[🇧🇩] Insurgencies in Myanmar. Implications for Bangladesh

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Addressing Rohingya crisis: New Canadian envoy assures support

The assurance came when he called on Foreign Adviser Touhid Hossain at the foreign ministry today

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Addressing Rohingya crisis: New Canadian envoy assures support

Photo: PID

Newly-appointed Canadian High Commissioner Ajit Singh has assured maximum support to Bangladesh in addressing the Rohingya crisis as well as ease visas for the Bangladeshi students.

The assurance came when he called on Foreign Adviser Touhid Hossain at the foreign ministry today.

According to a foreign ministry statement, they had discussions on key issues, including agricultural cooperation, trade and investment, financial sector, and Rohingya crisis.

The foreign adviser mentioned the daunting challenges faced by Bangladesh in hosting around 1.3 million Rohingyas in Bangladesh and sought international cooperation including Canada's strong support for their sustainable return to their homeland.

He also requested expedited processing of Canadian visas for Bangladeshi nationals, with particular emphasis on student visas.

"The High Commissioner noted these concerns and assured maximum support in addressing them," the statement said.​

 

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Rohingya crisis: a call for shared responsibility and lasting solutions

The Rohingya crisis has become an enduring humanitarian disaster, with renewed violence in Myanmar forcing nearly 80,000 more refugees to seek shelter in Bangladesh since August last year

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Rohingya crisis: a call for shared responsibility and lasting solutions

Reuters file photo

The Rohingya crisis has become an enduring humanitarian disaster, with renewed violence in Myanmar forcing nearly 80,000 more refugees to seek shelter in Bangladesh since August last year.

This has further strained the already overstretched resources of Cox's Bazar, home to over 1.2 million displaced Rohingyas. This burden cannot remain the sole responsibility of one nation. The international community must act decisively to address the root causes of this crisis and support Bangladesh in its efforts to manage it.

Bangladesh, despite its limited resources, has demonstrated immense compassion by sheltering such a vast number of refugees. However, this has come at a significant cost. The Rohingya camps are overwhelmed, with living conditions deteriorating and gender-based violence escalating. The study by the Bonn International Centre for Conflict Studies and the Refugee and Migratory Movements Research Unit, published in The Daily Star on January 26, depicts a grisly picture of widespread insecurity, forced marriages, and psychological trauma within the camps. The growing involvement of armed groups like ARSA, RSO, and the Arakan Army further exacerbates the crisis, with thousands of young men forcibly recruited.

Moreover, the refugees' reliance on informal labour, such as salt cultivation and deep-sea fishing, underscores the inadequacy of the daily allowance they receive. While these activities offer a semblance of livelihood, they expose refugees to exploitation and unsafe working conditions, adding another layer of vulnerability to their plight.

The Rohingya crisis is not merely a regional issue -- it is a global humanitarian challenge. Yet, international support has been insufficient and fragmented. While countries like Malaysia and China have engaged diplomatically, their efforts need to be more robust and result-oriented.

A multi-pronged approach is essential to address the crisis. Firstly, global actors must intensify diplomatic efforts to ensure Myanmar creates conditions conducive to the safe and dignified repatriation of Rohingyas. This includes holding the Myanmar government accountable for the human rights abuses that have led to this exodus.

Secondly, the international community must provide more financial and technical support to Bangladesh. Thirdly, addressing gender-based violence should be a priority. Establishing community-led programmes that challenge patriarchal norms and provide psychological support, legal aid, and rehabilitation for survivors of violence can create safer environments in the camps.

Finally, regional diplomacy must take centre stage. The UN and other global bodies should lead peacebuilding efforts in Myanmar, focusing on restoring governance and preventing further displacement.

Bangladesh cannot continue to bear this burden alone. As Women and Children's Affairs Adviser Sharmeen S Murshid rightly noted, this is not just another humanitarian crisis -- it is a cycle of violence rooted in decades of instability. To break this cycle, the world must act collectively and decisively.​

 

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Fresh Rohingya influx will deteriorate the refugee crisis

World leaders must address renewed concerns over funding

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Fresh Rohingya influx will deteriorate the refugee crisis
World leaders must address renewed concerns over funding

VISUAL: STAR

It's alarming to learn that renewed violence in Myanmar has forced around 80,000 more Rohingyas to take shelter in Bangladesh since August last year, adding to the staggering 1.2 million already rising here. This has been revealed by a study conducted by the Bonn International Centre for Conflict Studies (BICC) and the Refugee and Migratory Movements Research Unit (RMMRU). It goes without saying that the fresh influx puts Bangladesh in a particularly tight spot, as it finds itself scrambling to not just address the challenges festering within the overcrowded camps but also to handle the pressure of new arrivals amid renewed concerns over funding sparked by the policy shift under the new president of the United States—the largest donor for the Rohingya refugees.

