investments and partnerships. India needs to ask itself: Can it afford to be seen as the enabler of tyranny when the soft power of its reputation rests on its model of democracy?
Adani: national security threat
UNDER the Hasina regime, India allowed economic ties to get entangled with corruption and short-term gains. The Adani Group is exposed to serious allegations of running a monopoly of energy in Bangladesh with bloated prices, unfair contracts, and strategic risks.
The controversial energy deals, creating monopolistic control that mirrors another East India Company. In addition, Rahul Gandhi has raised concerns about Adani’s ties to Chinese logistics firms, further compromising India’s economic and security interests. It is undeniable that, by supporting regimes like Hasina’s, India has allowed strategic vulnerabilities to fester near its borders.
India’s silence on these issues raises uncomfortable questions on what it means by national security.
Why India needs to rethink narrative
INDIA’S support for Sheikh Hasina, even in her exile, has taken an insidious turn with narratives targeting the minorities in Bangladesh. Such narratives, cobbled together by her supporters and amplified by sympathetic elements in India, pose a twin threat: destabilising the very fabric of Bangladesh’s society and undermining India’s own reputation as a secular democracy.
Under Hasina’s leadership, Bangladesh’s minorities — Hindus, Buddhists, Christians, and indigenous communities — have faced unprecedented repression. Ironically, her exile to India has not stopped such divisive rhetoric; rather, reported targeted propaganda in India and abroad points toward a campaign of sowing discord within Bangladesh by portraying the revolution as anti-minority while masking Hasina’s track record of enabling systemic discrimination and violence.
This is not a story confined to Bangladesh. In India, supporters of Hasina are using this propaganda to conflate her plight with communal agendas by falsely depicting her as a protector of the minorities and demonising the revolutionaries who toppled her tyrannical regime.
In allowing such narratives to gain traction, India risks entrenching itself in a dangerous position. Here’s why such rhetoric is counterproductive for India:
Undermining regional stability: Support for Hasina’s communal rhetoric is a blow to Bangladesh’s efforts to heal from the July uprising. If the communal tensions reignite, the instability will spill into India — especially in sensitive regions such as Assam, Tripura, and West Bengal, where communal fault lines already exist.
Against secular values: India used to pride itself on its secular democracy; therefore, even implicitly standing by a leader known to oppress minorities tarnishes this image. Continued support for this narrative weakens India’s moral standing and further fuels criticism from international human rights organisations.
Alienating future generations in Bangladesh: The Bangladeshi youths who fought for democracy and inclusivity during the July uprising now look at India with suspicion because of its apparent support for Hasina. This mistrust could sour future bilateral relations and reduce India’s influence in its neighbour’s affairs.
Undermining domestic cohesion: By allowing the rhetoric of Hasina to grow unstopped, it emboldens communal elements in India. Tensions between India’s own religious communities are threatened to be ignited, undermining domestic harmony and social cohesion.
India needs to take note of the larger significance of Hasina’s minority rhetoric and its potential to destabilise both countries. India should distance itself from Hasina’s propaganda machine and publicly reaffirm its support for Bangladesh’s democratic aspirations, including the protection of minorities. Counter Hasina’s false narratives with the proof of the inclusiveness of the uprising through the stories of Hindus, Muslims, Christians, and Buddhists united against tyranny and engage in fact-based diplomacy.
Defining moment for South Asia
INDIA now stands at a historic juncture. Will India rise to the occasion, supporting Bangladesh’s democratic rebirth, or will it cling to alliances that undermine its values and interests? Its actions in Bangladesh are not just a test of diplomatic finesse but of its commitment to its own identity as the world’s largest democracy. The choice is stark: to stand with the democratic aspirations of Bangladesh’s people or tacitly to endorse a discredited autocracy sowing division and oppression.
