[🇧🇩] A Strategic Analysis of Bangladesh Myanmar Relationship

[Saif]

Bangladesh citizens in quake-hit Myanmar, Thailand safe: officials

Bangladesh citizens now staying in Thailand and Myanmar have so far remained safe after a massive earthquake struck the two Southeast Asian countries on Friday, killing around 150 people.

www.newagebd.net

Bangladesh citizens in quake-hit Myanmar, Thailand safe: officials
Staff Correspondent 28 March, 2025, 23:26

Bangladesh citizens now staying in Thailand and Myanmar have so far remained safe after a massive earthquake struck the two Southeast Asian countries on Friday, killing around 150 people.

‘None of our citizens have been affected by the earthquake so far. We have learned that a 30-story under-construction building in Bangkok collapsed due to the quake,’ said Md Fahad Pervez Bosunia, Counsellor (Labour Welfare) at the Bangladesh embassy in Bangkok.

He said that most of the construction workers there were from Myanmar.

He mentioned that they were in contact with the relevant authorities for further updates.

‘We have not received any reports of Bangladeshi casualties so far,’ the counsellor told New Age around 10:40 PM.

Bangladesh citizens in Myanmar were also reported safe after the earthquake struck the country, according to the United News of Bangladesh, quoting Bangladesh's Ambassador to Myanmar, Faiyaz Murshid Kazi.

In Mandalay, Myanmar’s second-largest city, which is close to the epicentre, the earthquake caused damage to part of the former royal palace and nearby buildings, according to videos and photos shared on Facebook.

In the Sagaing region, southwest of Mandalay, a 90-year-old bridge collapsed, the UNB report stated.

The earthquake, which hit Myanmar and Thailand on Friday, killed nearly 150 people and injured hundreds, with dozens trapped in collapsed buildings.

The death toll might rise, according to Agence France-Presse, reporting from Naypyidaw, Myanmar.

The shallow 7.7-magnitude tremor struck northwest of the city of Sagaing in central Myanmar in the early afternoon, followed minutes later by a 6.4-magnitude aftershock, according to the AFP report.​

 

[Saif]

https://www.thedailystar.net/opinion/views/news/reassessing-our-southern-defense-strategy-3864961

Reassessing our southern defense strategy

A view of Myanmar visible from the bank of the Naf River in Teknaf. PHOTO: MD RAJIB RAIHAN

Bangladesh's security concerns have historically been shaped by its relationship with India, particularly when the governing regime maintained strong ties with New Delhi, reflecting the enduring and complex historical dynamics between the two nations. This evolving security landscape now demands a shift in strategic focus. Recent developments along the southern border, particularly from Myanmar and non-state actors, indicate an urgent need to reassess the country's defense and diplomatic approaches. The rise of armed insurgent groups, border violations, and disruptions to trade highlight the vulnerabilities of Bangladesh's southern frontier. In response to these emerging threats, a new security paradigm—the Southern Contingency Framework (SCF)—is necessary to address these challenges effectively.

The China-India rivalry and Bangladesh's strategic dilemma

Bangladesh's geopolitical landscape has been linked to the ongoing rivalry between China and India. Both regional powers have vested interests in South Asia, often influencing Bangladesh's security, economic policies, and foreign relations. China has invested in Bangladesh's infrastructure through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), while India has historically played a crucial role in Bangladesh's defense and diplomatic affairs. The Myanmar crisis further complicates this dynamic, as China has maintained close ties with Myanmar's military regime, while India has historically supported certain movements within Myanmar. These competing influences leave Bangladesh in a precarious position, requiring a carefully balanced foreign policy that prioritises national security while maintaining strategic autonomy.

The escalating security crisis in the south

Tensions involving Myanmar affecting southern Bangladesh have long existed but have recently intensified to a concerning level. On October 27, 2023, the Three Brotherhood Alliance (3BTA), which includes the Arakan Army (AA), launched Operation 1027 against Myanmar's military, capturing significant territory in Rakhine State. The growing instability along the Myanmar border quickly spilled over into Bangladesh, as seen on February 4-5, 2024, when over 100 Myanmar Border Guard Police (BGP) personnel illegally crossed into Bangladesh and were disarmed and interned by the Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB). The situation further deteriorated on May 22, 2024, when the AA launched a large-scale attack on Maungdaw, seizing over 10 junta camps and killing approximately 200 Myanmar military personnel. This escalation posed direct risks to Bangladesh's territorial integrity and border security.

The security threats extended to the maritime domain. On June 6, 2024, ferry services on the Teknaf-Saint Martin route were suspended due to gunfire from Myanmar, leaving over 10,000 residents facing food shortages. That same month, AA fighters allegedly fired at Bangladeshi trawlers, including one carrying election officials. These hostilities continued into October when the Myanmar Navy fired on six Bangladeshi fishing trawlers near Saint Martin's Island, killing one person and injuring two. Although Myanmar authorities later released 72 detained fishermen and their trawlers on October 10, 2024, the situation underscored the fragile nature of Bangladesh's southern security.

By November 2024, the crisis had escalated further. On November 5, the AA detained 20 Bangladeshi fishermen and seized 15 boats, accusing them of illegal entry. Although the fishermen were released on November 7 after negotiations with the BGB, this episode demonstrated the group's growing power in the region. The most alarming development came on December 8, 2024, when the AA announced its control over the entire 271-kilometre Myanmar-Bangladesh border after capturing a BGP base in Rakhine State. This takeover led to an indefinite ban on vessel movement in the Naf River, disrupting trade between the two countries.

