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[🇧🇩] India's Water Terrorism Against Bangladesh

G Bangladesh Defense
[🇧🇩] India's Water Terrorism Against Bangladesh
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How do you "neutralize" 172 million Indian Muslims?

They have too much of political relevance which is fading now. What they need is appeasement. They do not want progress. As the Hindus are divided and Muslims vote in blocks, they have political relevance. Once Hindus starts voting for Hinduism, their political significance will be lost and they will be neutralized politically.

They are useless so fat as education, economy and social order is concern. They only have political relevance because of appeasement to get block votes. Once we start penalizing them for their mischiefs, they will realize that their heard voting will not bring them any fruit.

Many Muslims who are annoyed of the behavior of their fellow Ummah leaders are ready to switch to their ancestor's fold. They will make a move. That has already begun. Their illegal encroachments and electricity theft has now been countered in harsh way and they have started speaking language of brotherhood. Coward Modi at the center is the biggest hurdle in dealing with these guys, many of whom thrives on theft and illegal activities. Now, their illegal activities and land grabbing are being targeted. Earlier, there was a situation where you cannot touch their encroached land and mosques build on those land. They had an ecosystem and support of draconian law like Waqf act.

Now, rightwing Hindutva Vadi government doesn't care atall about their concern. It is now evident that they do not want progress. They need illegal means for their survival. As the governments acting tough, they have started realizing that their days of hooliganism are over. They will have to act responsibly to survive. Many educated Muslims have started raising their voice against their Thug leadership. They are getting neutralized. They are getting neutralized in a way that their thuggery is now no more effective to frighten political party, BJP in particular. They have lost their political relevance to bring parties to power and overthrow the government they do not like. They are dealt in a way they deserve.
 
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DAMS, DUCTS AND DIPLOMATIC DILEMMAS: India’s dominance and Bangladesh’s decision
Simon Mohsin 16 January, 2025, 00:00

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The River Brahmaputra runs from its origin in western Tibet through India before flowing into the sea in Bangladesh. | Wikimedia Commons

INDIA is investing $1 billion to accelerate the construction of 12 hydropower projects in Arunachal Pradesh, aiming to harness the state’s estimated hydropower potential of more than 57,000MW. The strategy includes developing at least 135 hydroelectric projects along the River Brahmaputra. However, building dams upstream may worsen water shortage for Bangladesh, which relies on the Brahmaputra for 75 per cent of its dry-season river water and is already facing a 25 per cent shortfall. This situation raises concern about human security in the region.

To facilitate the transmission of electricity generated from these projects to the Indian mainland, establishing several high-capacity power transmission lines is essential. This presents a logistical challenge because of the existing development in Siliguri town’s chicken neck, commonly called the Siliguri corridor, which features a network of roads, canals and established electricity infrastructure. Consequently, implementing high-voltage electric lines in this region presents significant difficulties. Moreover, a military base in the Doklam Valley, under Chinese control, introduces additional complexity and risk to the situation. Given these factors, India wants to route this critical power grid transmission line through Bangladesh to mitigate potential risks and enhance overall security.

The Indian government is negotiating with Bangladesh to establish a power transmission corridor connecting northeast India to other regions. The Bangladesh-India joint working group is facilitating these talks. In a significant development during the group’s 22nd meeting on July 19, 2024, Bangladesh agreed to construct a 765kV transmission line from Katihar in Bihar, India, to Barnagar in Assam, via Parbatipur in Bangladesh, with a completion target of 2028. This agreement comes despite previous concern from Bangladesh about the necessity of the line for power import and its potential use for evacuating hydropower from northeast India. Bangladesh has raised issues regarding the security and maintenance of the line, suggesting a data-sharing agreement for feasibility studies and impact assessments. While India has denied a direct connection between the transmission line and hydropower projects in Arunachal Pradesh, the project’s implications for the Brahmaputra river system and Bangladesh’s water management need careful consideration.

In this context, the interim government of Bangladesh has two primary responsibilities. First, it should protest at India’s unilateral decisions to construct 12 hydroelectric power projects upstream the Brahmaputra basin and take diplomatic steps to deter India from proceeding. Second, it should cancel the approval of the Katihar-Parbatipur-Barnagar transmission line project immediately so that India cannot use it to evacuate the hydropower generated by damming the Brahmaputra.