Funding shortages have been a persistent issue since nearly a million refugees entered Bangladesh in 2017, with each passing year widening the gap between funding requirements and provisions. For example, the total funding requirement in 2024 was $852.4 million, but donors provided only $548.9 million. Since 2017, the US has provided nearly $2 billion in humanitarian assistance. However, with the recent suspension of US funding for development projects in Bangladesh for at least three months, there is uncertainty about how this will affect Rohingya funding and whether previous commitments will be honoured. The declining donor support in recent years speaks volumes about the international community's waning attention to the crisis, leaving critical services underfunded. The World Food Programme, for instance, has had to repeatedly cut rations due to funding shortfalls, pushing refugees further into desperation.

With such uncertainties around, the state of the camps is likely to worsen. The RMMRU study paints a grim picture of living conditions, gender-based violence, and security concerns in these camps. With each refugee receiving a meagre allowance of Tk 16 per day, many have been forced into informal labour or criminal activities. The crisis is further illustrated by escalating gender-based violence, with physical assault, sexual abuse, forced marriages, and severe psychological trauma becoming commonplace. There have also been reports of increasing militarisation with armed groups, including ARSA, RSO, and the Arakan Army, forcibly conscripting young men. One estimate suggests that between 3,000 and 5,000 were recruited in the first half of 2024 alone.

This is not a burden that Bangladesh should be expected to bear alone. Bangladesh has repeatedly urged the international community to take meaningful action to resolve the Rohingya crisis so that these displaced individuals can return to their homeland. Their safe repatriation to Myanmar remains the only sustainable solution. We, therefore, urge world leaders to step up efforts to resolve the crisis, and increase funding while such efforts are underway. At the same time, Bangladesh does have a responsibility to ensure that Rohingya refugees within our borders are protected. It must work to improve conditions in the camps. It also must take decisive action to address the reality of new arrivals.​

 

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Geopolitics rewritten: The Arakan Army’s unprecedented rise

After decades of centralised military control, the AA has shifted Rakhine’s power dynamics, emerging as the de facto authority.

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Geopolitics rewritten: The Arakan Army’s unprecedented rise

Rohingya refugees gather behind a barbed-wire fence in a temporary settlement set up in a "no man's land" border zone between Myanmar and Bangladesh. PHOTO: AFP

The rise of the Arakan Army (AA) in Myanmar's Rakhine State marks a historic shift in South and Southeast Asian geopolitics, redefining regional power and security. Between October and December 2024, the AA seized over 80 percent of Rakhine State, including its 271 km border with Bangladesh—a rare instance of a non-state actor controlling an international border. The seizure of the regime's Western Command headquarters in Ann town, after the fall of Maungdaw, represents a territorial as well as strategic reshuffling that undermines the military junta's grip on power and raises fundamental issues for the region.

The shifting power dynamics

After decades of centralised military control, the AA has shifted Rakhine's power dynamics, emerging as the de facto authority. In particular, the past 15 to 16 months have seen the AA transform dramatically, seizing dozens of townships and army outposts, culminating in the seizing of Western Command headquarters in Ann town—marking a serious blow to the legitimacy of the military junta.

There are various reasons behind the group's success. Its military capabilities have increased tremendously and it can now mount effective operations against well-entrenched military positions. However, the AA has shown a level of military sophistication beyond that of many other armed organisations in Myanmar, proving its ability to capture and hold territory. Its capability to coordinate operations with allies in the Three Brotherhood Alliance was particularly evident as these forces secured important areas on multiple fronts.

Politically, the AA, as the United League of Arakan's (ULA) military wing, has established parallel governance in the areas it controls. It demonstrates a deep understanding of the need to synthesise military victories with political legitimacy, as seen in its efforts to weave a governance framework that includes both Buddhist Rakhine and Muslim populations. The junta's loss of control in Rakhine State is the second regional military command to fall under the control of ethnic rebels in five months. The loss of the Western Command headquarters alone could signal the start of a domino effect, further weakening the military's grip on power.

The Rohingya question

With more than one million Rohingya currently in Bangladesh, the issue of their return and future status under AA control has become a major regional concern. The AA leadership—particularly through its political wing, the ULA—has outlined a vision of Rakhine that includes both Buddhist and Muslim populations, such as the Rohingya. This marks a significant departure from Myanmar's historically exclusionary stance. However, this position must be viewed in the context of the AA's historically troubled relationship with the Rohingya community, whatever form that relationship has taken in the past.