Sheikh Hasina’s rule represents a world, one where there has been corruption, repression, and fear. The blood-stained streets of the July Revolution call for another kind of future. Taking Sheikh Hasina into custody and pulling down her propaganda machinery would signal that India respects justice and human rights and also proves willing to be a principled regional leader.
Its credibility with allies, its image as a secular democracy, and its ability to cooperate with South Asian countries all depend on its ability to shed outdated, manipulative tactics. In standing with the people of Bangladesh, in supporting their democratic rebirth, India can secure a partnership based on trust. The stakes are high. The eyes of the world are upon us. History will remember if India chose courage over convenience, justice over expediency, and unity over division. The time for half-measures has gone. Now is the time to lead with bold, unequivocal action.
Abu Rushd is president of the Institute of Strategy and Tactics Research. M Zakir Hossain Khan serves as director of nature and integrity and Salman Chowdhury is director of national security and external affairs at the ISTR.
Islam and democracy are not compatible with each other. All those radicals who topples the elected government say that the government which was elected was autocratic and the one which is air dropped by US deep state is democratic. Vinash kale viparit buddhihi.
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The term was invented/popularized by a veteran Indian journalist Ravish Kumar and used extensively by current opposition in India in common political parlance. I don't know how it could be offensive, but as requested, will be seen as such by yours truly.
If Godi Media can be considered offensive, can Jamati be considered offensive too? Food for thought...
Godi media - Wikipedia
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Hasina's govt. WAS autocratic, which you Indians have little knowledge of.
Ballot boxes were filled with fake ballots at the stroke of midnight, it is well-documented. No one can call that democratic.
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Chest puffery notwithstanding, read the following from a Western perspective. Will be educational for you. This is only part of the Mukti Bahini narrative (400~500 frogmen), who did the majority of crucial work for Indian Army's showy success and drama of 1971. Think what would happen if these assets (now grown over a hundred fold) would work against you rather than for you.
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Lessons in Maritime Insurgency from the Mukti Bahini Freedom Fighters of 1971
Editor’s note: This article is part of Project Maritime, which explores modern challenges and opportunities in the maritime dimension at the intersection of irregular warfare and strategic competition. We warmly invite your participation and engagement as we embark on this project. Please send...
irregularwarfare.org
Lessons in Maritime Insurgency from the Mukti Bahini Freedom Fighters of 1971
September 20, 2023 by Christopher Booth Leave a CommentEditor’s note: This article is part of Project Maritime, which explores modern challenges and opportunities in the maritime dimension at the intersection of irregular warfare and strategic competition. We warmly invite your participation and engagement as we embark on this project. Please send submissions to submissions@irregularwarfare.org with the subject line “Project Maritime Submission” and follow us on X (formerly Twitter) @proj_maritime.
Between August and November 1971, amid the Bangladesh Liberation War, frogmen of the Bengali Mukti Bahini “Freedom Fighters” sank more than 100,000 tons of merchant shipping and damaged another 50,000 tons in their struggle for independence against the military regime of West Pakistan. These attacks left international shipping in what was then East Pakistan vulnerable and practically uninsurable. They knocked out power plants, destroyed bridges, severed the military’s sea lines of communication, and brought production and export of its major crops (tea and jute) to a near standstill. In a remarkable feat, a little more than 500 men, trained and equipped in a covert action program by Indian Naval Intelligence, had an outsized impact on the conflict. With a growing emphasis on asymmetric maritime options in modern resistance campaigns against conventionally superior adversaries such as Russia and China, the frogmen of the Mukti Bahini provide a relevant, yet underexplored, model at the intersection of modern maritime irregular operations and proxy warfare. The actions of the “Water Rats” demonstrate the impact that a small, but sufficiently resourced covert action campaign can have in support of an enthusiastic and motivated resistance movement.
