[🇧🇩] Indo-Bangla Relation: India's Regional Ambition, Geopolitical Reality, and Strategic Options For Bangladesh

G Bangladesh Defense
[🇧🇩] Indo-Bangla Relation: India's Regional Ambition, Geopolitical Reality, and Strategic Options For Bangladesh
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A conversation with RSN Singh, a former RAW officer and geopolitical expert, which "divulges" a bunch of information about internal machinations of Bangladesh Army (recent rumors of Islamist Army coup as alleged by Indians). What are your thoughts @Old School bhai. @Saif bhai



If needed, let's discuss privately.
 
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Legal notice served seeking cancellation of transit, transshipment facilities to India
FE Online Desk
Published :
Apr 17, 2025 20:38
Updated :
Apr 17, 2025 20:38

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A legal notice has been served to the government urging cancellation of all facilities, including transit and transshipment, granted to India.

Supreme Court lawyer Mohammad Azizul Haque served the notice on Thursday, reports UNB.

The notice was served to the secretaries to the foreign and finance ministries.

SC lawyer Azizul said that if the government does not take steps to cancel the transit and transshipment facilities, as well as discriminatory agreements signed with India, a writ petition will be filed in the higher court seeking necessary steps in this regard.

He further stated that India has already revoked the transshipment facilities it had given to Bangladesh.

Now, the people of Bangladesh also want all facilities granted to India to be withdrawn, he added.​
 

Dhaka dismisses allegations linking Bangladesh to Murshidabad violence
UNB Dhaka
Published: 17 Apr 2025, 19: 15

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Dhaka dismisses allegations linking Bangladesh to Murshidabad violence UNB

The interim government has strongly refuted any attempts to implicate Bangladesh in the communal violence in Murshidabad.

"We strongly refute any attempts to implicate Bangladesh in the communal violence in Murshidabad," Chief Adviser's Press Secretary Shafiqul Alam told UNB on Thursday.

He said they condemn attacks on Muslims causing losses of lives and property.

"We urge the government of India and West Bengal to take all steps to fully protect the minority Muslim population," Alam said.

The Indian Union Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) has been apprised of an initial probe into West Bengal's Murshidabad violence, which indicates the involvement of alleged Bangladeshi miscreants, the Indian media reported on Tuesday quoting sources.​
 
India Bangladesh Trade War: Who Is Winning? (The GoB should stop buying cotton from a hostile country like India. We have other friendly countries who are willing to sell cottons to us. The West African countries collectively supply 1.9 million bales, 41% of Bangladesh's total import. As a single country Brazil emerged as the major supplier of cotton to Bangladesh. Brazil exports 970487 bales which is 20% of the market share. Whereas India exports 887600 bales which is 19% of the total market share. Bangladesh imports $15 billion worth of products from Bangladesh and India imports just $1.8 billion worth of products from Bangladesh. If we impose a trade embargo on India, they will suffer because we are the largest export market for India in South Asia.)


 

Rising risk of Indo-Bangla trade retaliations
Asjadul Kibria
Published :
Apr 19, 2025 22:49
Updated :
Apr 19, 2025 22:49

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The government withdrew restrictions on yarn imports from India through the land ports around two decades ago. Earlier, the restriction had been imposed on the pretext of infrastructure weakness, smuggling, and tax evasion at the land ports. The ban, effected on March 9, 2002, sparked a bitter rivalry between export-oriented clothing manufacturers and domestic yarn producers. Three years later, the government re-opened the land ports, allowing yarn imports from India.

Almost two decades later, the country is witnessing a similar situation as the government banned yarn imports through the Benapole, Bhomra, Banglabandha, Burimari, and Sonamasjid land ports on April 13 this year. The restrictive move came after India on April 8 cancelled the transhipment facility for Bangladeshi exports to third countries through India's land customs stations to ports and airports in containers or closed-body trucks. Indian authorities at that time mentioned that the transhipment facility had been withdrawn due to cargo congestion at Indian airports, which was affecting Indian exporters.

Actually, the Indian move is a calculated step to pressure the Yunus-led interim government, which is currently in a delicate position due to the ongoing political transition in Bangladesh. As New Delhi has yet to accept the reality of post-Hasina Bangladesh, it has been putting various pressures on the interim government. Indian media categorically linked the cancellation of the transhipment facility with the chief adviser Muhammad Yunus's comments on the north-eastern region of India. During his visit to China last month, Yunus said that seven sisters, the seven north-east states of India, are landlocked, and that the only access to the ocean is through Bangladesh. He also asked China to invest more in Bangladesh. Indian politicians, experts and the media labelled it as provocative remarks and blamed Yunus for inviting Chinese influence in a region that India considers vital to its security and territorial integrity.

