[🇧🇩-Land] Indian army---A long term threat for Bangladesh army.

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Dhaka-Delhi Ties: Normalcy to return once elected govt is in place

The India-Bangladesh relations will normalise once an elected government is in place, said Indian Army Chief General Upendra Dwivedi yesterday.

www.thedailystar.net

Dhaka-Delhi Ties: Normalcy to return once elected govt is in place
Says Indian army chief

Upendra Dwivedi

The India-Bangladesh relations will normalise once an elected government is in place, said Indian Army Chief General Upendra Dwivedi yesterday.

"The military relations between the two countries remain perfect. But if you talk about the overall relations between the two countries, I would say that it will be normal once an elected government comes to power," he said in his annual press conference ahead of the Army Day celebrations in New Delhi.

Dwivedi described Bangladesh as a "strategic neighbour" and said any kind of animosity between the two countries is not in the best interest of either nation.

"I take your mind back to when the Bangladesh army chief recently said that India was a strategic neighbour of his country. It is the same vice versa -- Bangladesh is strategically important to us. We are neighbours. We have to live together, understand each other, and any kind of animosity is not in each other's interest."

The Indian army chief said he has been in regular contact with his Bangladeshi counterpart, Waker-Uz-Zaman, including during the regime change.

He mentioned a video conference with Waker on November 24 last year and has stayed in touch with him since.

Bangladesh shares a significant border with India, except for a small portion in the southeastern region, and no other country shares such an extensive border with India, he said.

The comments come at a time when relations between the two countries remain strained in the aftermath of the ouster of Sheikh Hasina and her fleeing to India.

The two countries have summoned their envoys in Dhaka and New Delhi amid tensions over border fencing by the Indian Border Security Force.

Although the relationship between the militaries of the two countries remains "perfect", the joint military exercises have been temporarily put on hold due to the current situation in Bangladesh.

The joint military exercises would resume once the situation stabilises.

On military cooperation, he said it is "on the rise again."

Responding to a question about the vulnerability of India's northeastern states following allegations that "anti-India" elements were being allowed free movement near the border, Dwivedi said: "There is no vulnerability from either side."​

 

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বাংলাদেশের পাশে প্যারাসুটে ভারতের ট্যাঙ্ক ও যোদ্ধা নামলো.

 

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Lt. General Pradeep Bali has said that India will take the fight inside Bangladesh and China. I think Bangladesh should start thinking of signing a military pact with China to deal with such intimidation by the Indian army.

Security dynamics of the Siliguri corridor - The Tribune

The army units must carry out public training exercises near the Bangladesh border to give a clear message. This should be done in concert with the BSF.

www.tribuneindia.com

Security dynamics of the Siliguri corridor

The army units must carry out public training exercises near the Bangladesh border to give a clear message. This should be done in concert with the BSF.
Lt Gen Pradeep Bali Retd
Updated At : 02:02 AM Feb 28, 2025 IST

Tough role: The BSF guards the 4,096-km long border with Bangladesh. PTI

THE turbulence and violence in the neighbouring Bangladesh reflect latent security threats and implications which may well spill over across the border, especially in the sensitive region of the Siliguri corridor. The geographical attributes and cartographic peculiarities of this area create vulnerabilities which can be exploited by inimical elements using non-conventional methods.

This corridor, which links India with eight of its states in the north-east, is formed due to the sudden decrease in width as the Indian territory extends eastwards across the land mass linking north Bengal with Assam and with Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh hedging in this area from the west, north and south, respectively. The shortest expanse is 20 km, between Naxalbari on the India-Nepal border and Phansidewa on the India-Bangladesh border. Close to this is the 30-km transit route for third-party trade permitted by India between the border checkpoints of Kakarbhitta in Nepal and Banglabandha in Bangladesh. The Indian territory’s width between Bhutan and Bangladesh is 43 km at its narrowest. Known as the 'gateway to the Northeast', major communication arteries, including NH 17 and 27, broad gauge rail lines, oil and gas pipelines and the national power grid, pass through it. The strategic airfields of Bagdogra and Hasimara, important military formation HQs, and the large towns of Siliguri, Jalpaiguri and Cooch Behar are located within this corridor.

In the north, this area is over 40 km from the Chinese territory of Chumbi Valley, across the undeveloped mountainous terrain of south Bhutan till the Indian border. However, all along its southern length, it is flanked by the undulating border with Bangladesh as it meanders across the riverine terrain and swampy areas.

