[🇧🇩] Indo-Bangla Relation: India's Regional Ambition, Geopolitical Reality, and Strategic Options For Bangladesh

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Imports from India rise, exports remain almost unchanged

Bangladesh’s imports from India continue to rise despite restrictions imposed by both countries on the movement of some goods, while exports to the neighbouring country remained almost unchanged.

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Imports from India rise, exports remain almost unchanged

Refayet Ullah Mirdha

Bangladesh’s imports from India continue to rise despite restrictions imposed by both countries on the movement of some goods, while exports to the neighbouring country remained almost unchanged.

The country imported goods worth $10.96 billion from India in fiscal year 2025-26, up from $9.62 billion a year earlier, according to National Board of Revenue (NBR) data.

In contrast, exports to India stood at $1.75 billion in FY26, compared with $1.76 billion in the previous fiscal year.

The figures show that trade between the two neighbours has continued despite restrictions introduced over the past two years, particularly on the movement of goods through land ports.

Bangladeshi businesses say Indian yarn, cotton, fabrics and other industrial raw materials remain in demand because of their competitive rates, and because some international buyers specify particular fabrics or yarn from India.

After China, India is Bangladesh’s second-largest trading partner and the country’s largest trading partner in South Asia.

The trade gap between the two countries, however, remains wide, with Bangladesh importing more than six times as much from India as it exports to the country.

Businesses and economists say Bangladesh has scope to raise exports to India, but the country’s export basket remains heavily concentrated in apparel.

India granted Bangladesh duty-free market access in 2010, with one year of retrospective effect, for all products except 25 alcoholic and beverage items under the South Asian Free Trade Area’s (SAFTA) least developed country category.

Although exports have increased since then, the growth has not been enough to narrow the trade gap.

M Masrur Reaz, chairman of the Policy Exchange Bangladesh, said three factors are limiting Bangladesh’s exports to India.

“Firstly, India has its own import-substitute goods such as garments; secondly, India has a long list of standard requirements, and thirdly, both Bangladesh and India could not establish a regional value chain yet,” he said.

He suggested signing the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) between the two countries to expand bilateral trade.

The two countries have introduced a series of trade restrictions since the political changeover in Bangladesh in 2024.

In March 2025, Bangladesh’s commerce ministry asked the National Board of Revenue to take steps to restrict yarn imports through land ports to protect the local textile and spinning sector. In early April, India suspended a transhipment facility used by Bangladesh to send garments to third countries through Indian airports.

The NBR restricted yarn imports from India through land ports. Yarn imports from India are now allowed only through Chattogram port.

India later imposed restrictions on the import of garments, agro-processed food, jute goods, furniture and some other Bangladeshi goods through land ports.

Despite the restrictions, imports of Indian goods continued to rise.

Showkat Aziz Russell, president of the Bangladesh Textile Mills Association, said yarn imports from India doubled to around Tk 30,000 crore in FY26 from Tk 14,000 crore a year earlier.

“The higher import of yarn through the seaport is the real reflection of yarn imports from India. Because when yarn was allowed to be imported through the land ports, a lot of yarn used to be imported through informal channels, meaning it was smuggled in,” he said.

Russell said restrictions on yarn imports through land ports should not be lifted. He argued that local textile mills are facing higher production costs and competition from imported yarn.

Mahmud Hasan Khan, president of the Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Exporters Association, said businesses have raised trade-related issues in different forums to increase exports to India.

He said Bangladesh should be able to export more goods through land ports and gain greater access to the Indian market.

Mohammad Hatem, president of the Bangladesh Knitwear Manufacturers and Exporters Association, said the recent trade disputes have commercial implications but require a political solution.

“It needs a political solution from the top-level leaders of both countries,” Hatem said.

MA Razzaque, chairman of Research and Policy Integration for Development, said the issue of land ports is part of a wider bilateral relationship.

“The land port is not an issue alone; it is a matter of a warm relationship between Bangladesh and India,” he said.

He said better bilateral relations could support stronger trade because both countries stood to gain from greater commercial engagement.

Md Abdul Wahed, former honorary joint secretary general of the India-Bangladesh Chamber of Commerce and Industry, said trade could increase if the movement of major goods through land ports resumes.

