[🇧🇩] Terrorist BSF is pushing Indian Nationals into Bangladesh

[🇧🇩] Terrorist BSF is pushing Indian Nationals into Bangladesh
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G Bangladesh Defense

The folly of India's push-in policy

SYED MUHAMMED SHOWAIB

Published :
Jun 26, 2026 01:03
Updated :
Jun 26, 2026 01:03

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Photo: Al Jazeera

A quarter of a century ago, the film 'No Man's Land' told the tale of soldiers trapped between opposing armies during the Yugoslav war. Stranded in a narrow strip of land, they found that every attempt to move carried the certainty of danger and the constant shadow of death. It was a classic case of ordinary people becoming pawns of geography and politics, abandoned in a place where neither side cared enough to claim them. One would naturally expect such horrors to remain confined to the realm of fiction rather than spill into everyday life. Yet reality often is more unsettling than imagination. Along the Bangladesh-India border, scenes even more disturbing are unfolding everyday as men, women and children find themselves caught in a cruel limbo that puts cinematic tragedy to shame.

Today, stretches of the 4096-kilometre frontier separating Bangladesh and India have become the scene of a standoff where innocent people are herded like cattle toward the edge by one side only to be stopped from crossing by the other. It is a humanitarian failure that should embarrass any state claiming to uphold human dignity. Reports and photographs emerging from border regions repeatedly show exhausted families, terrified children and frail elderly people left at the mercy of heat, rain and uncertainty that seems to have no end.

What actually becomes of those people stranded in these desolate stretches of land? The ordeal of one stranded person, Sumi Akter, makes it clear enough. Along with her five-month-old and four-year-old daughters, she was shoved towards the Roumari frontier in Kurigram by the Indian side. In a plea quoted by the media, she begged for her children' lives even if her own could not be saved. For days, she and her family survived on mere scraps of food and water tossed by sympathetic locals. As hunger tightened its grip, her breast milk dried up entirely, leaving her infant without any source of nourishment. She said that if they were left there for two more days, her babies would surely die. Trapped under the constant watch of armed personnel and curious onlookers from both countries, she lamented that she could not even answer nature's call in private. It is said that unearned suffering of innocent children is an unbearable injustice that would unsettle anyone with a shred of conscience. But did they move the policymakers in Delhi who gave the green light for these deportations? It is a relief that Sumi was ultimately allowed into Bangladesh after media coverage drew attention to her plight, but she is a rare exception. Countless families like hers continue to be hounded across India and dumped into the border's buffer zone. Their situation continues without any clear path forward.

Nowadays, Indian authorities routinely label people as Bangladeshi infiltrators even when they are, in fact, Indian Muslim citizens. A significant number of them come from families that have lived in India for generations and know no other homeland. Under the current style of governance in India where citizenship records and voter lists have become tools to win elections, such outcomes were perhaps only a matter of time. Barely two months ago, a controversial revision of the voter list in West Bengal led to the removal of nine million names, a move that disproportionately targeted Muslim Bengalees. Back in 2019, a similarly flawed and discriminatory verification exercise in Assam left nearly two million people excluded from the National Register of Citizens and facing uncertainty about their legal status. Since then, thousands of Bangla speaking residents have been thrown into detention centres or illegally forced into Bangladesh despite claiming Indian citizenship.

None of this is meant to deny the right every sovereign state holds to regulate migration and decide who may legally reside within its territory. No serious observer disputes that principle. If undocumented migrants are identified, governments are entitled to investigate their status and, where appropriate, arrange repatriation. The real question has never been whether India can act against illegal immigration. The real question is how it goes about doing so. International practice has long laid down clear cut procedures for verification, legal review and coordinated return through proper diplomatic channels. And nowhere in these procedures is there room for forcibly dumping people into a neighbouring country without due process. Both Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have expressed grave concern at India's actions. They urged that regardless of their nationality and legal status, affected people are not to be subject to arbitrary arrest and detention, and demanded that states refrain from mass expulsion of people from their territory.

