🇧🇩 Indo-Bangla Relation: India's Regional Ambition, Geopolitical Reality, and Strategic Options For Bangladesh

India needs to pursue equal partnership with Bangladesh

Gautam Adani, founder and chairman of India’s Adani Group, meets former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina at Gono Bhaban on July 15, 2023. PHOTO: X/Gautam Adani

India is often portrayed as Bangladesh's closest ally. The two nations share a strategic partnership grounded in shared history, economic interdependence and strong cultural ties. However, this relationship has frequently been characterised by a power imbalance, with India being in a position to exert dominance over Bangladesh. If Bangladesh and India are to forge a more equitable friendship, three existing bilateral issues need to be addressed.

A vexing issue that has been in deadlock for decades is the disadvantages imposed on Bangladesh for being a lower riparian state. Even though the recent floods cannot solely be attributed to India opening the Dumbur dam, the situation serves as an eye-opener on our water-sharing agreements (or lack thereof), flood management capacity, and the need for bilateral negotiations where both countries can mitigate the damages from heavy rainfall without harming the other. Teesta River's water-sharing agreement is one example. If current trends continue, the Teesta water shortage could lower Bangladesh's rice production by roughly 8 percent by 2030 and 14 percent by 2050. This scarcity raises production costs and risks for farmers and also triggers social issues such as migration, displacement, and poverty.

Even though Sheikh Hasina's government allowed India several benefits, including the upcoming railway line that will allow the transport of goods and travel of passengers (including military personnel) from India to its seven northeastern states via Bangladesh, Dhaka continues to be sidelined. Under Hasina's government, Dhaka had not been able to leverage its concessions to India to make progress with Teesta or other shared rivers. The interim government now has an opportunity to address this issue and build strong political consensus for a more equitable and sustainable water-sharing and flood mitigation arrangement between the two neighbours.

The second issue is the border killings between India and Bangladesh. Despite the close friendship between the two countries, the border is riddled with mindless deaths of Bangladeshis at the hands of the Indian Border Security Forces (BSF). Ain o Salish Kendra, a human rights organisation in Bangladesh, conservatively reported that between 2013 and 2023, 332 people were killed by the BSF, averaging 30 deaths per year. Aside from the killings, the BSF has also subjected Bangladeshis at the border to gruesome torture and abductions. It makes little sense for two countries that share exemplary ties to allow such lethality on their border. Although the leadership in India pledged zero deaths, this reality is yet to materialise as state promises are unaligned with BSF actions at the border. If the previous home advisor's words are an indication, the Bangladesh Border Guard (BGB) will no longer remain passive and retreat in border conflicts in the face of aggression from the Indian side. But more importantly, it is pertinent for the interim government to address the crisis and catalyse strong political will from its Indian counterparts to end the killings and bring to book the BSF soldiers who engaged in prior misconduct that led to the loss of lives and lifelong injuries of Bangladeshis.

A third contentious point that requires a comprehensive reassessment is Adani's Godda power plant in Jharkhand which charges Bangladesh an exorbitant, above-market rate. The deal was initiated back in 2015 by Modi—who Adani's chairman is close to—and signed in 2017 with Hasina's blessing, despite the deal not being favourable for Bangladesh, as reported by The Washington Post.

Even though a report by the non-profit AdaniWatch suggested Bangladesh might have at least two ways to exit the contract, it turns out that Adani made sure to insert clauses that prevent Bangladesh from leaving even if Adani breaches the contract. First, private coal-fired power plants in India can export electricity if only India has a power surplus, which it currently does not. Second, the contract states that the Bangladesh Power Development Board (BPDB) must pay a levy of taxes and duties that Adani itself is exempt from, especially since it was declared a Special Economic Zone (SEZ). BPDB was supposed to be officially informed of these changes for a price adjustment within 30 days, but Adani failed to do so. BPDB still went ahead with the contract, even fast-tracking it under the political compulsion of the Hasina government. Unfortunately, as The Daily Star pointed out, Bangladesh can only leave if Adani's breach of contract negatively impacts the latter's ability to produce electricity. As it stands, making unethical profits off the backs of Bangladeshi tax-payers will not be harming Adani's bottom line anytime soon.

Despite the ironclad agreement, there may be a way out. Unresolved disputes may be "settled in accordance with the Rules of Arbitration of the Singapore International Arbitration Centre, 2016, 6th Edition," according to a lawyer interviewed by The Daily Star. If such a pathway can be pursued, the interim government may probe into the matter to identify any scopes for dispute resolution. Getting out of this contract or renegotiating the prices would drastically minimise costs in a country that is already plagued with debts and dwindling foreign reserves.

Whether it's our riparian rights, contentious border killings, or power deals designed to empty Bangladesh's coffers, it is true that Bangladesh often gets the short end of the stick. But Bangladesh can leverage its advantage as a zone of influence for great power politics and make use of its concessions to its upper riparian neighbour to ensure the sustainable prosperity of its land and people. It is also in the best interest of both India and Bangladesh to ensure the survival and thriving of their long-lasting exemplary friendship—with transparency and broad political consensus benefitting both countries equally.

Afia Ibnat is a political analyst and executive member of a local non-profit.​

Dhaka, Delhi stress promoting bilateral relations
BSS
Published: 02 Oct 2024, 22: 48


Indian high commissioner Pranay Verma makes a courtesy call on the foreign affairs adviser Md Touhid Hossain at the foreign ministry in the capital on Wednesday BSS

Bangladesh and India have emphasized that the two neighbouring countries need to work together in promoting bilateral relations for the welfare of their people.

