- Copy to clipboard
- Thread starter
- #46
Chinese plan about Teesta River Comprehensive Restoration Project has been described in the video below.
- Thread starter Saif
- Start date
- Replies 121
- Views 2K
Bangladesh Defense Forum- Copy to clipboard
- Thread starter
- #47
The Teesta management project presents new challenges before Bangladesh
If Bangladesh cannot get an equitable share of the water from upstream, the Teesta crisis will not be resolved.
The Teesta management project presents new challenges before Bangladesh
Any discussion on the Teesta management should involve a water-sharing agreement with India. FILE PHOTO: STAR
Discussing the Teesta water-sharing agreement has become part of the routine in prime-minister-level meetings between Bangladesh and India. In each meeting, the prime minister of Bangladesh would request the Indian prime minister for the conclusion of the interim agreement on sharing the water of Teesta, as agreed upon by both governments in January 2011. And then the Indian PM would reiterate that his government was working with all the stakeholders in India for an early conclusion of the agreement. This kind of request and assurance can be found in all the recent joint statements, like the joint statements issued during the Bangladesh PM's visit to India in October 2019, and the Indian PM's visit to Bangladesh in March 2021.
However, an exception can be seen in the statement of September 2022, during the Bangladesh PM's visit to India, where she raised the issue of signing the draft Teesta agreement prepared in 2011. That time, there was no assurance from the Indian PM in the statement. Subsequently, neither of the prime ministers mentioned the Teesta water-sharing agreement in the joint statement titled "India-Bangladesh Shared Vision for Future," issued after the latest visit of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina to India on June 21-22 this year.
Instead, it was announced that an Indian technical team would soon visit Bangladesh to discuss "conservation and management of the Teesta River inside Bangladesh." What India meant by "conservation and management" was elaborated on by Indian Foreign Secretary Vinay Mohan Kwatra.
"It is less about the water-sharing part, but more about management of water flow within the Teesta River," explained Secretary Kwatra, in a special media briefing.
This omission of the Teesta water-sharing agreement from the joint statement is a significant change. Does this mean that the Teesta water-sharing agenda has been abandoned?
The discussion on the Teesta River Comprehensive Management and Restoration Project (TRCMRP) has been going on in Bangladesh for quite a few years. This megaproject to restore the Teesta is supposed to be implemented with financial and technical assistance from China. Since 2019, China and Bangladesh have been discussing this matter. Now it appears that India has also become seriously interested in the project.
This is because the region where the TRCMRP is to be implemented is deemed strategically important by India. According to a report in the Hindustan Times on June 22, besides worries about water flow data and other information on the cross-border river being scooped up by China, India has concerns about Chinese personnel establishing a presence at the project site located near the "chicken's neck"āthe narrow strip of land connecting the northeast of India to the rest of the country.
But will the Teesta crisis be solved by conserving and managing the water of the Teesta inside Bangladesh? The main problem of the Teesta River is India's unilateral withdrawal of water from the river by building barrages upstream and the creation of obstacles in river flow by constructing infrastructure projects, including hydroelectric power plants. So, what will be the procedure of involving India, the country which is responsible for drying up the Teesta River and depriving Bangladesh of the fair share of the river's water, in the management of the river inside Bangladesh? Accepting India's technical assistance in an attempt to revitalise the Teesta in its current state, without entering a water-sharing agreement, could mean accepting unilateral withdrawal of water from the Teesta by India.
No matter what activities are done under the Teesta megaproject, if Bangladesh cannot get an equitable share of the water from upstream, the Teesta crisis will not be resolved. Even if the Teesta water-sharing agreement is signed between Bangladesh and India over sharing water only at Gajoldoba point, without taking into account the impact of upstream projects in Sikkim, the crisis will not be solved.
Another question is, no matter which country implements the TRCMRP project, is it really possible to solve the Teesta water crisis by implementing it inside Bangladesh, without removing all the obstacles to the water flow upstream in India? According to a demonstration by Power China, the project involves reducing the width and increasing the depth of the river by dredging and building embankment on both sides, recovering 170 square kilometres of land on both sides of the river by filling with dredging soil and constructing housing and industrial parks, among other things, on that land. At present, the maximum width of the Teesta River is 5.1 kilometres and the average width is 3.1 kilometres. Under the TRCMRP project, this width will be reduced to 0.7 kilometre to one kilometre, which will cause a serious adverse effect on the velocity and water carrying capacity of the river.
According to a study by Dr Md Khalequzzaman, professor of geology and environmental sciences at the Commonwealth University of Pennsylvania in the US, due to the reduced cross-section of the river, the velocity of the river will increase. As a result, when the flow of water increases greatly during the rainy season, the erosion tendency of the two banks will increase. Due to the embankments on both sides of the river, most of the tributaries and distributaries of the Teesta will likely be cut off from the main river. For this reason, during flooding, the flow in the river will not spread to its tributaries and distributaries, causing the floods to intensify. Even the reclaimed land will be in the active flood-flow zone of the Teesta and will likely be exposed to flood damage.
But after all these, the proposed TRCMRP will not be able to solve the water scarcity issue because without increased water flow from upstream, no additional water can be generated by dredging the river to greater depths. The water that might become available in the river after deepening the riverbed would be shallow groundwater. Using this water for irrigation will lower the groundwater table in the catchment area, reducing the availability of potable water and irrigation water drawn through shallow tube wells.
So, no matter what activities are done under the Teesta megaproject, if Bangladesh cannot get an equitable share of the water from upstream, the Teesta crisis will not be resolved. Even if the Teesta water-sharing agreement is signed between Bangladesh and India over sharing water only at Gajoldoba point, without taking into account the impact of upstream projects in Sikkim, the crisis will not be solved.
Any discussion on the Teesta management should involve a water-sharing agreement with India which will ensure equitable water flow, enforce restrictions on unilateral changes in upstream river flow, keep provisions for mandatory exchange of data regarding any upstream project, and have the option for third-party dispute settlement. Otherwise, Bangladesh will continue to suffer for the Teesta for decades to come.
Kallol Mustafa is an engineer and writer who focuses on power, energy, environment and development economics.
Any discussion on the Teesta management should involve a water-sharing agreement with India. FILE PHOTO: STAR
Discussing the Teesta water-sharing agreement has become part of the routine in prime-minister-level meetings between Bangladesh and India. In each meeting, the prime minister of Bangladesh would request the Indian prime minister for the conclusion of the interim agreement on sharing the water of Teesta, as agreed upon by both governments in January 2011. And then the Indian PM would reiterate that his government was working with all the stakeholders in India for an early conclusion of the agreement. This kind of request and assurance can be found in all the recent joint statements, like the joint statements issued during the Bangladesh PM's visit to India in October 2019, and the Indian PM's visit to Bangladesh in March 2021.
However, an exception can be seen in the statement of September 2022, during the Bangladesh PM's visit to India, where she raised the issue of signing the draft Teesta agreement prepared in 2011. That time, there was no assurance from the Indian PM in the statement. Subsequently, neither of the prime ministers mentioned the Teesta water-sharing agreement in the joint statement titled "India-Bangladesh Shared Vision for Future," issued after the latest visit of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina to India on June 21-22 this year.
Instead, it was announced that an Indian technical team would soon visit Bangladesh to discuss "conservation and management of the Teesta River inside Bangladesh." What India meant by "conservation and management" was elaborated on by Indian Foreign Secretary Vinay Mohan Kwatra.
"It is less about the water-sharing part, but more about management of water flow within the Teesta River," explained Secretary Kwatra, in a special media briefing.
This omission of the Teesta water-sharing agreement from the joint statement is a significant change. Does this mean that the Teesta water-sharing agenda has been abandoned?
The discussion on the Teesta River Comprehensive Management and Restoration Project (TRCMRP) has been going on in Bangladesh for quite a few years. This megaproject to restore the Teesta is supposed to be implemented with financial and technical assistance from China. Since 2019, China and Bangladesh have been discussing this matter. Now it appears that India has also become seriously interested in the project.
This is because the region where the TRCMRP is to be implemented is deemed strategically important by India. According to a report in the Hindustan Times on June 22, besides worries about water flow data and other information on the cross-border river being scooped up by China, India has concerns about Chinese personnel establishing a presence at the project site located near the "chicken's neck"āthe narrow strip of land connecting the northeast of India to the rest of the country.
But will the Teesta crisis be solved by conserving and managing the water of the Teesta inside Bangladesh? The main problem of the Teesta River is India's unilateral withdrawal of water from the river by building barrages upstream and the creation of obstacles in river flow by constructing infrastructure projects, including hydroelectric power plants. So, what will be the procedure of involving India, the country which is responsible for drying up the Teesta River and depriving Bangladesh of the fair share of the river's water, in the management of the river inside Bangladesh? Accepting India's technical assistance in an attempt to revitalise the Teesta in its current state, without entering a water-sharing agreement, could mean accepting unilateral withdrawal of water from the Teesta by India.
No matter what activities are done under the Teesta megaproject, if Bangladesh cannot get an equitable share of the water from upstream, the Teesta crisis will not be resolved. Even if the Teesta water-sharing agreement is signed between Bangladesh and India over sharing water only at Gajoldoba point, without taking into account the impact of upstream projects in Sikkim, the crisis will not be solved.
Another question is, no matter which country implements the TRCMRP project, is it really possible to solve the Teesta water crisis by implementing it inside Bangladesh, without removing all the obstacles to the water flow upstream in India? According to a demonstration by Power China, the project involves reducing the width and increasing the depth of the river by dredging and building embankment on both sides, recovering 170 square kilometres of land on both sides of the river by filling with dredging soil and constructing housing and industrial parks, among other things, on that land. At present, the maximum width of the Teesta River is 5.1 kilometres and the average width is 3.1 kilometres. Under the TRCMRP project, this width will be reduced to 0.7 kilometre to one kilometre, which will cause a serious adverse effect on the velocity and water carrying capacity of the river.
According to a study by Dr Md Khalequzzaman, professor of geology and environmental sciences at the Commonwealth University of Pennsylvania in the US, due to the reduced cross-section of the river, the velocity of the river will increase. As a result, when the flow of water increases greatly during the rainy season, the erosion tendency of the two banks will increase. Due to the embankments on both sides of the river, most of the tributaries and distributaries of the Teesta will likely be cut off from the main river. For this reason, during flooding, the flow in the river will not spread to its tributaries and distributaries, causing the floods to intensify. Even the reclaimed land will be in the active flood-flow zone of the Teesta and will likely be exposed to flood damage.