The economic ramifications of this crisis became evident in 2025. On January 16, the AA seized three cargo ships carrying 50,000 bags of dried fruits, betel nuts, coffee, and other goods en route from Yangon to Teknaf via the Naf River. Two of the three vessels were released on January 20, while the last ship remained in AA custody until February 1. Meanwhile, on February 10, the AA seized another timber-laden trawler near Golar Chor in Shah Porir Island. The next day, four Bangladeshi fishermen were abducted along with their fishing boat from the Naf River in Teknaf, Cox's Bazar.

March 2025 witnessed further complications. On March 1, Bangladesh's Home Adviser Lt Gen (retd) Jahangir Alam Chowdhury, confirmed that the AA had begun collecting an unofficial "tariff" on goods entering Bangladesh, adding another layer of economic insecurity. On March 5-6, the Myanmar Navy reportedly detained 56 Bangladeshi fishermen along with six trawlers near Saint Martin's Island. Before releasing them, the navy looted fish, fuel, nets, and food supplies. Further tension arose on March 16 when ARSA chief Ataullah Abu Ammar Jununi was arrested in Narayanganj, sparking unrest in Rohingya camps. On March 21, gunfire from Myanmar injured two individuals in the Tumbru border area in Bandarban, allegedly coming from the AA. The security situation had significantly deteriorated, leaving Bangladesh to confront an entirely new set of security concerns from the south.

Trade between Bangladesh and Myanmar also suffered due to the border instability. According to Teknaf customs, in the fiscal year 2023, Bangladesh imported 188,999 metric tonnes of goods worth Tk 1,545 crore from Myanmar. By the fiscal year 2024, imports had sharply declined to 71,741 metric tonnes, valued at Tk 808 crore. This decline underscores the economic vulnerabilities linked to border insecurity.

Some key theories of security and strategic studies—Realism, Securitisation Theory, and Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT)—offer valuable insights but present limitations in fully addressing the emerging threats in Bangladesh's southern frontier. Realism, which prioritises state-centric power politics and military preparedness, provides an essential framework for understanding geopolitical tensions. It primarily focuses on conventional state actors, making it less adaptable to addressing asymmetric security threats and non-state actors like the AA. The Securitisation Theory highlights how security threats are shaped through political discourse, aiding in understanding how Bangladesh frames its security concerns. Nevertheless, it does not offer direct policy mechanisms for managing concrete security risks beyond discursive practices. The RSCT explains Bangladesh's security challenges by situating them within the broader dynamics of South Asia, particularly the China-India-Myanmar triangle. While useful, this theory assumes that regional security is shaped predominantly by state interactions, overlooking the significant role of transnational insurgent groups and informal economic networks. Given these limitations, Bangladesh requires a more comprehensive and adaptive security approach, such as the SCF, which must comprehensively integrate military, diplomatic, economic, and community-driven strategies to address evolving security threats effectively.

SCF can provide a multi-pronged approach

Firstly, Bangladesh must deploy advanced surveillance technology, including drones and satellite monitoring, to enhance situational awareness along the Myanmar border. Additionally, fortifying border security posts and increasing the presence of the BGB and the Bangladesh Navy will serve as deterrents against incursions. Presence does not always necessitate a physical deployment in all operational contexts.

Secondly, the Bangladesh Armed Forces should conduct more joint military exercises with friendly nations to improve rapid response capabilities. Strengthening naval and coast guard operations near Saint Martin's Island is essential.

Thirdly, Bangladesh should leverage diplomatic channels, particularly through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the United Nations, to address cross-border tensions. Engaging China and India (on equal terms) in diplomatic dialogues to ensure Myanmar's stability will be crucial in preventing further escalation.

Fourthly, to mitigate economic risks, Bangladesh should reduce its reliance on Myanmar for imports and explore alternative trade routes. Strengthening domestic fisheries, agriculture, and logistics infrastructure will help absorb trade shocks caused by border disruptions.

Fifthly, we need to increase focus on community-based security and intelligence gathering. Local communities near the border should be integrated into intelligence-sharing networks. Establishing rapid communication channels between security forces and residents will enhance early threat detection and crisis response.

Finally, Bangladesh should focus on exploring innovative methods to engage with non-state actors following the UN Charter. The Charter encourages peaceful dialogue and conflict resolution through mechanisms such as Article 33 (negotiation and mediation) and Chapter VIII (regional arrangements). By leveraging these provisions, Bangladesh can establish new avenues for communication with non-state actors while ensuring compliance with international norms and advancing its security and strategic interests. This approach can boost broader regional stability and enhance Bangladesh's diplomatic capabilities.

Bangladesh's security posture must evolve to address the emerging threats from the south. The SCF offers a comprehensive strategy to safeguard national security, economic stability, and regional influence. By strengthening border defense, military preparedness, diplomatic engagement, trade security, and community intelligence, Bangladesh can effectively mitigate the risks posed by the ongoing instability in Myanmar. As regional dynamics continue to shift, Bangladesh must remain proactive in securing its sovereignty and national interests.