This was observed today, Wednesday while Indian high commissioner Pranay Verma paid a courtesy call on the foreign affairs adviser Md Touhid Hossain at the foreign ministry in the capital, a foreign ministry’s press release said.

During the meeting, the two sides discussed a range of bilateral issues, with particular emphasis on the resumption of regular visa processing by the Indian high commission.

Both the foreign adviser and the Indian envoy underscored the importance of activating the regular bilateral mechanisms between the two countries.

Touhid referred to his the meeting with Indian external affairs minister S Jaishankar on the sidelines of the 79th United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in New York in this regards.

They also explored opportunities for enhanced cooperation in trade, ongoing development projects, and fostering stronger people-to-people connections between Bangladesh and India.​

'India needs a clear security assurance from Bangladesh'



The India-Bangladesh relationship experienced some strains in the aftermath of the Awami League's fall and Sheikh Hasina being sheltered in India. Prof Sreeradha Datta, a South Asian expert who teaches international affairs at the Hariyana-based OP Jindal Global University, shared her views on the future of Bangladesh-India relations with The Daily Star's Diplomatic Correspondent Porimol Palma.


How is India looking at Bangladesh after Bangladesh's recent political change?

Historically, we have supported the Awami League (AL). We perceive that there is a possibility of an Islamist party takeover in Bangladesh if the AL is not in power. However, that is not the current reality in Bangladesh. It is true that India has worked extensively with the AL, which has increased bilateral trade volume and has also benefited Bangladesh. However, India does not have any policy that would prevent it from collaborating with any other government in Bangladesh.
The relationship with a sovereign state must be based on equity. This principle has been repeatedly emphasised by the current leadership in Bangladesh. Nevertheless, claims that India was responsible for the recent floods in Bangladesh's southeastern region are unfounded. Additionally, some senior Indian leaders have made remarks that were unnecessary and did not benefit either side.

What should be the immediate steps to improve the relations?

I believe Dhaka and New Delhi are already in contact. I propose that both countries hold formal dialogue at the earliest opportunity to resolve any outstanding issues. India needs a clear assurance that there will be no anti-Indian activities originating from within Bangladesh. The core problem is that India believes only the AL can address its security concerns, which I consider a misguided perception. If Dhaka assures Delhi that it will address India's security concerns, this could serve as the foundation for a strong relationship. At the same time, the interim government can also communicate to India which issues it should urgently address regarding Bangladesh.

The interim government has not said anything that can create such a perceived threat for India. So, why is India worried about it?

There have been attacks on Hindus in Bangladesh recently, and we understand the reasons behind these incidents. However, many other events are occurring that are not receiving adequate attention. What we are observing is that the BNP seems to be becoming quite vocal. Although the BNP is separate from the interim government, it appears that the party is gaining strength. The interim government should have the authority to manage any aggressive rhetoric, as it conveys the wrong message. Some experts argue that religious fundamentalism is not a big factor in Bangladesh, and I share this belief.

Dhaka said the Indian media has exaggerated the events of attacks on minorities. What is Delhi's understanding?

I agree that there is a lot of disinformation. However, a perception has developed in India that Hindus in Bangladesh are coming under attack because Hasina is not in power. While we know that such incidents are not as prevalent as portrayed in the media, the general public has developed a negative perception. On August 15, Prime Minister Narendra Modi spoke about the persecution of Hindu minorities in Bangladesh, but he failed to mention that others were also killed. He could have addressed that point. It's important to understand that this matter is related to our domestic politics. What I'm saying is that a negative perception is being cultivated. Therefore, the leaderships should meet and issue a joint statement affirming that the relationship will be as it should be between two sovereign states.

Border killings and water issues have been thorns in the relationship. How do you see it?

Border killings can be stopped if the two countries work together. Even if the number of killings is low, they should not occur between two friendly nations. In 2010, we stated that we would establish an agreement for the basin-wide management of our transboundary rivers and address the problems of other rivers, if not the Teesta. Why has this not been implemented? India must resolve the water issue. Just as security is important for India, water is equally important for Bangladesh. Even if there had been an interim arrangement for water sharing, the typical anti-India sentiment would not be as strong as it is now. Given that the water-sharing issue has always been an emotional one for Bangladesh, India must do the right thing.

There is a perception that India benefited more from the agreements or MoUs signed during the AL regime. There is a discussion those may be reviewed.

It may not look good to India, but Bangladesh can certainly review those agreements. I know that many MoUs may not have been discussed in parliament. I believe that the connectivity projects implemented thus far benefit both countries. However, if Bangladesh wants to review any deal, such as the one concerning transit, it is entitled to do so. India has not acted in a non-transparent manner. In fact, I think it would be beneficial for the MoUs to be revisited. Doing so will clarify whether the MoUs are useful or not.

Work of some projects under the Line of Credit remains suspended as Indian contractors are yet to restart working. Why?

I believe it is due to a lingering sense of fear. While we are not certain yet, the information we are receiving is somewhat unnerving. If the Bangladeshi authorities assure India that they have no security concerns, then things will proceed.

The interim government said it may take steps to bring back Sheikh Hasina for legal reasons. Will it create any friction in the relationship?

