[🇧🇩] China is a Time Tested Friend and a Strategic Partner of Bangladesh

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China won't oppose India's entry into economic corridor: Envoy
Chinese envoy says Beijing to send experts for Teesta feasibility study

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Published :
Jul 02, 2026 19:38
Updated :
Jul 02, 2026 19:38

Chinese Ambassador to Bangladesh Yao Wen said on Thursday that China would not oppose India's participation in the proposed China-Myanmar-Bangladesh Economic Corridor if New Delhi decides to join the initiative.

Responding to a question at a media briefing on Prime Minister Tarique Rahman's recent visit to China, the ambassador said China remained open to the participation of other countries.

"We are open. We welcome other countries if they are ready. But it is up to them to make that decision," he said.

Yao noted that the proposal was not new, recalling that China had earlier floated the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) Economic Corridor.

"That could not be achieved. Since China, Bangladesh and Myanmar all seek greater regional connectivity, the three countries can begin the initiative together," he said, adding that the door would remain open for others to join later.

Describing Prime Minister Tarique Rahman's visit to China as a "complete success", the ambassador said it marked a new stage in bilateral relations and expanded cooperation in trade, investment and regional affairs.

On the proposed Teesta project, Yao said the initiative had been proposed by the Bangladesh government, which sought China's assistance for its implementation.

He said China had agreed to support the project and would send a team of experts to conduct a joint feasibility study with the Bangladesh government.

"The most important thing is a sound scientific feasibility study. Whatever we do should be based on that," he said.

Responding to another question, the ambassador said the proposed "2+2" dialogue mechanism was not a new concept, noting that Bangladesh had already agreed to establish a similar arrangement with Türkiye and that China maintained such mechanisms with several countries.

Under the new format, Bangladesh and China will hold regular strategic dialogues alongside existing engagements between their foreign ministries, he added.

On the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on the Global Development Initiative (GDI), Yao said Bangladesh's decision to join the initiative would create new opportunities for bilateral cooperation.

He added that more than 190 countries and international organisations had joined the initiative.

Regarding Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI), the ambassador said many Chinese companies had expressed interest in investing in Bangladesh during the visit, while the Chinese economic and industrial zones in Bangladesh would provide a strong platform for investment.

According to the Bangladesh Investment Development Authority (BIDA), Chinese companies have so far committed investments worth US$9.0 billion in Bangladesh, he said.

Yao also said Prime Minister Tarique Rahman's father, late President Ziaur Rahman, and former prime minister Begum Khaleda Zia had played important roles in strengthening Bangladesh-China relations.

He said the visit's most significant outcome was the decision to upgrade the existing China-Bangladesh Comprehensive Strategic Cooperative Partnership to a China-Bangladesh Community with a Shared Future in the New Era.

According to the ambassador, the new framework provides for enhanced cooperation between the two governments, legislatures and political parties, the establishment of a strategic dialogue between the foreign ministers and exploration of a "2+2" dialogue involving foreign affairs and defence officials.

Quoting Chinese President Xi Jinping, Yao said Beijing would remain a trusted friend, neighbour and development partner of Bangladesh regardless of changes in the international environment.

He said China reaffirmed its support for Bangladesh's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, while Bangladesh reiterated its commitment to the one-China principle by recognising Taiwan as an inalienable part of China and opposing "Taiwan independence".

The ambassador said the two countries also agreed to deepen cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative by expanding collaboration in green development, the digital economy, information technology, artificial intelligence, finance, healthcare, education and cultural exchanges.

They also agreed to continue implementing major infrastructure projects, including cooperation in ports and water resources development.

Among the key outcomes of the visit, Bangladesh announced that it would establish its first overseas investment office in China to facilitate bilateral investment.

During an investment forum held alongside the visit, agreements were signed on developing the Chinese Economic and Industrial Zone in Chattogram and the Mongla Port Economic Zone. The two countries also agreed to advance the Mongla Port Facilities Modernisation and Expansion Project.

Bangladesh and China also signed a phytosanitary protocol allowing exports of fresh Bangladeshi jackfruit to China, following the opening of the Chinese market to Bangladeshi mangoes. The two sides also signed a joint action plan to strengthen Bangladesh's export capacity.

China welcomed Bangladesh's participation in the Group of Friends of the Global Development Initiative and pledged to work closely with Dhaka to implement the newly signed memorandum.

The ambassador also said China supports Bangladesh's greater role in multilateral institutions, including the United Nations, as well as its participation in BRICS and its application to become a partner of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.