Of the estimated 150 trans-boundary rivers, 54 flow through the Bangladesh-India border. In a total disregard for international laws, India is constructing one dam after another across the rivers and unilaterally blocking or releasing water. The more dams India constructs upstream Bangladesh, the more such incidents will increase. Thus, there is valid concern that if India is given a power corridor, several Indian agencies can arrange for investment to construct many planned barrages upstream Bangladesh. So, assisting India to construct a power corridor would be a suicidal decision for Bangladesh.

Bangladesh must undertake robust diplomatic and international initiatives to prevent India from unilaterally constructing dams. Reports indicate that when officials within the power department raised concern regarding the design risks associated with the Barnagar-Parbatipur-Katihar 765KV transmission line, they faced either transfers or harassment. It is essential to reconsider the India-centric political decisions made during the tenure of the Awami League government. The Power Grid Company of Bangladesh engaged consultants to develop a design for this corridor line, with another consultant being appointed by the power cell for environmental clearance. This process should be suspended pending further research and a comprehensive political, economic and environmental reassessment.

In a significant development, a trilateral power-sharing agreement involving Nepal, India and Bangladesh was implemented on Friday, coinciding with Nepal’s export of 40MW of electricity to Bangladesh, which has high energy demand for its economic needs. This agreement formally initiates electricity trade between the two nations, facilitated through the Indian power grid. Notably, Nepal and Bangladesh do not share a direct territorial connection, as the Siliguri corridor separates them — a 22-kilometre segment located within the Indian state of West Bengal between southern Nepal and northern Bangladesh. According to the Nepal Electricity Authority, this initial export represents the sole transaction planned for the current year with Bangladesh. Under the power agreement established between Kathmandu and Dhaka on October 3, Nepal is set to export 40MW of electricity annually from June 15 to November 15 for five years.

Meanwhile, Muhammad Yunus, the chief adviser to Bangladesh’s interim government, convened with the Social Business Group in Baku, Azerbaijan, during the UN climate conference COP29. He emphasised the necessity of establishing a South Asian electricity grid to facilitate sharing hydroelectric power produced by Nepal and Bhutan. Yunus articulated that a significant portion of the hydroelectric potential in the Himalayan nations remains under-used because of the absence of interconnected electricity grids in Bangladesh, India, Nepal and Bhutan. He noted that Nepal could generate 40,000MW of hydroelectricity, substantially reducing reliance on fossil fuels in countries such as India and Bangladesh. Bangladesh also plans to import power from Bhutan, a feat that would require Indian support once again, given geographic realities.

India’s prime minister Narendra Modi and Chinese premier Xi Jinping held their first formal talks in 2024 year after five years. The meeting comes days after the two countries agreed a deal to resolve a four-year military standoff on their disputed Himalayan border. Although the two leaders have showed willingness to resolve issues in the Himalayan border, the Doklam issue is unlikely to be resolved soon. Thus, India’s geopolitical and geostrategic compulsions to acquire the power corridor remain high.

Power geopolitics in the BBIN region offers mutual benefits by enhancing energy security, reducing costs and fostering economic growth. It strengthens India’s regional influence while Bangladesh, Nepal and Bhutan gain access to reliable, affordable electricity. This cooperation promotes stability and integrated development.

Power trade between Bangladesh, Nepal and Bhutan is intricately linked to crossing Indian territory, giving India a dominant geopolitical position in shaping the region’s energy dynamics. Given geographical realities, India is critical in establishing a regional power grid that connects the four countries — Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, and Nepal. India’s relatively advanced transmission infrastructure gives it significant leverage to dictate terms in the electricity trade, ensuring it remains the central node of the regional energy network. As the facilitator of power flow, India can influence trade agreements, prioritise its energy needs and dictate pricing, thereby consolidating its political and economic influence over the BBIN sub-region.

Bangladesh must urgently revisit its position regarding the power corridor with India, weighing the long-term implications for its water security and regional sovereignty. While regional connectivity remains vital, Bangladesh must ensure that India’s hydropower ambitions do not compromise its interests. India, in turn, must demonstrate a greater commitment to being a trustworthy interlocutor by fostering transparent and cooperative dialogue, respecting Bangladesh’s concern and prioritising mutual benefits. Only through such a recalibrated approach can both countries navigate their complex interdependencies and ensure sustainable, equitable development for the entire region.