I believe there are various aspects to consider—both from legal and technical perspectives. Bangladesh needs to take these into account. Sheikh Hasina will not be extradited simply because Bangladesh wishes it. We cannot disregard India's relationship with the AL or Sheikh Hasina. Nevertheless, we would like to work with Bangladesh.

Our foreign adviser said India's relationship needs to be with the people of Bangladesh, not only with AL. What are your thoughts?

I agree 100 percent. India should work with whichever government is in office in Bangladesh. The problem arose with the government that was in power from 2001 to 2006, which soured relations. Later, we found that the AL was friendly towards India. In a multiparty system, any government can be elected to office. Why should India not work with it?

Sadly, it was the BNP that fostered anti-India sentiment in Bangladesh from 2001 to 2006. During the BNP-Jamaat regime, a large quantity of arms and ammunition, reportedly meant for the Indian separatist organisation ULFA (United Liberation Front of Assam), was seized in Chattogram in 2004.

The interim government wants to revitalise SAARC. What's your view?

SAARC is important for cooperation in South Asia, but Pakistan needs to change its behaviour. We have always said we are willing to work with Pakistan if it does so, but it hasn't.​

An astute strategic prism
M Rashiduzzaman 07 October, 2024, 00:00


A student carrying the national flag takes part in a protest march as protesters on August 3 demanded justice for victims arrested and killed in the student-mass uprising. | Agence France-Presse/Munir uz Zaman

THE sweeping protests in July-August that ousted Bangladesh’s prime minister Sheikh Hasina’s authoritarian rule, won the country an innovative brand — the ‘new’ Bangladesh minus the earlier steamroller governance. In the wake of that upheaval, which still rings throughout the country, two hot-button disputes re-emerged from its not-so-hidden past: While Hasina’s sudden tumble ripples like a political earthquake in India, will New Delhi be a threat to Bangladesh’s future stability and sovereignty? Should Bangladesh reset its ideological and identity sensitivities as a bulwark against a future despotic menace? Both are existential questions. But Dr Muhammad Yunus is now busy navigating between the populist cry for a retribution against the perpetrators of the banished tyranny, responsible for wanton killings and repression, and the simmering demands for an early restoration of an elected democracy.

The post-Hasina leaders need an astute strategy to deal with the emerging Bangladesh-India encounters and the ideological contents for the country’s national integrity and sovereignty. Neither the strategic imperatives nor the ideological probes will take care of themselves — not in ‘new’ Bangladesh where Hasina’s earlier autocratic rule is more than a painful remembrance. Her swift collapse has severely jolted India, the persistent benefactor of the hegemonic leadership that rigged three consecutive elections boycotted by opposition parties. And the maximum number of Bangladeshis are more confident now, which is likely to pop up in their domestic and diplomatic aspirations.

Geopolitics, however, does not give Bangladesh easy choices in dealing with its big and powerful neighbour that surrounds the country from three sides. But India’s enormous size and its military as well as economic prowess have not yet offered an unrestrained diplomatic advantage over Bangladesh, still blistering against its ousted autocrat, now sheltered in India. New Delhi’s old political ties to the Awami League and its remnants scattered across the band evoke deep suspicion in Bangladesh. Not long ago, the Guardian, the British newspaper, disparaged India’s strategy of putting all its diplomatic eggs in the basket of one leader (Hasina) and one party (Awami League) as a ‘myopic’ venture. India hopes for Bangladesh’s ‘eternal obligation’ to yield to New Delhi’s wishes because of its overt and covert help towards the 1971 struggle for independence. Narendra Modi’s brazen anti-Muslim policy is humiliating to the Bangladeshi Muslims although the Hasina government did not raise an eyebrow against India’s Hindutva zealots. It will be a thorn in the future Indo-Bangladesh relations. New Delhi tries to handcuff Dhaka’s domestic and foreign policies on grounds of the (Bengali) Hindu minority’s alleged insecurity in Bangladesh while the Indian media continue to smear Bangladesh’s current interim regime for its apparent capitulation to the Islamic militants and their leaders. Badruddin Umar, a senior socio-political commentator in Dhaka, recently pointed out that the Indian intellectual community has been mostly silent about the unprecedented protests that recently dislodged a dictatorship after an enormous loss of lives and destruction of infrastructures.

Hasina’s rapid plunge on August 5 dramatised India’s loss in Bangladesh, but India’s popularity faltered with the bulk of Bangladeshis, not long after the 1971 independence. As New Delhi became the enabler of the Hasina-led single party (the Awami League) juggernaut, India’s unpopularity spiralled in Bangladesh throughout the last decade. India will be a threat to Bangladesh’s internal politics and stability if New Delhi tries for a ‘regime change’ by rehabilitating and regrouping Hasina and her Awami League. She has settled in a virtual exile in India, but scores of AL leaders have also fled to India and the whispering reminiscences of the 1971 Indian military intervention stoke up anxiety in Bangladesh. The Bangladeshis itch for Hasina’s extradition to face a domestic or international trial for the hundreds of students and ordinary citizens deliberately killed or wounded by the politicised police, security forces and the AL-hired goons during the tumultuous civil unrest in July-August. China, New Delhi’s archrival, may now extract more geopolitical advantages from the post-Hasina regime; it will not be welcome to India and the western rivals vying for influence in the region.

