[🇧🇩] A Strategic Analysis of Bangladesh Myanmar Relationship

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Taking provocations from Rakhine coast seriously

The tiny St. Martinn's Island of Bangladesh has again been in the news, but for the wrong reason. Since the first week of this month, plying of water transports between the mainland and the island has repeatedly come under fire from Myanmar's Rakhine coast, which is about eight&nb

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Taking provocations from Rakhine coast seriously
SYED FATTAHUL ALIM
Published :
Jun 23, 2024 22:01
Updated :
Jun 23, 2024 22:01

The tiny St. Martinn's Island of Bangladesh has again been in the news, but for the wrong reason. Since the first week of this month, plying of water transports between the mainland and the island has repeatedly come under fire from Myanmar's Rakhine coast, which is about eight kilometres away from the island. The residents and visitors to the island, who are totally dependent on the mainland for the supply of food and other necessities,were as a result in a state of great fear and uncertainties for more than a week. As the usual communication between Teknaf (an upazila of Cox's Bazar under which the island is a Union Parishad) and the St. Martin's via the Naf river became risky due to occasional gunfire from the Rakhine State of Myanmar, the government at a stage had to use the sea route from Cox's Bazar to reach food and other supplies to the island. It is unfortunate that the St. Martin's Island, an integral part of sovereign Bangladesh remained cut off from the mainland for so many days to the utter dismay and suffering of the islanders! Whoever might have been behind the firings, the Myanmar government forces or the members of Arakan Army (AA), the Rakhine State-based ethnic armed organization (EAO), an immediate response from the Bangladesh side was urgently expected to put a stop to such illegal activities within Bangladesh's territorial waters. Notably, since October last year, the fighting between the AA, two other EAOs and the forces of military junta in Naypyidaw erupted in the northern part of Myanmar. As the fighting had been taking place quite close to the Bangladesh border, the impact of the conflict occasionally spilled over into Bangladesh territory. Artillery shells falling on Bangladesh territory causing injuries and even death to villagers on this side of the border, instances of violation of Bangladesh's airspace by Myanmar junta's air force were frequent. Incidents of Myanmar's Border Guard Police (BGP) personnel, injured or otherwise, fleeing to Bangladesh for shelter have been taking place from time to time. The local authorities in Bangladesh have been generous enough to provide them shelter and arrange for treatment of the wounded followed by their subsequent repatriation home. Such acts of generosity and humanity were never reciprocated by the Myanmar side.

So, there is no scope of taking the recent firings from the other side of Bangladesh-Myanmar border that caused serious dislocation of ferry service between mainland and the St. Martin's Island lightly. The instances of gunfire do not appear to have been aimless since on June 5 the gunfire (from that Rakhine coast) that hit the water transport carrying Bangladesh's Election Commission officials and their equipment was to all intents and purposes deliberate. Later a vessel carrying supplies to the island from Teknaf was fired upon, forcing local authorities to suspend ferry service between Teknaf and the island via Naf River temporarily. Similar firings continued to target any vessel found crossing the waterway of Naf river including a speed boat on June 11.

To read the rest of the news, please click on the link above.​

 

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Endeavours for transition to green electric energy

Bangladesh has been working to increase the use of renewable energy in its energy mix. State Minister for the Ministry of Power, Energy and Mineral Resources Nasrul Hamid, MP considers that Bangladesh needs coordinated initiatives and major investment to make green energy transition. He confirms th

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Should we think differently about St Martin?
HASNAT ABDUL HYE
Published :
Jun 25, 2024 21:32
Updated :
Jun 25, 2024 21:32

Border Guards Bangladesh (BGB) personnel get off from a civilian vessel to begin their deployment on St Martin's Island on April 7, 2019 Photo : Collected Photo


My visit to St. Martin in 1976 as the Deputy Commissioner was reportedly the first ever by a senior government officer in the memory of the islanders. Not having even the status of a ward of an union porishad, the island was the very epitome of being an administrative and political backwater. With a population of little over 1800 in 1976, St. Martin did not qualify to have the status of a local government unit and therefore was beyond the pale of the administrative network. The only presence of the government was a platoon of erstwhile BDR which had no physical infrastructure of their own and per force availed of the space available adjacent to the only mosque in the island. Their duty was ostensibly the prevention of smuggling in the Bay of Bengal, a goal belied by their number, housing and transport facilities. With no economic and strategic importance, St Martin suffered the benign neglect of successive governments in stoic resignation