Complicating matters are reports that both the AA and the Myanmar military recruit Rohingya for their respective causes. This exploitation of the vulnerable community raises questions about the AA's true commitment to Rohingya rights and inclusion. Some analysts argue that elements of the AA's vision of an "Arakan Dream" are influenced by Burmese nationalist discourse, which could potentially erase evidence of the Rohingya's presence.

The refugee crisis remains a major regional challenge, particularly for Bangladesh, which now hosts the bulk of Rohingya refugees. The AA's new control over the border region introduces new variables into potential repatriation efforts. While the AA's claimed willingness to accept Rohingya return offers some hope, any repatriation programme would face significant challenges without guarantees of citizenship rights, security, and economic integration.

The great power game

With its control over Rakhine State, the AA has introduced a new dimension to the great power contest between China and India in the region. Rakhine is vital to China's $1.5 billion investment in oil and gas pipelines to Kunming and its Belt and Road Initiative in the region. These investments, including a $2.5 billion oil and gas pipeline project, a $7.3 billion port project at Kyaukphyu, and a $2.7 billion special economic zone (SEZ), are critical for reducing China's dependence on energy imports via the Malacca Strait.

In retrospect, China has enjoyed a close relationship with Myanmar's military junta and is its principal trade partner and biggest weapons supplier, but the ground reality has compelled it to move with a more nuanced attitude. Recent developments show that Chinese officials have been having talks with the AA's allies in an attempt to broker ceasefires, indicating a pragmatic accommodation with shifting relative power.

India's strategic interests in the region are equally significant but differ in focus. The Kaladan Multi-Modal Transport and Transit Project (KMTTP) represents India's major strategic investment in establishing connectivity between Kolkata, Sittwe port, and India's northeastern states via Mizoram. India's Act East policy has traditionally relied on ties with Myanmar's military but is now compelled to consider engaging with the AA to safeguard its strategic interests in the face of shifting ground realities.

Bangladesh's strategic dilemma

With the AA in control of their shared 271-kilometer border, Bangladesh faces an unprecedented diplomatic and security challenge. Over the past few months, Bangladeshi security experts and former diplomats have increasingly called for engagement with the AA, given the new reality on the ground. Former defence attaché to Myanmar, Major General (Retd) Md Shahidul Haque, stated that engagement with the AA would be a "win-win situation" for Bangladesh, both from security and economic perspectives. This perspective reflects a growing sense within Bangladesh's security establishment that traditional diplomatic approaches may need reconsideration.

Nevertheless, Bangladesh's foreign ministry spokesperson Mohammed Rafiqul Alam and others have reiterated the country's official position of not working with non-state actors, stating that relevant ministry departments would take appropriate action. While engagement with the AA could address border security concerns and facilitate Rohingya repatriation, it might also complicate Bangladesh's relations with Myanmar's central government and other regional powers.

The battle for infrastructure control

The Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project in India has been thrown off its course due to the changing security landscape. How the group stands in respect to this project will play an important role in India's strategic position in the region. Because of the AA's influence over maritime traffic and potential development projects in the Bay of Bengal coastline, its position along the Bay of Bengal shoreline is vital.

Also, the case of Kyaukphyu is particularly evident as the terminus for China's strategic oil and gas pipelines. Security expert Ye Myo Hein of the US Institute of Peace said the AA theoretically could launch a military campaign to seize Kyaukphyu, it appears to be employing a more calculated strategy, leveraging its control as a bargaining chip in broader regional negotiations.

The rise of the AA in Rakhine State demonstrates that non-state actors can reshape regional dynamics in ways that compel traditional power structures to adapt. It is worth recalling that the regional security architecture is not static, but evolves itself to the new power configurations. The future of South and Southeast Asian security will depend, in part, on how regional stakeholders navigate these changes while striving to preserve stability.

Kawsar Uddin Mahmud is a geopolitical analyst and a researcher at the KRF Center for Bangladesh and Global Affairs.​

 

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FOUR YEARS SINCE COUP: UN probe warns Myanmar violence may worsen

UN investigators said on Thursday that serious international crimes had been committed in the four years since Myanmar’s military coup, warning this would only worsen unless the perpetrators faced justice...

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FOUR YEARS SINCE COUP: UN probe warns Myanmar violence may worsen
Agence France-Presse . Geneva 30 January, 2025, 23:56

UN investigators said on Thursday that serious international crimes had been committed in the four years since Myanmar’s military coup, warning this would only worsen unless the perpetrators faced justice.

Nicholas Koumjian, head of the United Nations’ Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar, said impunity was emboldening the perpetrators to commit further violence.

Myanmar’s ruling junta seized power in a February 1, 2021 coup that ousted Aung San Suu Kyi’s elected government, ending a 10-year experiment with democracy and plunging the Southeast Asian nation into bloody turmoil and a humanitarian crisis.