But after all these, the proposed TRCMRP will not be able to solve the water scarcity issue because without increased water flow from upstream, no additional water can be generated by dredging the river to greater depths. The water that might become available in the river after deepening the riverbed would be shallow groundwater. Using this water for irrigation will lower the groundwater table in the catchment area, reducing the availability of potable water and irrigation water drawn through shallow tube wells.
So, no matter what activities are done under the Teesta megaproject, if Bangladesh cannot get an equitable share of the water from upstream, the Teesta crisis will not be resolved. Even if the Teesta water-sharing agreement is signed between Bangladesh and India over sharing water only at Gajoldoba point, without taking into account the impact of upstream projects in Sikkim, the crisis will not be solved.
Any discussion on the Teesta management should involve a water-sharing agreement with India which will ensure equitable water flow, enforce restrictions on unilateral changes in upstream river flow, keep provisions for mandatory exchange of data regarding any upstream project, and have the option for third-party dispute settlement. Otherwise, Bangladesh will continue to suffer for the Teesta for decades to come.
Kallol Mustafa is an engineer and writer who focuses on power, energy, environment and development economics.
- Copy to clipboard
- Thread starter
- #48
The Name of a Plundered River
West Bengal is planning to dig two new canals to divert more water from the Teesta River for irrigation, and set up two hydropower projects on its tributary.
The Name of a Plundered River
West Bengal is planning to dig two new canals to divert more water from the river for irrigation and set up two hydropower projects on a tributary of the river, which will further worsen the sufferings of farmers in Bangladesh.
The drying up of the Teesta River is threatening biodiversity, environment and ecology and hampering the livelihoods of thousands of farmers living in the northern region of Bangladesh. PHOTO: S DILIP ROY
With the Teesta water-sharing deal between Bangladesh and India hanging in the balance for over a decade, West Bengal is planning to dig two new canals to divert more water from the river for irrigation and set up two hydropower projects on a tributary of the river, which will further worsen the sufferings of farmers in Bangladesh. According to these plans, as reported by The Telegraph, a 32km canal to draw water from the Teesta and the Jaldhaka rivers will be dug till Changrabandha of Cooch Behar district, and another 15km canal will be dug on the left bank of Teesta. And two dams named Teesta Low Dam Project (TLDP) I and II will be set up on the Bara Rangeet River to produce 71MW electricity.
This is clearly a violation of all international norms of transboundary river water management, as well as India's commitment given at the 37th meeting of the Joint Rivers Commission (JRC), held in New Delhi in March 2010. During that meeting, India agreed that "the Indian side would not construct any major structure for diversion of water for consumptive uses upstream of (Gajoldoba) barrage except minor irrigation schemes, drinking water supply and Industrial use" (Article 8, Annexure V).
At the same meeting, Bangladesh proposed a draft water-sharing agreement, according to which the Teesta water would be equally divided between Bangladesh and India, leaving 20 percent in the river to maintain ecological requirements. Had that draft agreement been signed, Bangladesh and India would each get 40 percent of the actual flow available at Gajoldoba point. After much deliberation, the two sides agreed in June 2011 that India would get 42.5 percent and Bangladesh 37.5 percent. But that agreement could not be signed due to the opposition from West Bengal Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee. Though Mamata mentioned "shortage of water" as the reason for not signing the agreement, her government's latest move to withdraw more water from the river contests the validity of her argument.
Previously, Bangladesh and India signed an ad hoc agreement to share Teesta water at the 25th JRC meeting held in Dhaka in July 1983. According to the agreement, valid till 1985, 36 percent of the water from the Teesta would be allocated to Bangladesh, 39 percent to India, and 25 percent would remain unallocated. These shares would be subject to reallocation upon the completion of scientific studies by the Joint Teesta/Tista Committee. That reallocation agreement never took place, and India continued to withdraw water from the Teesta River.
According to a report published by The Daily Star last year citing data from the JRC, between 1973 and 1985 when the barrage was yet to be built in West Bengal, the daily average flow of water in the river in the last 10 days of March was 6,710 cusec (cubic feet per second). After the barrage became operational, the water flow started to reduce in the dry season while increasing in the monsoon. The flow in the Teesta starts to dwindle in October, and by December the river dries up. To meet the irrigation needs, the flow should be over 5,000 cusecs, but Bangladesh has been getting only 1,200-1,500 cusecs during the dry season, which sometimes drops to as low as 200-300 cusecs.
As a result, the drying up of the Teesta riverbed is threatening biodiversity, environment and ecology, hampering the livelihoods of thousands of farmers living in the northern region of Bangladesh. According to the Department of Agricultural Extension (DAE), about 60 percent of an estimated 90,000 hectares of land in the river basin areas are left unutilised in the dry season. Many farmers in the Lalmonirhat district, who cultivate crops on the sandy char lands, are compelled to use diesel-run shallow machines to irrigate their croplands, which increases their costs of farming.
In this circumstance, if two new canals are dug and two new dams are built by the West Bengal government, the situation will become unbearable for Bangladesh during the dry season. Along with the Teesta, the Dharla River will also dry up because of water withdrawal from the Jaldhaka River. That's why Bangladesh needs to engage with India immediately in order to stop the new canals and put pressure to sign equitable water-sharing treaties.
Some Bangladeshi experts are concerned that sharing water based on the available water at the Gajoldoba point will not be fair nor optimal for Bangladesh, as the water flow is reduced by the hydropower projects even before it reaches Gajoldoba. Although the dams are termed "run-of-the-river" dams, which are not supposed to affect the river flow, the requirement of water storage for a long time to generate electricity and also the evaporation loss from the reservoirs reduce the downstream flows substantially, especially during the dry season. That's why the experts opine that Bangladesh should demand the minimum historical flow in the Teesta River, which is 4,500 cusecs.
Bangladesh should put pressure on India during bilateral discussions and raise Teesta and other transboundary river water-sharing issues as a mandatory condition for the continuity of India's access to Bangladeshi rivers, inland waterways and seaports. We also need to ratify the UN watercourses convention of 1997, which can be a great tool for a lower riparian country like Bangladesh to get its fair share of water from its big neighbour. According to Article 7.1 of the convention, "Watercourse States shall, in utilising an international watercourse in their territories, take all appropriate measures to prevent the causing of significant harm to other Watercourse States." Article 7.2 says, "Where significant harm nevertheless is caused to another Watercourse State, the States whose use causes such harm shall, in the absence of agreement to such use, take all appropriate measures, having due regard for the provisions of Articles 5 and 6, in consultation with the affected State, to eliminate or mitigate such harm and, where appropriate, to discuss the question of compensation."
It remains a mystery why Bangladesh, being a lower riparian country that suffers from unilateral water withdrawal from a big neighbour, still has not ratified the convention. It's high time Bangladesh ratified the convention and took the disputed water-sharing issues to international platforms to get a fair share of Teesta water from India.
Kallol Mustafa is an engineer and writer who focuses on power, energy, environment and development economics.
West Bengal is planning to dig two new canals to divert more water from the river for irrigation and set up two hydropower projects on a tributary of the river, which will further worsen the sufferings of farmers in Bangladesh.
The drying up of the Teesta River is threatening biodiversity, environment and ecology and hampering the livelihoods of thousands of farmers living in the northern region of Bangladesh. PHOTO: S DILIP ROY
With the Teesta water-sharing deal between Bangladesh and India hanging in the balance for over a decade, West Bengal is planning to dig two new canals to divert more water from the river for irrigation and set up two hydropower projects on a tributary of the river, which will further worsen the sufferings of farmers in Bangladesh. According to these plans, as reported by The Telegraph, a 32km canal to draw water from the Teesta and the Jaldhaka rivers will be dug till Changrabandha of Cooch Behar district, and another 15km canal will be dug on the left bank of Teesta. And two dams named Teesta Low Dam Project (TLDP) I and II will be set up on the Bara Rangeet River to produce 71MW electricity.
This is clearly a violation of all international norms of transboundary river water management, as well as India's commitment given at the 37th meeting of the Joint Rivers Commission (JRC), held in New Delhi in March 2010. During that meeting, India agreed that "the Indian side would not construct any major structure for diversion of water for consumptive uses upstream of (Gajoldoba) barrage except minor irrigation schemes, drinking water supply and Industrial use" (Article 8, Annexure V).
At the same meeting, Bangladesh proposed a draft water-sharing agreement, according to which the Teesta water would be equally divided between Bangladesh and India, leaving 20 percent in the river to maintain ecological requirements. Had that draft agreement been signed, Bangladesh and India would each get 40 percent of the actual flow available at Gajoldoba point. After much deliberation, the two sides agreed in June 2011 that India would get 42.5 percent and Bangladesh 37.5 percent. But that agreement could not be signed due to the opposition from West Bengal Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee. Though Mamata mentioned "shortage of water" as the reason for not signing the agreement, her government's latest move to withdraw more water from the river contests the validity of her argument.
Previously, Bangladesh and India signed an ad hoc agreement to share Teesta water at the 25th JRC meeting held in Dhaka in July 1983. According to the agreement, valid till 1985, 36 percent of the water from the Teesta would be allocated to Bangladesh, 39 percent to India, and 25 percent would remain unallocated. These shares would be subject to reallocation upon the completion of scientific studies by the Joint Teesta/Tista Committee. That reallocation agreement never took place, and India continued to withdraw water from the Teesta River.
According to a report published by The Daily Star last year citing data from the JRC, between 1973 and 1985 when the barrage was yet to be built in West Bengal, the daily average flow of water in the river in the last 10 days of March was 6,710 cusec (cubic feet per second). After the barrage became operational, the water flow started to reduce in the dry season while increasing in the monsoon. The flow in the Teesta starts to dwindle in October, and by December the river dries up. To meet the irrigation needs, the flow should be over 5,000 cusecs, but Bangladesh has been getting only 1,200-1,500 cusecs during the dry season, which sometimes drops to as low as 200-300 cusecs.
As a result, the drying up of the Teesta riverbed is threatening biodiversity, environment and ecology, hampering the livelihoods of thousands of farmers living in the northern region of Bangladesh. According to the Department of Agricultural Extension (DAE), about 60 percent of an estimated 90,000 hectares of land in the river basin areas are left unutilised in the dry season. Many farmers in the Lalmonirhat district, who cultivate crops on the sandy char lands, are compelled to use diesel-run shallow machines to irrigate their croplands, which increases their costs of farming.
