[🇧🇩] Insurgencies in Myanmar. Implications for Bangladesh

[Saif]

https://www.newagebd.net/post/opinion/309726/repatriation-without-rights

Repatriation without rights

The photograph shows a view of the Kutupalong Rohingya camp in Ukhiya, Cox’s Bazar. | Agence France-Presse/Munir uz Zaman

THE Rohingya crisis remains one of South and Southeast Asia’s most enduring humanitarian and political failures. Since the mass expulsion of Rohingyas from Myanmar’s Rakhine State in 2017, Bangladesh has hosted more than one million refugees in Cox’s Bazar and Bhasan Char while Myanmar has failed to create the conditions for their safe return. What began as an emergency has become a protracted crisis marked by statelessness, insecurity, aid dependency and diplomatic fatigue. Repatriation continues to be presented as the preferred durable solution, yet every major initiative has failed because the central political issue remains unresolved: the Rohingyas cannot safely return to a country that still denies them citizenship, protection and equal belonging.

Bangladesh and Myanmar signed a bilateral repatriation agreement only months after the 2017 exodus. Yet the arrangement was non-binding and failed to address the guarantees that mattered most to the refugees, including citizenship, freedom of movement, property restitution and independent monitoring. Since then, every major repatriation effort has followed the same pattern. Attempts in 2018 and 2019 collapsed because refugees refused to return without credible assurances of safety and rights. A China-facilitated pilot initiative in 2023, which included visits by Rohingya representatives to Rakhine, also stalled as renewed fighting, cyclone damage and deteriorating security made even limited returns unrealistic. More fundamentally, refugees remained unconvinced that conditions had changed. Their reluctance was not a rejection of repatriation but a rational response to continued uncertainty. Returning to fenced settlements or tightly controlled villages without legal status would simply replace exile in Bangladesh with confinement in Myanmar.

These repeated failures expose the central weakness of the repatriation agenda. Too much attention has been given to moving refugees across the border and too little to creating the conditions that would allow them to return as citizens with rights, security and dignity. Myanmar’s 1982 citizenship law, long-standing restrictions on movement and entrenched discrimination remain fundamental obstacles. The 2021 military coup has made matters worse, fragmenting authority and turning Rakhine into an active conflict zone contested by the Myanmar military, the Arakan Army and other armed groups. Bangladesh is therefore no longer negotiating with a single reluctant government but with an increasingly fragmented political and security landscape.

The challenge extends well beyond Bangladesh and Myanmar. China has sought to mediate because stability in Myanmar serves its strategic interests, but its diplomacy has focused more on facilitating dialogue than addressing the rights that underpin sustainable return. India has balanced humanitarian concerns with security and geopolitical priorities, while ASEAN has struggled to move beyond its tradition of consensus and non-interference. Western governments have backed accountability efforts and imposed sanctions, yet these measures have done little to change realities inside Rakhine. The result is a fragmented diplomatic response in which no external actor has applied sufficient leverage or sustained pressure to make a rights-based solution politically unavoidable.

Bangladesh’s position has become increasingly difficult. Its humanitarian response has evolved into a long-term national responsibility, placing growing pressure on land, forests, water resources, public services and host communities. Security concerns have also intensified as trafficking, armed groups and criminal networks exploit a refugee population with limited education, livelihood opportunities and freedom of movement. At the same time, declining international funding has reduced food assistance, healthcare and education, deepening frustration in the camps and encouraging dangerous onward journeys by sea to countries such as Indonesia and Malaysia. Yet these mounting pressures cannot justify premature repatriation. Any return must remain voluntary, safe, dignified and firmly grounded in rights.

The crisis also exposes the limits of humanitarianism. Aid can keep people alive, but it cannot resolve statelessness or political exclusion. For years, the international response has operated on separate tracks: humanitarian agencies sustain refugees in Bangladesh, legal institutions pursue accountability, diplomats negotiate repatriation and development partners support host communities. Each effort is necessary, but together they have failed to produce a coherent political strategy. The Rohingya have too often been treated as beneficiaries of assistance rather than stakeholders in decisions about their future. Any durable solution must give them a meaningful voice in shaping the conditions of return, including citizenship, security, education and mechanisms to monitor implementation.