Guarding such a border, primarily against illegal immigrants and smugglers, is a herculean task as it is also densely populated on either side.

The conventional threats to the Siliguri corridor appear overhyped. Whether it is the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) through Bhutan or the Bangladesh forces from the south, the Indian armed forces can deter them and may well carry the battle across in the unlikely scenario of hostilities breaking out.

The real threat lies in the unconventional domain. The high volume of illegal crossings driving a rapid demographic change, ethnic assertion turning to insurgency and support for both from across the borders — these are the actual security challenges.

Illegal immigration from Bangladesh has always been the bane of this region. It has impacted the ethnic composition of the populace in towns and villages. It has built up over the years in the garb of labour, domestic workers and petty businesses, including trans-border smuggling. All this provides a human resource for creating unrest in a vital part of India.

A strong vein of Islamic fundamentalism had existed in East Bengal even before and after 1947, when it became the East of Jinnah's Pakistan. 1971 did not exorcise these elements. Pakistan recognised Bangladesh in 1974. Ironically, Pak PM Bhutto got a hero's welcome in Dhaka barely three years after the Pakistan army's infamous Operation Searchlight in 1971, which led to the Bangladesh liberation war.

Khaleda Zia's tenure from 2001 to 2006 was the high noon of Pakistan/ISI influence with radical Islamists in government. Harkat-ul-Jihad al-Islami ran terror operations, targeting Indian interests with impunity. Sheikh Hasina did focus on this common enemy, but she could not eliminate the powerful strain of opinion.

Post the regime change in Bangladesh, the emerging alignment between Bangladesh and Pakistan does not augur well for peace and stability in the adjoining regions. The fundamentalist elements who have come to fore in the post-Hasina era would find mutuality of interests with a rogue state like Pakistan, whose ISI, for one, would like to get involved in this part of the sub-continent. This could create turbulence in the adjoining Indian territory that is under favourable ethnic conditions, structured on illegal migrants, with support bases in Bangladesh.

The recent interceptions of suspicious radio signals across the border point at jihadis in Bangladesh working in cohorts with Pakistan's ISI for nefarious designs against India. A readily available recruitment base of Rohingya refugees gives a further impetus to the launch of anti-India terrorist operations.

The role of guarding the 4,096-km long border with Bangladesh, including the Siliguri corridor, is performed by the Border Security Force (BSF). The largest among the central armed police forces, the BSF is well-structured and well equipped. While there are a few military stations near Siliguri, no army units are deployed opposite Bangladesh, though some formations may have a dual task role on this border.

The Director General-level talks between the BSF and the Border Guard Bangladesh held in New Delhi last week focussed on the contentious issue of erecting border fencing in the remaining areas, attacks on BSF personnel, movement of illegal immigrants, curbing anti-India insurgent groups and smuggling of arms and drugs into India. But all this is as repetitive as it is inconclusive.

The BSF, while doing a stellar job on this border, feels sandwiched between Bangladesh and the Indian villages and towns populated by Bangladeshi illegals and their Indian sympathisers. Any strong check on human trafficking and animal and drug smuggling is strongly resisted.

The focus should be on all issues of concern in this vital corridor. The BSF must be further empowered. The BSF also has the legal sanction to check border-related crimes within 50 km of the IB and this should be done with blazing publicity.

Deterrence and signalling are clear indicators of intent. The army units in the region must carry out public training exercises near the border to give a clear message. This should be done in concert with the BSF. It will be a morale booster for the forces.

Above all, our intelligence agencies need to get their act together, with an ear to the ground. Intelligence failures have often led to initial debacles, leading to blame game. This can be obviated by adopting a thoroughly professional approach in this aspect.

The Bangladesh situation's possible fallout in the most sensitive part of India must be taken in all seriousness. It cannot be left to the ambiguous and non-tangible confabulations of diplomacy alone. Indian hard power has to be in clear display to protect safety and deter any kind of threat, especially non-conventional threat.​

 

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Consider Action Against Bangladesh Along With Pak: Himanta Sarma To Centre

Assam Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma on Sunday said India should take tough action against Bangladesh also along with Pakistan.

www.ndtv.com

Consider Action Against Bangladesh Along With Pak: Himanta Sarma To Centre

Himanta Sarma stressed that the decision will be taken by the Central government but he shared the sentiment of other political leaders of the Northeast demanding tough action against Bangladesh.

Press Trust of India

Dibrugarh: Assam Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma on Sunday said India should take tough action against Bangladesh also along with Pakistan.