In this circumstance, if two new canals are dug and two new dams are built by the West Bengal government, the situation will become unbearable for Bangladesh during the dry season. Along with the Teesta, the Dharla River will also dry up because of water withdrawal from the Jaldhaka River. That's why Bangladesh needs to engage with India immediately in order to stop the new canals and put pressure to sign equitable water-sharing treaties.
Some Bangladeshi experts are concerned that sharing water based on the available water at the Gajoldoba point will not be fair nor optimal for Bangladesh, as the water flow is reduced by the hydropower projects even before it reaches Gajoldoba. Although the dams are termed "run-of-the-river" dams, which are not supposed to affect the river flow, the requirement of water storage for a long time to generate electricity and also the evaporation loss from the reservoirs reduce the downstream flows substantially, especially during the dry season. That's why the experts opine that Bangladesh should demand the minimum historical flow in the Teesta River, which is 4,500 cusecs.
Bangladesh should put pressure on India during bilateral discussions and raise Teesta and other transboundary river water-sharing issues as a mandatory condition for the continuity of India's access to Bangladeshi rivers, inland waterways and seaports. We also need to ratify the UN watercourses convention of 1997, which can be a great tool for a lower riparian country like Bangladesh to get its fair share of water from its big neighbour. According to Article 7.1 of the convention, "Watercourse States shall, in utilising an international watercourse in their territories, take all appropriate measures to prevent the causing of significant harm to other Watercourse States." Article 7.2 says, "Where significant harm nevertheless is caused to another Watercourse State, the States whose use causes such harm shall, in the absence of agreement to such use, take all appropriate measures, having due regard for the provisions of Articles 5 and 6, in consultation with the affected State, to eliminate or mitigate such harm and, where appropriate, to discuss the question of compensation."
It remains a mystery why Bangladesh, being a lower riparian country that suffers from unilateral water withdrawal from a big neighbour, still has not ratified the convention. It's high time Bangladesh ratified the convention and took the disputed water-sharing issues to international platforms to get a fair share of Teesta water from India.
Kallol Mustafa is an engineer and writer who focuses on power, energy, environment and development economics.
- Jan 24, 2024
- 1,653
- 855
- Copy to clipboard
- Moderator
- #49
The Name of a Plundered River
West Bengal is planning to dig two new canals to divert more water from the Teesta River for irrigation, and set up two hydropower projects on its tributary.www.thedailystar.net
The Name of a Plundered River
West Bengal is planning to dig two new canals to divert more water from the river for irrigation and set up two hydropower projects on a tributary of the river, which will further worsen the sufferings of farmers in Bangladesh.
View attachment 6632
The drying up of the Teesta River is threatening biodiversity, environment and ecology and hampering the livelihoods of thousands of farmers living in the northern region of Bangladesh. PHOTO: S DILIP ROY
With the Teesta water-sharing deal between Bangladesh and India hanging in the balance for over a decade, West Bengal is planning to dig two new canals to divert more water from the river for irrigation and set up two hydropower projects on a tributary of the river, which will further worsen the sufferings of farmers in Bangladesh. According to these plans, as reported by The Telegraph, a 32km canal to draw water from the Teesta and the Jaldhaka rivers will be dug till Changrabandha of Cooch Behar district, and another 15km canal will be dug on the left bank of Teesta. And two dams named Teesta Low Dam Project (TLDP) I and II will be set up on the Bara Rangeet River to produce 71MW electricity.
This is clearly a violation of all international norms of transboundary river water management, as well as India's commitment given at the 37th meeting of the Joint Rivers Commission (JRC), held in New Delhi in March 2010. During that meeting, India agreed that "the Indian side would not construct any major structure for diversion of water for consumptive uses upstream of (Gajoldoba) barrage except minor irrigation schemes, drinking water supply and Industrial use" (Article 8, Annexure V).
At the same meeting, Bangladesh proposed a draft water-sharing agreement, according to which the Teesta water would be equally divided between Bangladesh and India, leaving 20 percent in the river to maintain ecological requirements. Had that draft agreement been signed, Bangladesh and India would each get 40 percent of the actual flow available at Gajoldoba point. After much deliberation, the two sides agreed in June 2011 that India would get 42.5 percent and Bangladesh 37.5 percent. But that agreement could not be signed due to the opposition from West Bengal Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee. Though Mamata mentioned "shortage of water" as the reason for not signing the agreement, her government's latest move to withdraw more water from the river contests the validity of her argument.
Previously, Bangladesh and India signed an ad hoc agreement to share Teesta water at the 25th JRC meeting held in Dhaka in July 1983. According to the agreement, valid till 1985, 36 percent of the water from the Teesta would be allocated to Bangladesh, 39 percent to India, and 25 percent would remain unallocated. These shares would be subject to reallocation upon the completion of scientific studies by the Joint Teesta/Tista Committee. That reallocation agreement never took place, and India continued to withdraw water from the Teesta River.
According to a report published by The Daily Star last year citing data from the JRC, between 1973 and 1985 when the barrage was yet to be built in West Bengal, the daily average flow of water in the river in the last 10 days of March was 6,710 cusec (cubic feet per second). After the barrage became operational, the water flow started to reduce in the dry season while increasing in the monsoon. The flow in the Teesta starts to dwindle in October, and by December the river dries up. To meet the irrigation needs, the flow should be over 5,000 cusecs, but Bangladesh has been getting only 1,200-1,500 cusecs during the dry season, which sometimes drops to as low as 200-300 cusecs.
As a result, the drying up of the Teesta riverbed is threatening biodiversity, environment and ecology, hampering the livelihoods of thousands of farmers living in the northern region of Bangladesh. According to the Department of Agricultural Extension (DAE), about 60 percent of an estimated 90,000 hectares of land in the river basin areas are left unutilised in the dry season. Many farmers in the Lalmonirhat district, who cultivate crops on the sandy char lands, are compelled to use diesel-run shallow machines to irrigate their croplands, which increases their costs of farming.
In this circumstance, if two new canals are dug and two new dams are built by the West Bengal government, the situation will become unbearable for Bangladesh during the dry season. Along with the Teesta, the Dharla River will also dry up because of water withdrawal from the Jaldhaka River. That's why Bangladesh needs to engage with India immediately in order to stop the new canals and put pressure to sign equitable water-sharing treaties.
Some Bangladeshi experts are concerned that sharing water based on the available water at the Gajoldoba point will not be fair nor optimal for Bangladesh, as the water flow is reduced by the hydropower projects even before it reaches Gajoldoba. Although the dams are termed "run-of-the-river" dams, which are not supposed to affect the river flow, the requirement of water storage for a long time to generate electricity and also the evaporation loss from the reservoirs reduce the downstream flows substantially, especially during the dry season. That's why the experts opine that Bangladesh should demand the minimum historical flow in the Teesta River, which is 4,500 cusecs.
Bangladesh should put pressure on India during bilateral discussions and raise Teesta and other transboundary river water-sharing issues as a mandatory condition for the continuity of India's access to Bangladeshi rivers, inland waterways and seaports. We also need to ratify the UN watercourses convention of 1997, which can be a great tool for a lower riparian country like Bangladesh to get its fair share of water from its big neighbour. According to Article 7.1 of the convention, "Watercourse States shall, in utilising an international watercourse in their territories, take all appropriate measures to prevent the causing of significant harm to other Watercourse States." Article 7.2 says, "Where significant harm nevertheless is caused to another Watercourse State, the States whose use causes such harm shall, in the absence of agreement to such use, take all appropriate measures, having due regard for the provisions of Articles 5 and 6, in consultation with the affected State, to eliminate or mitigate such harm and, where appropriate, to discuss the question of compensation."
It remains a mystery why Bangladesh, being a lower riparian country that suffers from unilateral water withdrawal from a big neighbour, still has not ratified the convention. It's high time Bangladesh ratified the convention and took the disputed water-sharing issues to international platforms to get a fair share of Teesta water from India.
Kallol Mustafa is an engineer and writer who focuses on power, energy, environment and development economics.
It is not like we do not have leverage to pressure the Indian Govt.
One small thing, like putting some tariff on their exports to our market, will do wonders.
But this woman is such a doormat in front of Modi. He walks all over her.
We should not worry about any Indian Govt. move.
Ousting Hasina will automatically do wonders. The dominoes will fall in no time.
Last edited:
- Copy to clipboard
- Thread starter
- #50
Lack of progress on Teesta water sharing deal is frustrating
Takeaways from the PMās recent India visit
Lack of progress on Teesta water sharing deal is frustrating
Takeaways from the PM's recent India visit
VISUAL: STAR
It is little wonder that any positive outcome from the PM's recent visit to India has been largely overshadowed by a palpable frustration over the lack of progress on the longstanding Teesta water-sharing issue. Overall, as a former ambassador has put it, the two-day visit was "long on visions but short on details." And one glaring shortage or rather omission in the joint statement issued afterwards was that of the Teesta water-sharing agreement, which has remained pending for 13 years despite assurances from India's highest level. The issue didn't even appear to feature in the talks. Instead, we have learnt of India's interest in a megaproject to manage Teesta River inside Bangladesh, where China's pre-existing interest would more likely complicate things going forward.
But before it becomes another geostrategic battleground for the regional superpowers, we must ask ourselves: what does the project mean for the future of the Teesta water-sharing agenda? Reportedly, it will involve dredging the river, building embankments, setting up townships and industries, irrigation, etc. Clearly, it has its benefits, if planned and executed properly, but can focusing on only one part of a transboundary river resolve the water crisis facing downstream Bangladesh, with upstream India unilaterally controlling its flow? Will India's potential involvement in the project overshadow the water-sharing agenda? Although the PM has said there is no link between the two, concerns remain.
It is, therefore, vital that while the government scrutinises all aspects related to the project, including the viability of massive investments, it also keeps demanding results from India on the water-sharing issue. Bilateral talks during the visit also involved various other issues, with the two countries signing and renewing some agreements. One of the issues that drew significant speculations is rail connectivity, which the PM too addressed in her media briefing. The question that's being raised is, how much of it will really benefit Bangladesh? While greater regional connectivity via rail and road is important and should ideally benefit both Bangladesh and India, experts say the rail transit as it is being conceptualised will mostly benefit India.
There seems to be a widespread perception in Bangladesh that whatever connectivity projects have been implemented over the last few years have benefitted India more than they did Bangladesh, allowing the former greater and more strategic passage. Examples of Europe's rail connectivity clearly do not apply if the interests of all parties are not considered equally. The government, therefore, should approach the issue with greater caution with a more realistic and comprehensive assessment of the costs and benefits of such projects.