The practice of pushing people across the border by the BSF is not entirely new. The last time the BNP was in power in Bangladesh, push-in incidents occurred frequently. However, these large-scale push-ins disappeared from view during the 15 years the India-friendly Awami League government was in power. Only after its collapse did the push-ins make a comeback. India may be unhappy with the political transition in Bangladesh, but why are Indian Muslims being made to pay the price? It is obviously not their fault that the Awami League fell. Why exactly, then, should their citizenship become a matter of dispute depending on who happens to govern Bangladesh?

Push-ins by India also display an unwarranted hostility that will do little to improve relations between the two countries. Bangladesh is not merely another neighbour. It is one of India's most important regional partners. Economic cooperation, connectivity projects, trade and security coordination all depend upon a foundation of goodwill. Policies that generate anger among ordinary Bangladeshis erode that foundation. They create the impression that Bangladesh is viewed not as a partner but as dumping ground for unwanted populations. If New Delhi remains unwilling to address border grievances and rebuild trust, it certainly risks pushing its neighbour away toward other regional powers in search of strategic and economic opportunities. That is unlikely to serve India's long-term interests.​
 

No push-in allowed across Bangladesh border: minister
United News of Bangladesh . Dhaka 26 June, 2026, 20:27

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Salahuddin Ahmed. | File photo

Home minister Salahuddin Ahmed on Friday said not a single person had been allowed to enter Bangladesh through illegal push-ins due to the strict vigilance maintained by the Border Guard Bangladesh along the country’s frontiers.

He made the remarks while briefing reporters after attending a discussion and award-giving ceremony organised by the Department of Narcotics Control marking the International Day Against Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking 2026 at Osmani Memorial Auditorium in Dhaka.

Salahuddin Ahmed said that pushing individuals across the border without prior verification is neither a proper nor internationally accepted procedure.

‘If India has a list of Bangladeshi nationals staying there illegally, it can provide the information through diplomatic channels or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,’ he said.

The minister said that the Bangladesh government would verify their nationality through due process and, if confirmed, bring them back through legal procedures.

Referring to claims made in the West Bengal Legislative Assembly regarding the pushback of 10,000 people, he said the Bangladesh government has no documentary evidence or verified statistics supporting such assertions.

The minister praised the role of BGB, saying the border force remains on maximum alert across all frontiers and has successfully thwarted any attempts by India’s Border Security Force to push people into Bangladesh.

He also suggested that recent push-in activities along the border may have been displayed as part of a political agenda following recent elections in the Indian state of West Bengal.

Providing an update on the murder case of Shaheed Osman Hadi, Salahuddin Ahmed said three of the principal suspects had been arrested by Indian law enforcement agencies in Bongaon, West Bengal.

He said that judicial proceedings have already begun in India following the filing of a case under the country’s laws.

According to the minister, Bangladesh has formally sought the return of the accused under the extradition treaty between the two countries by sending the necessary legal documents and warrants to the Indian authorities.

‘We are hopeful of their early handover to Bangladesh,’ he said.

Regarding former IGP Benazir Ahmed, the minister said the Federal Police of the United Arab Emirates informed the Bangladesh government via email after arresting him.

The UAE authorities requested the required documents within 30 days, he said.

‘The Bangladesh government completed all legal and institutional documentation within just three days and sent them to the UAE through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,’ he added.

The documents were formally handed over to UAE authorities by the Bangladesh Embassy in Abu Dhabi a few days ago.

Salahuddin Ahmed said Benazir Ahmed is currently in the custody of the UAE Federal Police and Bangladesh is awaiting the final response from the UAE government regarding the next course of action.

Senior secretary of the home ministry Manjur Morshed Chowdhury, IGP Mohammad Ali Hossain Fakir and other senior officials of the ministry were present at the briefing.​
 

India’s push-ins are not a border problem

Navine Murshid

On June 25, 2026, India’s new High Commissioner to Bangladesh, Dinesh Trivedi, presented his credentials at Bangabhaban. Within hours, he announced the resumption of tourist visas for Bangladeshi nationals after a two-year suspension. The same day, he was accorded the rank of Union Cabinet Minister in India’s Table of Precedence, a designation with no precedent for a diplomatic posting to Dhaka. The optics were carefully managed: reset, goodwill, and a senior political figure with Bengali roots dispatched to steady a wobbly relationship.