Speaking to reporters on the sidelines of an official function, Mr Sarma said, "India should take tough action against Bangladesh also but these are strategic decisions, and we should not go beyond a point." He hoped that such measures are under active consideration of the central government.

"As a chief minister, we can request but the decision will be taken by the Government of India after considering the entire security aspect that whether you take Pakistan and Bangladesh at a time or one by one," Mr Sarma said.

He stressed that the decision will be taken by the Central government but he shared the sentiment of other political leaders of the Northeast demanding tough action against Bangladesh.

"The country should repose faith in Prime Minister Narendra Modi and people should refrain from expert comment," he added.

In Dibrugarh, Mr Sarma along with Union Minister Sarbananda Sonowal inaugurated two flyovers to ease traffic congestion in the town.

The two projects were constructed at a cost of Rs 117 crore, Mr Sarma said.​

 

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https://www.dhakatribune.com/opinion/longform/361034/combatting-india%E2%80%99s-manufactured-fears

Combatting India’s manufactured fears
A strategic framework for Bangladesh

Anu AnwarAnu Anwar
Publish : 07 Oct 2024, 08:44 AMUpdate : 07 Oct 2024, 03:32 PM

The Indian defense minister's recent remarks about Bangladesh, hinting at potential use of force, have triggered a significant response within Bangladesh, including within its military establishment. In response, former Chief of Army General Iqbal Karim Bhuiyan has urged the military to assess the possibility of putting forces on war footing under the French model of levee en masse -- which refers to a policy from the French Revolution that required all able-bodied men of certain ages to serve in the military to defend the nation.

This development underscores the urgent need to assess Bangladesh's strategic options, dissect India’s “manufactured fears,” and formulate a comprehensive defense strategy. In this article, I advocate for "Triple-A Deterrence (AAAD)” strategy -- which stands for Asymmetric, Adaptive, and Aligned Deterrence, where "asymmetric" represents a focus on quality over quantity, "aligned" emphasizes the internationalization of defense through multipolar partnerships, and "adaptive" highlights the nation’s ability to remain united and resilient to evolving security challenges.

Bangladesh’s strategic depth

While Bangladesh may seem small on the global map, it is a country of considerable strategic significance. With a population of 175 million, it is the eighth-largest nation globally and the third-largest Muslim-majority country, surpassing even Russia in population. Its geo-strategic location at the crossroads of the Bay of Bengal -- where Eurasian land powers meet Western Sea powers -- has been geo-politically significant for centuries. Historically, Bengal has been a critical region, from the prosperous Bengal Sultanate, to the Mughal Empire, to its role in providing a launching pad for 200-years of British colonial expansion across South Asia.

India’s strategic gains from Bangladesh’s independence in 1971 is profound. In the shorter term, the independence of Bangladesh eliminated India’s two-front threat posed by East and West Pakistan. However, while Bangladesh has gone the extra mile to maintain friendly relations with India, Delhi’s recent chauvinist nationalist policies under BJP alienated Bangladeshis as it is at odds with what defines Bangladesh’s national identity. Bangladesh hostility toward India could force India to redirect its military resources, which have since been concentrated against China and Pakistan, and it could undercut India’s horizontal expansion via “Look East and Act East policy” as well as engaging Gulf Cooperation Council Countries, and Iran on the West aimed at countering China’s vertical expansion in Indian Ocean via Belt and Road Initiative.

However, from the very inception of Bangladesh, India laid the groundwork to exert long-term influence. For the past five decades, it has employed a mix of covert and overt strategies -- ranging from economic incentives to political pressure -- to keep Bangladesh within its sphere of influence to project power eastward. Yet, a generational shift is underway. The new generation of Bangladeshis, born and raised in an independent country, is deeply committed to protecting their nation’s interests, marking a departure from the older generation’s historical ties to either India or Pakistan.

The mass uprising of August 5, when Gen Z-led protests ousted Sheikh Hasina's dictatorial regime after 15 years of rule, symbolizes a tectonic shift in the political landscape. The youth-led movement not only removed a perceived India pet regime seen as compromising national interests, but also may dismantle India’s carefully constructed “spider net” of influence within Bangladesh. The frustration and anxiety of ruling elites in India were visible in their media. Faced with these developments, India’s response has been to fall back on its familiar playbook of exerting control through what can be termed “manufactured fear.” The Indian defense minister’s statement fits squarely within this broader strategy.