Another issue that has caught our attention is the agreement to initiate discussions on the renewal of the Ganges Water Agreement, which will expire in 2026. This is a positive development, and it is vital that the lessons of the past years are reflected in the renewal process. The Joint Rivers Commission should continue to work on the unresolved issues surrounding our common rivers, and Bangladesh must be able to protect its best interests in this and any future water-sharing treaty. We value our friendship with India, but we also believe that our mutual respect should result in equitable benefits in any bilateral issue. This is how the foundation of longstanding relations is kept intact.
Takeaways from the PM's recent India visit
VISUAL: STAR
It is little wonder that any positive outcome from the PM's recent visit to India has been largely overshadowed by a palpable frustration over the lack of progress on the longstanding Teesta water-sharing issue. Overall, as a former ambassador has put it, the two-day visit was "long on visions but short on details." And one glaring shortage or rather omission in the joint statement issued afterwards was that of the Teesta water-sharing agreement, which has remained pending for 13 years despite assurances from India's highest level. The issue didn't even appear to feature in the talks. Instead, we have learnt of India's interest in a megaproject to manage Teesta River inside Bangladesh, where China's pre-existing interest would more likely complicate things going forward.
But before it becomes another geostrategic battleground for the regional superpowers, we must ask ourselves: what does the project mean for the future of the Teesta water-sharing agenda? Reportedly, it will involve dredging the river, building embankments, setting up townships and industries, irrigation, etc. Clearly, it has its benefits, if planned and executed properly, but can focusing on only one part of a transboundary river resolve the water crisis facing downstream Bangladesh, with upstream India unilaterally controlling its flow? Will India's potential involvement in the project overshadow the water-sharing agenda? Although the PM has said there is no link between the two, concerns remain.
It is, therefore, vital that while the government scrutinises all aspects related to the project, including the viability of massive investments, it also keeps demanding results from India on the water-sharing issue. Bilateral talks during the visit also involved various other issues, with the two countries signing and renewing some agreements. One of the issues that drew significant speculations is rail connectivity, which the PM too addressed in her media briefing. The question that's being raised is, how much of it will really benefit Bangladesh? While greater regional connectivity via rail and road is important and should ideally benefit both Bangladesh and India, experts say the rail transit as it is being conceptualised will mostly benefit India.
There seems to be a widespread perception in Bangladesh that whatever connectivity projects have been implemented over the last few years have benefitted India more than they did Bangladesh, allowing the former greater and more strategic passage. Examples of Europe's rail connectivity clearly do not apply if the interests of all parties are not considered equally. The government, therefore, should approach the issue with greater caution with a more realistic and comprehensive assessment of the costs and benefits of such projects.
Another issue that has caught our attention is the agreement to initiate discussions on the renewal of the Ganges Water Agreement, which will expire in 2026. This is a positive development, and it is vital that the lessons of the past years are reflected in the renewal process. The Joint Rivers Commission should continue to work on the unresolved issues surrounding our common rivers, and Bangladesh must be able to protect its best interests in this and any future water-sharing treaty. We value our friendship with India, but we also believe that our mutual respect should result in equitable benefits in any bilateral issue. This is how the foundation of longstanding relations is kept intact.
- Copy to clipboard
- Thread starter
- #51
The hydro-hegemony in South Asia
India also gets to exploit Bangladesh based on its technological projects.
New canals from Teesta
The hydro-hegemony in South Asia
FILE PHOTO: AFP
The West Bengal government recently decided to dig two new canals to divert water from the Teesta, a transboundary river that India shares with Bangladesh. Water from another transboundary river, Jaldhaka, will also be channelled to the canals for agricultural purposes. The canals are expected to benefit 100,000 farmers in Jalpaiguri and Cooch Behar, and the West Bengal Irrigation Department has already been allocated 1,000 acres of land for the canals under the Teesta Barrage Project.
However, the benefits will come at the expense of Bangladeshi farmers in northern Bangladesh. As Teesta is a transboundary river, both Bangladesh and India should share its water in an equitable and reasonable manner, as per the international water-sharing convention. Unfortunately, Bangladesh has been denied such equity and reason as upper-riparian India unilaterally constructs barrages, dams, and canals, restricting the river's flow to Bangladesh.
This has also resulted in a scarcity of river water, with only 100 cumecs (cubic metres per second) available during the dry season, compared to the 1,600 cumecs required for agriculture in both countries.
Bangladesh and India share 54 rivers that flow from the Himalayas to the Bay of Bengal. The best practice across the world is to manage such international or transboundary rivers in accordance with international rules and conventions such as Helsinki Rules, Berlin Rules, and the 1997 UN water-sharing convention. But in South Asia, this takes the form of bilateral agreements between the relevant stakeholders. As a result, the upper-riparian countries often enjoy advantages and unequal shares. For instance, India's construction of canals and barrages affects Bangladesh adversely. In the same manner, India also faces the same issue with China in the case of Brahmaputra River. As a result, Bangladesh has managed to get India to sign agreements on only two rivers: the Ganges and the Kushiyara. The Kushiyara agreement came nearly 25 years after the Ganges River treaty. Decade-long negotiations have failed to ink the treaty on Teesta water-sharing.
The delay in signing the Teesta treaty and the uneven water distribution have resulted in serious environmental and agricultural concerns in northern Bangladesh, where the river is drying up, biodiversity is under peril, and food production is being adversely affected. Between 2006 and 2014, the northern region of Bangladesh, known for its ample Boro rice harvest, lost Tk 8,132.6 crore in production due to water shortages caused by India's arbitrary withdrawal from the river.
Why has the water-sharing deal stalled when both Bangladesh and India have built much more fruitful relationships in other areas? The answer probably lies in the concept of hydro-hegemony.
Hydro-hegemony is a relatively new theory that argues that water-sharing, conflicts, and river management between the countries that share transboundary rivers are influenced by their riparian position, power dimensions, and exploitation potential. Prominent Indian scholar Brahma Chellaney used the term to explain China's activity in the upstream that affected India. In the case of Bangladesh-India transboundary rivers, India holds the upper hand as the country is upper-riparian. When India has a demand for river water, it can simply dig canals and redirect the river's flow, or build a barrage to navigate the water flow.
Bangladesh lacks the political and economic power to force India to provide its rightful share of water. Because of this power asymmetry, India influences the negotiation process often in its favour. The decision to drain water from Jaldhaka River without informing Dhaka is a prime example of such influence. Not only that, but India consciously depoliticises bilateral disputes between the two countries.
India also gets to exploit Bangladesh based on its technological projects. Historical water flow data suggests that Bangladesh's share should not fall below 4,500 cusecs (cubic foot per second), but India's upstream interventions with technologically advanced barrages have decreased Bangladesh's share to one-third of that amount. Similar riparian and power dynamics have harmed India's equation with China over water-sharing on the Brahmaputra. The river is shared by China, India, and Bangladesh, but because China is upstream, it can build dams and barrages that threaten water flow to India and Bangladesh in the absence of any treaty. While India narrates China's behaviour as unequal, interestingly it does the same with lower-riparian Bangladesh.
River disputes will persist in South Asia because the region's largest rivers ā the Indus, Ganges, Brahmaputra, Teesta, Mahananda, Surma, and Ghaghara ā are transboundary. The region is largely dependent on these river basins. As a result, disruption and unjust water flow can lead to conflicts. Brahma Challaney in his book Water: Asia's New Battleground also discussed such.
War or conflict for water has been going on for ages. For decades, conflicts between Egypt and Ethiopia often escalated over the Nile River's water-sharing. Water also played a central role in the civil war in Sudan. Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon also had a series of confrontations with Israel in the 1960s over the Jordan River that ultimately culminated in the Six-Day War.
In the case of Bangladesh and India, river basin management has been always suggested to avoid such conflicts. But for that, the upper-riparian side must acknowledge equity and reason. Yet, the hydropolitics between Bangladesh and India can be of great interest to researchers as it has unique hegemonic elements in river management. How the upper-riparian and its federal governance structure is posing challenges to the lower-riparian is quite a new phenomenon in hydropolitics. Therefore, researchers may take a keen interest in developing further understanding.
Masfi-ul-Ashfaq Nibir is a Dhaka-based independent researcher and analyst.
The hydro-hegemony in South Asia
FILE PHOTO: AFP
The West Bengal government recently decided to dig two new canals to divert water from the Teesta, a transboundary river that India shares with Bangladesh. Water from another transboundary river, Jaldhaka, will also be channelled to the canals for agricultural purposes. The canals are expected to benefit 100,000 farmers in Jalpaiguri and Cooch Behar, and the West Bengal Irrigation Department has already been allocated 1,000 acres of land for the canals under the Teesta Barrage Project.
However, the benefits will come at the expense of Bangladeshi farmers in northern Bangladesh. As Teesta is a transboundary river, both Bangladesh and India should share its water in an equitable and reasonable manner, as per the international water-sharing convention. Unfortunately, Bangladesh has been denied such equity and reason as upper-riparian India unilaterally constructs barrages, dams, and canals, restricting the river's flow to Bangladesh.
This has also resulted in a scarcity of river water, with only 100 cumecs (cubic metres per second) available during the dry season, compared to the 1,600 cumecs required for agriculture in both countries.
Bangladesh and India share 54 rivers that flow from the Himalayas to the Bay of Bengal. The best practice across the world is to manage such international or transboundary rivers in accordance with international rules and conventions such as Helsinki Rules, Berlin Rules, and the 1997 UN water-sharing convention. But in South Asia, this takes the form of bilateral agreements between the relevant stakeholders. As a result, the upper-riparian countries often enjoy advantages and unequal shares. For instance, India's construction of canals and barrages affects Bangladesh adversely. In the same manner, India also faces the same issue with China in the case of Brahmaputra River. As a result, Bangladesh has managed to get India to sign agreements on only two rivers: the Ganges and the Kushiyara. The Kushiyara agreement came nearly 25 years after the Ganges River treaty. Decade-long negotiations have failed to ink the treaty on Teesta water-sharing.
The delay in signing the Teesta treaty and the uneven water distribution have resulted in serious environmental and agricultural concerns in northern Bangladesh, where the river is drying up, biodiversity is under peril, and food production is being adversely affected. Between 2006 and 2014, the northern region of Bangladesh, known for its ample Boro rice harvest, lost Tk 8,132.6 crore in production due to water shortages caused by India's arbitrary withdrawal from the river.
Why has the water-sharing deal stalled when both Bangladesh and India have built much more fruitful relationships in other areas? The answer probably lies in the concept of hydro-hegemony.