All this comes after weeks of heightened tension surrounding what is popularly called the “push-in” from India. Between May 2025 and January 2026, the Border Security Force pushed 2,479 people across into Bangladesh, of whom at least 120 were later confirmed to be Indian nationals. Since Suvendu Adhikari’s BJP government took office in West Bengal in May 2026, running on an explicit “detect, delete, and deport” campaign, approximately 5,000 people have been expelled without judicial review. Human Rights Watch documented BSF personnel escorting groups through cuts in the border fence at night.

Border Guard Bangladesh has resisted at least 21 such attempts since June 1 alone. The 57th BGB-BSF Director General-level conference, held in New Delhi on June 9, produced no binding commitment. India maintained that its deportations were lawful under domestic law. Bangladesh maintained that they violated international norms. Both sides returned home.

And yet, visas were resumed. A Cabinet-rank envoy was installed. The message from New Delhi was: the relationship matters, and we are investing in it.

The most credible reading is not that India is trying to reset the relationship in Bangladesh's favour. Rather, it is trying to manage the relationship while its domestic political compulsions remain unchanged.

In my book, India’s Bangladesh Problem, I have argued that seemingly contradictory actions were, in fact, part of a larger, congruous plan. These two things—the push-ins and the diplomatic gestures—similarly appear contradictory, but are, in fact, part of the same policy, operating at two levels simultaneously.

Robert Putnam’s two-level game remains one of the more useful frameworks for understanding how states behave when domestic and international pressures pull in opposite directions. At the domestic level (Level I), leaders respond to constituency pressures, electoral mandates, and factional competition. At the international level (Level II), they manage interstate relations, negotiate agreements, and project a face appropriate for diplomacy. The skill lies in the overlap: what Putnam called the “win-set,” the range of agreements at the international level that can also survive domestic ratification.

India’s current Bangladesh policy makes no sense if analysed only at Level II. At that level, New Delhi’s behaviour is incoherent: it sends a high-profile envoy to stabilise relations while its border forces dump families into no-man’s land at gunpoint. But when analysed across both levels simultaneously, the logic becomes clear.

At Level I, the BJP has built its decade-long political economy in part on the Bangladeshi Muslim as a threat. The rhetoric has moved through stages: from the “infiltrator” language of the early 1990s, to Amit Shah’s description of migrants as “termites” in 2019, to the institutional codification of the Citizenship Amendment Act, which for the first time imposed a religious test on asylum seekers by creating a path for non-Muslim minorities while excluding Muslims. By 2025, the BJP had won a landslide victory in West Bengal, where Adhikari had campaigned on driving out Bangladeshi Muslims while exempting Hindus under the CAA. The “detect, delete, deport” directive was not a policy deviation. It was a campaign promise. It was the win-set.

At Level II, India needs Bangladesh. Bangladesh is India’s largest trading partner in South Asia. The Teesta water treaty remains unresolved. Transit access through Bangladesh matters for India’s North-east. The Hasina years provided India with a government in Dhaka that subordinated Bangladesh’s interests to India’s strategic preferences, sometimes at considerable domestic political cost to Hasina herself. That arrangement collapsed in August 2024. What followed, under the Yunus interim government, was the most volatile period in bilateral relations since 1975.

Trivedi’s appointment at Cabinet rank is India’s attempt to reconstruct the Level II relationship without conceding anything at Level I. The visa resumption signals normalcy. The Cabinet rank signals strategic priority. But neither comes with any offer to halt the push-ins, verify nationality before expulsion, or accept the return of the 120 confirmed Indian nationals Bangladesh has already documented.

It would be a mistake to analyse the push-in crisis purely through the lens of bilateral relations or Hindu nationalist ideology. Both matter, but neither fully explains the structural mechanism by which poor, working-class Bangladeshi migrants, alongside Indian Muslims mistaken for them, have become the primary target of a state security apparatus.