After his visit to China, Yunus joined the BIMSTEC (Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation) summit in Bangkok, where he met with Indian prime minister Narendra Modi. The long-awaited bilateral meeting was a critical move to ease the strained relations between the two neighbouring countries. Since the fall of Sheikh Hasina's government on August 5, when she resigned as the country's prime minister and fled to New Delhi, relations between the two countries continued to deteriorate.

Yunus-Modi meeting actually took place amidst a concealed anxiety and discomfort, which was reflected in the varied official versions coming out from the two countries after the meeting. India's decision to cancel the transhipment facility for Bangladesh heightens the uneasiness further. Finally, on Thursday, the Indian external affairs ministry's spokesman mentioned that the cancellation of the transhipment was due to 'some of the developments' that took place earlier. He said, "I would urge you to look at some of the developments that preceded it so that you can get a full perspective on the issue." Though he did not elaborate or explain the developments, it is not difficult to understand what he meant.

Since the fall of the Hasina regime in the face of a student-led mass uprising, New Delhi has been expressing its disappointment and anger through a series of statements and steps, making it further clear that it has no respect for the choices and wishes of Bangladeshi people. The Indian government has allowed thousands of Hasina loyalists and leaders of the Bangladesh Awami League to stay in India, especially in the West Bengal. Most fled secretly crossing the borders on and after August 5, without any valid travel documents. The lack of documents does not bar them from staying safely in India, thanks to the BJP-led Indian government's generosity towards Hasina and her loyalists. New Delhi has also persistently raised the so-called 'minority issue' in Bangladesh to pressure the interim government. At the same time, a section of Indian media continues to spread hatred and disinformation in this regard. For the last couple of months Indian government has also started to harp on the string of 'inclusive and participatory elections' in Bangladesh.

So, the bilateral trade-related restrictions need to be viewed in the above-mentioned context. Equipped with a number of tools in hand to make the international trade of Bangladesh costlier, New Delhi is better positioned to exert pressure on the Yunus-led government further. So, it is not unlikely that Bangladesh will face more trade restrictions from India in the coming days. As the bilateral trade balance is heavily tilted towards India, it will be more challenging for Bangladesh to address such actions like the cancellation of the transhipment facility.

Motivated restrictive trade measures with its potential for sparking retaliatory action are a risky game that can exacerbate the situation. The recent ban on yarn imports from India through land ports is viewed as a retaliatory move for India's cancellation of the transhipment facility. This non-tariff barrier (NTB) is in place while imports through sea ports remain open. India has been a major supplier meeting 80 to 90 per cent of Bangladesh's annual demand for yarn for the export-oriented garment industries, particularly knit garments. The country imported yarn worth $3.22 billion in the last fiscal year, a 15 per cent increase from the previous year, indicating that local yarn manufacturers are unable to meet the entire demand. The geographic proximity has also been a key factor in the significant yarn imports from India over the years.

There is an allegation since long that India has been dumping low-quality yarn in Bangladesh. Bangladesh Textiles Mills Association (BTMA) recently demanded the imposition of anti-dumping duty on Indian yarn. The organisation made a similar demand before the ban on the import of Indian yarn in 2002. Nevertheless, the imposition of anti-dumping duty requires rigorous investigation to prove the dumping and proper compliance with the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Once imposed, the affected party can challenge the duty through the respective government and drag the duty-imposing country into the dispute settlement platform of the WTO. To keep the duty, the imposing country has to prove that there is no violation of WTO rules, whereas the affected country needs to show that the imposition of anti-dumping duty breaches WTO rules. It, however, takes a long process.

The recent imposition of a non-tariff barrier (NTB) on yarn imports from India is expected to exert significant pressure on Bangladesh's export-oriented RMG industry. This comes at a time when exports to the United States, the leading market, are already facing a new challenge due to Donald Trump's tariff escalation. Although Trump has suspended the so-called reciprocal tariff on Bangladesh for three months, the future remains uncertain. India's cancellation of the transhipment facility has further compounded the pressure on RMG exports from Bangladesh.