While territorial size is important for conventional defense, “strategic depth” encompasses more than just physical space. Bangladesh's strategic depth lies in its access to the Bay of Bengal, its proximity to three nuclear powers -- China, India, and Pakistan -- each sharing borders with each other, which is unique globally, size of the population and their historic resilience, along with its position as a bridge between Southeast and South Asia. Additionally, Bangladesh's restrictive terrain imposes both operational and strategic limitations on invading forces. The dense vegetation and waterlogged landscape create further obstacles to maneuverability. In sum, Bangladesh has indeed the sufficient strategic depth required to defend itself against India.

India’s strategy of manufactured fear

India’s strategy to influence Bangladesh is rooted in a well-orchestrated campaign of manufactured fear, deployed through three primary tactics:

1. Psychological warfare: India has mastered the art of psychological warfare, leveraging its media and intellectual infrastructure to project power and instill a sense of vulnerability among its neighbours. For Bangladesh, this has manifested in regular border killings of Bangladeshi civilians by Border Security Force (BSF) that serve as reminders of India’s military dominance, undermining the morale of Bangladeshi Security Forces. Intermittently playing the “vulnerability of minority” card and putting Bangladesh in defensive mode. India’s control over shared river systems, where it has built dams unilaterally, has led to seasonal droughts and floods in Bangladesh, exacerbating the country’s vulnerabilities. Additionally, India’s deep penetration into Bangladesh’s cultural and media landscape subtly shapes public perception, aligning Bangladeshi thought patterns more closely with Indian values and diminishing the capacity for independent strategic thinking.

2. Discursive warfare: India’s discursive dominance revolves around three key narratives: its overwhelming size relative to Bangladesh, its geographic encirclement of Bangladesh, and India’s nuclear superiority.

Indian analysts often portray South Asia as a region of “India and smaller countries,” a narrative that is both factually incorrect and dismissive of the seven other South Asian states. If such framing were accepted globally, we would also hear narratives like “China and smaller countries in Northeast Asia” or “Brazil and smaller countries in South America.” Yet, no one describes these sub-regions with the same reductive terminology.

Furthermore, let alone global, India frequently portrays Bangladesh as "too small" to be an actor in regional issues. While geographically India is 22 times larger in size and eight times more populous than Bangladesh, China is 25 times larger in size and 11 times bigger than Japan in population. Yet, Japan is never described as “too small” in geo-political discourse. History shows that power dynamics are not solely determined by size -- after all, Japan was never invaded by China but the opposite happened.

Another narrative is that Bangladesh is encircled by India on three sides, with the Bay of Bengal on the other, leaving it no choice but to pay deference to India. This interpretation fails to recognize that if Bangladesh is India-locked then India should realize that its Northeastern seven states are also “Bangladesh-locked.” The "seven sisters" region of India, which makes up 8% of the country’s territory, is connected to the mainland only via the narrow Siliguri Corridor, which lies between Bangladesh and Nepal. From a military perspective, this corridor is a strategic vulnerability. More so, Doklum and Naku La incidents near this place in 2017 and 2021 with China should substantiate fragility. Furthermore, while India emphasizes its geographic advantage, it avoids mentioning that Bangladesh is less than 100 miles from China’s border, just beyond the Siliguri Corridor. If China is hungry to expand vertically into the Indian Ocean through economic corridors, this has significance. India also overlooks the fact that the populations in its northeastern states often feel alienated from Delhi and share more cultural and linguistic ties with Bangladesh than with India’s heartland. In sum, Bangladesh, if it plays its cards right, can leverage its geographical and cultural positions to expose India’s vulnerabilities.

Finally, India leverages its nuclear status to present Bangladesh as militarily vulnerable. However, history shows that nuclear weapons are seldom used in warfare, with the last and only instance occurring 78 years ago in Japan. The close proximity of India and Bangladesh also complicates the use of nuclear weapons, as any detonation would result in radiation fallout affecting both countries. Furthermore, the use of nuclear weapons would drastically alter the regional balance of power, a development that superior nuclear power China or Pakistan would oppose. Even if Bangladesh cannot count on direct support from China or Pakistan, if nukes come into play in an event of conflict, these countries would likely interfere to protect their own strategic interests. Thus, India’s nuclear advantage is not as absolute as it might appear.

3. Divide and rule tactics: India’s most effective strategy has been to foster internal divisions within Bangladesh, whether along political, religious, or ideological lines. These divisions prevent Bangladesh from presenting a united front and allow India to exert influence regardless of which political party is in power.