‘Since then, according to substantial evidence collected and analysed by the IIMM, serious international crimes have been committed across the country,’ Koumjian said in a statement.

Myanmar has been rocked by fighting between numerous ethnic rebel groups and the army. The civil war has displaced more than 3.5 million, according to the UN.

‘Protests against the military regime were suppressed with often lethal violence. Thousands of perceived opponents have been unlawfully imprisoned, where many have suffered torture, sexual violence and other abuses,’ said Koumjian.

‘Increasingly frequent and indiscriminate air strikes, artillery and drone attacks have killed civilians, driven survivors from their homes, and destroyed hospitals, schools and places of worship.’

He said that while most of the evidence collected so far concerned crimes committed by the military, investigators were also probing ‘disturbing’ reports of atrocities committed by other armed groups, including rape, killings and torture.

The IIMM was established by the UN Human Rights Council in 2018 to collect evidence of the most serious international crimes and prepare files for criminal prosecution.

In November, the International Criminal Court’s prosecutor requested an arrest warrant for junta chief Min Aung Hlaing for alleged crimes committed against the Rohingya minority during clearance operations in 2016 and 2017.

There are no judicial proceedings under way for any serious international crimes committed since the military takeover, said Koumjian.

‘We believe that impunity for crimes emboldens perpetrators to commit more violence, and ending this impunity is necessary,’ he said.

‘The mechanism stands ready to assist authorities who are willing and able to investigate and prosecute these cases. Until the perpetrators are brought to justice, violence will continue to spiral.’

The UN estimates that 19.9 million people, or more than a third of Myanmar’s population, will need humanitarian aid in 2025.​

 

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Myanmar junta extends state of emergency

Myanmar’s junta extended a state of emergency by six months on Friday, four years after it seized power triggering a civil war that has claimed thousands of lives.

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Myanmar junta extends state of emergency
Agence France-Presse . Yangon 01 February, 2025, 01:21

Myanmar’s junta extended a state of emergency by six months on Friday, four years after it seized power triggering a civil war that has claimed thousands of lives.

The country is mired in a bloody, multi-sided conflict stemming from the February 1, 2021 putsch that ended a 10-year experiment with democracy.

The military is struggling to contain armed resistance to its rule, suffering a series of damaging battlefield losses over the past year to an alliance of ethnic minority armed groups in the north and west of the country.

The ruling military council headed by army chief Min Aung Hlaing unanimously approved the extension, the junta’s information team said in a statement.

‘All members of National Defence and Security Council including the commander in chief as well as acting president decided in unison for the extension of the state of emergency for another six months,’ the statement said.

Elections cannot be held under a state of emergency, so long-promised polls the junta has said will be held in 2025 will not take place until the second half of the year at the earliest.

Min Aung Hlaing told the ruling council that ‘peace and stability is still needed’ before the state of emergency can be lifted and polls held.

Critics and Western governments have said that any elections held under the auspices of the junta will be neither free nor fair.

The military seized power after making unsubstantiated allegations of fraud in 2020 elections which Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy won in a landslide.

It has extended the state of emergency multiple times since as it battles established ethnic minority armed groups and newer pro-democracy ‘People’s Defence Forces’.

More than 6,000 civilians have been killed since the coup, and more than 20,000 arrested, according to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners onitoring group.

On Thursday the UN’s Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar said serious international crimes had been committed in the four years since the coup.

The conflict has forced more than 3.5 million people to flee their homes, while an estimated 19.9 million people — or more than a third of Myanmar’s population — will need humanitarian aid in 2025, according to the UN.

Earlier this month, foreign ministers from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations regional bloc urged the junta to prioritise a ceasefire in the conflict over holding elections.

ASEAN has led international efforts to find a diplomatic solution to the crisis but, despite multiple meetings and declarations, has made no substantial progress.​

 

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MYANMAR’S CRISIS: Regional threat, strategic response

MYANMAR’S ongoing civil war has reached a critical point, with the rise of ethnic armed organisations significantly altering the balance of power in the country. Among these groups, the Arakan Army has gained substantial control over Rakhine State, capturing key border areas near Bangladesh...

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MYANMAR’S CRISIS: Regional threat, strategic response
MA Hossain 04 February, 2025, 00:00

The photograph shows a view of the Kutupalong Rohingya camp in Ukhia, Cox’s Bazar. | Agence France-Presse/Munir uz Zaman

MYANMAR’S ongoing civil war has reached a critical point, with the rise of ethnic armed organisations significantly altering the balance of power in the country. Among these groups, the Arakan Army has gained substantial control over Rakhine State, capturing key border areas near Bangladesh. This shift in power has further complicated the already dire situation of the Rohingya, who remain stateless, persecuted, and caught between conflicting forces. As Myanmar’s political and military landscape continues to evolve, the crisis has transformed into a regional security concern, extending beyond its borders to impact neighbouring countries, particularly Bangladesh.