However, the use of trade restrictive measures by two neighbouring countries to exert pressure on each other is not a win-win situation. If negotiations are not conducted in a balanced manner, the situation could worsen further in the coming days.​
 

Use of Bangladeshi credit cards in India sees steep 73pc decline
bdnews24.com
Published :
Apr 19, 2025 09:33
Updated :
Apr 19, 2025 09:33

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The steady decline in credit card transactions by Bangladeshi citizens in India, first observed during the July Uprising last year, has grown more pronounced.

In February, India dropped to sixth place among foreign destinations, with transactions plummeting 73.15 per cent compared to the same period in the previous year.

As in previous months, the United States remains the top destination for Bangladeshi credit card spending.

Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, and the United Kingdom follow.

These findings were drawn from a monthly report issued by Bangladesh Bank, titled “An Overview of Credit Card Usage Pattern Within and Outside Bangladesh.”

According to the report, Bangladeshis spent Tk 3.83 billion abroad using credit cards in February of this year.

The figure was Tk 4.45 billion in January.

This represents a month-to-month decrease of 13.93 per cent in foreign spending via credit cards.

In contrast, Bangladeshis spent Tk 4.99 billion abroad through credit cards in February 2024.

Among all foreign destinations, the highest amount was spent in the United States in February this year—Tk 520 million.

That figure was Tk 680 million in January.

Thailand ranked second, where Bangladeshis spent Tk 460 million in February.

In January, they spent Tk 640 million.

Singapore saw an increase in credit card spending by Bangladeshis in February, with expenditures rising by Tk 10 million to a total of Tk 390 million.

Malaysia, however, witnessed a decline.

Bangladeshis spent Tk 300 million there in February, down from Tk 350 million in January. As such, the country has secured the fourth position.

The United Kingdom matched Malaysia in February, with Bangladeshi credit card spending totalling Tk 300 million, compared to Tk 330 million in January.

India, now in sixth place, saw spending by Bangladeshi citizens fall to Tk 290 million in February.

In January, the figure stood at Tk 320 million.

This marks a dramatic shift from a year ago, when Bangladeshis spent more than three times that amount in India using credit cards.

In February 2024, the total reached Tk 1.08 billion.

Bangladesh Bank, which began publishing this data in 2023, had shown India as the top destination for Bangladeshi credit card usage.

The United States, Thailand, Singapore, and Malaysia had trailed behind.

That pattern held steady until July 2024.

India imposed visa restrictions following the July Uprising that led to the ousting of the Awami League government.

As a result, travel from Bangladesh to India has fallen significantly, triggering a drop in credit card usage in the neighbouring country.

In July of last year, Bangladeshis spent Tk 730 million on credit cards in India.

The month prior, in June, the figure was even higher at Tk 920 million.

A senior official at Bangladesh Bank, speaking to bdnews24.com, confirmed that travel to India by Bangladeshi citizens has decreased since the change in government in August.

He added that earlier data consistently showed India as the top location for credit card transactions by Bangladeshis abroad.

According to him, recent patterns indicate that Bangladeshis are now opting more for destinations such as Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand instead of India.

The central bank’s report also includes data on foreign nationals using credit cards while visiting Bangladesh.

In February, foreign citizens spent Tk 2.68 billion in Bangladesh through credit card transactions.

That figure stood at Tk 2.52 billion in January.

This marks a 6.35 per cent increase in foreign spending within Bangladesh over a single month.

Here too, the United States ranks first.

American citizens spent Tk 880 million in Bangladesh.

The United Kingdom follows, with its citizens spending Tk 270 million.

India comes in third, with Indian nationals spending Tk 160 million in Bangladesh using credit cards.​
 

Are Bangladeshis anti-Indian?

1745109657037.png

FILE VISUAL: SALMAN SAKIB SHAHRYAR

Nearly two decades ago, I visited an office in Dhaka and overheard a brief conversation between a superior and their subordinate. The former was telling the latter that they had planned to go to India for Eid shopping but couldn't make it because they were down with flu. Honestly, up until then, I was not aware that there are Bangladeshis who regularly visit the neighbouring country for such purposes.

We often hear that Bangladeshis hate India and that this becomes obvious especially during international matches involving the Indian cricket team. But what about Bangladeshis who travel to India just for shopping and buy products which are available in their own country at equally or more reasonable prices? Do they hate India? Given that they earn money in Bangladesh and spend it in another country probably without much thinking, can we ask the following question: Do they love their motherland for which innumerable people laid down their lives in 1971 and then again in 2024?

Without questioning the patriotism of these India-going and shop-in-India Bangladeshis, we can also ask a set of questions from the opposite direction: are there Indians who receive salaries from their country but do their shopping in Bangladesh? Do Indians love Bangladesh? Or, are Indians anti-Bangladeshi?