In India’s Bangladesh Problem, I argued that the marginalisation of Bengali Muslims in India does not follow the logic of simple exclusion. It follows the logic of differential neoliberalism: a formation in which the liberalisation of markets, labour, and capital proceeds alongside the selective securitisation of specific populations. The Bengali Muslim migrant occupies a particular position in this formation. As labour, they are absorbed into India’s informal economy—construction, domestic work, and the garment supply chain. As a political figure, they are constructed as the perfect outsider: the infiltrator whose presence justifies the NRC, the CAA, the holding centre, and the border fence.

During Narendra Modi’s election campaign in 2014–15, the BJP discovered that the Bengali Muslim “infiltrator” could perform double ideological work: consolidating the Hindu vote in West Bengal by activating demographic fear, while providing the national security narrative that justified expanding state surveillance infrastructure. The NRC in Assam found approximately two million people stateless, the majority of them poor, Muslim, and Dalit.

Trivedi's appointment at Cabinet rank is India's attempt to reconstruct the Level II relationship without conceding anything at Level I. The visa resumption signals normalcy. The Cabinet rank signals strategic priority. But neither comes with any offer to halt the push-ins, verify nationality before expulsion, or accept the return of the 120 confirmed Indian nationals Bangladesh has already documented.

The 2025 Immigration and Foreigners Act accelerated this logic by removing the Foreigners Tribunal from the deportation chain. Previously, suspected foreigners in Assam were supposed to appear before a tribunal before expulsion. The administrative bypass enabled by the new law—which West Bengal has adopted for its holding centre operations—means the determination of foreignness is now a police function. This is not simply an efficiency measure. It is the conversion of citizenship into a security category, one determined by phenotype, language, religion, and suspicion rather than by documentation.

The result is that a pregnant woman from Birbhum with an Aadhaar card and a voter ID can be deported to Bangladesh within forty-eight hours. A Calcutta High Court later called this deportation illegal and carried out in “hot haste.” The Supreme Court ordered her return on humanitarian grounds after she had already given birth. These are not edge cases produced by administrative error. They are what happens when the state’s deportation mechanism is deliberately designed to operate faster than judicial oversight can follow.

Dinesh Trivedi is a former Railways Minister, a BJP member with roots in the Trinamool Congress, and a politician with a constituency base in Barrackpore, West Bengal. He is not a career diplomat. He has never served in any foreign posting. India has never before sent a political appointee as High Commissioner to Dhaka.

This is worth sitting with. At a moment of acute bilateral tension over deportations that Bangladesh has described as illegal, inhumane, and in violation of international law, the Indian government has decided that its diplomatic needs in Dhaka are best served not by a seasoned IFS officer with technical expertise in bilateral mechanisms, but by a Bengali politician with deep familiarity with the domestic politics of West Bengal.

The most credible reading is not that India is trying to reset the relationship in Bangladesh’s favour. Rather, it is trying to manage the relationship while its domestic political compulsions remain unchanged. Trivedi’s Bengali identity and political experience make him better equipped than a career diplomat to navigate the cultural register of the relationship and to translate Indian domestic politics to a Bangladeshi audience in ways that minimise blowback. His Cabinet rank ensures that when he meets Tarique Rahman or Bangladesh’s foreign ministry, he carries sufficient protocol weight to signal that India is serious about the relationship, while insulating the push-in operations from formal diplomatic accountability.

It is thus no anomaly that, at Level I, the BJP continues to run holding centres in all districts of West Bengal, continues to process deportees without court hearings, and continues to describe Muslims expelled across the border as “infiltrators”, while, at Level II, it sends a Cabinet-rank envoy, resumes visas, and offers cultural goodwill through a politician who understands Bangladesh.

Dr Navine Murshid is the author of India’s Bangladesh Problem: The Marginalisation of Bengali Muslims in Neoliberal Times and Associate Professor of Political Science at Colgate University.​
 

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