For years, Bangladesh has struggled to find a sustainable resolution to the Rohingya crisis, relying primarily on diplomatic efforts that have yielded little success. Myanmar’s junta has consistently stalled negotiations, using misinformation and leveraging its relationships with China, Russia, and India to avoid accountability. Given these challenges, it is now essential for Bangladesh to move beyond its traditional reactive approach and adopt a proactive strategy that secures diplomatic, economic, and military leverage. A well-coordinated plan will enable Bangladesh to pressure Myanmar’s actors into meaningful negotiations while ensuring regional stability and safeguarding its national interests.

Myanmar’s internal conflict and the Rohingya dilemma

MYANMAR’S political landscape has been in turmoil since the military coup in 2021, which led to widespread resistance against the junta. Various EAOs, including the AA, have gained ground, seizing control of multiple regions and significantly weakening the military government. The AA’s dominance in Rakhine State has been particularly noteworthy, as it has captured strategic locations, including Maungdaw and Taungup townships, both of which border Bangladesh. The fall of Ann, the headquarters of the junta’s Western Military Command, further demonstrated the shifting power dynamics in the region.

Despite these changes, the fate of the Rohingya remains uncertain. Historically, the Rohingya have faced persecution from Myanmar’s military, culminating in the 2017 crisis that forced over a million of them to flee to Bangladesh. While the AA has positioned itself as a defender of Rakhine’s autonomy, its stance on the Rohingya remains ambiguous. There have been reports of hostilities against Rohingya civilians, sometimes as a result of the junta’s strategic manipulations. Additionally, the use of derogatory language, such as referring to the Rohingya as ‘Bengali Muslims,’ signals that discriminatory attitudes persist.

The Rohingya are now in an increasingly precarious position. Forced conscription by the junta, accusations of affiliation with armed groups like the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army, and growing hostility from the AA have further marginalised them. Without a clear framework for their repatriation and protection, their status remains in limbo, making a resolution to the crisis even more urgent.

Bangladesh’s strategic approach

BANGLADESH has long sought a peaceful resolution to the Rohingya crisis, but its efforts have been repeatedly undermined by Myanmar’s unwillingness to engage in meaningful negotiations. Myanmar has successfully used diplomatic cover from China, Russia, and India to delay repatriation efforts while continuing to receive political and economic support. Given these circumstances, it is imperative for Bangladesh to shift its strategy from passive diplomacy to one that establishes firm leverage over Myanmar.

The new approach should be built on three key pillars: diplomatic engagement with ASEAN, policy-driven advocacy, and strategic military preparedness. By strengthening regional alliances, utilising research-based arguments, and reinforcing its defence capabilities, Bangladesh can create a position of strength that forces Myanmar to take repatriation efforts seriously.

Building regional alliances with ASEAN

ONE of the most effective ways for Bangladesh to gain leverage over Myanmar is by solidifying its ties with ASEAN nations. Historically, ASEAN has been divided over Myanmar’s crisis, with some member states favouring diplomatic engagement while others have advocated for stricter measures. However, Bangladesh has the opportunity to bridge these divisions by presenting the Rohingya crisis as a regional security threat rather than just a humanitarian issue.

By engaging directly with ASEAN leaders, Bangladesh can highlight the broader implications of instability in Rakhine State. The ongoing conflict poses risks such as transnational crime, arms trafficking, and potential extremist recruitment, which could affect countries like Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia. By framing the crisis as a shared security concern, Bangladesh can push for a unified ASEAN stance that increases diplomatic pressure on Myanmar’s military and the AA.

A united ASEAN front would make it more difficult for Myanmar’s allies, particularly China and Russia, to continue supporting the junta without facing international backlash. China, which has significant investments in Myanmar’s Belt and Road Initiative, values stability in the region. If ASEAN collectively demands action, Beijing may be compelled to reconsider its position, thus weakening Myanmar’s ability to stall negotiations.

Policy advocacy and data-driven diplomacy

WHILE diplomatic efforts lay the foundation for engagement, Bangladesh must also reinforce its position through rigorous, data-driven policy advocacy. Collaborating with ASEAN-aligned think tanks and research institutions can provide concrete evidence of the economic, security, and humanitarian consequences of the Rohingya crisis.

Research efforts should focus on three critical areas. First, documenting human rights violations committed by both the junta and the AA will create stronger international pressure for a rights-based resolution. Second, assessing the economic impact of instability in Rakhine can demonstrate how disrupted trade routes and declining cross-border investments affect regional economies. Finally, analysing security threats related to stateless Rohingya populations can highlight the risks of radicalisation and criminal exploitation, making a compelling case for ASEAN intervention.