Fast forward to the start of the third millennium. St Martin with a population of over seven thousand became a tourist attraction. After about a quarter century, St Martin is now a tourist hotspot. For holiday makers it became a favourite go-to place by the turn of the century, what with its wind-swept landscape dotted with tall coconut trees and corals under water. Besides, there was the thrill of travelling in the blue water of sea that became high waves, tossing and turning boats. The island also attracted visitors who, shunning the sybaritic pleasures, went for exploration of the mystery in sands and under water flora and fauna. Before long, the island was dotted with hotels and rest houses of all shapes and sizes. It also attracted those who were keen to cash in on its new found popularity as a holiday destination and bought land to set up resorts.

St Martin assumed a new status of importance with the competing claims of Bangladesh and Myanmar over territorial limits in the Bay of Bengal. The potentials of finding oil and gas in the Bay made ownership and sovereignty over the Bay of great importance. The UN court that adjudicated the dispute over the maritime boundary took St Martin as the base for delimiting the maritime border between the two countries. According to observers, Bangladesh got more than 128,600 nautical miles of the Bay because of its ownership of St Martin. It may be the tipping point that made Myanmar look at St Martin with a jaundiced eye. In 2018 the ministry of population of Myanmar put up a map in their website showing St Martin within their territorial limits. After protest by Bangladesh foreign ministry the map was removed. But there are enough indications that Myanmar has not given up its designs to sway over as much of the Bay as would satisfy its policy of aggrandisement. Its naval ships were seen last year within the territorial waters of Bangladesh near St Martin. This encroachment was stopped only after formal protest was made. Myanmar was clearly and literally testing waters to see if the government of Bangladesh would react strongly. Then there was the incident of oil and gas exploration by a South Korean company Daewoo near St Martin which saw the two countries at eye-to-eye confrontation because of the trespass by Myanmar.

Very lately, in the first week of June, Bangladeshi boats and ships carrying passengers from Teknaf to St Martin were fired at by Myanmar armed forces, bringing transport between the mainland and the island to a standstill. Soon after this three ships of Myanmar navy were seen off the coast of St Martin scaring the residents of the island. For over nine days the islanders' supply of food and medicine remained suspended because of indiscriminate firing by Myanmar forces, ostensibly targeting Arakan rebels. Myanmar drove home the point that it can hold the islanders as hostage at its sweet will. Supply through alternative route, skirting around the normal route between Teknaf and St Martin, has now eased the supply of essential items. Patrolling by ships of Bangladesh navy and coast guard has restored calm and normalcy .But similar crisis-like situation may arise again as long as Myanmar persists its belligerent policy. In its policy of harassment and aggrandisement St Martin will always be a target.

It is not only Myanmar that has got St Martin in the cross-hair. Rumours are rife that a big power wants to take lease of the island to make it a military base. As the confrontation between China and the western powers has become more intense, the need to have a foothold in the Bay of Bengal has become urgent. The attempt to gain control over the island may have been staved off for now. But like the Myanmar tentacle, the pressure from the big power may be seen again, in a different form. So, Bangladesh has to resolve the St Martin issue in a decisive manner to put an end to the occasional pinpricks from Myanmar and arm twisting by any big power.

One solution lies in turning the entire island into a defence garrison with the presence of army, navy, air force and coast guard. To be secure, all facilities should be built underground. In keeping with modern warfare, instead of heavy equipments and armament reliance should be on drones for surveillance and for retaliation or pre-emptive attacks. For this transformation of the island, the present population of 8.400 may be resettled in the mainland giving them adequate compensation. Tourists may be allowed day trip, from morning to evening, in selected parts of the island, under supervision of the garrison authority.

Converting St Martin into a defence garrison will be costly because of construction and re-settlement. It is not something that should be high on the agenda of development of the government. But given the pressure that is being brought to bear by a big power and hostile policy of Myanmar, Bangladesh may have to bite bullet. Militarisation of St Martin now appears as one of the possible solutions to the problem that the island has created simply being where it is.​

 

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Bangladesh protests at Myanmar gunfire on fishermen

Dhaka on Sunday raised deep concern to Myanmar over instances of gunfire targeting Bangladeshi fishermen amid the neighbouring country’s internal conflict, stressing the...