The storm of protests that evicted the Hasina government changed the country’s political calculus. The secular Bengali nationalism that gained an unprecedented ascendancy against the earlier Pakistani Muslim nationalism exhausted its political traction since 1971. Secularism and Bengali nationalism provided an ideological cover for Hasina’s long tyrannical rule. She also postured her regime as a thundering protection against Islamic orthodoxy in Bangladesh. Those appeals, exclusionary in their substances, merit a reset although it is not yet certain if Yunus’s cabinet is ready to step into emotionally charged identity debates.

The western-style secularism has failed to take roots in most Muslim countries, including Bangladesh, mainly because the social, political and religious interactions in the Muslim-majority countries are not identical with those of the European and North American nation-states. The stringent secular rhetoric that indeed equated conventional Islamic expressions with hardline fundamentalism hastened the country’s political polarisation. The Muslim political inheritances of the colonial Bengal, the 1947 partition and former East Pakistan connect with what is independent Bangladesh today. Not surprisingly, the Bangladesh government exiled in India in 1971 did not have enough time to deliberate on the details of the expected country’s ideological and identity configuration. Even though their political and historical contexts did not match, Bengali nationalism sauteed in Rabindranath Tagore’s patriotic song as the national anthem became a convenient choice blessed by India at those critical hours. Later in Bangladesh, the ‘pro-liberation forces’ and their ‘cult of patriotic fervour’, a vocabulary borrowed from (the late) Ashok Mitra, a West Bengali leftist intellectual, denied the Muslim inspiration’s space in the country’s chronicle. But those ideological postures effectively helped the Awami League to consolidate its authority multiple times — by Hasina in recent years, but also by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman at the dawn of Bangladesh.

Muslim distinctiveness, not a religious extremism, is a security asset for Bangladesh’s sovereignty, independence and integrity. Once AK Fazlul Haque, in the 1940s, called upon the people not to apologise for being Muslims. The liberal perception of the Islamic groups as the ‘enemy’ of Bangladesh sovereignty is a dangerous appellation that undermines national harmony. The Islamic parties stand for the curse of the liberal intellectuals and politicians — the stance goes beyond the right-wing parties’ controversial resistance to the 1971 breakup of Pakistan.

In my Asian Survey, November 1994, article, ‘The Liberals and the Religious Right in Bangladesh’, I observed that the right-left controversy eventually destabilised peace and democracy in Bangladesh while, globally, that time-worn dichotomy gradually yielded to a more pragmatic and multilateral view of life. The feisty Muslim consciousness, however, survived through their populist roots. Partly, the liberal-secular clash emanates from the liberal establishment’s ‘blind spot’ about religion. Anyone who appeals to Islamic values endures the relegation as a maulabadi (fundamentalist/fanatic), enemy of Bangladesh independence scratching for zealotry. The Awami League and its liberal allies abused this epithet as a political capital against the so-called religious right. But the country’s strategic future and its democratic development call for participation of all groups including the Islamists in the political process.

Majority of the liberal leaders, their outfits and the cohorts did not raise a hell against the New Delhi-supported authoritarian regime for the last 15 years. Hasina’s ultimate downfall came from the swelling anti-job quota roil that transformed into a fearsome coalition against her long dictatorship. The widening political upheaval involved diverse elements — the opposition-blessed protesters, right-wing Islamic campaigners and the ordinary citizens who came out of their hiding plus a handful of human rights non-governmental organisations. The courageous student coordinators from both sides of the ideological scale blasted through death and destruction conducted by the police and the armed partisans. But it was an effective example of a strategic partnership between the right and the left to exorcise a merciless autocracy that consistently denied democracy, fair election and a peaceful political transition in Bangladesh.

M Rashiduzzaman is a retired academic based in the United States. He occasionally, writes on Bangladesh politics, history and Muslim identity.​

'If you’re in power for 15 years, you feel all is well'
Says ex-Indian high commissioner Pinak Ranjan Chakravarty on Hasina's downfall


Photo: Facebook/Unofficial: Diplomats of India

Former Indian High Commissioner to Bangladesh Pinak Ranjan Chakravarty discussed a range of issues from India-Bangladesh ties under Sheikh Hasina's regime, her downfall, and her presence in India with Shubhajit Roy, diplomatic affairs editor of The Indian Express.

On what the Hasina govt meant for Bangladesh

Chakravarty said Bangladesh became one of the fastest-growing economies in Asia, and had a stable relationship with India.

Indian investments were made in Bangladesh, and the countries developed energy connectivity, railway, and transport links, and trade grew to almost $18 billion.

Bangladeshis also were the largest set of tourists to India.

On the negative side, there were allegations of elections not being free and fair, he said.

The BNP boycotted the polls and the Jamaat-e-Islami was banned as a political organisation and a party.

Hasina also banned the Jamaat's student wing, the Islamic Chhatra Shibir.

Additionally, she instituted the International War Crimes Tribunal, for Jamaat leaders who were pro-Pakistan in 1971. Those leaders were convicted and hanged; that created bad blood.

Later, BNP Chairperson Khaleda Zia was convicted of corruption. Such domestic developments gave the feeling that Sheikh Hasina was becoming increasingly authoritarian, Chakravarty said.

India had no role to play in those things; they were entirely domestic, he added.

On India's relationship with Bangladesh govt under Hasina

India's problems with the previous BNP-Jamaat government were over security issues and their ties with Pakistan's Inter-services Intelligence (ISI).