Alauddin Mohammad is joint member secretary of National Citizen Party (NCP).​

 

[Saif]

Bangladesh recalls ambassador from Myanmar

Bangladesh has recalled its ambassador from Myanmar, a Bangladeshi foreign ministry official said on Thursday, after it acknowledged opening a communications line with a rebel army fighting its neighbour's military junta. Monowar Hossain, who had been serving in Myanmar's capital Naypyidaw since m

thefinancialexpress.com.bd

Bangladesh recalls ambassador from Myanmar

REUTERS
Published :
May 29, 2025 20:42
Updated :
May 29, 2025 20:42

Bangladesh has recalled its ambassador from Myanmar, a Bangladeshi foreign ministry official said on Thursday, after it acknowledged opening a communications line with a rebel army fighting its neighbour's military junta.

Monowar Hossain, who had been serving in Myanmar's capital Naypyidaw since mid-2023, was told to return to Dhaka with immediate effect, said the official, describing it as an "administrative decision" without giving further reasons.

Relations between Bangladesh and Myanmar have been strained by the Rohingya refugee crisis and border security concerns.

A Myanmar junta spokesperson was not available for comment.

More than 1.2 million Rohingya are sheltering in Bangladesh, with the U.N. warning that widespread hunger in western Rakhine state could trigger fresh displacement. Over 130,000 people are thought to have crossed in the past year, Bangladesh says.

Bangladesh's National Security Adviser Khalilur Rahman said last week that Dhaka has opened informal communication channels with the Arakan Army, an ethnic armed group active in Rakhine, to maintain border stability.

Dhaka also remains engaged with the Myanmar junta to pursue a long-term solution to the Rohingya crisis, Rahman said, including potential support for a proposed U.N.-led humanitarian corridor in Rakhine.

But Bangladesh's army opposes that.

"The army will not be involved in any activity that compromises the country's security," Colonel Shafiqul Islam, a senior Bangladesh army official, told reporters this week, of the aid plan.​

 

[Saif]

Myanmar govt, Arakan Army congratulate new Bangladesh Foreign Minister

Messages signal readiness to cooperate on Rohingya crisis and strengthen bilateral ties

www.thedailystar.net

Myanmar govt, Arakan Army congratulate new Bangladesh Foreign Minister

Messages signal readiness to cooperate on Rohingya crisis and strengthen bilateral ties
BSS, Dhaka

From left to right: Than Swe, Twan Mrat Naing, Dr Khalilur Rahman

Myanmar Foreign Minister Than Swe has congratulated Bangladesh’s newly appointed Foreign Minister Dr Khalilur Rahman.

For the first time, Twan Mrat Naing, chairman of the United League of Arakan (ULA) and head of the Arakan Army, also sent a congratulatory letter to the Bangladesh foreign minister.

In his message, Naing expressed hope for “practical, sustainable and realistic solutions” and said the two sides now have an opportunity to chart a new course of friendship between Bangladesh and Arakan.

The messages appeared to reflect readiness from both the Myanmar government and the Arakan Army to work with Bangladesh’s new government toward resolving the Rohingya crisis.

Foreign Minister Khalilur recently confirmed that Dhaka has been in contact with both parties in this regard.

"The messages from Myanmar and Arakan Army authorities are an extraordinary event and have come in the wake of continued engagement. They reflect their confidence in the new Bangladesh government in promoting a peaceful resolution of the Rohingya issue through continued contacts and dialogue," a senior foreign ministry official told BSS this evening.

Bangladesh has also been engaging other key countries and the United Nations to advance an early, durable solution to the longstanding Rohingya issue.​

 

[Saif]

Beyond the BRAVE Burma Act: US Myanmar Policy at a Crossroads

Policy toward Myanmar has always remained on the periphery of the American establishment's attention. It is all the more surprising

moderndiplomacy.eu

Beyond the BRAVE Burma Act: US Myanmar Policy at a Crossroads

Policy toward Myanmar has always remained on the periphery of the American establishment's attention.

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By Alexey Nikolayev
March 11, 2026

A man shows his ink-marked finger after voting at Kyauktada Township Polling Station No. 1, on the day of the general elections in Kyauktada, Myanmar, December 28, 2025. REUTERS/Stringer

Policy toward Myanmar has always remained on the periphery of the American establishment’s attention. It is all the more surprising that in February 2026, the House of Representatives passed the BRAVE (Bringing Real Accountability Via Enforcement) Burma Act, which proposes significantly tightening sanctions against the “junta” and, consequently, the entire country. The Act was recently introduced in the Senate and will likely be approved there as well, after which it will be signed by the US President.

Compared to previous sanctions packages, the bipartisan bill appears more threatening and clearly aimed at regime change; it directs the US President to annually tighten sanctions against the Myanmar Oil & Gas Enterprise (MOGE) and the Myanmar Economic Bank, which should ultimately collapse the country’s financial system and stimulate the “fall of the junta.” Furthermore, according to the bill, Myanmar’s vote in the IMF is to be blocked, preventing the country from borrowing from the institution. Sanctions are also imposed on all foreign suppliers of aviation fuel to Myanmar, which, according to the bill’s sponsors, is intended to directly hinder the Myanmar Air Force’s operations against the insurgents. The BRAVE Burma Act would establish the position of a US special envoy for Myanmar, whose responsibilities include “promoting an end to violence and protecting human rights” in the most interventionist sense.