Md Fazlul Hoque, administrator of the Federation of Bangladesh Chambers of Commerce and Industry, called for discussions between the two countries to ease trade rules.​

 

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Past can't be forgotten, yet dwelling on the past not an option: Dinesh Trivedi

India’s High Commissioner to Bangladesh Dinesh Trivedi has said development work will not be possible by being stuck in the past. He said the past cannot be forgotten, yet being stuck in the past is not an option.

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Past can't be forgotten, yet dwelling on the past not an option: Dinesh Trivedi

Staff Correspondent
Dhaka

Dinesh Trivedi File photo

India’s High Commissioner to Bangladesh Dinesh Trivedi has said development work will not be possible by being stuck in the past.

He said the past cannot be forgotten, yet being stuck in the past is not an option.

Dinesh Trivedi made the remarks while speaking to journalists after a meeting with Local Government Minister Abdul Moyeen Khan at the Secretariat on Tuesday.

Replying to a query, the Indian high commissioner said he did not want to talk about internal politics. He said such matters should not be discussed. “Whatever the people of Bangladesh deem best, will be done. The party that won two-thirds of the seats is in power, and they understand the situation of the country better,” he said.

State Minister for Local Government Mir Shahe Alam said local elections were discussed during the bilateral meeting. The Indian high commissioner shared his country’s experience of local elections. He has experience with local elections, the state minister said.

The state minister further said local government elections would be held in Bangladesh during the current fiscal year. This time, the election will be quite challenging, he said, as the government has to ensure a free and fair election.

Dinesh Trivedi said their main goal is to maintain direct relations with the people of the two countries. This will always remain. If I am not here, someone else will come. The decision will remain the same, he said.

The Indian high commissioner said, “The decisions we make have an impact on common people. So, our responsibility is to do what is good for common people.”

“As neighbours, our responsibilities increase. We are all equal. No one is big and no one is small,” Dinesh Trivedi added.

Dinesh Trivedi also said he has learned many things during the 30-minute meeting with the local government minister.

Replying to a query during the meeting, Dinesh Trivedi said there would be challenges, but they have to move forward keeping the challenges in mind. He added that free trade was discussed during the bilateral meeting.

Asked whether there had been any discussion about Prime Minister Tarique Rahman’s visit to India, Dinesh Trivedi did not comment. At the time, he spoke about the two countries working together.​

 

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Tarique Rahman’s India visit and the end of automatic deference

When a decision over whether to accept an invitation from New Delhi becomes a statement in itself, it signals that Bangladesh-India relations have indeed entered a new phase.

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Tarique Rahman’s India visit and the end of automatic deference

Shakeel Anwar

VISUAL: ANWAR SOHEL

When a decision over whether to accept an invitation from New Delhi becomes a statement in itself, it signals that Bangladesh-India relations have indeed entered a new phase. Prime Minister Tarique Rahman’s decision not to immediately accept India’s invitation has triggered an unusually emotional response across sections of the Indian media. Meanwhile, Dhaka has maintained a noticeably restrained position: no rejection or public confrontation—only the insistence that any visit requires a “conducive environment” and that no final decision has yet been made.

This is not simply a story about a postponed bilateral visit. It is a story about how Bangladesh is attempting to redefine the grammar of its relationship with its giant neighbour. For decades, an early visit to New Delhi by a newly elected leader carried symbolic value. It was seen as signalling validation, legitimacy, goodwill, and a willingness to place India at the centre of Bangladesh’s regional diplomacy. That convention is now being clearly questioned.

One may recall how Indian High Commissioner to Bangladesh Dinesh Trivedi, while addressing an event in Dhaka on August 18, spoke of making Tarique Rahman’s Delhi visit “memorable.” Yet Dhaka chose not to confirm the visit. This seems to signal that high-level engagement with India can no longer be separated from several unresolved bilateral issues affecting Bangladesh’s sovereignty and democratic legitimacy. From Dhaka’s perspective, three issues stand out.

First, Dhaka has formally requested the extradition of former prime minister Sheikh Hasina to face judicial proceedings. India has neither accepted nor rejected the request, saying it is examining it under its legal procedures. For the BNP government, this is not merely a legal matter; it also concerns Bangladesh’s sovereign right to prosecute alleged crimes committed on its territory.

Second, Dhaka viewed India’s decision to allow Sheikh Hasina and her son to hold a press conference in New Delhi, where they sharply criticised Bangladesh’s government, as an affront to its sovereignty. Another unresolved issue concerns the border push-ins. Bangladesh has repeatedly accused Indian border forces of pushing people across the frontier without due process. Such unilateral actions undermine its control over its own borders—another core element of state sovereignty.