To be continued......................​

 

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What can India actually do against Bangladesh?

In practical terms, India’s capacity for overt military action against Bangladesh is highly constrained and counterproductive-- it would be a bigger bite than India can chew. If India had that capacity, it would not have withdrawn its forces after the 1971 Independence War of Bangladesh, nor would it likely refrain from using force unlike it did in cases like the Maldives or Sri Lanka. India’s military resources are already stretched thin by threats from China and Pakistan, making a prolonged conflict with Bangladesh unlikely.

It maintains about 40 divisions, yet it would need to commit at least 30 divisions to effectively attack Bangladesh, assuming a minimum force ratio of 3:1 for successful offensive operations. However, Bangladesh, with a population of 175 million, one-third of whom are youth, can rapidly mobilize its population for military service, tapping into a pool of 56 million people of standard military age. While India has a larger population, it also faces larger and more numerous adversaries. Bangladesh, in contrast, can focus its military entirely on India, as it faces no other threats.

Moreover, Bangladesh’s 4,000km border complicates any Indian military strategy. Bangladesh could unleash millions of fighters potentially crossing into Indian territory, creating widespread mayhem against Indian forces. Rather than a strategic advantage, India’s geographic encirclement of Bangladesh becomes a vulnerability in this context.

Furthermore, any military escalation would likely prompt reactions from regional and global powers, particularly the US, China, and the wider Muslim world as a change in the regional power balance would threaten their interests. However, India can indeed cause significant damage to Bangladesh should an all-out war break out but Bangladesh’s strength rests in its ability to incur relative damage on India across the board over the longer term. Though, India is likely to get an initial upper hand in a direct confrontation but unlikely to sustain relative gain is protracted guerilla warfare that has been the doctrine of Bangladesh’s armed forces in an event of invasion. Recognizing these constraints, India has refrained from overt conflict and instead relies on psychological warfare and gray-zone tactics, leveraging covert influence to extract concessions from Bangladesh without direct military engagement.

National defense through unity

Bangladesh faces the challenge of establishing a credible deterrent against a larger, nuclear-armed neighbour like India. Given this asymmetry, it must explore strategic alternatives that do not rely on traditional power projection. Three primary options emerge for Bangladesh: Nuclear deterrence; a robust conventional force; or a multifaceted strategy incorporating military quality, international partnerships, and national unity.

The first option, pursuing nuclear weapons, offers a proven deterrent. However, as a signatory of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and considering global geo-political realities, Bangladesh cannot develop a nuclear arsenal or seek an extended nuclear deterrent from another power without facing significant political and economic repercussions. This constraint makes the nuclear option neither feasible nor practical.

The second possibility is building a conventional military force capable of inflicting significant damage, similar to North Korea's strategy against US-South Korea before acquiring nuclear weapons. This would involve developing advanced precision-strike capabilities, and missile systems such as short and medium-range hypersonic missiles, to create a credible threat. However, this approach is not viable for Bangladesh due to the massive financial resources and technological expertise required. Additionally, obtaining such advanced weapons would likely encounter serious geopolitical obstacles, including sourcing them from international suppliers may warrant regional destabilization.

Given these limitations, Bangladesh’s most viable path is adopting the aforementioned AAAD strategy: A multifaceted approach combining asymmetric military development, internationalizing defense policy, and fostering national unity, which would entail:

1. Asymmetric deterrence (prioritizing quality over quantity): Bangladesh cannot match India’s military size; therefore, it should focus on developing a qualitative edge. This entails building an agile, technologically advanced, and professional armed force. Implementing meritocracy within military ranks is essential to counteract recent declines in operational capabilities caused by political interference.

Qualitative enhancement can provide a powerful deterrent. For instance, during India’s 2019 Balakot airstrike, Pakistan demonstrated how technological sophistication, and tactical prowess could outweigh numerical superiority. Despite possessing around 600 fighter aircraft compared to Pakistan’s 350, India was forced to halt its air campaign after a Pakistani US-made F-16 downed an Indian Soviet-made MiG-21 in a dogfight. This incident underscores that quantity does not guarantee success; rather, advanced capabilities and skilled personnel can shift the strategic balance.