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Bangladesh protests at Myanmar gunfire on fishermen
Bangladesh Sangbad Sangstha . Dhaka 11 November, 2024, 00:37

Dhaka on Sunday raised deep concern to Myanmar over instances of gunfire targeting Bangladeshi fishermen amid the neighbouring country’s internal conflict, stressing the urgency of preventing further such occurrences.

The concerned was flagged when Myanmar ambassador to Bangladesh U Kyaw Soe Moe met with foreign secretary Md Jashim Uddin at the foreign ministry in Dhaka.

During the meeting, the foreign secretary expressed deep concerns regarding the escalating situation in Myanmar, particularly in Rakhine State, according to a foreign ministry’s press release.

He expressed Dhaka’s security concerns along the border, noting stray mortar shells and shooting at Bangladeshi boats due to Myanmar’s internal conflicts.

These incidents had heightened tensions among Bangladeshi border communities, impacting their daily lives, said the foreign secretary.

He also highlighted that the Myanmar’s turmoil had intensified forced displacement, resulting in a recent influx of Rohingya people into Bangladesh, adding to the over 1.2 million already sheltered there.

Reflecting on his recent visit to Cox’s Bazar, the foreign secretary cited the deterioration of law and order, the rise in criminal activities and violent clashes within the camps, increased drug smuggling and trafficking, all of which have placed substantial pressure on local resources and administration.

He also pointed out the environmental and economic toll on host communities, underscoring the importance of an early repatriation process.

The foreign secretary conveyed that the Rohingya in the camps strongly desired to return to Myanmar.

The Myanmar envoy acknowledged the need for a feasible solution to the displacement crisis, affirming on the need for their repatriation.

The two sides also discussed the recent UNDP forecast of a potential famine in Rakhine, with the foreign secretary urging Myanmar to take immediate action to address the issue and prevent further displacement towards Bangladesh.​

 

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Formulating coherent Myanmar policy

OR centuries, the polities located in the Bengal delta — the Bengal Sultanate, the Bengal subah, or the Bengal Presidency — have shared complex ties with Arakan (Rakhine State) and Burma (Myanmar). While there existed substantial trade links, cultural interaction and migration flows between the...

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Formulating coherent Myanmar policy
Md Himel Rahman 21 January, 2025, 00:00

Rohingya refugees attend a ceremony organised to remember the second anniversary of a military crackdown that prompted a massive exodus of people from Myanmar to Bangladesh at the Kutupalong refugee camp in Ukhia on August 25. | Agence France-Presse/Munir uz Zaman

FOR centuries, the polities located in the Bengal delta — the Bengal Sultanate, the Bengal subah, or the Bengal Presidency — have shared complex ties with Arakan (Rakhine State) and Burma (Myanmar). While there existed substantial trade links, cultural interaction and migration flows between the two regions, they also engaged in intermittent warfare, with the Arakanese/Burmese occasionally invading the current Chattogram division and the Bengalis periodically establishing protectorates over parts of the Rakhine State. In 1948, Myanmar obtained independence from the United Kingdom and the Rakhine State became one of its constituent parts. On its part, Bangladesh obtained its independence from the United Kingdom, as a constituent wing of Pakistan, in 1947 and from Pakistan in 1971.

Since 1971, a number of factors, including the protracted Rohingya refugee crisis, the continuous flow of drugs from Myanmar to Bangladesh, occasional border conflicts and silent strategic competition, have persistently overshadowed the potential benefits of a comprehensive economic partnership between the two states.

Bangladesh–Myanmar relations

STATE-SANCTIONED campaigns of ethnic cleansing and inter-communal riots have resulted in the repeated flights of hundreds of thousands of Muslim-majority Rohingyas, largely concentrated in Myanmar’s northern Rakhine State, to Bangladesh in 1978, 1991–1997, 2012, 2015, 2016–2018 and 2024. Bangladesh now hosts about 1.4 million Rohingya refugees and the protracted crisis has imposed serious economic, political, social, environmental and security costs on the country. Meanwhile, decades of internal conflict, rampant corruption and failures of governance have turned Myanmar into a narco-state and Bangladesh has become a substantial market as well as a significant transit route for Myanmar-origin drugs such as methamphetamine (Yaba) tablets, crystal meth (Ice), and heroin. Bangladesh–Myanmar relations have periodically been characterised by border clashes, the killing and detention of Bangladeshi civilians, the violation of Bangladesh’s borders and Myanmar’s territorial claims over the St Martins Island. Accordingly, Bangladesh and Myanmar have been locked in a largely silent military-strategic competition, illustrated by their respective acquisitions of Chinese and Indian submarines.