Hydro-hegemony is a relatively new theory that argues that water-sharing, conflicts, and river management between the countries that share transboundary rivers are influenced by their riparian position, power dimensions, and exploitation potential. Prominent Indian scholar Brahma Chellaney used the term to explain China's activity in the upstream that affected India. In the case of Bangladesh-India transboundary rivers, India holds the upper hand as the country is upper-riparian. When India has a demand for river water, it can simply dig canals and redirect the river's flow, or build a barrage to navigate the water flow.
Bangladesh lacks the political and economic power to force India to provide its rightful share of water. Because of this power asymmetry, India influences the negotiation process often in its favour. The decision to drain water from Jaldhaka River without informing Dhaka is a prime example of such influence. Not only that, but India consciously depoliticises bilateral disputes between the two countries.
India also gets to exploit Bangladesh based on its technological projects. Historical water flow data suggests that Bangladesh's share should not fall below 4,500 cusecs (cubic foot per second), but India's upstream interventions with technologically advanced barrages have decreased Bangladesh's share to one-third of that amount. Similar riparian and power dynamics have harmed India's equation with China over water-sharing on the Brahmaputra. The river is shared by China, India, and Bangladesh, but because China is upstream, it can build dams and barrages that threaten water flow to India and Bangladesh in the absence of any treaty. While India narrates China's behaviour as unequal, interestingly it does the same with lower-riparian Bangladesh.
River disputes will persist in South Asia because the region's largest rivers ā the Indus, Ganges, Brahmaputra, Teesta, Mahananda, Surma, and Ghaghara ā are transboundary. The region is largely dependent on these river basins. As a result, disruption and unjust water flow can lead to conflicts. Brahma Challaney in his book Water: Asia's New Battleground also discussed such.
War or conflict for water has been going on for ages. For decades, conflicts between Egypt and Ethiopia often escalated over the Nile River's water-sharing. Water also played a central role in the civil war in Sudan. Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon also had a series of confrontations with Israel in the 1960s over the Jordan River that ultimately culminated in the Six-Day War.
In the case of Bangladesh and India, river basin management has been always suggested to avoid such conflicts. But for that, the upper-riparian side must acknowledge equity and reason. Yet, the hydropolitics between Bangladesh and India can be of great interest to researchers as it has unique hegemonic elements in river management. How the upper-riparian and its federal governance structure is posing challenges to the lower-riparian is quite a new phenomenon in hydropolitics. Therefore, researchers may take a keen interest in developing further understanding.
Masfi-ul-Ashfaq Nibir is a Dhaka-based independent researcher and analyst.
- Copy to clipboard
- Thread starter
- #52
India's Brahmaputra Board plans project to conserve Teesta water flowing thru north Bengal
Representatives of the Brahmaputra Board, which works for conservation of rivers flowing through the Brahmaputra basin, including the Teesta, have said they intended to take up a project for conservation of water flowing through hilly streams in north Bengal so that it could be used for...
India's Brahmaputra Board plans project to conserve Teesta water flowing thru north Bengal
Any discussion on the Teesta management should involve a water-sharing agreement with India. FILE PHOTO: STAR
Representatives of the Brahmaputra Board, which works for conservation of rivers flowing through the Brahmaputra basin, including the Teesta, have said they intended to take up a project for conservation of water flowing through hilly streams in north Bengal so that it could be used for different purposes.
This was stated at the 82nd meeting of the board in Kalimpong yesterday, The Telegraph reported today.
The board asked officials of West Bengal irrigation department to submit specific proposals for approval of funds for anti-erosion and flood protection on either bank of the Teesta river, our New Delhi correspondent reports.
Responding to the board's plan, West Bengal state irrigation department pointed out that the areas through which the hilly streams flow are under the Gorkhaland Territorial Administration (GTA) and that the department cannot take up the task on its own.
It was then decided that at the next meeting of Brahmaputra Board, the GTA will also be invited so that the project can be executed.
Officials of West Bengal irrigation department elaborated on the flash flood that had occurred on the Teesta in October last year following a cloudburst in Sikkim.
"We mentioned how the flash flood led to the huge deposition of debris on the Teesta, which led to a rise in the river bed. Also, other issues like erosion caused by the river on its both banks were pointed out," said Krishnendu Bhowmik, chief engineer (northeast) of the irrigation department.
He said Ranbir Singh, the chairman of the Brahmaputra Board, had sought a specific proposal from them.
"We will discuss with Sikkim and submit a joint DPR (detailed project report) to the board so that funds are sanctioned to carry out these works in the Teesta," according to Bhowmik.
At the meeting, the officials also mentioned the DPR of Rs 11 crore which was submitted to the board for carrying out flood protection works on the Teesta river bank in Mekhliganj near the India-Bangladesh border.
Any discussion on the Teesta management should involve a water-sharing agreement with India. FILE PHOTO: STAR
Representatives of the Brahmaputra Board, which works for conservation of rivers flowing through the Brahmaputra basin, including the Teesta, have said they intended to take up a project for conservation of water flowing through hilly streams in north Bengal so that it could be used for different purposes.
This was stated at the 82nd meeting of the board in Kalimpong yesterday, The Telegraph reported today.
The board asked officials of West Bengal irrigation department to submit specific proposals for approval of funds for anti-erosion and flood protection on either bank of the Teesta river, our New Delhi correspondent reports.
Responding to the board's plan, West Bengal state irrigation department pointed out that the areas through which the hilly streams flow are under the Gorkhaland Territorial Administration (GTA) and that the department cannot take up the task on its own.
It was then decided that at the next meeting of Brahmaputra Board, the GTA will also be invited so that the project can be executed.
Officials of West Bengal irrigation department elaborated on the flash flood that had occurred on the Teesta in October last year following a cloudburst in Sikkim.
"We mentioned how the flash flood led to the huge deposition of debris on the Teesta, which led to a rise in the river bed. Also, other issues like erosion caused by the river on its both banks were pointed out," said Krishnendu Bhowmik, chief engineer (northeast) of the irrigation department.
He said Ranbir Singh, the chairman of the Brahmaputra Board, had sought a specific proposal from them.
"We will discuss with Sikkim and submit a joint DPR (detailed project report) to the board so that funds are sanctioned to carry out these works in the Teesta," according to Bhowmik.
At the meeting, the officials also mentioned the DPR of Rs 11 crore which was submitted to the board for carrying out flood protection works on the Teesta river bank in Mekhliganj near the India-Bangladesh border.
- Copy to clipboard
- Thread starter
- #53
Bangladesh-India: Ambiguity over water-sharing persists
The Teesta issue has come to a halt, this will have an impact regarding our other rivers too. The fear of losing our rights remains.
en.prothomalo.com
Bangladesh-India: Ambiguity over water-sharing persists
M Humayun Kabir
Published: 25 Jun 2024, 12: 14
The basic premise of the discussions and MoUs signed between Bangladesh and India during prime minister Sheikh Hasina's Delhi visit was, India-Bangladesh Shared Vision for Future: Enhancing Connectivity, Commerce and Collaboration for Shared Prosperity. From reviewing the discussions and MoUs, it may seem that smaller irritants have been overlooked in the interests of greater objectives.
A summary of this visit will indicate that Bangladesh and India are drawing up the framework of their cooperation with an invisible side in dominance. It is being said, though, that both sides are making an effort to do this in the interests of both India and Bangladesh.
Have we been able to have adequate connectivity with Nepal and Bhutan? That has not happened and that is why people are venting their anger.
Lofty issues such as digital and green partnership and the Indo-Pacific Strategy have come up in the vision, with Bangladesh being a partner to India is these areas, taking steps for implementation. For example, goods train will travel from India's Gede to Hasimara in the northeast. Yet it is not clear how this will operate, and whether Bangladesh will have the authority to know what is being carried in the goods train or not. Perhaps these matters will be discussed at a later date.
This will benefit India strategically. They will be able to bypass the Chicken's Neck and go to the northeast states through Bangladesh and transport their goods too. The reaction evoked in the mind of people in Bangladesh is only natural. After all, a lot has been said and done about connectivity over the past 15 years, and India has been the beneficiary. But we want to benefit too.
When prime minister Sheikh Hasina in 2010 announced that India would be able to use Mongla and Chattogram ports, the main objective was to create a free regional space. That would mean connectivity with not just India, but with Nepal , Bhutan and all other neighbours too. But have we been able to have adequate connectivity with Nepal and Bhutan? That has not happened and that is why people are venting their anger.
There are, however, positive angles to this visit too. This includes enhanced cooperation among India, Bangladesh Nepal and Bhutan. India has given its nod to Bangladesh bringing electricity from Nepal over Indian territory. This will play a positive role to render Bangladesh's power sector multidimensional in the future.
Both the countries have also agreed to commence with the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA). Negotiations will now take place in this regard. This will further enhance economic ties between Bangladesh and India. However, it will take a few years for the full implementation of CEPA. It involves trade, investment and a lot of factors. Trade investment and a lot of things are involved.
There are no indications of how to overcome the tariff barriers in our trade with India. We face all sorts of hurdles in sending certain items to India. These matters remain unclear. The concept of CEPA is good, though. It will increase opportunities for Bangladesh's participation and investment in the Indian market.
Another positive factor is that India has given directives to renew the Ganges treaty which will expire in two years' time. However, already all sorts of negative statements are being made in West Bengal to this end. But I feel that this is a good decision. We can do whatever is required to implement this decision now. The concepts of digital and green partnership are positive too. India is way ahead of us in digital economy and green energy. It will be beneficial to our partnership of we can work together in these areas.
There have been talks for many years between the two countries regarding water management. Other than with Ganges, we have not been able to reach any agreement concerning any other of the 53 common rivers. While the Teesta agreement was prepared in 2011, this was not signed. This is an ardent demand of the people of Bangladesh. The fate of 20 million people in our northern regions is tied to this. India was pledged to this agreement too. However, there was no mention of this agreement in the declaration this time. As this is a common river, we have a right to a share in the waters. But as the Teesta issue has come to a halt, this will have an impact regarding our other rivers too. The fear of losing our rights remains.
The framework drawn up by India and Bangladesh in 2011 regarding rivers, spoke of paying attention to the Teesta, Brahmaputra and Ganges river basins. But it is difficult to understand what they are saying now. They are saying that talks will continue on the basis of our joint river commission's recommendations, to give priority to exchange of information and an outline for interim water sharing. This does not explain where the Teesta issue stands. As a result, he ambiguity over Teesta remains. We are not comfortable with this. This is, after all, a matter of our rights.