During the House hearings, activists from Myanmar’s radical opposition, who typically advocate for maximum US involvement in Myanmar’s civil war, were brought in as experts. The difference is that during Biden’s presidency, the primary focus was on the junta’s violations of human rights, including those of LGBTQ+ people and Rohingya Muslims, while in Trump’s second term, the emphasis shifted to anti-Chinese rhetoric. Members of the National Unity Government (NUG), closely aligned with liberal NGOs, are now making every effort to ingratiate themselves with the Trump administration, as they already have some support among Democrats.

From the perspective of political science and international relations, the BRAVE Burma Act case study could prove quite illustrative. It’s a striking example of how an entity driven by wishful thinking can be manipulated by vested interests and how a lack of knowledge leads to absurd decisions.

Containing China by Empowering China-Backed Rebels?: The Contradiction Between Rhetoric and Reality

It’s telling that one of the bill’s sponsors, Senator Mitch McConnell, stated after introducing the bill in the Senate that the BRAVE Burma Act is being passed at a time when “the military junta’s sham elections threaten to deepen the PRC’s influence in a critical region.” According to McConnell, it “blocks funding to the junta by authorizing stronger sanctions on the entities that finance its operations and strengthens mechanisms to implement these sanctions while countering the growing influence of China and Russia in the region.” Thus, the new stage of sanctions policy against Myanmar is given the character of countering China.

McConnell’s justification for the bill as a blow to the “China-backed junta” appears contradictory against the backdrop of news coming out of Myanmar itself. In February 2026, an opposition ethnic portal published an article entitled “Hsenwi Transformed Under MNDAA Rule: From Saopha Heartland to a De Facto China Annex.” As is well known, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), representing the Han Chinese in the Kokang region, in alliance with other groups, carried out Operation 1027 in 2023-2024, a large-scale offensive against Tatmadaw positions, capturing significant territories rich in resources. The successes of the Three Brotherhood Alliance, which includes the MNDAA and two other groups, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and the Arakan Army (AA), were enthusiastically greeted by Myanmar’s political exiles. Continuous attacks by the People’s Defense Forces (PDF), subordinate to the NUG, distracted the Tatmadaw from focusing on the ethnic insurgents. It could be argued that the PDF also played a role in the MNDAA’s triumphant capture of the Tatmadaw’s Northeast Command in Lashio in August 2024. A remnant of the infamous Burmese Communist Party (BCP), the MNDAA thus avenged the Tatmadaw’s celebrated victories in the war against the communists when Burma enjoyed positive relations with the United States.

Observers claim that the MNDAA is pursuing a policy of Sinicization in the occupied territories, particularly in the Hsenwi township. Mandarin Chinese has been made a compulsory subject in schools, Burmese classes have been abolished, all city signs are now in Chinese, and preferential terms are being offered to Chinese businessmen. According to reports, Hsenwi is now indistinguishable from a Chinese border town, which is inevitably offensive to the Shan population. Even during the Burmanization period, the local Shan people did not encounter such aggressive chauvinistic policies as they did once their areas fell into the hands of the “democratic forces” with a Han accent.

It’s no secret that the MNDAA and its allies in northeastern Myanmar closely cooperate with China in both economic and non-economic areas. Operation 1027, while officially targeting scam centers used by pro-government militias, also aimed to “clear obstacles to the China–Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC).” Previously, Tatmadaw sympathizers in Myanmar circles suggested that China would benefit from direct control over the most important sections of the CMEC, which links Yunnan with the Bay of Bengal. The ethnically Han MNDAA, loyal to China by default, is a more convenient partner than the nationalist Myanmar military.

Of course, China has never sought to completely remove the military from its plans, even when it engaged directly with Aung San Suu Kyi’s government from 2016 to 2021. After the stunning success of the second phase of Operation 1027 in the summer of 2024, Beijing pressured the MNDAA, forcing the rebels to hand Lashio back to the military (while retaining important positions on the approaches to the city). Opposition commentators believe that by ordering the Three Brotherhood Alliance to abandon its offensive, Beijing saved the “junta” from imminent collapse. This is the wrong way to put it. In fact, almost no one is interested in the fall of the Naypyidaw regime, least of all China, which, through its support for the MNDAA, is responsible for the Tatmadaw’s most significant defeat in the history of the civil war. There is a popular saying among Myanmar’s military about China: “They hold fire in one hand and water in the other.” Perhaps this saying best describes the essence of Chinese policy.

In any case, imagining China-Myanmar relations without both sides’ deep-seated prejudices against each other is simply incompetent. The Myanmar conflict, or rather a series of conflicts, has long-standing roots in ethnic and political grievances, and artificially fitting it into the framework of a “new Cold War” means catering to the Myanmar opposition and its short-term lobbying needs.

Despite the ceasefire, war between the Myanmar government and the MNDAA could break out at any moment. Of course, China needs a precarious peace to continue colonizing the region through its proxies. Therefore, Beijing will not hesitate to continue using the MNDAA to pressure Naypyidaw. Anyone who has studied Sun Tzu’s strategems knows that winning a war doesn’t necessarily require military action; the key is for the vital energy factor (the Taoist concept of Qi) to exert pressure on the enemy. China has at least two fully loyal armed groups, the MNDAA and the UWSA, and several others, also dependent to varying degrees, such as the KIA and TNLA.