The way forward requires realism rather than rhetoric. Repatriation should remain the long-term objective, but only after verifiable changes inside Rakhine. Refugees need more than transport across a border; they need a credible pathway to citizenship, freedom of movement, access to services, protection from abuse and either the restoration of, or compensation for, lost property. Any future agreement should include independent international monitoring with meaningful access to return areas. Diplomacy must also adapt to Myanmar’s fragmented political landscape by engaging relevant actors without compromising the principle that rights, not expediency, should determine the terms of return.

Nor can the camps in Bangladesh remain indefinite waiting rooms. Refugees need education, skills development, legal protection and limited livelihood opportunities to prevent social deterioration and preserve their capacity to rebuild their lives when return eventually becomes possible. These measures should not be viewed as local integration but as responsible crisis management. International partners must also do more by sustaining humanitarian funding, expanding resettlement for the most vulnerable, supporting host communities and maintaining coordinated diplomatic pressure on Myanmar. Accountability efforts must continue because impunity remains one of the principal obstacles to safe return.

Ultimately, the Rohingya crisis is not a logistical failure but a political one. Refugee lists, reception centres and pilot projects cannot substitute for citizenship, security and recognition. Bangladesh seeks relief from a burden it cannot carry indefinitely; Myanmar continues to avoid confronting the policies that created the crisis; regional powers prioritise stability; and donors struggle to sustain international attention. The Rohingya seek something far simpler: the right to return home as equal citizens. Until repatriation efforts are anchored in that principle, they will continue to produce agreements without trust, announcements without returns, and roadmaps without roads.

Dr Mohammad Zaman is an expert in resettlement and development. His recent edited book (co-editors Robert Anderson and Kawser Ahmed) is titled Rohingya Stories: History and Geopolitics in a Multipolar World (Springer, 2025).​

 

[Saif]

A new political voice is emerging from the Rohingya diaspora. Why it matters

As the Rohingya crisis deepens, a digitally connected diaspora is emerging as a new political force capable of shaping its future.

www.thedailystar.net

A new political voice is emerging from the Rohingya diaspora. Why it matters

Anas Ansar

The Rohingya crisis has undergone a significant transformation over the past five years, particularly since the military coup in Myanmar in 2021. As the civil war continues to intensify, the prospects for durable solutions to protracted displacement and a return to their homeland remain a distant reality. Amidst this politics of forgetting, nearly a decade after almost a million Rohingya fled Myanmar for Bangladesh, a new generation of Rohingya is building something that did not exist in quite this form before: a transnational, digitally connected political community. The world should start listening to it.

On Aug 25, 2017, the Rohingya exodus began on a scale that few could have imagined. In the weeks that followed, roughly 700,000 Rohingya men, women and children fled Myanmar’s Rakhine State for Bangladesh, joining hundreds of thousands who had escaped earlier waves of persecution. Today, more than a million Rohingya refugees live in Bangladesh, most in the sprawling camps of Cox’s Bazar, next to a porous borderland.

Nearly a decade later, however, the central question is no longer simply how to sustain the camps, what is needed on a daily basis or under what terms Bangladesh should engage in repatriation dialogue. It is about what kind of political community is emerging from this prolonged exile—and whether the international community is prepared to recognise it as part of the solution.

The Rohingya did not simply become refugees in 2017. They emerged as a diaspora, and this distinction matters.

For decades, persecution, exclusion from citizenship and repeated displacement had already scattered Rohingya communities across South and Southeast Asia. The 2017 catastrophe accelerated that process dramatically, expanding the Rohingya presence into countries including Malaysia, Indonesia, Australia, the United States, Canada and parts of Europe.