With parallels to recent maritime raids, attacks, and reconnaissance activity conducted by Ukrainian regular, irregular, paramilitary, and special operations forces (including the Ukrainian Maritime Special Operators of the 73rd Spetsnaz), the Mukti Bahini frogmen demonstrated the outsized operational impact that a campaign of tactical maritime attacks could have in a theater. As an irregular guerrilla force, the frogmen planned and carried out independent operations while also being the beneficiaries of equipment and training provided clandestinely by Indian naval intelligence. The success of the Mukti Bahini frogmen was not a result of superior equipment, but instead based on their daring, their knowledge of the local environment, and the ability to leverage these skills to maximize their impact against enemy maritime targets (similar to Ukraine’s successful strikes against the Moskva, Kerch Bridge, a landing ship in the Russian port of Novorossiysk; and the recent cruise missile strikes in Crimea that critically damaged another landing ship and a Kilo-class submarine). The impact of the frogmen on Pakistan’s ability to support its forces in Bangladesh and the larger Pakistani economy is a bright chapter in the slim volume of successful irregular maritime campaigns, demonstrating how effective India’s Directorate of Naval Intelligence’s covert action program was (an operation that only in recent years has India begun to acknowledge).
The Mukti Bahini have largely been overlooked in Western professional literature, and in particular their naval element – generally referred to as Mukti Bahini frogmen – has received scant attention. This oversight is especially noteworthy in contrast to the attention devoted to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and their “Sea Tigers” who are regularly discussed as an exemplar for a maritime irregular force, despite being ultimately unsuccessful in obtaining a Tamil homeland. That Mukti Bahini frogmen conducted combat operations for less than a year (and were eclipsed even in Bangladeshi memory by the actions of the guerrilla forces on land, many of whom later led the government), in what was for the West largely an unfamiliar area of the world, may have contributed to their relative obscurity. But sufficient material is now available to allow for a deeper investigation of this maritime campaign. Sources include English-language memoirs from Bengali and Indian participants, contemporaneous articles from foreign correspondents, declassified records from the British Foreign Office (which include the later Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO) records), and documents made available in the CIA’s Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room.
To better understand the role played by the maritime element of the Bengali guerrillas this article will first provide historical context for the broader liberation struggle. Thereafter, it will consider the Mukti Bahini’s naval campaign against the forces of West Pakistan. Finally, the piece will evaluate any continued salience from this historical example from half-a-century ago in this new high-tech era of drones, global communications, AI, and great power competition.
1971: Crisis engulfs the Indian subcontinent
Now as then, a debate continues on how to frame the conflict that led to an independent Bangladesh. For Bengalis it was their foundational struggle. For Pakistan’s military and political elite an apparent betrayal by their strategic allies: the United States, and China. To India, the war in East Pakistan was perhaps a mere secondary theater in India’s ongoing and protracted conflict with Pakistan. Even minor parties, had roles in the margins of the conflict, such as the Mizo rebels from India’s restive Northeast who were sheltered by Pakistan, or the “Phantoms of Chittagong” the Tibetan Special Frontier Force who rather than helping liberate their homeland from China’s People’s Liberation Army conducted commando raids against Pakistani troops in the Chittagong Hill Tracts.
The fighting in Bangladesh also provided a Cold War sideshow, with India signing the Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty with the Soviet Union in 1971 as a counter-weight to the US, the United Kingdom, and China – which India saw aligning against it. India’s first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru was a founder of the “non-aligned movement” and reticent to be too closely tied to the United States; this treaty with the Soviet Union helped further deepen India’s ties to Russia and reliance on Russian military equipment, which continued for generations. (The US had also equipped Pakistan with substantial armaments, furthering India’s concerns.)