By shifting the narrative from a humanitarian plea to a policy-backed security concern, Bangladesh can strengthen its diplomatic engagements and build a broader coalition of support. This approach will also help counter Myanmar’s misinformation campaigns, ensuring that the international community remains aligned with Bangladesh’s objectives.

Military readiness and strategic defence cooperation

ALTHOUGH diplomacy should remain the primary tool for engagement, Bangladesh must also prepare for potential security challenges along its border with Myanmar. The increasing volatility in Rakhine State, coupled with the AA’s rising confidence, necessitates a visible and well-coordinated military presence.

Bangladesh can enhance its strategic position by participating in joint military exercises with ASEAN nations that share concerns over Myanmar’s instability. Strengthening defence ties with countries such as Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand can send a strong message to Myanmar’s actors, particularly the AA, that regional forces are closely monitoring the situation.

Additionally, Bangladesh can leverage provisions of the US BURMA Act, which authorises support for resistance groups opposing Myanmar’s military junta. While direct military involvement is not an option, utilising available resources for border security and intelligence-sharing can help Bangladesh maintain a strong defensive posture. A visible military presence along the border will also serve as a deterrent, discouraging any spillover of violence into Bangladesh’s territory.

Global implications and the role of major powers

THE Rohingya crisis is not just a bilateral issue between Bangladesh and Myanmar — it has far-reaching geopolitical implications. China, Russia and India have played significant roles in shaping Myanmar’s political landscape, often prioritising strategic interests over human rights concerns. But one crucial aspect overlooked by all stakeholders is that these Rohingya refugee camps could become breeding grounds for transnational terrorist organisations. These vulnerable populations are under the hawkish eyes of international terrorist organisations seeking to exploit them.

China, in particular, has deep economic stakes in Myanmar, including infrastructure projects linked to the BRI. While Beijing has traditionally backed the junta, a unified ASEAN stance could force it to reassess its position. Similarly, Russia’s military support to Myanmar may become increasingly difficult to justify if international pressure mounts. India, balancing its interests between countering China’s influence and maintaining regional stability, may also reconsider its approach.

For Bangladesh, the challenge lies in navigating these complex geopolitical dynamics while securing commitments for Rohingya repatriation. Strengthening alliances with Western nations, particularly the United States and European Union, could provide additional diplomatic leverage. Furthermore, advocating for an UN-monitored safe zone in Rakhine may be a viable solution to ensure that returning Rohingya populations are protected from further persecution.

By leveraging international support, engaging in multilateral negotiations, and maintaining strategic pressure on Myanmar, Bangladesh can push for a sustainable solution. Bangladesh must also assert its sovereignty while upholding humanitarian principles, ensuring that Myanmar fulfils its responsibility to reintegrate the Rohingyas into their homeland.

Conclusion

THE crisis in Myanmar has entered a new phase, with the AA’s growing influence reshaping governance in Rakhine State. While this shift presents challenges, it also offers Bangladesh an opportunity to recalibrate its strategy and assert greater control over the diplomatic process.

Moving beyond reactive diplomacy, Bangladesh must secure the strategic high ground by strengthening regional alliances, utilising research-driven policy advocacy, and reinforcing military preparedness. By framing the Rohingya crisis as a regional security issue rather than just a humanitarian concern, Bangladesh can shift the balance of power and force Myanmar’s actors into meaningful negotiations.

There should be continuous efforts for empowering Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh to develop leadership skills, assert their rights, and facilitate repatriation efforts. A proactive, multi-dimensional approach will not only facilitate Rohingya repatriation but also ensure long-term regional stability, positioning Bangladesh as a key diplomatic force in South Asia.

M A Hossain is a political and defence analyst based in Bangladesh.​

 

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To solve the Rohingya crisis, we must address the root causes

The Rohingya crisis continues to mystify everyone with its uncertainties.

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To solve the Rohingya crisis, we must address the root causes

The world seems to have forgotten the Rohingya people and their persistent suffering in Myanmar. FILE PHOTO: REUTERS

The Rohingya crisis continues to mystify everyone with its uncertainties. In 2017, close to a million Rohingya people took refuge in Bangladesh over a period of only one month after a most brutal genocide and violent exodus in recent history. The influx of refugees continued in October-December 2024 due to the rise in armed conflicts between various armed groups and the military junta, as well as the impacts of the long-running brutal civil war inside Myanmar. Amid this, the Rohingya in Cox's Bazar refugee camps still hope to return to their homes in northern Rakhine—their old heartland in Myanmar.