The above red herring is intended to initiate a discussion on the question if Bangladeshis are anti-Indian.

The prefix "anti" is generally associated with a sense of hostility and antagonism. But do Bangladeshis have the power—political, economic, diplomatic or military—to be hostile and antagonistic to their behemoth neighbour which is one of the largest economies with one of the strongest militaries in the world? Similar questions can also be raised in India's relations with the people of its other neighbours. Are they also anti-Indian?

I am wondering about these questions because in media parlance, the concept of anti-Indianism is often used to characterise the attitude of Bangladeshis towards India. This unjust, populist accusation that Bangladeshis are anti-Indian has spilled over in academic discourse too.

I have come across journal articles where academics, who are otherwise well-trained, do not hesitate to caricature and stereotype Bangladeshis as anti-Indian. I have read essays, published by reputable presses, where Bangladeshis are routinely associated with phrases such as: "anti-Indian sentiments," "anti-Indian feelings," "not just anti-Indianism but anti-Hinduism," "anti-Hindu feelings," "anti-Indian forces," "anti-Indian posture," "anti-India plank," "anti-India stand," "anti-Indian machinations," "anti-Hindu violence," and "anti-Indian rhetoric." By the way, the extension of the rhetoric of anti-Indianism to anti-Hinduism is premised upon the assumption that India is a Hindu country even though constitutionally it is a secular state (with a Hindu majority).

In terms of proportional land sharing between Bangladesh and India, no other two countries can perhaps be as close neighbours as Bangladesh and India are. Moreover, Bangladeshis who were born before the partition of 1947 were Indian. For example, my parents were born (British) Indian and died Bangladeshi and were Pakistani in between. Likewise, there are millions of Bangladeshis who are still alive and were born when the entire subcontinent was known as (British) India. They have lived under three flags and have embraced three nationalities—(British) Indian, Pakistani, and Bangladeshi. That is to say, India is not geographically and spiritually far removed from the people of Bangladesh.

But what instilled a sense of horror in Bangladeshis that may have given them reasons to dislike the Indian establishment and for which anti-Indianism is associated with them?

In order to understand the recent surge of so-called anti-Indian views among Bangladeshis, we need to examine the misrule that shipwrecked their country for over a decade on successive Indian governments' watch.

For fifteen and a half years from early 2009 to August 5, 2024, Bangladeshis were crumbling under the juggernaut of Sheikh Hasina's fearsome and self-serving regime. Under Hasina's mafia-style fascist rule, they lost their right to life and death with dignity. Occurrences of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances became the main instrument of the Hasina administration to rule Bangladesh and to keep its population under subjugation. Family members of many victims didn't even have the opportunity to observe funeral rites for the dead. Nor were they able to properly mourn their loved ones or accord them a dignified burial. There were many instances where government forces killed citizens and concealed the dead bodies, and bereaved family members were given an opportunity to receive the remains of the deceased only after agreeing to say in public that their loved ones died of heart attacks, strokes, or other health complications.

Detailed information about the existence of a network of secret torture centres, called Aynaghar or the House of Mirrors (ghost houses), that government forces set up across Bangladesh under Hasina's leadership is now emerging. We are gradually grasping the fuller extent of post-mortem drowning or dead body dumping cases orchestrated by the regime.

On the economic side, financial institutions, including Bangladesh's central bank, were plundered and ruling party high-ups and their cronies siphoned off money to purchase expensive properties in foreign destinations and/or to deposit into their offshore bank accounts. People were forced to pay high prices for food items and other necessities in order to satisfy the greed of those in power. In the name of megaprojects, ministers and their subordinates and henchmen fattened their pockets.

All these and many other instances of human rights violations, corrupt practices and financial crimes continued unabated because the regime didn't need public support to cling to power. It hardly practiced even a modicum of democracy. It ruled through a combination of repression and fake/nocturnal elections one after another, and any form of dissent was met with violence, persecution, custodial torture or death in police custody.

It is common knowledge in Bangladesh and beyond that the Hasina regime remained in power undemocratically for such a long time almost solely through India's covert and overt support. As, in his 2024 book Pathways of Autocratisation, Ali Riaz argues that "Bangladesh's autocratisation process" under Hasina was "influenced by the overall global political situation, but… accentuated, perhaps succeeded, because of its neighbour India's unqualified support for" her since 2009 (pg 62). Unfortunately, India's patronisation of autocracy in Bangladesh is often given an innocuous label—a strategy to maintain "a stable regional political system" even if to the detriment of Bangladesh.