Following the partition of India in 1947, the nation of Pakistan was created with two wings: West Pakistan (now the nation of Pakistan) and East Pakistan (now Bangladesh), separated by the near entirety of the Indian subcontinent. The two enclaves shared only Islam in common, and were divided by language, ethnicity, with different histories and a lack of shared culture. The Punjabi elite who ran West Pakistan generally looked down upon the Bengalis in the East as peasants and rice farmers lacking martial valor. In 1948, Islamabad declared Urdu the only official language of Pakistan. On February 21, 1952, the military opened fire on Bengali students demonstrating in favor of using Bangla at Dacca university, killing several and wounding hundreds. (Bangladesh commemorates this date as foundational in their struggle, and the United Nations has recognized February 21st as “International Mother Language Day.” In December 1970, after years of lack of investment and economic serfdom by West Pakistan (which East Pakistan’s population outnumbered), and in an effort to demonstrate their political power, the Bengalis voted as a unified voting bloc supporting the Awami League (led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman – father of Bangladesh’s current Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina Wazed). The population of East Pakistan captured 167 of 311 seats in the Pakistani parliament. Largely influenced by then foreign minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, later to be Prime Minister and also father of slain Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, the military junta decided in March 1971 to arrest Rahman and Awami League leadership, and instituted a violent crackdown: Operation Searchlight, which sought to break resistance and involved wanton execution, torture, and mass rape. While most Bengalis are Muslim, religion was not the defining focus, instead the Bangla language became an organizing principle of the independence movement.
With millions of refugees flooding into India, as early as April 1971, Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi requested military options to invade East Pakistan to depose the Pakistani government there. Chief of the Indian Army, Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw asked for a delay until December to both allow for his forces to be properly trained and staged, and to avoid invading the Bengali floodplains during monsoon season. Supporting the Bengali insurgency in the interim served to degrade Pakistan’s forces and bought time for well-planned Indian assault during more favorable conditions.
Indian Goals
While India has historically sought to portray its involvement in the 1971 war as a selfless undertaking, conducted on humanitarian grounds, India had its own strategic objectives as well. An obvious concern was the influx of 10 million refugees destabilizing its borders, the largest number to flee war in recorded history. Academic literature suggests that refugees themselves may serve as a catalyst for interstate conflict, and this conflict was no exception. The Indian military sought a more dramatic victory than the inconclusive result of the war with Pakistan in 1965, to demonstrate its arrival as a modern military that could execute combined arms operations (both the Indian Air Force and Navy felt shortchanged in the 1965 war). India also sought to stamp out Pakistani (and Chinese) covert support to guerrillas fighting in India’s Northeastern provinces.
A significant development from India’s loss to China in their 1962 war was the development of India’s external intelligence service, the Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW or RAW).
In 1965, the head of Indian military intelligence proposed the creation of an agency to gather foreign and military intelligence. In September 1968, RAW was established, drawing much of its staff from the internal service – the Intelligence Bureau. Its first chief, Rameshwar Nath Kao, laid out two priority tasks: (1) collect intelligence on Pakistan and China, and (2) prepare to conduct covert action in East Pakistan. A key goal was to disrupt Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence’s support to separatist groups fighting in India’s northeastern “Seven Sisters” provinces. ISI allowed training camps in East Pakistan, and by 1968 Chinese intelligence was also providing aid as well.
Nehru, India’s first Prime Minister, had largely eliminated India’s covert action capability, focusing instead on internal security. With the establishment of RAW, the Indian government reversed this decision, and granted RAW a covert action mandate. Nehru’s daughter – Prime Minister Indira Gandhi – saw a larger opportunity to truncate Pakistan through covert action by training and equipping Bengali guerrillas to break East Pakistan off from West Pakistan. This campaign would also buy India six-months to posture its forces to invade while it bled the Pakistani defenders and drained their supplies. Notably, in his memoirs, one of the founders of RAW, B. Rahman, wrote that one of the purposes of India’s support for the Bengali rebels was “to put an end to the activities of the ISI in India’s North-East from East Pakistan.”
Supporting the Mukti Bahini
In early 1971, the Indian Army began to undertake Operation Jackpot, a plan to train and equip up to 100,000 Mukti Bahini in India, providing four-to-six weeks of training in small arms, light automatic weapons, mortars and explosives. The Mukti Bahini were divided into conventional forces, and a guerrilla element. The RAW primarily focused on training 10,000 of the Mujib Bahini – a cadre arising from the Awami League’s student organization.