So, rather than rushing to accept the invitation, Tarique opted to sequence diplomacy, signalling that a ceremonial visit should follow, rather than precede, progress on issues that deeply resonate with the citizens. Unlike in the past, the government enters such negotiations with a relatively strong political mandate. More importantly, Bangladesh’s foreign policy options have widened of late.

Within months of taking office, Tarique prioritised visits to Malaysia and China before India. Dhaka has simultaneously deepened engagement with Gulf states while maintaining constructive relations with western countries. Discussions about closer security cooperation with Gulf partners—including proposals linked to the Mecca pact—illustrate how Bangladesh’s strategic options are broadening (even if no formal decision has been made). Whether one describes this as multi-vector diplomacy or strategic balancing, the underlying message is clear: Bangladesh no longer wishes to be seen as operating within a single country’s diplomatic orbit.

That, however, does not diminish India’s importance. India remains Bangladesh’s most consequential bilateral partner. It is a critical trading partner and an important energy supplier. But Bangladesh is equally important to India’s northeastern connectivity and border security, as well as being a market worth roughly $11 billion for Indian exports. Closer ties, however, will require both sides to navigate the unresolved issues surrounding Sheikh Hasina, cross-border tensions, and the wider trust deficit that has emerged as Bangladesh expands its strategic partnerships.

For the BNP government, Hasina’s continued political interventions from India have become a question of sovereignty. For New Delhi, handing over a former prime minister carries potential political and legal consequences. Neither side can easily concede without incurring domestic costs. The dispute is now less about one individual’s fate than about whether each government acknowledges the other’s political sensitivities.

In this saga, perhaps the most troubling development has come not from official diplomacy but from parts of India’s television and digital media ecosystem. Several opinion pieces and primetime discussions portrayed Bangladesh as an unreliable neighbour that must be “taught a lesson,” or warned against drifting towards China and Pakistan. Some framed Tarique’s hesitation as an affront to “India’s generosity.” Media rhetoric can gradually narrow diplomatic space. Every televised threat or nationalist headline strengthens anti-India sentiment inside Bangladesh, making compromise politically more difficult for Dhaka. Equally, every anti-India slogan in Bangladesh reinforces hawkish voices in New Delhi.

For much of the past decade or so, New Delhi viewed Bangladesh primarily through the lens of border security and the stability provided by Sheikh Hasina’s government. That framework no longer reflects its political reality. Treating every disagreement as evidence of Chinese or Pakistani influence risks becoming a strategic misreading. Alienating Bangladesh through coercive rhetoric serves little strategic purpose. As a confident regional and aspiring global power, India should not expect automatic deference from its neighbours. Instead, it should create political conditions in which cooperation becomes rational and the mutually beneficial choice. That lesson is evident across much of South Asia, where relations with neighbours such as Nepal, Sri Lanka, the Maldives, and now Bangladesh have often become more difficult whenever perceptions of Indian dominance have overshadowed the language of partnership.

For the Muslim-majority Bangladesh, there is an additional layer of unease. The rise of anti-Muslim and anti-Bangladeshi rhetoric in India’s domestic politics has gradually eroded the goodwill that India once enjoyed among many in Bangladesh. For decades, India was admired not only for its role in Bangladesh’s Liberation War, but also for its democratic institutions, secular traditions, and cultural pluralism. As that image has come under strain, public perceptions in Bangladesh have changed as well. This shift in sentiment is increasingly shaping the country’s domestic politics and narrowing the space for pursuing a visibly India-friendly policy.

However, Bangladesh should resist reducing India to a permanent adversary. Geography is an enduring reality. Nearly every major issue, ranging from water and migration to energy and regional trade, requires sustained cooperation regardless of political differences. Tarique Rahman has not declared a diplomatic rupture with India, nor has Narendra Modi withdrawn the invitation. That is encouraging.

The real test now is whether both governments can move beyond the assumptions that defined the past. Bangladesh rightly seeks recognition as a sovereign equal rather than a subservient junior partner. Tarique Rahman’s cautious approach signals that Bangladesh is prepared to engage India on the basis of mutual respect—not automatic deference. India, understandably, seeks reassurance that a changing Bangladesh will remain a constructive regional partner. But it must also respect Dhaka’s demand for reciprocity. Only then can a future Delhi visit become memorable.

Shakeel Anwar is a former journalist at the BBC.​