Bangladesh can also learn from Singapore’s defense strategy, which emphasizes meritocracy, high-tech capabilities, and qualitative superiority to create a credible deterrent against much larger neighbours. Given India's limited ability to achieve strategic objectives through conventional warfare, it often resorts to gray-zone tactics, such as covert operations and economic pressure, to exert influence. To counter this, Bangladesh should adopt a two-pronged strategy: Deterrence by denial and "escalate to de-escalate."

“Deterrence by denial” necessitates that Bangladesh fortify its defense and posture its forces in a manner that imposes unacceptable costs on India in the event of an invasion. A critical part of this deterrence strategy, however, is assurance. Bangladesh must unequivocally communicate that its objective is strictly defensive -- not offensive. On the other hand, ”escalate to de-escalate” involves countering Indian gray-zone tactics with a readiness to escalate conflicts into conventional military confrontations. This strategy signals that Bangladesh is prepared to defend its sovereignty, which in turn would dissuade India from pursuing sub-conventional maneuvers that might provoke a larger confrontation. Ultimately, the aim is to deter, not provoke.

2. Aligned deterrence (internationalizing defense policy): South Asia’s geo-political landscape ensures that any conflict in the region has far-reaching implications. While Bangladesh is smaller than India, interstate warfare would have more than a purely bilateral matter -- as evident during Bangladesh’s War for Independence in 1971. The international community and regional actors would likely oppose India’s attempts to alter the status quo. Thus, Bangladesh must internationalize its defense policy, positioning itself as a key player in regional stability.

By actively engaging with regional powers and international partners, Bangladesh can create a strategic environment where any Indian aggression is perceived as contrary to regional and global powers’ interests. Building strategic partnerships through diplomatic channels not only enhances Bangladesh's defense capabilities but also discourages India from pursuing military adventurism. By framing its security policy within a broader international context, Bangladesh could strengthen its position and deter unilateral action by its larger neighbour.

3. Adaptive deterrence (national unity as a strategic tool): National unity should be the cornerstone of Bangladesh’s deterrence strategy. With a population of approximately 175 million, cohesive internal strength acts as a significant force multiplier. Historically, internal divisions in Bangladesh have been exploited by external actors, especially through India’s gray-zone tactics. Therefore, uniting the populace around a common national cause is vital for defense.

To counter India’s efforts to create internal instability, Bangladesh must leverage its intellectual and media resources, as well as a capable intelligence community, to expose clandestine activities. Highlighting such operations disrupts immediate threats and signals long-term vigilance, thereby serving as a deterrent. Bangladesh should also foster a scholarly community specializing in security studies to build a solid theoretical foundation for its defense policies. This scholarly engagement can produce counter-narratives that debunk India’s influence and educate the public on Bangladesh’s relative strength, reducing unwarranted fear and empowering citizens to support national security confidently.

The military can play a pivotal role in this endeavour, promoting national solidarity and projecting strength. While this task extends beyond the traditional military traditional mandate, it is critical for bolstering the country’s deterrence posture as they must realize it is harder for Bangladesh to compete with India only by military means. A unified Bangladesh presents a formidable front to any external threat, potentially rivaling even nuclear capabilities as a deterrent force.

India is likely to continue employing strategies aimed at internal destabilization. Therefore, national cohesion is paramount for Bangladesh's survival and sovereignty. As Singapore’s leaders have observed: "The world is like a pond, and countries are like fish where big fish must eat small fish for their own survival. For small fish to survive, they must become poisonous to deter predators." Bangladesh must adopt this in its strategic culture, nurturing internal unity and building a superior qualitative military force to counter external threats effectively. In effect, it becomes a poison mushroom that, if swallowed, could kill the host.

While achieving direct military parity with India is neither feasible nor necessary, Bangladesh can establish credible deterrence through a strategy that prioritizes qualitative military enhancements, internationalizes its defense policy, and fortifies national unity. This AAAD approach not only strengthens Bangladesh’s defense posture but also serves as a robust deterrent against potential aggression, ensuring its sovereignty and regional stability.

For constructive Bangladesh-India relations, both nations need to embrace a “live and let live” approach, acknowledging the changing realities on the ground. If India fails to recognize Bangladesh's transformation and persists with a heavy-handed strategy, the consequences could prove detrimental not only for Bangladesh but for India as well. In essence, Bangladesh has no reason to live in fear or insecurity, nor should India entertain overambitious strategy. The path to development for both countries lies in fostering mutual security and respect.

The author would like to express gratitude to several anonymous experts who provided valuable feedback on the initial draft.

Anu Anwar serves as a non-resident associate at Harvard University and is a PhD candidate at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.​