Exile, therefore, has produced something paradoxical. The Rohingya are geographically fragmented, politically marginalised and largely immobilised. Yet they are also more connected to one another than at any previous point in their history.

Much of that connection is digital.

The emergence of a Rohingya “digital diaspora” deserves far more attention from policymakers than it has received. Social media has become a space in which Rohingya dispersed across countries can preserve memories, debate identity, share information, support one another and advocate for political recognition.

The significance is not merely technological. It is political.

When a stateless population is denied meaningful political space in its homeland and faces restricted physical mobility in exile, the internet can become a substitute public sphere. It allows people separated by borders and refugee camps to communicate as members of a community with shared interests and aspirations.

Any durable political settlement will require more than negotiations among governments and male political elites. It will require a representative Rohingya constituency capable of articulating what return, citizenship, security, justice and coexistence should actually mean. The digital diaspora could help build that constituency.
Digital platforms have created a “community of hope”, where Rohingya construct a sense of virtual togetherness and collective identity, while also facilitating civic resistance, political mobilisation, and material and emotional support.

That is not a trivial development.

A recent study provides an indication of its scale. Examining Rohingya diaspora activity on Facebook between 2017 and 2022, the researchers identified 47 diaspora pages that collectively published nearly 35,000 posts and generated almost 8 million interactions. These pages were not focused solely on politics. They covered human rights, education, news, youth development, culture and diaspora community life.

In other words, the Rohingya digital diaspora is beginning to look less like a collection of refugee voices and more like an embryonic civic ecosystem.

There is another important dimension: women.

The traditional image of Rohingya political leadership has often been overwhelmingly male. But exile has begun to disrupt that pattern. International attention and the new social spaces created in the diaspora have enabled increasing numbers of Rohingya women to enter civic and political domains historically dominated by men. Education, language skills, technical knowledge, exposure to international organisations and opportunities in host countries have helped determine who can participate and how effectively.

This matters because any durable political settlement will require more than negotiations among governments and male political elites. It will require a representative Rohingya constituency capable of articulating what return, citizenship, security, justice and coexistence should actually mean.

The digital diaspora could help build that constituency.

But it would be a mistake to romanticise social media. The same platforms that can empower persecuted communities can also divide them, amplify misinformation and expose vulnerable people to surveillance and manipulation. Indeed, Facebook was itself implicated in the spread of anti-Rohingya hate and dehumanising narratives before and during the 2017 violence. Researchers have therefore rightly cautioned against excessive “digital optimism”. Unequal access to technology, differences in age, gender and economic status, and the realities of life in refugee camps all shape who gets heard online.

The lesson is not to retreat from digital politics. It is to make it more inclusive, secure and consequential. For governments and international organisations, that should mean a fundamental shift in how the Rohingya are engaged.

The objective in this regard should not be to create a single “Rohingya voice”. Diasporas are rarely that homogeneous. The objective should be to build a legitimate, representative ecosystem in which different Rohingya constituencies can debate their future and develop common positions on the issues that matter most.

That could prove crucial when a political opening eventually emerges in Myanmar.

The international community has spent years searching for a solution to the Rohingya crisis: repatriation agreements, diplomatic pressure, humanitarian assistance, international litigation and accountability mechanisms. All remain important. But sustainable return cannot mean merely transporting people across a border.

Rohingya youth Mohammad Rafiq uses his mobile phone to photograph and tell the stories of Rohingya refugees living in the Kutupalong camp. Such digital storytelling, amplified by the Rohingya diaspora, is helping bring Rohingya voices and their plight to a global audience. Photo: AFP

Return must involve rights.

It must involve security, citizenship or a credible pathway to it, freedom of movement, access to education and livelihoods, restitution and accountability. Most importantly, it must be shaped with the participation of the people who are expected to return.

This is where the Rohingya diaspora could become a game changer. It can transform a population scattered by persecution into a transnational community capable of speaking to governments, courts, journalists and international institutions.