After a months-long intense struggle known as the July revolution and at the expense of thousands of lives and limbs, on August 5, 2024, Bangladeshis collectively removed Hasina's oppressive regime (she fell and fled to the country whose interests she seemingly espoused). Now a constant barrage of allegations has been mounted against Bangladeshis that they are anti-Indian. In other words, the liberation of Bangladeshis from oppression is being perceived as going against India's interests.

But why?

During Hasina's fifteen-and-a-half-year rule, she did everything to accommodate Indian demands, regardless of what was in Bangladesh's national interests. Trade deficits in favour of India increased, Bangladesh gave India transit benefits and access to rivers and ports free of cost while buying electricity from it at an outrageously high price. For these and many other reasons, Bangladesh became a greater source of remittances for India. What is more, for decades Indian forces have been killing Bangladeshis at the borders on a regular basis while the relations between the two countries were being described as "golden" during Hasina's rule. Considering these and other examples, Bangladesh was having a relationship with India that was heavily slanted in favour of the latter.

Bangladeshis simply wanted this "lopsided" relationship to end. Does this make them anti-Indian?

Dr Md Mahmudul Hasan is professor in the Department of English Language and Literature at the International Islamic University Malaysia.​
 

Are Bangladeshis anti-Indian?

View attachment 16706
FILE VISUAL: SALMAN SAKIB SHAHRYAR

Nearly two decades ago, I visited an office in Dhaka and overheard a brief conversation between a superior and their subordinate. The former was telling the latter that they had planned to go to India for Eid shopping but couldn't make it because they were down with flu. Honestly, up until then, I was not aware that there are Bangladeshis who regularly visit the neighbouring country for such purposes.

We often hear that Bangladeshis hate India and that this becomes obvious especially during international matches involving the Indian cricket team. But what about Bangladeshis who travel to India just for shopping and buy products which are available in their own country at equally or more reasonable prices? Do they hate India? Given that they earn money in Bangladesh and spend it in another country probably without much thinking, can we ask the following question: Do they love their motherland for which innumerable people laid down their lives in 1971 and then again in 2024?

Without questioning the patriotism of these India-going and shop-in-India Bangladeshis, we can also ask a set of questions from the opposite direction: are there Indians who receive salaries from their country but do their shopping in Bangladesh? Do Indians love Bangladesh? Or, are Indians anti-Bangladeshi?

The above red herring is intended to initiate a discussion on the question if Bangladeshis are anti-Indian.

The prefix "anti" is generally associated with a sense of hostility and antagonism. But do Bangladeshis have the power—political, economic, diplomatic or military—to be hostile and antagonistic to their behemoth neighbour which is one of the largest economies with one of the strongest militaries in the world? Similar questions can also be raised in India's relations with the people of its other neighbours. Are they also anti-Indian?

I am wondering about these questions because in media parlance, the concept of anti-Indianism is often used to characterise the attitude of Bangladeshis towards India. This unjust, populist accusation that Bangladeshis are anti-Indian has spilled over in academic discourse too.

I have come across journal articles where academics, who are otherwise well-trained, do not hesitate to caricature and stereotype Bangladeshis as anti-Indian. I have read essays, published by reputable presses, where Bangladeshis are routinely associated with phrases such as: "anti-Indian sentiments," "anti-Indian feelings," "not just anti-Indianism but anti-Hinduism," "anti-Hindu feelings," "anti-Indian forces," "anti-Indian posture," "anti-India plank," "anti-India stand," "anti-Indian machinations," "anti-Hindu violence," and "anti-Indian rhetoric." By the way, the extension of the rhetoric of anti-Indianism to anti-Hinduism is premised upon the assumption that India is a Hindu country even though constitutionally it is a secular state (with a Hindu majority).

In terms of proportional land sharing between Bangladesh and India, no other two countries can perhaps be as close neighbours as Bangladesh and India are. Moreover, Bangladeshis who were born before the partition of 1947 were Indian. For example, my parents were born (British) Indian and died Bangladeshi and were Pakistani in between. Likewise, there are millions of Bangladeshis who are still alive and were born when the entire subcontinent was known as (British) India. They have lived under three flags and have embraced three nationalities—(British) Indian, Pakistani, and Bangladeshi. That is to say, India is not geographically and spiritually far removed from the people of Bangladesh.