Simon Mohsin is a political and international affairs analyst.​
 

Trilateral cooperation for Chinese dam on Brahmaputra
Mir Mostafizur Rahaman
Published :
Jan 22, 2025 21:59
Updated :
Jan 22, 2025 21:59

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The decision of China to construct the world's largest dam on the lower reaches of the Yarlung Zangbo River, known as the Brahmaputra downstream, has sparked significant concern in India and Bangladesh. The $137 billion project has given rise to fears about possible disruptions to water flow and downstream countries' rightful access to the Brahmaputra's waters. Although China has tried to dispel fear about any negative impact, Bangladesh and India remain apprehensive.

The Brahmaputra is considered a lifeline for Bangladesh, accounting for a significant portion of the country's total water resources. With at least 60 per cent of Bangladesh's population being dependent on its catchment basin, any alteration in the river's flow due to upstream damming poses a serious threat to its water security. Dams allow upstream countries to manipulate water flow, which could lead to reduced availability for downstream nations, jeopardising agriculture, fisheries, and livelihoods.

India has responded to China's plan with its own plan to construct a 10-GW hydroelectric dam in Arunachal Pradesh. This initiative aims to mitigate potential adverse impact of the Chinese dam by creating substantial water storage capacity within Indian territory. However, for Bangladesh, these developments are a double-edged sword. As the smallest downstream nation, it risks being squeezed between the competing interests of its larger neighbours.

To address this challenge, Bangladesh must engage proactively with both China and India to secure commitments ensuring that its due share of Brahmaputra water is not compromised. While bilateral dialogues are essential, experts emphasise the need for trilateral cooperation as the most viable solution. Collaborative approaches can transform potential conflicts into opportunities for mutual benefit.

One possibility is for Bangladesh to negotiate a stake in the Chinese dam project, leveraging the shared benefits of hydropower generation. The dam, projected to produce over 60 GW of electricity, could be an economic boon if power-sharing agreements are established among China, India, and Bangladesh. A tripartite investment model could ensure equitable access to the energy generated, aligning the interests of all three nations.

Trilateral cooperation could also foster trust and reduce regional tensions. By working together, the three countries can address environmental concerns, ensure equitable water distribution, and develop a framework for sustainable management of the Brahmaputra's resources. Such an agreement would demonstrate that shared rivers need not be sources of contention but rather platforms for regional collaboration.

To this end, Bangladesh must initiate efforts at diplomatic level to bring China and India to the negotiating table. It should also engage regional and international organizations to mediate and support the dialogue. A transparent, inclusive process will be the key to ensuring that the Brahmaputra remains a source of life and livelihood for all three nations.

Ultimately, the construction of dams on the Brahmaputra should not become a zero-sum game. With sincere and sustained trilateral dialogue, this critical transboundary river can emerge as a symbol of cooperation and a driver of regional stability.​
 

Can ‘engineering diplomacy’ solve Bangladesh-India water issue?

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Addressing natural calamities requires more than just technical fixes—it demands an understanding of the social and political narratives that shape perceptions and responses. FILE PHOTO: STAR

Bangladesh is still recovering from the devastating August 2024 floods, one of the worst regional floods in its history. Millions were displaced, livelihoods shattered, and diplomatic tensions reignited. Yet, this crisis could be the turning point for regional cooperation.

The science and misinformation of the floods

The floods were driven by intensified monsoon rains, a shifting jet stream, and the Madden-Julian Oscillation funnelling moisture into south-eastern Bangladesh. Districts like Feni and Noakhali, areas not typically prone to severe flooding, experienced record-breaking rainfall and devastating impacts—half a million displaced, over 300,000 hectares of farmland submerged, and schools and roads left in ruins.

But alongside the rising waters came a surge of misinformation. Social media was rife with accusations that India had released water from upstream dams to worsen the floods in Bangladesh—a narrative fuelled by decades of mistrust over water sharing. While these claims were scientifically questionable, they complicated mitigation efforts and strained relationship between the two neighbours.

Addressing natural calamities requires more than just technical fixes—it demands an understanding of the social and political narratives that shape perceptions and responses. This is where engineering diplomacy can play a transformative role.