The BNP has always been a little right-wing and pro-Pakistan. Jamaat, of course, has always been very pro-Pakistan, although they now claim that they are different. The BNP, too, claims they have changed, said the former envoy.

Festive offer

When Hasina came to power in 2009, she said they would not allow Bangladesh soil to be used against Indian security interests, which was something she lived up to, Chakravarty said.

The United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) Assam insurgency leaders were handed over to India. She ensured the insurgents' camps were uprooted and handed over, said the report.

"I remember how Hasina first told me that she needed electricity from India. That is how the project began for connecting the grids," he said.

"Today, we provide almost 1,200 megawatts. We also planned the Numaligarh refinery pipeline to northern Bangladesh, to provide diesel and petroleum products."

On the dissatisfaction with the economy, especially among the youth

"I think people welcomed the economic growth until the Ukraine war broke out and the energy and food prices went sky high," said Chakravarty.

Further, Bangladesh's growth was probably not equitable. The jobs created were insufficient and a younger generation was entering the economy. That's why the anti-quota agitation came in since quotas blocked employment in the government.

Later, with the elections, the new voters felt that they were not getting a choice, said the Indian Express report.

On how the anti-quota agitation grew

Chakravarty said he believed the agitation would have stopped after the Supreme Court judgement, which reduced the quota to only 7 percent.

More than 300 people died during those agitations. The protesters returned with a nine-point demand. They wanted the resignation of ministers, the police commissioner, and so on.

"Now, why they did that is a mystery. And my view is that there were other influences at work there -- mostly foreign and some internal. Since Hasina obviously did not agree to sack her ministers they went on a rampage again. And this time, I think, it was a very well-oiled machine backing them," the former high commissioner said.

"Why did it turn so political, with the march to Dhaka and demands for the PM's resignation? That is also a question. I would say that ultimately it was the army that unseated her by saying that, no, we can't protect you. We will not fire on these protesters," he added.

On whether India saw this coming

"Did we know about the things happening in Bangladesh? Of course, we knew. But the question is whether Sheikh Hasina anticipated her downfall. My sense is that she didn't, maybe if you stay for 15 years in power, then you feel that everything is okay," said Chakravarty.

On the interim govt led by Yunus

"It comprises different kinds of people. There is a leader of the far-right group Hefazat-e-Islam Bangladesh. Then there are BNP sympathisers. And then, of course, Professor Yunus is there. He's a big, internationally-known figure. I would say he's very anti-Hasina and she has slammed several legal cases against him, for things such as embezzlement," Chakravarty said.

"My worry is, will they (different sections) be able to work together? All of them could pull the government in different directions," he said.

There are two student leaders in the advisory council and apparently, there are two student appointees in every ministry to oversee what it does. Of course, some indicators are there, said the report.

"For example, Prof Yunus has said we must revive the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (Saarc). He has also reportedly said that he would want Bangladesh to join The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean)," he said.

"But ultimately, reality will bite. Things are still all over the place. Hindus were also attacked, unfortunately, they are seen as Awami League supporters."

In 2001, when the BNP-Jamaat government came to power, the same thing happened, said the former envoy.

On Sheikh Hasina's presence in India

"Hasina has been here before, from 1975 to '81, when her whole family was murdered as part of a political plot. She's back again. Does she have a future as a political leader of the Awami League (AL)? I would say we cannot dismiss the possibility that the AL reorganises, they are not a party that will disappear," said Chakravarty.

"They will participate in the next elections. Would Hasina then go back? She'll have to face cases and inquiries, and they might put her in jail. It's what was done to Khaleda Zia, and revenge politics is very much possible. But will the AL produce a new leader? These are all possibilities.

"Whether Hasina will continue to stay here is her choice. I don't think the government of India is going to push her out," Chakravarty concluded.​

Dhaka, Delhi discuss enhancing bilateral relations
Bangladesh Sangbad Sangstha . Dhaka 20 October, 2024, 20:16


Indian high commissioner to Bangladesh Pranay Verma and Bangladesh’s foreign secretary Md Jashim Uddin discuss ways to enhance bilateral relations on Sunday. | BSS photo

Indian high commissioner to Bangladesh Pranay Verma on Sunday met with foreign secretary Md Jashim Uddin to discuss ways to enhance bilateral relations in various sectors.

The meeting, held at the foreign ministry in Dhaka, focused on advancing mutual cooperation in line with the shared aspirations of both Bangladesh and India for peace, security, and development.

‘The meeting was more about how we can take forward our relations in the coming days,’ said the Indian envoy to media after the meeting.

Both sides emphasised the importance of reinvigorating regular bilateral mechanisms to address key issues, he added.

Responding to a question, Pranay Verma said that they did not specifically talk about the issue related to ousted prime minister Sheikh Hasina.

Regarding the next round of Foreign Office Consultations between India and Bangladesh, the high commissioner noted that the issue was a subject of their discussions.

The previous FOC was held in New Delhi on November 23, 2022. On October 2, the Indian high commissioner met with foreign affairs adviser Md Touhid Hossain where they also addressed a range of bilateral matters.​

Bangladesh's success under interim Chief Yunus could strengthen ties with India: The Wire
FE ONLINE DESK
Published :
Oct 29, 2024 14:07
Updated :
Oct 29, 2024 14:07



Indian news outlet - The Wire - in its recent article highlights how a successful Bangladesh, under Chief Adviser Professor Muhmmad Yunus, is more likely to be a strong ally of India than a failing one, reports BSS.