Still, Myanmar holds unique geopolitical and geo-economic significance for Bangladesh. The geographically larger but comparatively less populated and less industrialised Myanmar is one of the top producers of rice and other agricultural products and contains substantial reserves of oil and natural gas. Hence, by forging a comprehensive economic partnership with Myanmar, Bangladesh can ensure its food and energy security to a large extent. Myanmar can be a large market for Bangladeshi industrial and agricultural products, including textiles, textile wastes, cement, pharmaceutical goods potatoes and fish. Moreover, complexities in Indo–Bangladeshi relations necessitate the implementation of a more active ‘look east’ policy for Dhaka and Myanmar serves as Bangladesh’s potential gateway to China and Southeast Asia. Hence, enhancing connectivity between the two states through developing infrastructure is beneficial for both.

Both Bangladesh and Myanmar are in turmoil now. After the 2024 uprising, Bangladesh is struggling with political instability, financial uncertainty, growing crimes and simmering unrest among religious and ethnic minorities. On its part, Myanmar’s situation is worse, with the degeneration of the country’s decades-long internal conflict into a full-scale civil war in 2021. The Myanmar government exerts stable control over only one-third of Myanmar’s territory. Ethnic armed organisations control more than 80 per cent and 85 per cent of the Rakhine and Chin States respectively, thus effectively controlling the entire length of the Bangladesh–Myanmar border.

New Myanmar policy

FOR decades, Bangladesh has pursued an ad hoc policy vis-à-vis Myanmar and even the Rohingya crisis has failed to influence Dhaka to formulate a coherent set of policies towards its southeastern neighbour. Hence, Dhaka needs to formulate a pragmatic, flexible and systematic Myanmar policy for 2025 and onwards.

First, Bangladesh should prioritise the protection of its sovereignty, territorial integrity and national security over all other concerns, such as geo-economic interests, in dealing with Myanmar. In particular, Bangladesh should undertake necessary political and security measures to protect its citizens from the spillovers of the conflict in Myanmar, to prevent the violation of its land border, airspace, and maritime frontier, and preserve its control over all territories adjacent to the Myanmar border.

Second, while both Bangladesh and Myanmar can benefit from joint connectivity and infrastructure projects, such projects are unlikely to be realised unless a stable and secure government is established in Myanmar. Till then, Dhaka should adopt a policy of cautious economic engagement with Myanmar.

Third, the outcome of the Myanmar civil war is far from certain. So, Dhaka should maintain substantial contacts with all major stakeholders, including the Tatmadaw-controlled Myanmar government, the opposition National Unity Government, the United League of Arakan and its military wing Arakan Army, the ethnic armed organisations in the Chin State and the Rohingya organisations inside the Rakhine State. At the same time, Bangladesh should closely monitor the situation on the ground in Myanmar and adjust its policies on the basis of ground reality.

Fourth, drug trade has become enmeshed in Bangladesh’s political economy while drug abuse poses a serious threat to the state’s societal stability. Hence, Bangladesh should adopt and implement strict drug control policies to contain the drug epidemic. In this sphere, Dhaka should engage with all relevant actors in Myanmar and attempt to develop collaborative ties with them to prevent the smuggling of drugs into Bangladesh.

Fifth, the security of southeastern Bangladesh, in both its internal and external dimensions, is closely connected with the situation in Myanmar’s Rakhine and Chin States. So, Bangladeshi intelligence agencies should monitor the military-political situation in those two regions while the Bangladeshi military should prepare for all eventualities or contingencies arising out of Myanmar.

Finally, Bangladesh has so far resorted to extensive diplomatic measures, including bilateral dialogues, trilateral negotiations, multilateral mechanisms and international legal instruments, to ensure the repatriation of Rohingya refugees to Myanmar, but none of them has produced any fruitful result. Meanwhile, the Rakhine State is in a flux, with the Tatmadaw in retreat and the Arakan Army occupying more than 80 per cent of the region. The Arakan Army and its political wing United League of Arakan are not internationally recognised and it has struggled to effectively govern the war-torn region. Moreover, it has occupied the traditionally Rohingya-populated Maungdaw and Buthidaung townships in northern Rakhine State, but its forces have committed atrocities against the Rohingyas and its control over northern Rakhine State has come under challenge from the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army. Thus, the Rakhine State is currently facing a power vacuum.