This August, as we commemorate another anniversary of the Rohingya exodus, the question is no longer whether the Rohingya have a future. The question is whether the world will allow them to help define it.

The international community must take into account that, amid the tragedy of exile, something important has been built. A diaspora is quietly emerging as a political community.

And in a crisis defined for decades by the Rohingya’s lack of power, that emerging community—connected across borders and increasingly confident in its own voice—may be one of the few sources of political power the Rohingya can carry with them into whatever future awaits. The Rohingya diaspora may hold the key to solving a crisis the world has learned to ignore.

Dr Anas Ansar is an assistant professor in the Department of Political Science and Sociology and a member of the Centre for Peace Studies at North South University.​

 

[Saif]

Rohingya repatriation trapped in geopolitics

On 25 August, Bangladesh will mark nine years since more than 700,000 Rohingyas fled across the border from Myanmar's Rakhine State, joining earlier waves of refugees and creating one of the world's largest and most protracted displacement crises. Nine years on, the central promise that accompanied

thefinancialexpress.com.bd

Rohingya repatriation trapped in geopolitics

On 25 August, Bangladesh will mark nine years since more than 700,000 Rohingyas fled across the border from Myanmar's Rakhine State, joining earlier waves of refugees and creating one of the world's largest and most protracted displacement crises. Nine years on, the central promise that accompanied the international response remains unfulfilled: the Rohingyas have not returned home.

More than one million Rohingyas are now living in Bangladesh, overwhelmingly in crowded camps in Cox's Bazar. A generation of children has grown up knowing Myanmar only through the memories of parents and grandparents. For many, the word "home" describes a place they have never seen.

The most disturbing feature of this crisis is not merely its duration. It is the way the Rohingyas have remained trapped in a geopolitical contest over Myanmar, while the international community has struggled to translate concern into a viable political solution.

China and India, two of the most influential powers in Myanmar's neighbourhood, have important strategic and economic interests there. Both have maintained engagement with Myanmar's military authorities, seeking to protect their own interests and preserve influence. The military leadership, meanwhile, has continued to manoeuvre between competing external powers while the country sinks deeper into conflict.

Myanmar's recent political developments have done little to improve the prospects of the Rohingyas returning to their homeland. The military authorities have sought legitimacy through a general election widely criticised by opponents as manipulated and lacking credibility. The emergence of a new political administration under military influence does not, by itself, alter the fundamental reality: those claiming authority in Naypyidaw do not exercise effective control over much of the territory where the Rohingyas once lived.

That contradiction is at the heart of the repatriation problem.

The Arakan Army, which has established control over large parts of Rakhine State, including areas of significance to the Rohingya population, has emerged as a crucial actor. Yet its previous assurances that it would facilitate or initiate the return of Rohingyas have not translated into a meaningful repatriation process.

The Myanmar authorities have recently spoken of taking back more than 300,000 Rohingyas whose identities have been verified. But such assurances create little confidence when the relevant authorities lack effective control over the Rohingyas' homeland.

Repatriation cannot be reduced to a bureaucratic exercise of verifying names and issuing promises. A safe return requires security, citizenship, freedom of movement, access to homes and land, livelihoods and basic rights. Most importantly, it requires confidence that those who return will not once again become victims of persecution or violence.

None of these conditions appears remotely secure.

The civil war has made an already complex crisis still more dangerous. Myanmar is no longer dealing simply with a confrontation between the military and ethnic minorities. Armed groups have seized territory, alliances have shifted and the authority of the central government has been severely weakened. Rakhine State itself has become a major theatre of conflict.

For Bangladesh, this is not an abstract geopolitical problem. It is an increasingly heavy national burden.

The camps accommodating Rahingya have consumed enormous financial and administrative resources. Bangladesh has provided shelter to a population that is not its own and for a crisis over which it has little control. The pressure on land, forests, public services and local communities has been substantial. The humanitarian situation also creates serious security concerns, particularly as young people in the camps face limited opportunities, uncertainty about their future and exposure to criminal networks and extremist recruitment.