Vinod Khosla, a businessman and venture capitalist, wrote the opinion released in The Wire on October 27.

Following is the full text of the full article.

As a proud American and son of India, I look with hope at the exciting possibilities surrounding Professor Muhammad Yunus's leadership of Bangladesh. Three days after Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina fled the country on August 5, Yunus was sworn in as Bangladesh's interim government head.

Yunus, whom I consider a friend and have known for decades, accepted that post at the insistence of the student leaders who were at the forefront of the student-led struggle.

I am an entrepreneurship zealot, a believer in the power of ideas, and passionate about sustainability and impact. I am in awe of what Yunus has accomplished in his life. I work to bring life-enhancing technology to the world through my investments. Yunus, through endless experimentation and tinkering, has developed a series of institutional success models for reducing poverty, improving health care and education outcomes, and combating climate change.

For example, in 1996, Yunus succeeded in putting cell phones in the hands of hundreds of thousands of poor women in rural villages in Bangladesh, allowing them to generate income as village cell phone ladies. I am passionate about protecting our environment. Yunus founded a company that, beginning in 1995, has installed 1.8 million solar home systems and 1 million clean cook stoves, again almost exclusively in rural Bangladesh.

That doesn't even include the creation of Grameen Bank that has cumulatively made US$39 billion in small, mostly income-generating loans to more than 10 million poor women that became a model for similar efforts in India and many other countries.

But now, Yunus has turned his attention to a new challenge, leading the eighth largest country in the world by population, a nation of more than 170 million people. This is a country with about half the population of the United States all in a land mass equal to the U.S. state of Illinois.

There are people throughout Bangladesh and around the world who are batting for Yunus's success. I am one of them. But there are others who want him and the interim government he leads to fail and are spreading false narratives about what is going on under his leadership. So I would like to share my perspectives about his values, his approach, and his early results.

In his first two months in office, he got the police to return to work, which improved the law and order situation, took tangible steps to protect minorities such as Hindus, worked to improve relations with India, suggested that the regional powers reinvigorate SAARC, and made progress on bringing stability to the banking and financial sectors in Bangladesh (which were in disarray when he took office).

He also represented Bangladesh effectively at the UN General Assembly, and had more than 50 productive meetings with global leaders while
he was in New York.

In his work in this role, I have seen him applying the same values and approach that I have seen him use throughout his career: building a national consensus on key issues, experimenting to determine what works best, inspiring fellow citizens (especially youth) to get involved in practical and constructive ways, treating all people with respect regardless of their religion, gender, or ethnicity, and being pragmatic as well as energetic (despite being 84 years old).

But there are many challenges. Leading a government can be many times more difficult than running a suite of social businesses and nonprofits. People aligned with the prior government that lost power wants his efforts to fail. The party that has been out of power for years wants a quick return. But I believe Yunus is up to the job.

In September, I joined 198 global leaders including 92 Nobel laureates in a letter to the people of Bangladesh and people of goodwill around the world.

"We are excited to see Professor Yunus finally free to work for the uplift of the entire country, especially the most marginalisd, a calling he has pursued with great vigor and success across six decades (sic)."

His early successes in this role augur well for the future of Bangladesh, and a successful Bangladesh is more likely to be a strong ally of India than a failing one. We should all be rooting for Yunus to continuing making progress in this important interim role, because Bangladesh reaching its potential is in India's best interest.​

Bangladesh's shared GIs with India: The conflict and the outlook



The Jamdani saree, another significant traditional craft, is registered in both Dhaka, Bangladesh, and West Bengal, with further Indian registrations for Uppada and Fulia Jamdani sarees. PHOTO: SHAHREAR KABIR HEEMEL

In the recent past, the topic of shared Geographical Indications (GI) between India and Bangladesh has frequently appeared in public discourse. A comparative review of the GI journals published by the Department of Patents, Designs and Trademarks under Bangladesh's Ministry of Industries and Intellectual Property India under the Ministry of Commerce and Industry reveals that at least eight products are recognised as GIs in both countries, reflecting historical and cultural overlaps.

For instance, Bangladesh's Nakshi Kantha from Jamalpur corresponds to India's Nakshi Kantha from West Bengal, while Chapainawabganj's Khirsapat Mango parallels Malda Khirsapati (Himsagar) Mango in India. Similarly, Rajshahi-Chapainawabganj's Fazli Mango is registered as Malda Fazli Mango in India, and the renowned Dhakai Muslin in Bangladesh is registered as Bengal Muslin in West Bengal. The Jamdani saree, another significant traditional craft, is registered in both Dhaka, Bangladesh, and West Bengal, with further Indian registrations for Uppada and Fulia Jamdani sarees. Gopalganj's Rasogolla also has its counterpart in India's Banglar Rasogolla, and Tangail saree of Bangladesh has been registered as Tangail saree of Bengal in West Bengal. This shared registration pattern underscores the need for comprehensive legal protections to avoid conflicts, particularly as both countries seek to capitalise on the economic and cultural values of these products.

Products registered as GIs under both Indian and Bangladeshi jurisdictions due to overlapping geographical areas or historical connections fall under the category of trans-border GIs. A trans-border GI originates from a geographical area that extends over the territories of two adjacent contracting parties. While trans-border GI conflicts are not particularly common, they do occur globally. These conflicts arise when producers from different countries seek GI protection for similar products.