The technical team that is supposed to be coming from India, will work on the Bangladesh side. Does that mean we have shifted away from our focus on the Teesta basic? Dr Ainun Nishat, Sheikh Rokon and several others have raised this issue. It seems that we have entered yet another theoretical complexity regarding the issue of water.
Our prime minister did say that there have been talks in the issue of water sharing. However, the joint declaration offers no clear idea on the matter. India has managed to keep the entire matter behind a smokescreen, a plus point for them. Another matter is that India has now entered the scene where China had put forward a plan regarding Teesta. We have been pitched into a challenge now as to who can do this and how they will do this.
The attention of the two countries regarding this region is another interesting matter. India's attention is particularly sharper. The seven MoUs that have been signed are all focused on North Bengal. They have announces the opening of a deputy high commission in Rangpur. There was no announcement of whether we would be opening any such office.
There was no declaration or even mention regarding the border killings. Broadly speaking, we do not know whether there were any discussions on the issues where India's initiative is required to resolve our problems
India has expressed significant interest in issues of military security. There is talk of this outside too. It seems that India wants to involve Bangladesh in its military planning, with China in mind. India wants to mould Bangladesh to its convenience and it apparently seems that Bangladesh is acquiescing.
There was no declaration or even mention regarding the border killings. Broadly speaking, we do not know whether there were any discussions on the issues where India's initiative is required to resolve our problems. Even if there have been discussions, this has not been reflected in the declaration. In order to implement large visions, it is imperative that we resolve the innumerable smaller problems. We certainly have requirements to be met, but that requires political will. If not, the big visions will throw us into further challenges.
The prime minister will be visiting China next month. They will certainly want to know our areas of understanding with India. They too have plans concerning Teesta. No matter whether it is Teesta or any project, we must decide to whom we will give this on the basis of their experience, competence and financial capacity, and where our interests will be given priority. There may also be discussions with China on a host of other issues including assistance, the Rohingya issue, ensuring that the civil war in Myanmar doesn't harm our interests and so on.
* M Humayun Kabir is a former diplomat and ambassador
M Humayun Kabir
Published: 25 Jun 2024, 12: 14
The basic premise of the discussions and MoUs signed between Bangladesh and India during prime minister Sheikh Hasina's Delhi visit was, India-Bangladesh Shared Vision for Future: Enhancing Connectivity, Commerce and Collaboration for Shared Prosperity. From reviewing the discussions and MoUs, it may seem that smaller irritants have been overlooked in the interests of greater objectives.
A summary of this visit will indicate that Bangladesh and India are drawing up the framework of their cooperation with an invisible side in dominance. It is being said, though, that both sides are making an effort to do this in the interests of both India and Bangladesh.
Have we been able to have adequate connectivity with Nepal and Bhutan? That has not happened and that is why people are venting their anger.
Lofty issues such as digital and green partnership and the Indo-Pacific Strategy have come up in the vision, with Bangladesh being a partner to India is these areas, taking steps for implementation. For example, goods train will travel from India's Gede to Hasimara in the northeast. Yet it is not clear how this will operate, and whether Bangladesh will have the authority to know what is being carried in the goods train or not. Perhaps these matters will be discussed at a later date.
This will benefit India strategically. They will be able to bypass the Chicken's Neck and go to the northeast states through Bangladesh and transport their goods too. The reaction evoked in the mind of people in Bangladesh is only natural. After all, a lot has been said and done about connectivity over the past 15 years, and India has been the beneficiary. But we want to benefit too.
When prime minister Sheikh Hasina in 2010 announced that India would be able to use Mongla and Chattogram ports, the main objective was to create a free regional space. That would mean connectivity with not just India, but with Nepal , Bhutan and all other neighbours too. But have we been able to have adequate connectivity with Nepal and Bhutan? That has not happened and that is why people are venting their anger.
There are, however, positive angles to this visit too. This includes enhanced cooperation among India, Bangladesh Nepal and Bhutan. India has given its nod to Bangladesh bringing electricity from Nepal over Indian territory. This will play a positive role to render Bangladesh's power sector multidimensional in the future.
Both the countries have also agreed to commence with the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA). Negotiations will now take place in this regard. This will further enhance economic ties between Bangladesh and India. However, it will take a few years for the full implementation of CEPA. It involves trade, investment and a lot of factors. Trade investment and a lot of things are involved.
There are no indications of how to overcome the tariff barriers in our trade with India. We face all sorts of hurdles in sending certain items to India. These matters remain unclear. The concept of CEPA is good, though. It will increase opportunities for Bangladesh's participation and investment in the Indian market.
Another positive factor is that India has given directives to renew the Ganges treaty which will expire in two years' time. However, already all sorts of negative statements are being made in West Bengal to this end. But I feel that this is a good decision. We can do whatever is required to implement this decision now. The concepts of digital and green partnership are positive too. India is way ahead of us in digital economy and green energy. It will be beneficial to our partnership of we can work together in these areas.
There have been talks for many years between the two countries regarding water management. Other than with Ganges, we have not been able to reach any agreement concerning any other of the 53 common rivers. While the Teesta agreement was prepared in 2011, this was not signed. This is an ardent demand of the people of Bangladesh. The fate of 20 million people in our northern regions is tied to this. India was pledged to this agreement too. However, there was no mention of this agreement in the declaration this time. As this is a common river, we have a right to a share in the waters. But as the Teesta issue has come to a halt, this will have an impact regarding our other rivers too. The fear of losing our rights remains.
The framework drawn up by India and Bangladesh in 2011 regarding rivers, spoke of paying attention to the Teesta, Brahmaputra and Ganges river basins. But it is difficult to understand what they are saying now. They are saying that talks will continue on the basis of our joint river commission's recommendations, to give priority to exchange of information and an outline for interim water sharing. This does not explain where the Teesta issue stands. As a result, he ambiguity over Teesta remains. We are not comfortable with this. This is, after all, a matter of our rights.
The technical team that is supposed to be coming from India, will work on the Bangladesh side. Does that mean we have shifted away from our focus on the Teesta basic? Dr Ainun Nishat, Sheikh Rokon and several others have raised this issue. It seems that we have entered yet another theoretical complexity regarding the issue of water.
Our prime minister did say that there have been talks in the issue of water sharing. However, the joint declaration offers no clear idea on the matter. India has managed to keep the entire matter behind a smokescreen, a plus point for them. Another matter is that India has now entered the scene where China had put forward a plan regarding Teesta. We have been pitched into a challenge now as to who can do this and how they will do this.
The attention of the two countries regarding this region is another interesting matter. India's attention is particularly sharper. The seven MoUs that have been signed are all focused on North Bengal. They have announces the opening of a deputy high commission in Rangpur. There was no announcement of whether we would be opening any such office.
There was no declaration or even mention regarding the border killings. Broadly speaking, we do not know whether there were any discussions on the issues where India's initiative is required to resolve our problems
India has expressed significant interest in issues of military security. There is talk of this outside too. It seems that India wants to involve Bangladesh in its military planning, with China in mind. India wants to mould Bangladesh to its convenience and it apparently seems that Bangladesh is acquiescing.
There was no declaration or even mention regarding the border killings. Broadly speaking, we do not know whether there were any discussions on the issues where India's initiative is required to resolve our problems. Even if there have been discussions, this has not been reflected in the declaration. In order to implement large visions, it is imperative that we resolve the innumerable smaller problems. We certainly have requirements to be met, but that requires political will. If not, the big visions will throw us into further challenges.
The prime minister will be visiting China next month. They will certainly want to know our areas of understanding with India. They too have plans concerning Teesta. No matter whether it is Teesta or any project, we must decide to whom we will give this on the basis of their experience, competence and financial capacity, and where our interests will be given priority. There may also be discussions with China on a host of other issues including assistance, the Rohingya issue, ensuring that the civil war in Myanmar doesn't harm our interests and so on.
* M Humayun Kabir is a former diplomat and ambassador
- Jan 24, 2024
- 1,653
- 855
- Copy to clipboard
- Moderator
- #54
This is the biggest BS statement we have seen in a while. We consume over US$40 to US$45 Billion of Indian exports and services every year. If not for the capitulating actions from our PM, imposition of higher tariffs on Indian exports to our side will do wonders, just for starters. We have leverage - it is for our PM that we cannot impose them.
If China has upper-riparian country leverage, we can combine our interest with their interest. If Indian center and states start with drawing water illegally from Teesta or Brahmaputra, then we can ask China to do the same (at least from the Brahmaputra). We have to combine our leverage with Chinese leverage and then see where India stands.
- Copy to clipboard
- Thread starter
- #55
Spineless Hasina and her colleagues in Awami League are the root cause of one sided relationship with India. We have to diversify our import source to reduce Indian influence in our domestic politics. India's exploitative trade policy is hurting our economy.
- Copy to clipboard
- Thread starter
- #56
India's River Linking Project is a recipe for disaster.
- Copy to clipboard
- Thread starter
- #57
Tipaimukh Dam--another example of India's water terrorism against Bangladesh.