At the same time, the generosity of the international community is showing signs of fatigue.

Humanitarian funding for the Rohingyas has been declining even as their needs remain immense. The world's attention and resources are being pulled towards other devastating crises, from Sudan to Gaza and beyond. That is understandable in a world confronted by multiple wars and humanitarian emergencies. But competing crises cannot become an excuse for abandoning a problem that has remained unresolved for nearly a decade.

The international community must resist the temptation to regard the Rohingya crisis as a humanitarian problem that can simply be managed indefinitely.

It is a political crisis requiring a political settlement.

There are already voices advocating some form of long-term integration of the Rohingyas into Bangladeshi society. Such proposals may appear pragmatic to those observing the crisis from afar. They are not, however, an acceptable substitute for repatriation.

Bangladesh is a densely populated developing country with limited land and resources. It cannot reasonably be expected to permanently absorb more than one million refugees whose displacement resulted from events in a neighbouring country. Nor would permanent settlement resolve the underlying political and security conditions that produced the exodus in the first place.

The international community therefore needs to move beyond declarations of solidarity and humanitarian appeals. China, India and other countries with influence over Myanmar must use that influence to push all relevant actors towards a credible political process. The United Nations and major international powers must maintain pressure for accountability, citizenship rights and guarantees of safe and dignified return.

Bangladesh, for its part, needs sustained international diplomatic and financial support while continuing to insist on the principle that repatriation must be voluntary, safe, dignified and sustainable.

Nine years is far too long for a temporary refuge to become a permanent limbo.

The Rohingyas cannot remain indefinitely as pawns in Myanmar's civil war or as collateral damage in the strategic calculations of regional powers. Nor can Bangladesh be left to shoulder an ever-growing burden while the world gradually loses interest.

The danger extends beyond the camps. Prolonged displacement, political exclusion, armed conflict and growing frustration can create conditions for criminality, radicalisation, trafficking and cross-border instability. What is now principally a humanitarian crisis could become a far wider regional security problem.

The ninth anniversary should therefore be more than another occasion for speeches, appeals and expressions of sympathy. It should be a deadline for renewed diplomacy.

The goal must remain clear: a safe, voluntary and dignified return to a Rakhine State where Rohingyas can live with security, rights and a recognised place in society.

If the international community allows another year to pass without changing the political equation, it will not merely be postponing a solution. It will be allowing a generation to grow up without a home -- and allowing a regional crisis to deepen beneath the surface.​

 

[Saif]

Dhaka urges correction as Myanmar statement based on erroneous statistics

Referring to the latest press statement issued by the Myanmar Foreign Ministry on the Rohingya matter on 15 August, Bangladesh mentioned that many elements of the statement were based on erroneous statistics, including the number of the displaced Rohingya population. Requesting the Myanmar...

en.prothomalo.com

Dhaka urges correction as Myanmar statement based on erroneous statistics

Diplomatic Correspondent
Dhaka
Published: 18 Aug 2026, 20: 48

On 8 June, Rohingya leaders presented four demands as part of the ‘Go Home’ campaign in the Rohingya refugee camps. Photo: Prothom Alo

Referring to the latest press statement issued by the Myanmar Foreign Ministry on the Rohingya matter on 15 August, Bangladesh mentioned that many elements of the statement were based on erroneous statistics, including the number of the displaced Rohingya population.

Requesting the Myanmar government on expediting the verification process of the displaced Rohingyas based on agreed bilateral instruments, the foreign ministry said that the data of Rohingyas registered under the UN system reflects their accurate numbers, according to a release posted on the Facebook page of the foreign ministry.

DG (Myanmar) Md Toufiq-ur-Rahman made the request while holding a meeting with Ambassador U Kyaw Soe Moe of Myanmar to Bangladesh at his office at the foreign ministry today, Tuesday.

In a press release last Saturday, Myanmar's Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that Myanmar had verified a list of 828,824 refugees provided by Bangladesh as of late July. Authorities confirmed that among the 426,545 individuals verified, 308,797 were residents of Rakhine.