Analysts ignore the fact that the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA), lacking combat experience, has long used Myanmar as a testing ground. Myanmar troops who fought against the MNDAA in Kokang in 2015 and 2017 reported Chinese mercenaries among the rebels. Information about the recruitment of PLA veterans in Chinese cities bordering Myanmar can be found on forums dedicated to the topic. At a press conference on February 21, 2015, amid heavy fighting around the town of Laukkai, Myanmar Lieutenant Colonel Mya Tun Oo asserted that “Chinese mercenaries are involved in the fighting with Kokang forces; there are Chinese operating in the Kokang area.” At another press conference on November 24, 2019, Major General Tun Tun Nyi commented on the discovery of a large consignment of Chinese-made weapons at a captured TNLA base: “We are checking whether the weapons are new or old. Most of them are Chinese, and the overall value is high. I’d say the TNLA has illegally acquired weapons from China.” It should be noted that the MNDAA, like the TNLA, enjoyed the full support of the NUG, as the Myanmar opposition had assumed the representation of these armed groups in democratic countries. These and other facts demonstrate the fallacy of the stereotype of a war waged by a “China-backed junta” against “Western-oriented rebels.”

Given the above, it’s difficult to agree with Mitch McConnell’s characterization of the BRAVE Burma Act. It’s unclear how additional sanctions against the Myanmar military (and effectively against Myanmar as a nation) could weaken China’s influence, whose relationship with the regime in Naypyitaw is highly ambiguous and far from idyllic. It would be more logical to impose sanctions against the MNDAA leadership, with its extensive Chinese ties, and it’s important to remember that this armed organization is designated a terrorist group by the Myanmar military government. As strange as it may sound, given the fighting in 2015, 2017, and 2023/2024, only the Tatmadaw has concrete experience in practical “containment of China.” Meanwhile, while the bill is being debated in Washington, “democratic rebels,” enjoying the full moral support of the NUG, are carrying out forced Sinicization in northeastern Myanmar.

Not Just China: The Iran War and Its Impact on Myanmar

The Bill’s lobbyists took into account more than just the Chinese factor: they deserve credit for skillfully exploiting a recent Reuters investigation into the supply of aviation fuel from the Islamic Republic of Iran to Myanmar. In light of the military operation against Iran, this small fact undoubtedly played into the hands of proponents of anti-Myanmar measures.

On the other hand, the rapprochement between Myanmar and Iran is undoubtedly a consequence of previous US anti-Myanmar laws. During the Rohingya crisis in 2017, Iranian officials threatened Myanmar and even proposed the creation of an international expeditionary force to “liberate fellow believers in Rakhine.” At the same time, an international exhibition of anti-Buddhist cartoons in support of the Rohingya was held in Tehran. Following the transition of power from the civilian to the military government in February 2021 and the intensification of Western pressure on Myanmar, Tatmadaw officials apparently established contacts with the IRGC, which, having put aside its fanaticism, has begun pragmatic cooperation in the military-technological and energy sectors. Be that as it may, if there was indeed ad hoc cooperation between the two dissimilar regimes, the current dangers of shipping in the Persian Gulf and throughout the Indian Ocean have rendered it moot.

At the same time, Naypyidaw’s tactical cooperation with Tehran should not be exaggerated. From a security perspective in South and Southeast Asia, cooperation between the Myanmar and Indian militaries is more important, and both countries are concerned about the rise of an Islamist agenda after regime change in 2024. Furthermore, the Saudi Ambassador to Naypyidaw recently met with Foreign Minister Than Swe, confirming Riyadh’s intentions to invest in the country’s economy. Energy issues were discussed at the meeting, which is particularly important in light of developments in the Middle East. It is not difficult to understand that only mutually beneficial cooperation with Islamic countries can improve the situation of Muslims in Myanmar. The rulers of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE, who are establishing relations with the “junta,” understand this well enough (the first mosque in Naypyidaw is largely due to the Saudi ambassador).

Isolationist Trump, interventionist Trump: Myanmar’s opposition loses under either option.

It is interesting to speculate that China’s pressure on the MNDAA to reclaim Lashio is partly the fault of the Burmese opposition in exile, which has persistently tried to portray the MNDAA as a democratic and even pro-Western force, which the MNDAA, led by communists and admirers of Xi Jinping, is objectively not. This propaganda campaign has reinforced China’s belief that the MNDAA’s excessive successes could help the pro-Western opposition, while Beijing’s diplomacy doesn’t seek regime change in Myanmar but rather economic preferences. As the example of Donald Trump’s diplomacy shows, China isn’t alone in resorting to targeted interventions without regime change: this is confirmed by the example of Venezuela, where the Chavista regime remained fully intact after Maduro was kidnapped and Caracas complied with American demands. In the same vein is Trump’s recent statement that, instead of Prince Reza Pahlevi, he is considering one of the Islamic Republic’s reformist-minded statesmen for the post of head of the new Iran.

It’s worth noting that since 2021, the Myanmar opposition has been loudly declaring that any power configuration involving the military is unthinkable and that the Tatmadaw must be destroyed as a political entity, after which a “federal army” will be created based on the PDF. At this level, we see a fundamental contradiction between the dreams of the Myanmar opposition and the approaches of American interventionism as implemented by the Trump administration. Even if the much-desired humanitarian intervention were to materialize, it is impossible to imagine anyone from the NUG leading a new pro-American government or even holding a ministerial position in it. The opposition narratives clash even more with the normative isolationist and paleoconservative MAGA rhetoric, which Trump abandoned when he launched the war against Iran, but which the majority of his voters have not abandoned (there is a good chance that after Trump, J.D. Vance, a more consistent isolationist, will come to power, and then American foreign policy will take on the character of the original MAGA).