- Jan 24, 2024
- 1,653
- 855
- Copy to clipboard
- Moderator
- #58
ą¦¬ą¦¾ą¦ą¦²ą¦¾ą¦¦ą§ą¦¶ ą¦Ŗą§ą¦°ą¦¤ą¦æ ą¦¬ą¦ą¦° ą¦ą¦¾ą¦°ą¦¤ ą¦„ą§ą¦ą§ ą¦Ŗą§ą¦°ą¦¾ą§ ą¦®ą¦¾ą¦°ą§ą¦ą¦æą¦Ø ą¦ą¦²ą§ą¦²ą¦æą¦¶ ą¦¬ą¦æą¦²ą¦æą§ą¦Ø ą¦”ą¦²ą¦¾ą¦° ą¦ą¦° ą¦®ą¦¤ą§ ą¦ą§ą¦”ą¦ø ą¦ą¦Øą§ą¦” ą¦øą¦¾ą¦°ą§ą¦ą¦æą¦øą§ą¦ø ą¦ą§ą¦Øą§ ą¦Æą¦¾ą¦° ą¦øą¦æą¦ą¦¹ ą¦ą¦¾ą¦ ą¦ą¦øą§ ą¦Ŗą¦¶ą§ą¦ą¦æą¦®ą¦¬ą¦ą§ą¦ ą¦ą¦° ą¦øą§ą¦ą§ą¦Ø ą¦øą¦æą¦øą§ą¦ą¦¾ą¦°ą§ą¦ø ą¦„ą§ą¦ą§ (ą¦ą¦øą¦¾ą¦®, ą¦¤ą§ą¦°ą¦æą¦Ŗą§ą¦°ą¦¾, ą¦Øą¦¾ą¦ą¦¾ą¦²ą§ą¦Æą¦¾ą¦Øą§ą¦” ą¦ą¦¤ą§ą¦Æą¦¾ą¦¦ą¦æ)ą„¤ ą¦Æą¦¾ą¦°ą¦¾ ą¦¬ą¦²ą§ ą¦ą¦¾ą¦°ą¦¤ą§ą¦° ą¦ą¦Ŗą¦° ą¦ą¦®ą¦¾ą¦¦ą§ą¦° ą¦ą§ą¦Øą§ ą¦²ą§ą¦ą¦¾ą¦°ą§ą¦ ą¦Øą§ą¦ ą¦¤ą¦¾ą¦°ą¦¾ ą¦ą¦ą¦¾ ą¦ą¦¾ą¦Øą§ą¦Øą¦¾ - ą¦¬ą¦¾ą¦ą¦²ą¦¾ą¦¦ą§ą¦¶ą§ą¦° ą¦¶ą§ą¦§ą§ ą¦¦ą¦°ą¦ą¦¾ą¦° ą¦ą¦¾ą¦°ą¦¤ą§ą§ ą¦ą¦®ą§ą¦Ŗą§ą¦°ą§ą¦ą§ą¦ø ą¦ą¦° ą¦ą¦Ŗą¦° ą¦ą§ą¦Æą¦¾ą¦°ą¦æą¦« ą¦¬ą¦øą¦æą§ą§ ą¦¦ą§ą§ą¦¾, ą¦Æą§ą¦ą¦¾ ą¦ą¦¾ą¦°ą¦¤ą§ą§ą¦°ą¦¾ ą¦ą¦ą¦ą§ ą¦Ŗą¦ą§ą¦ą¦¾ą¦¶ ą¦¬ą¦ą¦° ą¦§ą¦°ą§ ą¦ą¦¾ą¦®ą§ą¦ą¦¾ ą¦
ą¦Øą§ą¦Æą¦¾ą§ ą¦ą¦¾ą¦¬ą§ ą¦ą¦°ą§ ą¦ą¦²ą§ą¦ą§ ą¦¬ą¦¾ą¦ą¦²ą¦¾ą¦¦ą§ą¦¶ą§ą¦° ą¦ą¦ą§ą¦øą¦Ŗą§ą¦°ą§ą¦ ą¦ą¦° ą¦ą¦Ŗą¦° ą„¤ ą¦Ŗą¦¶ą§ą¦ą¦æą¦® ą¦¬ą¦ą§ą¦ą§ą¦° ą¦Ŗą§ą¦°ą§ ą¦
ą¦°ą§ą¦„ą¦Øą§ą¦¤ą¦æą¦ą¦¾ą¦ ą¦ą¦®ą¦¾ą¦¦ą§ą¦° ą¦¬ą¦¾ą¦ą¦²ą¦¾ą¦¦ą§ą¦¶ą§ą¦° ą¦Ŗą§ą¦Æą¦¾ą¦ą§ą¦°ą§ą¦Øą¦æą¦ą¦¶ą¦Ø ą¦ą¦° ą¦ą¦Ŗą¦° ą¦Øą¦æą¦°ą§ą¦ą¦°ą¦¶ą§ą¦²ą„¤ ą¦ą¦ą¦ą§ ą¦Æą¦¦ą¦æ ą¦Ŗą¦¶ą§ą¦ą¦æą¦® ą¦¬ą¦ą§ą¦ą§ą¦° ą¦øą¦¾ą¦„ą§ ą¦¬ą¦¾ą¦ą¦²ą¦¾ą¦¦ą§ą¦¶ą§ą¦° ą¦ą§ą¦°ą§ą¦” ą¦ą§ą¦¾ą¦° ą¦¶ą§ą¦°ą§ ą¦¹ą§ ą¦¤ą¦¾ą¦¹ą¦²ą§ ą¦Ŗą¦¶ą§ą¦ą¦æą¦®ą¦¬ą¦ą§ą¦ą§ą¦° ą¦
ą¦°ą§ą¦„ą¦Øą§ą¦¤ą¦æ ą¦§ą§ą¦¬ą¦ą¦ø ą¦¹ą§ą§ ą¦Æą¦¾ą¦¬ą§ą„¤ ą¦Ŗą¦¶ą§ą¦ą¦æą¦®ą¦¬ą¦ą§ą¦ą¦ą§ ą¦ą§ą¦Øą§ą¦¦ą§ą¦°ą§ą¦° ą¦ą¦¾ą¦¤ ą¦®ą¦¾ą¦°ą¦¾ą¦° ą¦¦ą¦°ą¦ą¦¾ą¦° ą¦Øą§ą¦, ą¦¬ą¦¾ą¦ą¦²ą¦¾ą¦¦ą§ą¦¶ ą¦ą¦ą¦¾ą¦ ą¦Ŗą¦¶ą§ą¦ą¦æą¦®ą¦¬ą¦ą§ą¦ą§ą¦° ą¦
ą¦°ą§ą¦„ą¦Øą§ą¦¤ą¦æą¦ą§ ą¦§ą§ą¦¬ą¦ą¦ø ą¦ą¦°ą¦¾ą¦° ą¦ą¦Øą§ą¦Æ ą¦Æą¦„ą§ą¦·ą§ą¦ą„¤ ą¦Æą§ą¦¦ą¦æą¦Ø ą¦¬ą¦¾ą¦ą¦²ą¦¾ą¦¦ą§ą¦¶ą§ą¦° ą¦ą§ą¦Ø ą¦²ą§ą¦ą¦¾ą¦°ą§ą¦ ą¦øą¦«ą¦² ą¦¹ą¦¬ą§, ą¦øą§ą¦¦ą¦æą¦Ø ą¦ą¦° ą¦ą¦®ą¦¾ą¦¦ą§ą¦° ą¦Ŗą§ą¦°ą§ ą¦ą¦¾ą¦°ą¦¤ą¦ą§ą¦ ą¦¦ą¦°ą¦ą¦¾ą¦° ą¦Ŗą§ą¦¬ą§ą¦Øą¦¾, ą¦Ŗą¦¶ą§ą¦ą¦æą¦® ą¦¬ą¦ą§ą¦ ą¦¤ą§ ą¦¦ą§ą¦°ą§ą¦° ą¦ą¦„ą¦¾ą„¤ ą¦ą§ą¦Ø ą¦ą¦° ą¦¬ą§ą¦°ą¦¹ą§ą¦®ą¦Ŗą§ą¦¤ą§ą¦° ą¦Øą¦¦ą§ą¦° ą¦¬ą¦¾ą¦ą¦§ (ą¦¤ą¦æą¦¬ą§ą¦¬ą¦¤ ą¦) ą¦Ŗą§ą¦°ą¦¾ą§ ą¦ą¦®ą¦Ŗą§ą¦²ą¦æą¦, ą¦ą§ą¦Ø ą¦Ŗą¦¾ą¦Øą¦æ ą¦¬ą¦Øą§ą¦§ ą¦ą¦°ą§ ą¦¦ą¦æą¦²ą§ ą¦øą§ą¦ą§ą¦Ø ą¦øą¦æą¦øą§ą¦ą¦¾ą¦°ą§ą¦ø ą¦ą¦° ą¦Ŗą¦¶ą§ą¦ą¦æą¦®ą¦¬ą¦ą§ą¦ ą¦ą¦¾ą¦°ą¦¤ą§ą§ą¦¦ą§ą¦° ą¦ą¦æ ą¦¹ą¦¬ą§ ą¦¤ą¦¾ ą¦ą¦Øą¦¾ą¦°ą¦¾ą¦ ą¦ą¦¾ą¦²ą§ ą¦ą¦¾ą¦Øą§ą¦Øą„¤
Bangladesh buys about US $40 billion worth of goods and services from India every year, the lion's share of which comes from West Bengal and the Seven Sisters (Assam, Tripura, Nagaland, etc.). Those who say we have no leverage over India do not know this - Bangladesh only needs to impose tariffs on Indian imports, which Indians have been unfairly doing on Bangladeshi exports for fifty years now. The entire economy of West Bengal is dependent on the patronage of our Bangladesh. If a trade war between Bangladesh and West Bengal starts today, the economy of West Bengal will be destroyed. West Bengal does not need to be killed by the centre, Bangladesh alone is enough to destroy West Bengal's economy. The day Bangladesh's China leverage succeeds, we will no longer need the whole of India, let alone West Bengal. China's Brahmaputra dam (in Tibet) is almost complete, they know very well what will happen to the Seven Sisters and West Bengal Indians if China shuts off the water.
Bangladesh buys about US $40 billion worth of goods and services from India every year, the lion's share of which comes from West Bengal and the Seven Sisters (Assam, Tripura, Nagaland, etc.). Those who say we have no leverage over India do not know this - Bangladesh only needs to impose tariffs on Indian imports, which Indians have been unfairly doing on Bangladeshi exports for fifty years now. The entire economy of West Bengal is dependent on the patronage of our Bangladesh. If a trade war between Bangladesh and West Bengal starts today, the economy of West Bengal will be destroyed. West Bengal does not need to be killed by the centre, Bangladesh alone is enough to destroy West Bengal's economy. The day Bangladesh's China leverage succeeds, we will no longer need the whole of India, let alone West Bengal. China's Brahmaputra dam (in Tibet) is almost complete, they know very well what will happen to the Seven Sisters and West Bengal Indians if China shuts off the water.
- Copy to clipboard
- Thread starter
- #59
Dhaka prefers India over China
Foreign minister Hasan Mahmud said on Sunday that Bangladesh would have to consider Indiaās proposal to implement the Teesta development project first since it was a...
www.newagebd.net
Dhaka prefers India over China
Staff Correspondent 07 July, 2024, 18:45
Foreign minister Hasan Mahmud. | File photo.
Foreign minister Hasan Mahmud said on Sunday that Bangladesh would have to consider India's proposal to implement the Teesta development project first since it was a common river between the two countries.
Addressing a press conference ahead of prime minister Sheikh Hasina's four-day visit to China, scheduled from July 8 to July 11, he said that they had another proposal from China for the same project on the trans-boundary river inside Bangladesh.