Bangladesh should view the unfolding situation in the Rakhine State in a calculative manner and examine its options for facilitating the repatriation of the Rohingyas to northern Rakhine under the current circumstances. Having weighed all political, economic, strategic and diplomatic factors, the state should boldly push for the repatriation of the Rohingyas by leveraging the Tatmadaw’s current predicament and the Arakan Army’s lack of international legitimacy.

Under the current circumstances, challenges outweigh opportunities in relations between Bangladesh and Myanmar. Accordingly, Bangladesh should adopt and pursue a pragmatic, calculative and interest-driven Myanmar policy, with a particular emphasis on the prioritisation of national security, the containment of Myanmar-origin drug trade and the repatriation of the Rohingya refugees.

Md Himel Rahman is a Dhaka-based freelance analyst on international and strategic affairs.​

 

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Bangladesh citizens in quake-hit Myanmar, Thailand safe: officials

Bangladesh citizens now staying in Thailand and Myanmar have so far remained safe after a massive earthquake struck the two Southeast Asian countries on Friday, killing around 150 people.

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Bangladesh citizens in quake-hit Myanmar, Thailand safe: officials
Staff Correspondent 28 March, 2025, 23:26

Bangladesh citizens now staying in Thailand and Myanmar have so far remained safe after a massive earthquake struck the two Southeast Asian countries on Friday, killing around 150 people.

‘None of our citizens have been affected by the earthquake so far. We have learned that a 30-story under-construction building in Bangkok collapsed due to the quake,’ said Md Fahad Pervez Bosunia, Counsellor (Labour Welfare) at the Bangladesh embassy in Bangkok.

He said that most of the construction workers there were from Myanmar.

He mentioned that they were in contact with the relevant authorities for further updates.

‘We have not received any reports of Bangladeshi casualties so far,’ the counsellor told New Age around 10:40 PM.

Bangladesh citizens in Myanmar were also reported safe after the earthquake struck the country, according to the United News of Bangladesh, quoting Bangladesh's Ambassador to Myanmar, Faiyaz Murshid Kazi.

In Mandalay, Myanmar’s second-largest city, which is close to the epicentre, the earthquake caused damage to part of the former royal palace and nearby buildings, according to videos and photos shared on Facebook.

In the Sagaing region, southwest of Mandalay, a 90-year-old bridge collapsed, the UNB report stated.

The earthquake, which hit Myanmar and Thailand on Friday, killed nearly 150 people and injured hundreds, with dozens trapped in collapsed buildings.

The death toll might rise, according to Agence France-Presse, reporting from Naypyidaw, Myanmar.

The shallow 7.7-magnitude tremor struck northwest of the city of Sagaing in central Myanmar in the early afternoon, followed minutes later by a 6.4-magnitude aftershock, according to the AFP report.​

 

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https://www.thedailystar.net/opinion/views/news/reassessing-our-southern-defense-strategy-3864961

Reassessing our southern defense strategy

A view of Myanmar visible from the bank of the Naf River in Teknaf. PHOTO: MD RAJIB RAIHAN

Bangladesh's security concerns have historically been shaped by its relationship with India, particularly when the governing regime maintained strong ties with New Delhi, reflecting the enduring and complex historical dynamics between the two nations. This evolving security landscape now demands a shift in strategic focus. Recent developments along the southern border, particularly from Myanmar and non-state actors, indicate an urgent need to reassess the country's defense and diplomatic approaches. The rise of armed insurgent groups, border violations, and disruptions to trade highlight the vulnerabilities of Bangladesh's southern frontier. In response to these emerging threats, a new security paradigm—the Southern Contingency Framework (SCF)—is necessary to address these challenges effectively.

The China-India rivalry and Bangladesh's strategic dilemma

Bangladesh's geopolitical landscape has been linked to the ongoing rivalry between China and India. Both regional powers have vested interests in South Asia, often influencing Bangladesh's security, economic policies, and foreign relations. China has invested in Bangladesh's infrastructure through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), while India has historically played a crucial role in Bangladesh's defense and diplomatic affairs. The Myanmar crisis further complicates this dynamic, as China has maintained close ties with Myanmar's military regime, while India has historically supported certain movements within Myanmar. These competing influences leave Bangladesh in a precarious position, requiring a carefully balanced foreign policy that prioritises national security while maintaining strategic autonomy.