In line with the spirit and letter of classic American isolationism, the Myanmar regime poses no threat to the United States and, moreover, appears sufficiently pragmatic and nationalistic to enter into a mutually beneficial partnership with the United States against common enemies (China, international jihadism, and narcoterrorism). There is reason to believe that the military regime has attempted to influence the American establishment in a similar vein since Trump’s accession to the White House. But while these efforts are being pursued by the Myanmar side, they have so far been unsuccessful due to the presence of influential Republicans and Democrats with anti-Burmese sentiments, as well as the all-out information war unleashed by political exiles.

Chaos Instead of Victory: On the Prospects of PDF and NUG

Frankly, the reasons for the passage of the BRAVE Burma Act lie less in concerns about human rights than in the warmongering of neoconservative elites, whose credibility Myanmar opposition activists have managed to ingratiate themselves with. The Bill’s lobbyists are fortunate that Burma Studies is suffering from a shortage of competent specialists, especially after the death of Professor David Steinberg, who called for a more balanced policy toward the “junta.” American policymakers have a particularly poor understanding of the structure of the “Spring Revolution.” The NUG and the armed groups that recognize it, primarily the PDF, are portrayed as a monolithic revolutionary liberation force with hundreds of thousands of fighters and a ready-made plan for democratic reforms after achieving victory. However, this is a clear distortion of the actual course of the fighting in Myanmar, which presents a more complex, multi-factorial picture.

First of all, the PDF, which the US already provides non-lethal support to under the Burma Act passed under Joe Biden, is not a centralized structure. It is a multitude of small armed groups that are only formally subordinate to the NUG. The PDF’s most combat-ready units are operationally subordinate to ethnic armies, which view them as “Bamar cannon fodder.”

A telling example is the Mandalay PDF (MDY-PDF), which was operationally subordinate to the TNLA and participated in the capture of Mogok, a city rich in ruby deposits. Despite the bloodshed of the PDF and Mogok’s Bamar ethnicity, the city was governed by the TNLA administration. The city was later surrendered under a Chinese-brokered agreement with the Tatmadaw, and the TNLA ordered the MDY-PDF to leave. The Mogok case highlights the extent to which the PDF and the entire “democratic resistance” depend on vested ethnic groups that have far more in common with the drug trade and Chinese interests than with federal democracy.

The PDF’s core human resource should be familiar to Americans from the Indochina wars: disillusioned peasants, enraged by government inefficiency and crop failures, banding together in gangs led by political commissars. The PDF’s methods are akin to those of the Khmer Rouge and the Red Guards: in all cases, agrarian vigilantes carried out mass terror under the guise of political slogans. There’s a huge difference between an uneducated peasant under a red PDF flag and a Type 81 assault rifle in the depths of Sagaing Province and a Myanmar opposition activist in Los Angeles, comfortable in the company of fellow Free Palestine and LGBTQ+ activists.

Recently, misunderstandings have been growing between the exiled NUG leadership and the disparate PDF militias in Myanmar. This is due to conflicts over the division of financial resources (including from the US), the ambitions of warlords, and the refusal of ethnic armed organizations to grant strategic autonomy to the “Bamar supremacists.”

The surrender of Bamar National Revolutionary Army (BNRA) commander Bo Naga to the Tatmadaw on February 18, 2026, caused a sensation. Bo Naga, a well-known field commander who had previously caused considerable trouble for the Tatmadaw in Pale township, Sagaing province, decided to surrender to the army after the PDF effectively declared war on him. Such conflicts within the “resistance” and defections to the Tatmadaw will continue to multiply.

Despite the formation of the Spring Revolution Alliance (SRA) in November 2025, which united smaller Bamar and ethnic rebel groups, primarily in Anyar, Myanmar’s heartland, the so-called “resistance” remains loose and disorganized. Furthermore, it is highly significant that the SRA, which opposition media portray as a new stage in the unification of revolutionary forces, has refused to submit to the NUG. This speaks to the profound crisis engulfing the Myanmar opposition abroad. A crisis that this opposition itself is trying to alleviate by lobbying its proposals in the institutions of superpower No. 1.

The turmoil within Myanmar’s opposition has led to a rise in popularity not so much for “democratic” groups but also for purely communist ones, such as the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the Bamar People Liberation Army (BPLA), whose roots lie in the communist insurgency of the 1940s-1980s. Their more centralized and ideologically ingrained constitution makes it easier to endure a protracted war, which, after five years of the “imminent collapse of the junta,” has become tiresome for many PDF members. A powerful propaganda campaign has been launched by the Anti-Fascist International Front (AIF), founded by an “internationalist fighter” of Kurdish descent from the United States named Azad. The AIF makes no secret of its view of the civil war in Myanmar as part of the global struggle for anarcho-communist revolution. Following the designation of Antifa as a terrorist organization during Trump’s first term, some members of this movement are grateful to gain combat experience in the war against Myanmar. Moreover, the House of Representatives and the Senate suddenly found themselves on the same side with Antifa.