The Indian Navy, sensitive to the minor roles it had played in past conflicts, sought to take the fight to Pakistan across two fronts: via conventional naval ships, and secondly through development of an irregular maritime capability made up by Bengali insurgents. Chief of the Indian Naval Staff Admiral Sardarilal M. Nanda and the Director of Naval Intelligence (DNI) then-Captain Mihir K. Roy recognized the importance of the sea lines of communication for West Pakistan’s ability to reinforce its military in the East, the sole means of transporting jet fuel, gasoline for its tanks, ammunition, and food staples. Thus, they established “Naval Operations X” to train, equip, and mentor a Bengali frogman program. The DNI sketched out an initial concept to train Water Rats, his concept of “small, aggressive predators” who would strike from the rivers and littorals. Ultimately, “Operation X” or Naval Commando Operation X (NCO(X)) trained some 400 Bengali frogmen in combat swimming and diving, demolition, and sabotage – primarily using limpet mines. The majority of these frogmen were chosen from a base of educated student refugees who were young and fit. They were selected to return to regions where they had geographic knowledge.
Foundations of the Mukti Bahini
The Mukti Bahini began as a conventional force of volunteers from the East Bengal Regiment, an infantry regiment, and East Pakistan Rifles, a border constabulary – now known as Border Guard Bangladesh, who revolted against Islamabad’s Army. Officers who defected included Colonel M.A.G. Osmani who commanded Mukti Bahini forces in Bangladesh, and Major Zia-ur-Rahman who later served as President of Bangladesh (his widow, Khaleda, has subsequently twice served as Prime Minister). On March 26, 1971 Islamabad banned the Awami League, declared the independence leader Sheikh Rahman a traitor and imposed martial law in East Pakistan. In response, the second-in-command of the East Bengal Rifles, Zia Ur-Rahman declared Bengali independence in a radio broadcast.
The Mukti Bahini frogmen had a more unusual genesis than their land-based counterparts. Word of the crackdown and independence movement reached the French naval base in Toulon, where a Bengali naval telegraph operator named Abdul Wahed Chowdhury learned of it. Chowdhury served on PNS Mangro, Pakistan’s third and newly acquired French Daphné-class submarine, and was part of the crew being trained by the French navy on how to operate it. Not wanting to attack other Bengalis, Chowdhury mobilized other Bengali crewmen who fled France, aided by Indian diplomats, to a secret jungle training site in India’s West Bengal state where they made up the founding core of the Mukti Bahini frogmen. Over a long career, Chowdhury went on to serve as Director of Naval Intelligence for Bangladesh.
As the last hours of 14 August 1971 ticked away, 176 frogmen attacked targets across modern day Bangladesh. NCO(X) chose Pakistan’s independence day to initiate the campaign, which they did through a series of songs broadcast on an Indian radio station. The combat swimmers were armed with limpet mines and equipped solely with dive fins, swim trunks, and dive knives to remove barnacles and allow their bombs to adhere to boat hulls six feet below the waterline. In an hour, 25 vessels had been struck, with 44,500 tons sunk and another 14,000 tons damaged. Vessels included: merchant ships, naval gunboats, and oil tankers. The attacks buoyed the morale of the Mukti Bahini ground forces, and resulted in an immediate reallocation of Pakistani troops. No longer focused on solely on a land-based counterinsurgency, Pakistani infantry was redeployed to port and river security missions. (Chowdhury and two other insurgents were nearly captured in the days before the raid, as they were visiting various frogmen in safe houses, and stopped. Luckily for them, the wife of one of conspirators had insisted on coming along, and this ruse helped eliminate suspicion and the guards let their vehicle pass.)