The escalating security crisis in the south

Tensions involving Myanmar affecting southern Bangladesh have long existed but have recently intensified to a concerning level. On October 27, 2023, the Three Brotherhood Alliance (3BTA), which includes the Arakan Army (AA), launched Operation 1027 against Myanmar's military, capturing significant territory in Rakhine State. The growing instability along the Myanmar border quickly spilled over into Bangladesh, as seen on February 4-5, 2024, when over 100 Myanmar Border Guard Police (BGP) personnel illegally crossed into Bangladesh and were disarmed and interned by the Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB). The situation further deteriorated on May 22, 2024, when the AA launched a large-scale attack on Maungdaw, seizing over 10 junta camps and killing approximately 200 Myanmar military personnel. This escalation posed direct risks to Bangladesh's territorial integrity and border security.

The security threats extended to the maritime domain. On June 6, 2024, ferry services on the Teknaf-Saint Martin route were suspended due to gunfire from Myanmar, leaving over 10,000 residents facing food shortages. That same month, AA fighters allegedly fired at Bangladeshi trawlers, including one carrying election officials. These hostilities continued into October when the Myanmar Navy fired on six Bangladeshi fishing trawlers near Saint Martin's Island, killing one person and injuring two. Although Myanmar authorities later released 72 detained fishermen and their trawlers on October 10, 2024, the situation underscored the fragile nature of Bangladesh's southern security.

By November 2024, the crisis had escalated further. On November 5, the AA detained 20 Bangladeshi fishermen and seized 15 boats, accusing them of illegal entry. Although the fishermen were released on November 7 after negotiations with the BGB, this episode demonstrated the group's growing power in the region. The most alarming development came on December 8, 2024, when the AA announced its control over the entire 271-kilometre Myanmar-Bangladesh border after capturing a BGP base in Rakhine State. This takeover led to an indefinite ban on vessel movement in the Naf River, disrupting trade between the two countries.

The economic ramifications of this crisis became evident in 2025. On January 16, the AA seized three cargo ships carrying 50,000 bags of dried fruits, betel nuts, coffee, and other goods en route from Yangon to Teknaf via the Naf River. Two of the three vessels were released on January 20, while the last ship remained in AA custody until February 1. Meanwhile, on February 10, the AA seized another timber-laden trawler near Golar Chor in Shah Porir Island. The next day, four Bangladeshi fishermen were abducted along with their fishing boat from the Naf River in Teknaf, Cox's Bazar.

March 2025 witnessed further complications. On March 1, Bangladesh's Home Adviser Lt Gen (retd) Jahangir Alam Chowdhury, confirmed that the AA had begun collecting an unofficial "tariff" on goods entering Bangladesh, adding another layer of economic insecurity. On March 5-6, the Myanmar Navy reportedly detained 56 Bangladeshi fishermen along with six trawlers near Saint Martin's Island. Before releasing them, the navy looted fish, fuel, nets, and food supplies. Further tension arose on March 16 when ARSA chief Ataullah Abu Ammar Jununi was arrested in Narayanganj, sparking unrest in Rohingya camps. On March 21, gunfire from Myanmar injured two individuals in the Tumbru border area in Bandarban, allegedly coming from the AA. The security situation had significantly deteriorated, leaving Bangladesh to confront an entirely new set of security concerns from the south.

Trade between Bangladesh and Myanmar also suffered due to the border instability. According to Teknaf customs, in the fiscal year 2023, Bangladesh imported 188,999 metric tonnes of goods worth Tk 1,545 crore from Myanmar. By the fiscal year 2024, imports had sharply declined to 71,741 metric tonnes, valued at Tk 808 crore. This decline underscores the economic vulnerabilities linked to border insecurity.

Some key theories of security and strategic studies—Realism, Securitisation Theory, and Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT)—offer valuable insights but present limitations in fully addressing the emerging threats in Bangladesh's southern frontier. Realism, which prioritises state-centric power politics and military preparedness, provides an essential framework for understanding geopolitical tensions. It primarily focuses on conventional state actors, making it less adaptable to addressing asymmetric security threats and non-state actors like the AA. The Securitisation Theory highlights how security threats are shaped through political discourse, aiding in understanding how Bangladesh frames its security concerns. Nevertheless, it does not offer direct policy mechanisms for managing concrete security risks beyond discursive practices. The RSCT explains Bangladesh's security challenges by situating them within the broader dynamics of South Asia, particularly the China-India-Myanmar triangle. While useful, this theory assumes that regional security is shaped predominantly by state interactions, overlooking the significant role of transnational insurgent groups and informal economic networks. Given these limitations, Bangladesh requires a more comprehensive and adaptive security approach, such as the SCF, which must comprehensively integrate military, diplomatic, economic, and community-driven strategies to address evolving security threats effectively.