The renewed violence has worsened the already precarious situation in Cox's Bazar camps. Last year alone, according to one source, armed groups such as the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), the Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO), and the Arakan Army (AA) recruited an estimated 5,000 men from the camps in Cox's Bazar to fight against the Myanmar military. The radicalisation inside the camps, the increase in criminal gang activities, the targeted killing of camp leaders by opposing militant groups, and the continued cycle of violence have led to a significant deterioration of safety among the Rohingya refugees. To add to this, the renewed fighting between these armed rebel groups and the Myanmar junta has further pushed back any potential repatriation plan due to the lack of peace and stability inside Myanmar.

Given this situation, can we ever find a viable solution to the Rohingya crisis? Is there any pathway to resolve the crisis with accountability and justice for all? And who will find it?

To do this, we need to look back and understand Rohingya history. The armed struggles inside Myanmar and the demand for Rohingya autonomy and rights clearly establish that the crisis is not just a current humanitarian issue but also a political one, long rooted in Arakan's history. In recent weeks, the AA has taken full control of 14 out of 17 townships, including Maungdaw near Teknaf, from the Myanmar military junta. Armed fighting still continues to capture the remaining government-held territories in Rakhine. In the process, many coerced Rohingya conscripts to the Myanmar Army have been killed or captured, further entangling the displaced people in a war they did not initiate. Any resolution of the crisis must understand and address both the political and humanitarian aspects.

Many people tend to think that the Rohingya crisis is a 21st-century issue. On the contrary, it encapsulates centuries of historical marginalisation, ethnic conflict, and geopolitical intricacies. The Rohingya have a 200-year history, starting from the violent occupation of the Arakan dynasty in 1784, which gradually evolved during the pre- and post-colonial periods in Burma. Their identity has been under sustained attack by the military and the Buddhist civilian majority through genocidal campaigns aimed at erasing their shared history and culture over the years. The 1974 constitution and the census that preceded it marked the clearest breaking point when "Rohingya" was replaced with "Indian or Pakistani" and later by "Bengali" among "non-indigenous or foreign races." This was followed by the adoption of the discriminatory Citizenship Act of 1982. The decades of brutal oppression that followed forced many Rohingya to flee the country over the past 40 years. Today, four out of every five Rohingya live as refugees in countries across the region and around the world. Those still inside Myanmar are in camps in Buthidaung and Maungdaw or under military surveillance.

The magnitude and duration of this crisis require a comprehensive understanding of the underlying causes, an assessment of humanitarian interventions, and an examination of avenues for justice and reconciliation. Myanmar, Bangladesh, and the regional and international communities must address the root causes of the Myanmar crisis, including the long-standing discrimination and statelessness faced by the Rohingya. Any measures short of that would not be sufficient to resolve the crisis and facilitate the return of the Rohingya to their homeland.

The world seems to have forgotten the Rohingya people and their crisis. The terrible genocide and ethnic cleansing happened in 2017, coincidentally the year US President Donald Trump took office for the first time. It is now the ninth year of this conflict, resulting from long-running battles between the Myanmar military and the anti-regime AA and other armed groups. The Myanmar military's continued violence grossly undermines the rule of law and the rights of the people recognised by international bodies and conventions for refugee populations. International sanctions and other measures by Canada, the US, the EU, and others against the Myanmar military junta have failed to deliver the intended outcomes.

Many international rights groups, including Amnesty International, have long demanded that the top generals in the Myanmar army be investigated for their roles in the genocides committed against the Rohingya and the people of Myanmar. The recent International Criminal Court (ICC) ruling for an arrest warrant for General Min Aung Hlaing, based on the historic case brought by The Gambia, seems to have had no traction at all. If the international community, including the US, is serious about resolving the Rohingya crisis, it should move beyond statements and sanctions. Myanmar generals must be held accountable for the Rohingya genocide, but who will make that call?

The regional implications of the crisis are already evident from the recent emergency meeting held in Bangkok in December 2024, attended by foreign ministers and senior officials from Bangladesh, Myanmar, India, China, Laos, and Cambodia to review the current situation in Myanmar, leading to a global conference on the Rohingya later this year. As evident from occasional dialogues and visits by army officials, Bangladesh's interim government is focused on repatriation as the primary solution, including creating a "safe zone" for the Rohingya in Myanmar's Rakhine state under UN supervision. This approach will be doomed without due attention to the absence of rights, including citizenship rights and the need for return with dignity and honor. The Bangladesh government is also trying to maintain informal contacts with the AA for potential support and resolution of the crisis, which should be encouraged and quietly expanded.