Given the reputation and consumer faith that a GI status brings, it is in the economic interest of every country to register as many GIs as possible for their traditional products, regardless of the ambiguity of the exact geographical linkage. The motive behind seeking such protection is entirely rational from a national interest perspective. Consumers associate GIs with specific qualities and origins, differentiating them from similar products. They help develop collective brands for products with shared geographical characteristics, building a stronger market presence. It can also prevent unauthorised use of the indication by others ensuring only qualified producers benefit from its reputation. Additionally, GIs can lead to competitive advantages, premium prices for higher product value, increased export opportunities, stronger brand image, and higher export prices. The significance of these products extends beyond market economics and increased profits; they often embody the heritage, tradition, and culture of their place of origin.

However, when multiple countries register GI for a product separately under the national jurisdiction or the "Sui Generis System" of World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)—which protects at national level only, it may make the GI product semi-generic, where the name merely becomes a description or class of product that can be produced in several countries. This may undermine the ability to command premium export prices as neither country can establish exclusivity over the product (as seen with Basmati rice) and may even result in a loss of protection against imitation. Furthermore, there remains apprehension about legal disputes in case either country attempts to deter the other from entering international markets.

To illustrate the gravity of the issue regarding the shared resources and their GI registrations between India and Bangladesh, below we briefly analyse two case studies:

Tangail saree is now an Indian GI

The Tangail saree is a longstanding cottage industry in Bangladesh, tracing back to the British era. These are completely made by handwork. Tangail's zamindars patronised Dhaka Jamdani weavers during the British colonial period. Over time, these weavers innovated various motifs, shaping the Tangail saree as we know it today.

On January 4, 2024, the Tangail saree was officially registered as a GI of India under the title "Tangail saree of Bengal." Coming to know about the Indian action, the agony and anguish of the people of Bangladesh were expressed through public outrage, including those of the weavers and the local people of Tangail.

Bangladeshi Tangail saree has a global market, spanning Europe, North America, the Middle East, Japan, and several Indian states. Bangladesh exports about 50,000 sarees to India every week. By registering a GI for Tangail saree, India has demonstrated an inclination to "free ride" which may lead to unfair competition for Bangladeshi producers of Tangail saree. Although Bangladesh completed the GI registration for Tangail saree on April 25, 2024, this is not going to stop India from using the GI of Tangail saree and capitalising on it. India now has the opportunity to capitalise on the heritage brand of Bangladeshi Tangail saree, which was built over 250 years.

India claimed the GI based on the argument that "Basak," the key weaver family of Tangail saree migrated to West Bengal post-partition in 1947 and again after the Liberation War of Bangladesh in 1971. They claim this category of saree to be a hybrid of Shantipur design and Dhaka-Tangail. However, the documentary evidence submitted in the GI Journal of India nowhere had the mention of "Tangail saree of West Bengal," rather one of their submitted documents referred to Tangail of Bangladesh as the place of origin of Tangail saree. Based on these fuzzy arguments, the Indian GI registration for Tangail saree is neither fully factual nor compelling.

As specified by WIPO, GIs must be linked to products produced in a specific territory. Bangladesh had a strong case to contest this GI as the Indian GI refers to "Tangail saree," which is a specific geographic location in Bangladesh.

Building on this foundation, in May 2024, Bangladesh decided to legally challenge the "Tangail saree of Bengal" GI by India. A first draft has been prepared to contest and the legal team has continued its effort to gather further evidence to strengthen their case.



A man collects honey from the Sundarbans, the world’s largest mangrove forest spread out between Bangladesh and India, with around 60 percent of the forest lying within the former’s borders. File Photo: Collected

Sundarban honey GI conundrum

As the backlash from the controversy over the GI awarded to India for Tangail saree began to simmer down, a new concern emerged. Sundarban honey was displayed as a GI product of India at the Diplomatic Conference on Genetic Resources and Associated Traditional Knowledge organised by WIPO in Geneva (May 13-17, 2024).

This sole representation of the said product by India sparked questions in our minds as the majority of Sundarban's territory lies within Bangladesh. Indeed, Bangladesh is the primary extractor of Sundarban honey. While official government records could not be found, media reports indicate that about 200-300 tonnes of Sundarban honey are extracted annually, while India produces about 111 tonnes per year as mentioned in its GI application.

Curiously, the district administration of Bagerhat filed an application for the GI tag of Sundarban Honey on August 7, 2017. Yet for seven years there had been no development. This is a rather astonishing example of administrative dereliction of duty. The initiatives to secure GI status for Sundarbans' honey only gained traction after we drew attention to the matter through a media briefing organised at the Centre for Policy Dialogue (CPD). The GI registration for Sundarban honey was finally completed in Bangladesh in July 2024.

Contrary to Bangladesh, West Bengal Forest Development Corporation Limited of India applied for GI rights for Sundarban Honey on July 12, 2021. The GI tag was vigilantly issued on January 2, 2024. Consequently, India once again surpassed Bangladesh in the GI registration of shared resources. As a result, India alone received global recognition for the genetic uniqueness and traditional collection methods of Sundarban honey, while Bangladesh's contribution remains overlooked.