SCF can provide a multi-pronged approach

Firstly, Bangladesh must deploy advanced surveillance technology, including drones and satellite monitoring, to enhance situational awareness along the Myanmar border. Additionally, fortifying border security posts and increasing the presence of the BGB and the Bangladesh Navy will serve as deterrents against incursions. Presence does not always necessitate a physical deployment in all operational contexts.

Secondly, the Bangladesh Armed Forces should conduct more joint military exercises with friendly nations to improve rapid response capabilities. Strengthening naval and coast guard operations near Saint Martin's Island is essential.

Thirdly, Bangladesh should leverage diplomatic channels, particularly through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the United Nations, to address cross-border tensions. Engaging China and India (on equal terms) in diplomatic dialogues to ensure Myanmar's stability will be crucial in preventing further escalation.

Fourthly, to mitigate economic risks, Bangladesh should reduce its reliance on Myanmar for imports and explore alternative trade routes. Strengthening domestic fisheries, agriculture, and logistics infrastructure will help absorb trade shocks caused by border disruptions.

Fifthly, we need to increase focus on community-based security and intelligence gathering. Local communities near the border should be integrated into intelligence-sharing networks. Establishing rapid communication channels between security forces and residents will enhance early threat detection and crisis response.

Finally, Bangladesh should focus on exploring innovative methods to engage with non-state actors following the UN Charter. The Charter encourages peaceful dialogue and conflict resolution through mechanisms such as Article 33 (negotiation and mediation) and Chapter VIII (regional arrangements). By leveraging these provisions, Bangladesh can establish new avenues for communication with non-state actors while ensuring compliance with international norms and advancing its security and strategic interests. This approach can boost broader regional stability and enhance Bangladesh's diplomatic capabilities.

Bangladesh's security posture must evolve to address the emerging threats from the south. The SCF offers a comprehensive strategy to safeguard national security, economic stability, and regional influence. By strengthening border defense, military preparedness, diplomatic engagement, trade security, and community intelligence, Bangladesh can effectively mitigate the risks posed by the ongoing instability in Myanmar. As regional dynamics continue to shift, Bangladesh must remain proactive in securing its sovereignty and national interests.

Alauddin Mohammad is joint member secretary of National Citizen Party (NCP).​

 

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Bangladesh recalls ambassador from Myanmar

Bangladesh has recalled its ambassador from Myanmar, a Bangladeshi foreign ministry official said on Thursday, after it acknowledged opening a communications line with a rebel army fighting its neighbour's military junta. Monowar Hossain, who had been serving in Myanmar's capital Naypyidaw since m

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Bangladesh recalls ambassador from Myanmar

REUTERS
Published :
May 29, 2025 20:42
Updated :
May 29, 2025 20:42

Bangladesh has recalled its ambassador from Myanmar, a Bangladeshi foreign ministry official said on Thursday, after it acknowledged opening a communications line with a rebel army fighting its neighbour's military junta.

Monowar Hossain, who had been serving in Myanmar's capital Naypyidaw since mid-2023, was told to return to Dhaka with immediate effect, said the official, describing it as an "administrative decision" without giving further reasons.

Relations between Bangladesh and Myanmar have been strained by the Rohingya refugee crisis and border security concerns.

A Myanmar junta spokesperson was not available for comment.

More than 1.2 million Rohingya are sheltering in Bangladesh, with the U.N. warning that widespread hunger in western Rakhine state could trigger fresh displacement. Over 130,000 people are thought to have crossed in the past year, Bangladesh says.

Bangladesh's National Security Adviser Khalilur Rahman said last week that Dhaka has opened informal communication channels with the Arakan Army, an ethnic armed group active in Rakhine, to maintain border stability.

Dhaka also remains engaged with the Myanmar junta to pursue a long-term solution to the Rohingya crisis, Rahman said, including potential support for a proposed U.N.-led humanitarian corridor in Rakhine.

But Bangladesh's army opposes that.

"The army will not be involved in any activity that compromises the country's security," Colonel Shafiqul Islam, a senior Bangladesh army official, told reporters this week, of the aid plan.​