The Myanmar's Foreign Ministry noted that the identities of 113,507 individuals could not be successfully verified. On the other hand, the government claimed that 4,241 individuals had participated in terrorist activities. The country also denied that more than one million people were displaced from Rakhine.

DG Md Toufiq-ur-Rahman requested the Ambassador on expediting the verification process of the displaced Rohingyas based on agreed bilateral instruments including taking into account of the children born in the camps, and the new arrivals, forced to leave Rakhine after 2017.

It was also informed in the meeting that Bangladesh is in the process of registering them and the information of Rohingyas after the caseload of 828,824 would be shared with the Myanmar authorities in due course.

The DG requested to duly reflect these added information in the verification exercise. It was also pointed out that Rohingyas are not ‘Bengalis’ as they have their own ethnic identities accepted by the Myanmar authority until recently.

Ambassador Soe Moe assured to convey Bangladesh’s concerns and observations to his capital and expressed his government’s commitment to expedite the verification process to begin the repatriation of the verified Rohingyas.

The DG reiterated that the only sustainable solution of the crisis lies in safe, dignified, and voluntary repatriation of the Rohingyas to Rakhine.

In 2017, due to a brutal military campaign, nearly 700,000 Rohingya (over 800,000 according to Bangladesh's estimates) were forced to flee across the border into Bangladesh.

Hundreds of thousands of Rohingya refugees were already living in Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh, having fled earlier to escape brutal violence by the Myanmar military and ethnic militias. They have been living in Bangladesh for a long time.​

 

[Saif]

https://www.newagebd.net/post/foreign-affairs/310371/rohingya-leaders-slam-myanmars-3-lakh-repatriation-offer

Rohingya leaders slam Myanmar’s ‘3 lakh repatriation’ offer
Tarekur Rahman . Cox’s Bazar 19 August, 2026, 01:19

File photo

Rohingya leaders have described Myanmar’s latest offer to repatriate slightly more than 300,000 Rohingyas from Bangladesh as a ‘drama’, saying the conditions attached to the proposal could further delay the long-stalled repatriation process.

They fear that Myanmar may prolong the process by questioning the Rohingyas’ identity, creating complications over verification and imposing additional conditions for their return.

Mohammad Zubair, a senior leader of the Arakan Rohingya Society for Peace and Human Rights, told New Age on Tuesday that Myanmar’s recent statements and conditions on repatriation were deepening the crisis of confidence among Rohingyas.

He said there was concern that Myanmar could use the condition of restoring peace in Rakhine State as a pretext to delay repatriation. ‘It is uncertain when stability will return to the area amid the ongoing conflict,’ he said.

‘The verification lists are available with Myanmar and the Rohingyas. Based on those lists, the Rohingyas’ claims should be considered and steps should be taken for safe and dignified repatriation,’ Zubair said.

He also expressed concern that Rohingyas could face renewed persecution if they were sent back to Myanmar without guarantees of security and citizenship rights.

Criticising Myanmar’s continued refusal to recognise the Rohingya identity, Zubair said, ‘Rohingyas have long been demanding recognition of their ethnic identity as Rohingya. But Myanmar continues to describe them as “Bengali”, which goes against their demand.’

Meanwhile, the United Council of Rohingya (UCR), the elected representative body of Rohingya refugees in Cox’s Bazar, also rejected Myanmar’s August 15 statement, describing it as ‘misleading propaganda.’

In a statement issued on Monday, the UCR accused Myanmar’s military-backed government of attempting to ‘rewrite history’ and avoid accountability for atrocities committed against the Rohingya.

The organisation particularly condemned Myanmar’s continued use of the term ‘Bengalis’, saying it was an attempt to erase the Rohingya’s ethnic identity and historical presence in Rakhine State.

The UCR maintained that any repatriation must be voluntary, safe and dignified, with guarantees of citizenship rights, security and international protection for the returnees.​