'The Teesta is a joint river between the two countries. India has given us a proposal for the Teesta project in Bangladesh, and they will send a technical team to work jointly with us. So naturally, we will have to consider India's proposal first, as we have another proposal from China for the same project,' Hasan Mahmud told reporters, responding to a question.
He said that prime minister Sheikh Hasina would leave Dhaka for Beijing on Monday on a state visit at the invitation of China's Premier of the State Council, Li Qiang.
He, however, said that no treaties but 20 to 22 memorandums of understanding on cooperation in various areas, including the economic and banking sectors, infrastructure development, trade and investment, and the digital economy, were likely to be signed during the PM's visit to China.
Asked whether the Teesta project issue would be discussed during the bilateral meeting with her Chinese counterpart in Beijing, the minister said that it might be discussed if the Chinese side raised the issue.
Addressing a press conference on her India visit from June 21 to 22, Sheikh Hasina said in Dhaka on June 25 that it would be easy for Bangladesh if the Teesta restoration project received support from India.
Beijing and New Delhi are already on a collision course after India's latest proposal to finance the Teesta restoration and management project.
China has already offered both financial and technical support for the project after conducting a feasibility study.
During the PM's visit, Bangladesh will seek China's financial assistance amid pressure on its foreign currency reserves and in the repatriation of Rohingya to their homeland, Myanmar, during the bilateral talks scheduled for July 10, according to officials.
'China is our big development partner. They have made huge investments in Bangladesh, and they have played a key role in our infrastructure development over the past few decades. So development and economic cooperation will get priority,' said Hasan Mahmud, referring to the PM's visit.
Bangladesh's finance minister, foreign minister, prime minister's private industry and investment adviser, and state ministers for commerce, energy, information and communication technology, along with a business delegation and senior officials concerned, will accompany Hasina during the visit.
Hasina will attend a bilateral meeting with Li Qiang at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on July 10, where about 20 Memorandums of Understanding are expected to be signed in their presence, said the foreign minister.
Hasina will also hold a meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping at the same place on the same day.
'The MoUs on cooperation in the economic and banking sector, trade and investment, digital economy, infrastructure development, assistance in disaster management, construction of the 6th and 9th Bangladesh-China friendship bridges, export of agricultural products from Bangladesh, and people-to-people connectivity are likely to be signed during the visit,' he said.
Hasan, however, said that no loan agreement would be signed and no specific amount of financial assistance would be sought in the bilateral talks.
'There will be no loan deals. We will only sign MoUs on economic cooperation. Once all parameters are met, we will seek assistance in the finance and banking sectors as per our needs based on that MoU,' said Hasan.
Bangladesh is currently facing a severe dollar crisis, with foreign exchange reserves dropping to $26.81 billion in June this year from $46.15 billion in December 2021, according to Bangladesh Bank data.
According to the balance of payments and international investment position manual, the country's foreign exchange reserves were $21.78 billion at the end of June.
The reserve improved slightly in June after the International Monetary Fund released $1.152 for Bangladesh in the third tranche of a $4.7 billion loan package as much-needed economic relief for Bangladesh.
The foreign minister, however, dismissed concerns about pressure on foreign exchange reserves.
The minister said that Hasina would meet the president of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, Jin Liqun, and attend a summit on trade, business, and investment opportunities between Bangladesh and China during her visit.
China is one of the largest trade partners of Bangladesh, with bilateral trade reaching $18.50 billion in the 2022ā23 financial year, according to the latest data from the Dhaka Chamber of Commerce, which cited the Export Promotion Bureau and Bangladesh Bank sources.
The trade balance is heavily tilted towards China, which exported products worth $17.82 billion to Bangladesh and imported products, mostly jute yarn, worth $677.36 million from Bangladesh in the financial year.
Hasina last visited Beijing in July 2019, while Chinese president Xi Jinping visited Bangladesh in October 2016.
Staff Correspondent 07 July, 2024, 18:45
Foreign minister Hasan Mahmud. | File photo.
Foreign minister Hasan Mahmud said on Sunday that Bangladesh would have to consider India's proposal to implement the Teesta development project first since it was a common river between the two countries.
Addressing a press conference ahead of prime minister Sheikh Hasina's four-day visit to China, scheduled from July 8 to July 11, he said that they had another proposal from China for the same project on the trans-boundary river inside Bangladesh.
'The Teesta is a joint river between the two countries. India has given us a proposal for the Teesta project in Bangladesh, and they will send a technical team to work jointly with us. So naturally, we will have to consider India's proposal first, as we have another proposal from China for the same project,' Hasan Mahmud told reporters, responding to a question.
He said that prime minister Sheikh Hasina would leave Dhaka for Beijing on Monday on a state visit at the invitation of China's Premier of the State Council, Li Qiang.
He, however, said that no treaties but 20 to 22 memorandums of understanding on cooperation in various areas, including the economic and banking sectors, infrastructure development, trade and investment, and the digital economy, were likely to be signed during the PM's visit to China.
Asked whether the Teesta project issue would be discussed during the bilateral meeting with her Chinese counterpart in Beijing, the minister said that it might be discussed if the Chinese side raised the issue.
Addressing a press conference on her India visit from June 21 to 22, Sheikh Hasina said in Dhaka on June 25 that it would be easy for Bangladesh if the Teesta restoration project received support from India.
Beijing and New Delhi are already on a collision course after India's latest proposal to finance the Teesta restoration and management project.
China has already offered both financial and technical support for the project after conducting a feasibility study.
During the PM's visit, Bangladesh will seek China's financial assistance amid pressure on its foreign currency reserves and in the repatriation of Rohingya to their homeland, Myanmar, during the bilateral talks scheduled for July 10, according to officials.
'China is our big development partner. They have made huge investments in Bangladesh, and they have played a key role in our infrastructure development over the past few decades. So development and economic cooperation will get priority,' said Hasan Mahmud, referring to the PM's visit.
Bangladesh's finance minister, foreign minister, prime minister's private industry and investment adviser, and state ministers for commerce, energy, information and communication technology, along with a business delegation and senior officials concerned, will accompany Hasina during the visit.
Hasina will attend a bilateral meeting with Li Qiang at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on July 10, where about 20 Memorandums of Understanding are expected to be signed in their presence, said the foreign minister.
Hasina will also hold a meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping at the same place on the same day.
'The MoUs on cooperation in the economic and banking sector, trade and investment, digital economy, infrastructure development, assistance in disaster management, construction of the 6th and 9th Bangladesh-China friendship bridges, export of agricultural products from Bangladesh, and people-to-people connectivity are likely to be signed during the visit,' he said.
Hasan, however, said that no loan agreement would be signed and no specific amount of financial assistance would be sought in the bilateral talks.
'There will be no loan deals. We will only sign MoUs on economic cooperation. Once all parameters are met, we will seek assistance in the finance and banking sectors as per our needs based on that MoU,' said Hasan.
Bangladesh is currently facing a severe dollar crisis, with foreign exchange reserves dropping to $26.81 billion in June this year from $46.15 billion in December 2021, according to Bangladesh Bank data.
According to the balance of payments and international investment position manual, the country's foreign exchange reserves were $21.78 billion at the end of June.
The reserve improved slightly in June after the International Monetary Fund released $1.152 for Bangladesh in the third tranche of a $4.7 billion loan package as much-needed economic relief for Bangladesh.
The foreign minister, however, dismissed concerns about pressure on foreign exchange reserves.
The minister said that Hasina would meet the president of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, Jin Liqun, and attend a summit on trade, business, and investment opportunities between Bangladesh and China during her visit.
China is one of the largest trade partners of Bangladesh, with bilateral trade reaching $18.50 billion in the 2022ā23 financial year, according to the latest data from the Dhaka Chamber of Commerce, which cited the Export Promotion Bureau and Bangladesh Bank sources.
The trade balance is heavily tilted towards China, which exported products worth $17.82 billion to Bangladesh and imported products, mostly jute yarn, worth $677.36 million from Bangladesh in the financial year.
Hasina last visited Beijing in July 2019, while Chinese president Xi Jinping visited Bangladesh in October 2016.
- Copy to clipboard
- Thread starter
- #60
ą¦ ą¦„ą¦ ą¦Ŗą¦¶ą§ą¦ą¦æą¦® ą¦¬ą¦¾ą¦ą¦²ą¦¾ą¦° ą¦²ą§ą¦ą§ą¦°ą¦¾ ą¦¬ą¦²ą§ ą¦¬ą¦¾ą¦ą¦²ą¦¾ą¦¦ą§ą¦¶ ą¦Øą¦¾ą¦ą¦æ ą¦ą¦¦ą§ą¦°ą¦ą¦¾ ą¦ą¦¾ą§ ą¦Ŗą¦°ą§ą„¤ ą¦¬ą¦¾ą¦ą¦²ą¦¾ą¦¦ą§ą¦¶ ą¦øą¦°ą¦ą¦¾ą¦°ą§ą¦° ą¦Øą¦¤ą¦ą¦¾ą¦Øą§ ą¦Ŗą¦°ą¦°ą¦¾ą¦øą§ą¦ą§ą¦°ą¦Øą§ą¦¤ą¦æą¦° ą¦ą¦¾ą¦°ą¦Øą§ ą¦Ŗą¦¶ą§ą¦ą¦æą¦® ą¦¬ą¦¾ą¦ą¦²ą¦¾ą¦° ą¦®ą¦¤ ą¦ą¦æą¦ą¦¾ą¦°ą§ ą¦¬ą¦¾ą¦ą¦²ą¦¾ą¦¦ą§ą¦¶ą¦ą§ ą¦ą§ą¦ ą¦°ą¦¾ą¦ą¦æą§ą§ ą¦ą¦„ą¦¾ ą¦¬ą¦²ą§ą„¤
Latest Tweets
Seeing you're the more like-minded Bangladeshis, I was going advocate having you as moderator. Good to know it's already been done.
Have you considered adding a cool Egyptian symbol as your avatar?
About the 1971 conflict Separation of East Pakistan: The Untold Story (2021)
Latest Posts
-
-
-
[š§š©-Airforce] Bangladesh Air Force and how it is viewed by Indian Air Force.- Latest: Krishna with Flute
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
[š®š³] Mahindra's game changer BE6 and XE9 EVs. Changing the dynamics of automobiles.
- Latest: Krishna with Flute
-
-
-
-
-
-
General Quality of photos/images stored in Gmail & Facebook reduces after some days
- Latest: Krishna with Flute
-
-
-
-
-
[š®š³] Indonesia shows interest in collaborating with India in defense tech sector
- Latest: Krishna with Flute
-
-