Concluding the briefing, Yao said China was ready to work with Bangladesh to implement the understandings reached during the visit and translate them into concrete outcomes that would benefit the people of both countries.​

 

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Geopolitics: Prime Minister's China visit and the diplomacy ahead

The new government of Tarique Rahman has taken charge amidst various economic pressures and challenges; there is a need to increase foreign exchange reserves, attract new investments, create employment opportunities, rejuvenate industrialisation, at the same time not halting infrastructure...

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Geopolitics: Prime Minister's China visit and the diplomacy ahead

AKM Zakaria

The new government of Tarique Rahman has taken charge amidst various economic pressures and challenges; there is a need to increase foreign exchange reserves, attract new investments, create employment opportunities, rejuvenate industrialisation, at the same time not halting infrastructure development. Amidst this, the Iran war breaks out, exacerbating the situation. Given these circumstances, Prime Minister Tarique Rahman's choice of countries for his first foreign trip naturally carried significant economic considerations.

The Prime Minister visited Malaysia and then China. From an economic standpoint, both countries are important for Bangladesh. Malaysia is a major source of remittances for Bangladesh. Lifting the current ban on the labour migration to Malaysia is a key expectation for Bangladesh.

Additionally, China is one of Bangladesh's major partners for economic development, providing loans on easy terms, investments, infrastructure assistance, and trade relations. However, considering regional geopolitics and strategic perspectives, the visits to these two countries carry different dimensions and distinctions.

In such a reality, an effective path for Bangladesh is not to align itself with a specific sphere of regional and global politics. Instead of becoming part of one party's strategic rivalry, it is effective for smaller and medium countries to maintain parallel relationships with competing nations while keeping national interests in mind and balancing relationships with multiple powers.

The visit to Malaysia can be seen largely in light of economic-commercial cooperation and interests, and the relationship between two Asian or Muslim countries, with little scope for broader analysis. On the other hand, even though China is a major economic, commercial, development, and investment partner for Bangladesh, the relationship between the two countries cannot be considered solely on this basis. There are deeper connections with changing global politics, regional and global geopolitical competition, and influence. This visit by Prime Minister Tarique Rahman must be viewed separately from previous visits of this kind. Why? That would be addressed later.

Since the establishment of diplomatic relations in October 1975, politics in Bangladesh and China has gone through various changes, but the fundamental character of the relationship between the two countries has not changed significantly. China's general policy is to maintain good relations with all types of governments, prioritising trade and economic interests above all. Whether a country has a democratic government in power or a military or authoritarian government is not their concern. This has been observed in the case of Bangladesh. It can be said that China's relationship with any Bangladeshi government has not ever been particularly bad in that sense.

In regional geopolitics, the India-China relationship is highly competitive. We know that during the last Awami League regime, Bangladesh became completely immersed in India's sphere of influence. However, this did not pose a major problem for China. They maintained close ties with the Hasina government, and many major projects were implemented with Chinese assistance during that time. During Hasina's era, China became Bangladesh's largest trading partner, and they faced no issues with her downfall either.

Now, I will address why this visit needs to be seen differently from previous visits by Bangladeshi heads of government to China. Among the five decades of relations between the two countries, during Prime Minister Tarique Rahman's visit, the Bangladesh-China joint communique was issued for the third time. If we analyze this communique and the overall visit, it's evident that for the first time, more emphasis was placed on the political relationship between the two countries than on financial assistance or development project-based discussions.

I have already discussed China's general foreign policy stance; they prioritise economics over politics. However, in the past decade, changes have begun to appear in China's diplomacy. Economic cooperation remains their primary tool, but political relations are receiving more importance as well. It can be said that after the initiation of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China is not limiting its role to infrastructure development alone. They have adopted a policy of building relationships with political parties, policymakers, think tanks, and the media as well.

Before the Prime Minister's visit to China, a column by Liu Zongyi, director of the Center for South Asia Studies, was published in China's Global Times, indicating this shift in China's position. It became evident that China is now starting to place importance on political relationships alongside economic ties with partner countries.

His argument is that Bangladesh's intellectuals and high-ranking groups are largely influenced by the Western development model. They practice Western economic theories and governance systems and remain cautious regarding China's development framework and production capacity enhancement collaboration. He believes that Bangladesh needs to find a ''path of development suited to its national context. '' To find this path, he suggested increasing institutional communication between the political parties, think tanks, and local governments of the two countries.

We have seen visits to China by leaders from various political parties and ideologies in Bangladesh at the invitation of the Chinese government after the mass uprising in July. Confucius Institutes have been established in various universities across the country with China's assistance over the past few years. It is clear that such initiatives will increase in the future.