By 2026, it is quite obvious that those forces that position themselves as democratic and pro-Western (pro-American) are incapable of winning the war against the Tatmadaw. Despite a series of heavy defeats at the hands of ethnic groups (including those backed by China), the Tatmadaw has managed to maintain control of the country. However, the role of the PDF and similar groups cannot be underestimated. Deprived of hope of victory, the “democratic resistance” continues to wreak havoc in the country’s densely populated heartland (Mandalay, Sagaing, Magwe, and Bago provinces). While the strategy of the Rakhine or Karen separatists is clear—to achieve independence, if not de jure, then de facto (the Arakan Army is closest to this goal)—the PDF’s prospects lie in an endless, attritional war, similar to the one waged for decades by the Maoists in the Philippines or the Naxalites in India. Chaos, not victory, is the true limit of PDF and NUG capabilities.

It’s possible that the covert strategy developed by American think tanks was originally intended not to promote the restoration of democracy but to create chaos in Myanmar and disrupt the functioning of the CMEC. In that case, it’s not only short-sighted from the perspective of American interests but also immoral.

Conclusion

In summing up, one thing deserves to be noted that goes beyond a utilitarian political analysis. The current military operation in Iran demonstrates how deeply religious beliefs and spiritual commitments are ingrained in modern politics, which one would think should have long ago abandoned them. Israel, founded on the ideals of religious Zionism and inspired by Jewish chosenness, is confronted by Iran, whose leadership believes in the ideals of the Islamic Revolution and the return of a mysterious hidden Imam. Donald Trump’s team, holding collective prayers right in the Oval Office, also fits into this trend toward religiosity.

It’s impossible to understand Myanmar and its rulers without considering the Buddhist religion. It’s not for nothing that this country is called the “Holy Grail of Buddhism.” The foundations of Myanmar’s national identity lie in the anticipation of the coming Buddha Metteyya, whom the noble Buddhist knighthood (Tatmadaw) is called to serve. Burmese generals, usually portrayed as power-hungry tyrants, regardless of outsiders’ feelings toward them, feel like the last warriors of a besieged Buddhist fortress. Perhaps, besides tiny Bhutan in the Himalayas, only Myanmar offers an example of a pure Buddhist civilization. The Western desire to utterly reform or even abolish this ancient civilization wounds the Myanmar people to the core, as was evident in the anti-Myanmar campaign over the Rohingya issue. The new punitive measures will not induce the generals in Naypyitaw to swear allegiance to the White House but will only strengthen their resolve to fiercely resist the West, which has not yet understood and continues to fail to understand the motives of the military regime.​

 

[Saif]

A Rebuttal: Why the BRAVE Burma Act Is Exactly What Washington and Brussels Need

This article is a rebuttal to "Beyond the BRAVE Burma Act: US Myanmar Policy at a Crossroads," published by Modern Diplomacy on 11 March 2026.

moderndiplomacy.eu

A Rebuttal: Why the BRAVE Burma Act Is Exactly What Washington and Brussels Need
This article is a rebuttal to "Beyond the BRAVE Burma Act: US Myanmar Policy at a Crossroads," published by Modern Diplomacy on 11 March 2026.


By James Shwe
March 15, 2026

photo: Unsplash

This article is a rebuttal to “Beyond the BRAVE Burma Act: US Myanmar Policy at a Crossroads,” published by Modern Diplomacy on 11 March 2026.

Modern Diplomacy recently published an essay that, in my view, offers readers a deeply misleading portrait of both the BRAVE Burma Act and the broader situation in Myanmar. While I welcome open debate—and commend this publication for inviting rebuttals—readers and policymakers in Washington and Brussels deserve to see the other side of the ledger. What follows is a fact‑based response to the article’s central claims.

What the BRAVE Burma Act actually does

The original article describes the BRAVE Burma Act as a mechanism designed to “collapse the country’s financial system” and punish “Buddhist Myanmar.” That framing does not survive contact with the bill’s text. As summarized by non‑partisan trackers like The Capitol Wire and PoliScore, the Act requires the President to conduct an annual assessment of whether to impose targeted sanctions on specific junta revenue streams—Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE), Myanma Economic Bank, and foreign suppliers of aviation fuel used in airstrikes against civilians. It creates a Special Envoy to coordinate sanctions, humanitarian assistance, and diplomacy. It limits the junta’s voting power at the IMF. It does not authorize war, impose blanket trade embargoes, or target ordinary Burmese citizens. Bipartisan sponsors, including Senators Young and Van Hollen and Representatives Huizenga and McCollum, have been explicit: this is a targeted toolkit, not a scorched‑earth campaign.

The same logic applies in Europe. The EU has extended its own targeted sanctions on Myanmar through April 2026, covering 106 individuals and 22 entities with asset freezes, travel bans, a full arms embargo, and a ban on military training and cooperation with the Tatmadaw. Brussels has made clear it “stands ready to impose additional restrictive measures” and remains “committed to supporting the people of Myanmar in their struggle for democracy. “The BRAVE Burma Act and EU sanctions share the same architecture: precise pressure on the regime’s financial lifelines, not collective punishment of Myanmar’s people.

The junta as religious persecutor, not guardian

Perhaps the most striking claim in the original article is that Myanmar’s generals are the “last warriors of a besieged Buddhist fortress,” protecting a “pure Buddhist civilization” against the West. This is not cultural analysis; it is the Tatmadaw’s own propaganda, contradicted by one of the most authoritative bodies on the subject.

The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF), in its 2026 Annual Report, once again recommends that Myanmar be designated a “Country of Particular Concern”—the harshest category, reserved for the world’s worst violators of religious freedom. USCIRF documents that Tatmadaw forces destroyed 379 religious sites in 2025—Buddhist monasteries, Christian churches, and mosques—and killed more than 259 clergy and civilians in or around those places of worship. They have persecuted, conscripted, and displaced Rohingya and other religious minorities on a systematic basis.