But what instilled a sense of horror in Bangladeshis that may have given them reasons to dislike the Indian establishment and for which anti-Indianism is associated with them?

In order to understand the recent surge of so-called anti-Indian views among Bangladeshis, we need to examine the misrule that shipwrecked their country for over a decade on successive Indian governments' watch.

For fifteen and a half years from early 2009 to August 5, 2024, Bangladeshis were crumbling under the juggernaut of Sheikh Hasina's fearsome and self-serving regime. Under Hasina's mafia-style fascist rule, they lost their right to life and death with dignity. Occurrences of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances became the main instrument of the Hasina administration to rule Bangladesh and to keep its population under subjugation. Family members of many victims didn't even have the opportunity to observe funeral rites for the dead. Nor were they able to properly mourn their loved ones or accord them a dignified burial. There were many instances where government forces killed citizens and concealed the dead bodies, and bereaved family members were given an opportunity to receive the remains of the deceased only after agreeing to say in public that their loved ones died of heart attacks, strokes, or other health complications.

Detailed information about the existence of a network of secret torture centres, called Aynaghar or the House of Mirrors (ghost houses), that government forces set up across Bangladesh under Hasina's leadership is now emerging. We are gradually grasping the fuller extent of post-mortem drowning or dead body dumping cases orchestrated by the regime.

On the economic side, financial institutions, including Bangladesh's central bank, were plundered and ruling party high-ups and their cronies siphoned off money to purchase expensive properties in foreign destinations and/or to deposit into their offshore bank accounts. People were forced to pay high prices for food items and other necessities in order to satisfy the greed of those in power. In the name of megaprojects, ministers and their subordinates and henchmen fattened their pockets.

All these and many other instances of human rights violations, corrupt practices and financial crimes continued unabated because the regime didn't need public support to cling to power. It hardly practiced even a modicum of democracy. It ruled through a combination of repression and fake/nocturnal elections one after another, and any form of dissent was met with violence, persecution, custodial torture or death in police custody.

It is common knowledge in Bangladesh and beyond that the Hasina regime remained in power undemocratically for such a long time almost solely through India's covert and overt support. As, in his 2024 book Pathways of Autocratisation, Ali Riaz argues that "Bangladesh's autocratisation process" under Hasina was "influenced by the overall global political situation, but… accentuated, perhaps succeeded, because of its neighbour India's unqualified support for" her since 2009 (pg 62). Unfortunately, India's patronisation of autocracy in Bangladesh is often given an innocuous label—a strategy to maintain "a stable regional political system" even if to the detriment of Bangladesh.

After a months-long intense struggle known as the July revolution and at the expense of thousands of lives and limbs, on August 5, 2024, Bangladeshis collectively removed Hasina's oppressive regime (she fell and fled to the country whose interests she seemingly espoused). Now a constant barrage of allegations has been mounted against Bangladeshis that they are anti-Indian. In other words, the liberation of Bangladeshis from oppression is being perceived as going against India's interests.

But why?

During Hasina's fifteen-and-a-half-year rule, she did everything to accommodate Indian demands, regardless of what was in Bangladesh's national interests. Trade deficits in favour of India increased, Bangladesh gave India transit benefits and access to rivers and ports free of cost while buying electricity from it at an outrageously high price. For these and many other reasons, Bangladesh became a greater source of remittances for India. What is more, for decades Indian forces have been killing Bangladeshis at the borders on a regular basis while the relations between the two countries were being described as "golden" during Hasina's rule. Considering these and other examples, Bangladesh was having a relationship with India that was heavily slanted in favour of the latter.

Bangladeshis simply wanted this "lopsided" relationship to end. Does this make them anti-Indian?

Dr Md Mahmudul Hasan is professor in the Department of English Language and Literature at the International Islamic University Malaysia.​

Great article !!

Dr Md Mahmudul Hasan has mentioned the same things that me and my friends always say and discuss. If we watch the economic, strategic and cultural interest of Bangladesh (which is normal) than we really cannot be called Anti-Indian.

Just like - when Indians watch Indian interest, we cannot call them anti-Bangladeshi either ...
 
Great article !!

Dr Md Mahmudul Hasan has mentioned the same things that me and my friends always say and discuss. If we watch the economic, strategic and cultural interest of Bangladesh (which is normal) than we really cannot be called Anti-Indian.

Just like - when Indians watch Indian interest, we cannot call them anti-Bangladeshi either ...
We are not anti India. We are pro-Bangladesh.
 

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