Way forward

Given the ongoing disputes surrounding GIs between Bangladesh and India, questions loom over the equitable recognition of trans-border GIs of Bangladesh. One can safely say that these are not the last incidents between Bangladesh and India. Without any established legal framework, tensions may continue to rise regarding trans-border GI protection. Given the contingency of geographical proximity and shared natural resources, Bangladesh should find a mechanism to systematically protect its GIs and look for a predictable legal solution to address the issue of GI conflicts of shared geographical resources. In view of that, we would like to make the following recommendations:

- It is important to have an assessment of the list of Bangladeshi GIs. There is a need to be clear on which Bangladeshi GIs have export potential, especially in Lisbon contracting states. Converting these into global products is essential to fully reap the benefits.

- GIs must be secured for all products with geographic reputation and export potential. The prerequisite for any country to protect its origin-based traditional products is to register them first in the country of origin.

- To seek protection internationally, GIs must be registered separately in each jurisdiction where protection is desired, often through bilateral agreements. The Lisbon Agreement for the Protection of Appellations of Origin and their International Registration (1958) can also be utilised. The Geneva Act of the Lisbon Agreement on Appellations of Origin and Geographical Indications, adopted on May 20, 2015, revised the pre-existing Lisbon Agreement. Although the number of signatories to this act is still limited to 44 countries, it could be an important first step for extending supranational protection of GIs alongside Appellations of Origin (AOs).

- Registering collective marks for the country's GIs should also be given thought. The primary purpose of collective marks is to indicate the origin of products within an association. Even if the association is geographically based or has specific standards for membership, other associations from the same region with different standards or features can coexist without confusing consumers about the origin of the trademark. A regionally based collective mark, such as a GI, not only indicates the origin of the product but also serves as a brand. Protecting GI products as "collective marks" within the trademark system opens up the possibility of using the international Madrid System, administered by WIPO, to file international trademark registrations after registration in the home country. The Madrid System offers a convenient and cost-effective solution for registering and managing trademarks worldwide. By filing a single international trademark application and paying one set of fees, protection can be sought in up to 131 countries. However, it is important to note that marks are vulnerable to revocation if they have not been used in a real and effective manner within a certain period after registration, often five years.

- To safeguard products with geographic reputations, constant monitoring of the GI Journal of other countries, particularly of those having shared borders with Bangladesh, is necessary to prevent wrongful registration of GIs for Bangladeshi products.

- In case of any GI conflict with another nation, bilateral consultations and legal recourse should be pursued.

- In alignment with Articles 22-24, Part II, Section 3, of Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), each WTO member has an international obligation to ensure that a GI product genuinely originates from their territory. If there is confusion about the geographical origin, the concerned members should seek a mutually agreed upon solution.

- If a GI is believed to be wrongfully appropriated by another nation and bilateral negotiations cannot resolve the issue, an appeal can be made to the High Court for its cancellation. Upon receipt of an application in the prescribed format from any aggrieved party, the Registrar or the High Court has the authority to issue an order to cancel or vary the registration of a GI based on "any contravention or failure" to observe a condition entered on the register in relation to the GI.

- Indeed if bilateral consultations and legal recourse through the country court system do not work, the case could be taken to the WTO dispute settlement mechanism (which remains dysfunctional at the moment due to the absence of an adequate number of judges) under a possible TRIPS Agreement violation.

- To protect trans-border GIs effectively across borders, Bangladesh and India need to adopt a collaborative approach instead of a competing one based on shared understanding and mutual consultations. A joint binational approach for exploiting trans-border GIs would be the best commercial strategy to enhance the recognition and value of the shared resources of both countries in international markets.

- While there is a long way to go in establishing a system for shared protection of trans-border GIs, it is recommended that Bangladesh sign a regional agreement with the EU if it hasn't yet and accede to the Geneva Act of the Lisbon Agreement (2015). Subsequently, through mutual understanding between the two neighbouring countries, potential avenues for joint protection should be explored.

- Once both Bangladesh and India sign up for the Geneva Act of the Lisbon Agreement 2015, discussions can be initiated on submitting joint applications under the act for all trans-border GIs since the accession of the EU to the Geneva Act of the Lisbon Agreement means that as soon as any third country joins the agreement, their GIs will gain protection throughout the EU as well through the Lisbon system.

- To secure and reap the benefits from GI recognition, the government's role is necessary, but the role of producers is inevitable. Although 28 GI products have been registered in Bangladesh, none have been exported with the GI tag, indicating a failure on the exporters' part. Eligible businesses must contact the GI owner organisations to benefit from premium export prices.

- Furthermore, it has not been decided who will approve the GI tags to be used by exporters. The relevant government authority needs to address this issue.

- Producers must be vigilant to ensure that no one unlawfully registers a GI for their products within the country or in neighbouring jurisdictions.

- Commercialisation is required, but the downstream distribution of benefits is also a concern. It must be ensured that GI protection has the potential to improve the conditions of farmers and rural producers, who often do not see the benefits of intellectual property protection in a globalised world.

There is much work to be done before Bangladesh can reap the benefits of any GI registration and effectively safeguard its GIs. By implementing these recommendations, Bangladesh can better protect its GIs, resolve conflicts, and maximise the economic and cultural benefits of its unique products.

Debapriya Bhattacharya is distinguished fellow at the Centre for Policy Dialogue (CPD).

Naima Jahan Trisha is currently working as a programme associate at CPD.​