Notably, USCIRF has also urged Congress to ban CPC‑listed governments from hiring U.S. lobbying firms. An army that destroys Buddhist monasteries and tortures Buddhist monks, while also bombing and burning churches and mosques, is not guarding Buddhist civilization. It is weaponizing religion while systematically violating it.

Who actually leads the resistance?

The original article portrays Myanmar’s democratic opposition as “disillusioned peasants” in “gangs led by political commissars,” comparable to the Khmer Rouge and Red Guards. It dismisses the National Unity Government (NUG) as a façade for chaos. This caricature erases who has actually anchored Myanmar’s resistance since 2021.

The Civil Disobedience Movement was led from the first days of the coup by doctors, nurses, teachers, civil servants, and students who refused to work under an illegal regime—a pattern documented by the BBC, The Irrawaddy, and The Diplomat. Today, the NUG’s Minister of the Prime Minister’s Office is a renowned orthopedic surgeon who left a senior hospital post to lead civilian governance. The Minister of Humanitarian Affairs is a doctor and former dean of a major medical college. The NUG’s president and prime minister are university‑educated civilian politicians from the pre‑coup parliamentary era, not warlords or ideologues.

Are there problems? Of course. The Bo Nagar affair (an opportunistic revolutionary leader turned warlord who joined forces with the military after NUG took action) and tensions between PDF units and ethnic armed organizations are real. But comparing a broad‑based movement of professionals, elected officials, and civil servants to the Khmer Rouge is not analysis—it is defamation in the service of the regime that drove them underground.

Scam centers: the junta as enabler, not partner

The original article is notably silent on one of the most consequential developments connecting Myanmar to U.S. and European policy: the regime’s deep entanglement in transnational cyber‑scam operations. Investigations by the International Crisis Group, Al Jazeera, and the BBC have shown how scam compounds in Karen and Shan State grew under the protection of junta‑aligned militias.

This is not a peripheral issue. The U.S. Senate has passed the SCAM Act (S. 2950), now before the House, which authorizes sanctions against governments that enable scam centers. The House Foreign Affairs Committee has advanced the Dismantle Foreign Scam Syndicates Act (H.R. 5490) with the same focus. The U.S. Treasury has already sanctioned Burma‑linked militias and warlords tied to scam operations. The DOJ has launched a dedicated Scam Center Strike Force. And on 6 March 2026, President Trump signed an Executive Order making clear that governments that allow or profit from scam centers may face sanctions, visa bans, and aid restrictions.

Myanmar fits the profile of an enabler, not a partner. The regime’s belated, pressure‑driven raids on a handful of compounds do not erase years of protection. Any article that frames the junta as a credible ally against cybercrime while ignoring this record is incomplete at best.

The China argument, reversed

The original article’s strongest analytical thread—that China’s role in Myanmar is more complex than Washington acknowledges—contains some truth. Beijing does play all sides. But the article draws the wrong conclusion: that sanctions on the junta benefit China. The opposite is closer to reality.

For decades, it has been the Tatmadaw (military)—not the resistance—that opened Myanmar to Chinese pipelines, ports, dams, mines, and special economic zones. Beijing’s strategy in Myanmar has increasingly been described as “managed chaos”: sustaining the junta enough to keep corridors open while leveraging ethnic armed groups to ensure no one can operate outside Chinese influence. Normalizing with the generals does not contain China. It entrenches a dependent client regime that Beijing already dominates. The BRAVE Burma Act’s Special Envoy mandate, which includes coordinating with international partners to pressure China and Russia, is a more coherent approach to the China challenge than the article acknowledges.

The jet fuel pipeline

The article acknowledges Iran‑Myanmar fuel cooperation but downplays it. Justice For Myanmar has documented a sharp rise in jet fuel imports between 2024 and 2025 through an Iran–Vietnam–Myanmar shadow chain. These imports fuel the airstrikes that kill civilians. The Foundation for Defense of Democracies has argued that Washington should use the BRAVE Burma Act’s authorities to target Myanma Petrochemical Enterprise, vessels, and middlemen in this trade. EU sanctions already include a full arms embargo; targeting jet fuel supply chains is the logical next step for both Washington and Brussels.

What policymakers should take away

U.S. and EU policymakers are not naïve about Myanmar. Many have followed the crisis for years, studied the same USCIRF reports, and tracked the scam‑center economy’s expansion. They do not simply “fall for” a single essay. But in a crowded information environment—where Myanmar’s generals have hired major Washington lobbying firms to sell a package of elections, minerals, and supposed cooperation against China—even informed readers benefit from reminders of what the record actually shows.

That record shows a regime designated by USCIRF as one of the world’s worst religious persecutors. A regime whose aligned militias enabled transnational scam networks until international pressure forced cosmetic raids. A regime that depends on Iranian jet fuel to bomb its own people. And a democratic alternative—imperfect but genuine—led by professionals, elected officials, and civil servants whom the original article dismisses as peasant mobs and communist gangs.

The BRAVE Burma Act and the EU’s own expanding sanctions framework are not ideological crusades. They are precise, interest‑driven instruments designed to constrain a criminalized regime. Modern Diplomacy’s readers deserve to weigh these facts alongside the narrative offered in the original article—and to draw their own conclusions about which account is closer to the truth.​