While the repatriation of refugees is urgently needed to reduce the long-endured burden on Bangladesh, the government should work more closely with countries having significant influence on Myanmar—for instance, India, China, Korea, Singapore, and Japan—to apply pressure to ensure accountability and to provide local autonomy for the Rohingya in the Rakhine state, aimed at creating conditions for their return with dignity and rights. The US government should also support efforts to hold Myanmar's military leaders accountable through the ICC. The second Trump administration has an opportunity to reflect on its past policies and take bold steps towards a more just and lasting solution. The Rohingya crisis and displacement should be of concern due to the strategic security interests of the US in the Southeast Asia region.

What is required now is to keep the global focus alive on the Rohingya crisis to find a durable solution. The international community must also increase humanitarian aid and assistance to support the refugees and improve living conditions and rights in the refugee camps in Bangladesh. The Rohingya people have been waiting and watching the indifference and inaction of the world for years. They are hoping for an early, safe, voluntary, and dignified repatriation.

Dr Mohammad Zaman is a development and resettlement specialist. He is editor, with co-editors Robert Anderson and Kawser Ahmed, of 'The Rohingya Stories: History and Geopolitics in a Multipolar World' (forthcoming, Springer, 2025).​

 

[Saif]

Myanmar junta bans possible conscripts from foreign travel

Myanmar’s embattled junta has banned anyone eligible for military conscription from leaving the country without permission, as it seeks to shore up its forces fighting rebel groups opposed to its rule.

www.thedailystar.net

Myanmar junta bans possible conscripts from foreign travel

Myanmar's embattled junta has banned anyone eligible for military conscription from leaving the country without permission, as it seeks to shore up its forces fighting rebel groups opposed to its rule.

The junta has lost control of swathes of the country to ethnic minority armed groups and other opposition forces in the civil war triggered by its coup d'etat four years ago.

A long-dormant conscription law was enforced last year as the army reeled from a string of battlefield defeats to ethnic armed groups and civilian "People's Defence Forces" seeking to oust it from power.

A bylaw passed late last month that has only just come to light imposes new restrictions on those eligible to be called up -- men aged 18-35 and women aged 18-27.

"The person who receives the order shall not be allowed to leave for foreign countries without obtaining the permission of the Central Body," section 51 of the bylaw says.

The rule applies to those who have been called up and also those waiting for the outcome of appeals for exemption, reduction, or postponement of military service.​

 

[Saif]

Myanmar junta bid to sell Suu Kyi mansion flops for third time

Real estate agents say similar-sized properties in upmarket Yangon areas might fetch $1 million to $2 million

en.prothomalo.com

Myanmar junta bid to sell Suu Kyi mansion flops for third time
AFP
Yangon
Published: 05 Feb 2025, 11: 52

A woman stands outside the gates of the family house of detained Myanmar civilian leader Aung San Suu Kyi in Yangon on 5 February, 2025, during an attempt to sell the lakeside mansion AFP

Myanmar’s junta failed in its attempt to auction Aung San Suu Kyi’s lakeside mansion on Wednesday, with no bids submitted for the former democracy leader’s home—the third time the sale has flopped.

The two-storey Yangon house, with about 0.8 hectares (1.9 acres) of land, was put up for sale with a minimum price of $140 million following a decades-long dispute over the property between the Nobel laureate and her brother.

Suu Kyi, who spent years under house arrest at the mansion under a former junta, has been detained since the military seized power once again in February 2021.

Around a dozen journalists, watched over by security personnel in plain clothes, attended the kerbside sale outside the colonial-era house on leafy University Avenue, a few doors from the US embassy.

After calling for bids starting from 297 billion kyats—around $140 million at the official exchange rate—and getting no response, the auctioneer called off the sale, AFP reporters at the scene saw.

“I announce the auction is not successful after calling for bids three times,” the auctioneer said.

Similar auctions failed in March and August last year.

With Myanmar’s economy shattered by the civil war triggered by the military coup, it is unclear who in the country would be in a position to spend $140 million on a single, increasingly dilapidated property.

Real estate agents say similar-sized properties in upmarket Yangon areas might fetch $1 million to $2 million.

The house holds a special place in Myanmar history—Suu Kyi was confined within its crumbling walls for around 15 years after shooting to fame during huge demonstrations against the then-junta in 1988.

Cut off from her husband and children in England, Suu Kyi spent time playing the piano, reading detective novels and meditating as her status as a democracy leader grew.

Hundreds of people would regularly gather on the pavement outside to hear her talk about democracy and fighting military rule through non-violence.

After her release in 2010 she lived on in the villa, receiving a string of foreign leaders, including then US president Barack Obama, journalists and diplomats.

Suu Kyi, 79, is serving a 27-year prison sentence on charges ranging from corruption to not respecting Covid-19 pandemic restrictions—charges rights groups say are a junta sham designed to eliminate her politically.​