Among the 13 memorandums of understanding signed this time, subjects like Chinese language education and media cooperation are included. A memorandum of understanding was signed between the BNP and the Communist Party of China. It is not merely a formality; party-to-party communication holds strategic significance in diplomacy. China is now adopting this strategy in South Asia.

The world is going through changes in global politics. Considering political and economic factors, China's influence and importance are increasing worldwide. It is natural for the country to adopt a strategy of politically engaging with various countries beyond trade and economics. On the other hand, for economic interest, Bangladesh needs easy sources of funds. Whether through loans or investment, it seems there is no alternative for Bangladesh other than China. If Bangladesh can secure its economic, commercial, and infrastructural development interests through China, it will take that route, which is only natural. Prime Minister Tarique Rahman's visit to China has delivered that message.

However, it is crucial to consider regional and global realities in this regard. In the regional context, India-China competition, globally, the US's efforts to counter China, the US Indo-Pacific strategy, or the country's Quad security dialogue involving India, Japan, and Australia cannot be overlooked. The expansion of the Mongla port, the industrial zone in Chittagong planned by China, maritime cooperation, or the China-Myanmar-Bangladesh economic corridor—India will not view these solely as economic projects; they will see them as strategic occurrences. In today's world, ports are not merely trade infrastructure. They are related to maritime control, supply systems, energy security, and military presence. Similarly, digital infrastructure, artificial intelligence, and power projects have now become significant elements in geopolitical competition.

We must remember that the United States is one of Bangladesh's primary export markets. The European union is also among them. Japan has been one of Bangladesh’s most reliable development partners for many decades. India is Bangladesh's most important neighbour, with a lengthy border, shared rivers, trade, communication, energy, and border security—interdependence cannot be denied. Altogether, Bangladesh and its economy are tied and dependent on relationships with many countries and powers.

In such a reality, an effective path for Bangladesh is not to align itself with a specific sphere of regional and global politics. Instead of becoming part of one party's strategic rivalry, it is effective for smaller and medium countries to maintain parallel relationships with competing nations while keeping national interests in mind and balancing relationships with multiple powers.

I mentioned earlier that within the Chinese visit of the Prime Minister, there is a message of focusing on the country's economic and commercial interests. We have to wait and see how Bangladesh maintains this continuity with other countries. However, it would not be accurate to consider this visit as the beginning of a major change in diplomacy or foreign policy. Because no single visit can determine the direction of diplomacy. It is determined by a series of steps and decisions and a long-term strategy. The challenge ahead for Bangladesh is to ensure a mature, confident, and pragmatic foreign policy or diplomacy.

#AKM Zakaria is a Deputy Editor at Prothom Alo.​

 

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https://www.newagebd.net/post/opinion/304809/not-geopolitical-realignment

GEOSTRATEGIC DIVERSIFICATION

Not geopolitical realignment

Bangladesh’s prime minister Tarique Rahman meets with China’s president Xi Jinping at the Great Hall of the People. | Bangladesh Sangbad Sangstha

SPEARHEADED by Beijing, the proposed China-Myanmar-Bangladesh Economic Corridor is a multilateral infrastructure and trade initiative designed to link China’s landlocked south-western Yunnan province directly to the Bay of Bengal. Formally introduced during talks between China’s president Xi Jinping and Bangladesh’s prime minister Tarique Rahman, the corridor seeks to represents a major strategic shift in South Asian geopolitics. Rather than building a network from scratch, China intends to use Bangladesh as a natural extension of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor, creating a multimodal transit system of roads, railways, and maritime upgrades.

The blueprint places a heavy focus on Bangladesh’s coastline, with China pledging to modernise the Chittagong and Mongla ports to transform the region into a massive business hub. This integration also includes establishing a 150-acre Chinese industrial park adjacent to the Mongla port project. This new framework effectively re-engineers the stalled 1990s Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar concept by explicitly excluding India. After a deterioration in Sino-Indian relations and New Delhi’s opposition to Belt and Road projects near its borders, routing strictly through Myanmar and Bangladesh allows China to bypass the Indian territory entirely while still securing vital access to the Indian Ocean.

Economically, the proposal is significant for Bangladesh’s export-led economy, especially apparel and light manufacturing, as high transport costs remain a major structural constraint before the LDC graduation. Studies show that even modest reductions in logistics costs can substantially improve trade competitiveness and regional value-chain integration.