The frogmen became a tool for maritime trade warfare, cutting off valuable exports, and striking at the heart of Pakistani military logistics. Forty-five vessels were struck in the five-month campaign, sinking over 100,000 tons of shipping. Declassified British FCO records document internal government discussions, debates with shippers, and ultimately rates issued by Lloyds of London in consultation with the War Risks Club, that effectively made trade uninsurable. As their campaign gained steam Mukti Bahini naval attacks became more brazen, moving from mining ships to using speedboats to attack power plants and foreign vessels attempting to navigate narrow channels to reach the sea. Modern observers may note a similar evolution in Ukrainian tactics and operations as the war in Ukraine has evolved over 18 months.
By November 1971, the British Prime Minister was tracking the issue closely, after a British vessel the City of St. Albans carrying 5,000 tons of jute was attacked by boats firing Bofors-type recoilless rifles. That month CIA informed policymakers that jute exports had been reduced by more than 50 percent, tea production was under a quarter of the year prior, and even this “small amount will not reach the ports” unless the military could secure transportation routes. By December, analysts noted that the attacks on oil deliveries to Chittagong had limited East Pakistan to under 30 days’ supply at the outset of hostilities with India.
Backbreaking under the waterline
Much like a shaped charge, the Water Rats of the Mukti Bahini demonstrate the impact that a small, well-trained, and deadly force can have in maritime conflict. Operation X also illustrates the value of a properly scoped and focused covert action campaign using a foreign proxy force can have in support of larger strategic objectives (in this case to buy India’s Army greater time to prepare for combat, and degrade Pakistan’s forces in advance of India’s invasion of East Pakistan). While ultimately not decisive on its own, the maritime campaign nevertheless played a critical role in providing breathing space for the guerrilla ground troops. It also damaged Pakistani morale and reduced the number of Pakistani forces that could conduct operations against the land-based Mukti Bahini forces, as soldiers were diverted to harbor patrols and river security. Furthermore, their actions sapped the Pakistani economy and softened up Pakistani forces in the East prior to the Indian invasion. Indian training and equipping of a mere 400 to 500 insurgents had an outsized influence in the conflict. The frogmen operated without even SCUBA gear; at most they used flippers and some reeds as snorkels. Teams operated with limited guidance, and frequently executed attacks on their own initiative as communication with the Indian navy was either one-way, via radio broadcasts or hand-carried messages. This avoidance of technology, reliance on area knowledge, and local support and foraging made them very difficult to detect by Pakistani forces. Limpet mines were cheap, yet effective, not only sinking ships but holding others at risk: International shippers and insurance companies were unwilling to hazard their risk against multi-million-dollar ships and cargoes. Western militaries should consider the value of identifying motivated and educated volunteers without military backgrounds (a factor Russian forces have looked for at checkpoints and when seizing Ukrainian towns). One-way broadcasts, such as the songs played on Indian radio, have downsides, but can also provide an unbreakable code for sending messages to guerrillas. For these and many other reasons, the Bengali frogmen and their successful maritime campaign are worthy of additional study.
Christopher D. Booth served on active duty as an Army armor and cavalry officer and was a fellow in the General Robert H. Barrow Fellowship for Strategic Competition and the Brute Krulak Center for Innovation & Creativity.
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The term was invented/popularized by a veteran Indian journalist Ravish Kumar and used extensively by current opposition in India in common political parlance. I don't know how it could be offensive, but as requested, will be seen as such by yours truly.
If Godi Media can be considered offensive, can Jamati be considered offensive too? Food for thought...
Godi media - Wikipedia
en.wikipedia.org
That is why I supported you when you used the word "Godi media".
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Thanks brother. Hindu or Muslim, it is all incumbent upon us to communicate and get the real story.
In Bangladeshi temples, saffron dhwajas will fly, bells and shankha will sound. Church bells will ring.
In mosques, people will go to Namaaz. Buddhists will prostrate to Buddha.
We can all live in peace and prosper with being brothers and sisters.
Let peace prevail.
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