Engineering diplomacy: A bridge between science and society

Engineering diplomacy offers a pathway forward. It synthesises scientific facts ("numbers") with cultural and political contexts ("narratives") to create solutions that are technically defensible, societally acceptable, ethically responsible, and politically feasible. Rather than framing the floods merely as a natural disaster or a political weapon, engineering diplomacy would encourage both nations to explore shared interests. Bangladesh's vulnerability to extreme weather and India's role as an upstream actor are not mutually exclusive—they are intertwined challenges that demand shared solutions. By moving from positions ("India must release more water") to interests ("how do we ensure equitable water availability?"), engineering diplomacy fosters trust and pragmatic problem-solving.

What Bangladesh and India can do together

The 2024 floods underscore the shared stakes for both nations. India, too, faced devastating floods in upstream regions like Tripura and Bihar highlighting how interconnected the challenges are. Recognising this shared vulnerability, Bangladesh and India can take specific steps towards resilience and cooperation:

Initiate a "devising seminar" for shared resilience

The two countries can convene multi-stakeholder workshops with representation from four critical communities from Bangladesh and India—knowledge, political, resource, and affected—which can create a platform for collaborative problem-solving. This informal yet structured dialogue can focus on key areas like real-time data sharing, joint flood forecasting systems, and equitable water-sharing protocols for transboundary rivers such as the Feni and Gomti. I have discussed details of a devising seminar in an earlier piece for the Himalayan rivers. We need informed conversations to hammer out the details required to act and move forward on how to develop and share transboundary resources for an equitable and sustainable future. Complexity of transboundary issues demands learning from other river basins like the Nile, Jordan, and Danube—and adapting to local situations.

Strengthen public perceptions against misinformation

Debunking misinformation and conspiracy theories during a disaster usually does not work. Countering misinformation isn't just about presenting facts—it's about addressing the fears and mistrust that fuel these narratives. Within the context of current Bangladesh-India relations, these narratives are not surprising.

Collaborative projects that are responsive to the underlying interests—not positions–of both parties may be an effective way to ease these tensions, lessen misinformation virality during future floods, and make practical progress on flood resiliency challenges. For example, statements that simultaneously acknowledge that Bangladesh has legitimate fears of water control by India while being clear that the evidence in this particular case does not suggest India's political interference could go far to debunk conspiracy-inspired narratives. As a proactive measure, both nations can launch joint public communication campaigns now to start developing trust in the information they share. By aligning messaging with scientific findings and cultural sensitivities, these campaigns can build trust and reduce the likelihood of misinformation inflaming tensions when the next flood hits the region.

Reactivate collaborative institutions

The Joint River Commission between India and Bangladesh offers a formal venue for cooperation but has been largely inactive. Reactivating its subcommittees, particularly the Indo-Bangladesh Experts on Flood Forecasting and Warning Systems, could reinvigorate bilateral efforts. This subcommittee has not met since 2004.

Demonstrate collaboration through pilot projects

Pilot initiatives such as joint construction of flood-resilient embankments or shared water-storage facilities for the Feni and Gomti rivers can demonstrate the benefits of collaboration. In addition, establishing a shared platform for real-time data exchange on rainfall and river flows to improve flood forecasting accuracy and initiating joint training programmes for disaster response teams to equip them with advanced tools and techniques for flood mitigation can serve as examples of tangible steps forward. These projects will turn shared challenges into opportunities for cooperation.

Expand collaboration beyond water

Collaboration doesn't have to stop at rivers. To develop actionable strategies, a different approach that goes beyond water and includes a package of mutually beneficial options is needed. For example, joint solar parks and renewable energy projects can reduce energy insecurity on both sides. The inclusion of Sundarbans—as perhaps the only transboundary ecosystem that has a World Heritage site and Ramsar site on both sides of the boundary—within the upcoming 2026 Ganges Water Treaty negotiations can serve as an example of how to operationalise engineering diplomacy processes and tools for effective transboundary water cooperation. We need to look for opportunities to engage affected groups in value-creating exercises before final decisions are made. This will encourage issue and option linkages and increase opportunities for meaningful negotiations. Seeking broader consensus (total unanimity is not essential) and relying on professional neutral facilitators is likely to help formulate nearly self-enforcing and easier to get compliance agreements.

Shafiqul Islam is director of Water Diplomacy, professor of civil and environmental engineering and water diplomacy at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, US.​
 

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