Geopolitical challenges

THE first and most immediate challenge is Myanmar’s prolonged civil conflict. Large parts of Rakhine State, through which the Kyaukpyu corridor passes, remain contested between the military and the Arakan Army. Since the 2021 coup, fragmented state authorities have undermined border management, customs administration, infrastructure security and transport reliability. Scholarship consistently identifies political instability and armed conflict as the principal obstacles to connectivity projects in Myanmar, making the corridor’s commercial viability contingent on improved security.

A second challenge concerns Bangladesh’s relations with India. New Delhi has for long viewed Chinese infrastructure projects in South Asia through a strategic lens, a concern reinforced by the 2020 Sino-Indian border clashes and India’s withdrawal from the BCIM initiative. A China-Myanmar-Bangladesh corridor excluding India could, therefore, reinforce perceptions of Bangladesh moving closer to China’s strategic orbit. As India remains Bangladesh’s largest neighbour, an important transit partner and a key security interlocutor, Dhaka’s long-term interest lies in ensuring that CMBC complements, not replaces, existing cooperation in trade, energy, railway and inland waterways while maintaining strategic balance amid growing China-India-US competition in the Bay of Bengal.

Relations with the United States also require careful management. Although Washington supports regional connectivity, it has consistently expressed concerns about aspects of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, particularly infrastructure with potential dual-use applications. The recent US-Bangladesh Agreement on Reciprocal Trade does not preclude Bangladesh’s participation in the CMBC, but it validates cooperation on economic security, supply-chain resilience, investment screening and export controls. Consequently, Bangladesh should ensure that the corridor remains a commercially driven initiative rather than an instrument of exclusive geopolitical alignment.

Connectivity has become a source of geopolitical influence. Recent research demonstrates that transport corridors, ports, railways and logistics infrastructure create patterns of economic dependence and political influence that frequently outlast military deployment. Consequently, Bangladesh’s long-term objective should not be to avoid connectivity initiatives but to ensure that no single corridor acquires monopoly status within the country’s external economic relations. Diversification of connectivity, financing and investment, therefore, becomes a strategy for preserving national autonomy rather than limiting economic engagement.

Strategic equilibrium

RECENT scholarship shows that transport infrastructure has become an enduring instrument of geopolitical influence, as ports, railways and logistics corridors shape long-term patterns of trade and regional integration. This underscores the need to embed the CMBC within a diversified connectivity architecture rather than allowing it to become an exclusive corridor dominated by any single external power.

In a quest to preserve strategic equilibrium, Bangladesh should frame the CMBC as an instrument of national development rather than geopolitical alignment. Recent scholarship on middle-power diplomacy characterises this approach as strategic hedging, maintaining productive relations with competing major powers while avoiding exclusive security or economic dependence on any one of them. For Bangladesh, strategic diversification offers greater resilience than strategic alignment.

First, the CMBC should be embedded within Bangladesh’s broader connectivity strategy by complementing the BBIN, BIMSTEC, India-linked transport networks, Japan’s BIG-B initiative, ASEAN connectivity and partnerships with the United States, the European Union, Gulf states and multilateral institutions.

Second, the corridor must remain strictly commercial, excluding military, intelligence, or other dual-use functions. Third, financing should be diversified through multilateral development banks, private investors and China to enhance transparency, reduce geopolitical risks and strengthen project viability. Fourth, Dhaka should maintain close consultations with India to underscore that CMBC should complement, rather than replace, bilateral cooperation. Finally, implementation should proceed only when Myanmar’s security situation permits reliable commercial operations as infrastructure in conflict zones rarely delivers sustained economic returns.

The China-Myanmar-Bangladesh Economic Corridor should be understood neither as a geopolitical alignment with China nor as a challenge to Bangladesh’s partnerships with India, the United States, Japan or other development partners. Rather, it represents one component of Bangladesh’s broader strategy of geostrategic diversification, expanding connectivity, reducing logistical constraints and strengthening the country’s role as the principal commercial bridge between South Asia, Southeast Asia and the Bay of Bengal. It is not a geopolitical realignment.

For Bangladesh, the central policy objective is not choosing among competing powers but diversifying partnerships. If implemented through transparent financing, commercially viable projects, diversified investment, strong institutional safeguards and complementary engagement with India, Japan, the United States, multilateral development banks, ASEAN and the Gulf states, the CMBC can intensify Bangladesh’s economic resilience while preserving its strategic autonomy. The corridor’s success should, therefore, be measured not by which major power benefits most, but by whether it advances Bangladesh’s long-term national development and its journey towards becoming a trillion-dollar economy.

Kausar Mumin is a 2026 legislative policy fellow in the US Congress.​