Why is China not standing by Iran and Venezuela?
The Venezuela and Iran models clearly show that Trump is seeking to remove the governments of countries close to China in the Middle East and South America through open aggression. Yet why China is not standing by its geopolitical “friends” is written by Altaf Parvez.
Altaf Parvez
Published: 12 Jan 2026, 17: 08
After "Operation Absolute Resolve” in Venezuela, it appears that US President Trump has now set his sights on Iran. China purchases large amounts of fuel oil from both countries. By installing potential puppet governments in Venezuela and Iran, Trump aims to push China into an energy and trade crisis as well. For a long time, one of the United States’ key objectives has been to economically contain China. This time, that strategy is taking on a new form—by weakening China’s economic partners.
In the face of danger confronting its “friendly” states, what will the People’s Republic of China do now? Can Xi Jinping stop Trump? If so, how? And is China even willing to play such a role?
Selective aggression against China’s allies
By now, almost everyone agrees that Trump’s aggression against Venezuela is primarily aimed at controlling the country’s oil resources. China is the main buyer and consumer of Venezuelan oil. By December 2024, China’s daily appetite for fuel oil stood at around 16 million barrels. The rise in demand in the global oil market has largely been driven by China. Between 2013 and 2023, 60 per cent of the growth in global oil demand was attributable to China.
However, as China has begun to seek alternative energy sources, its demand for crude oil is declining. By prioritizing environmentally friendly production systems, China has also been reducing its dependence on fossil fuels. Moreover, the expansion of the services sector, as opposed to manufacturing, is causing shifts in its energy demand.
Even so, China remains the world’s leading consumer of fossil oil. It imports 50–60 per cent of the mineral oil it needs, producing the rest domestically. Although it ranks 14th globally in oil reserves, it is the second-largest consumer. As a result, China is still a major importer in this sector. China has been purchasing a portion of its required fossil oil from Venezuela.
The United States abducted Nicolas Maduro after launching an attack in Caracas. Reuters
China’s stakes in Venezuela and US pressure
Although Venezuela is not China’s largest oil source, it is still an important one. From Venezuela’s perspective, China is a major buyer of its oil and has also been a significant financial supporter. China had extended nearly $10 billion in advance loans for oil purchases. US aggression has not only disrupted China’s fuel supply but also frozen those loans.
Venezuela possesses one of the world’s largest crude oil reserves, but due to US economic sanctions, it could not extract or sell oil at full capacity, causing ongoing economic hardship. China has taken Venezuelan oil in exchange for loans. Additionally, China has $18 billion in investments in Venezuela, which are now at risk. Specialised refineries in China had been built to process the unique type of crude oil from Venezuela; these facilities are now facing both technical and financial difficulties.
China also imports oil from Russia and Iran, which are similarly under US sanctions. Like Venezuela, China is the top destination for much of Iran’s oil exports. A major reason for US hostility toward Venezuela and Iran is China. These sanctions and aggressive measures aim to create difficulties for China’s economic growth. By disrupting oil supplies, freezing loans to friendly countries, and targeting China’s global trade networks, the US seeks to put additional pressure on Beijing.
Should China retreat from South America?
Over the past decades, China has expanded its global influence through trade and credit. In the last twenty years, it became the main trading partner for South America, with significant investments across most countries in the region. Just last year, a summit of South American nations was held in Beijing, where Xi Jinping announced several new billion-dollar investments. Economic projects have increased the number of Chinese nationals in Brazil, Cuba, Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela. The volume of cargo shipped from China to the region has grown fivefold from 2005 to 2024, while imports from the region have increased sixfold.
In 2024, Beijing signed free trade agreements with Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Peru. At least 20 countries in the region are connected to China’s “Belt and Road Initiative,” and Chinese banks have extended at least $120 billion in loans to these countries since 2005. These developments have prompted the US to significantly adjust its foreign policy.
Historically, Washington has used various pretexts to overthrow governments worldwide, often secretly or semi-secretly, when those governments sought to operate independently. The models of Venezuela and Iran show that Trump now aims to openly remove governments closely allied with China in the Middle East and South America.
Trump’s advisors have indicated that they do not want any Chinese presence in the Western Hemisphere; the region must remain fully submissive to US interests. The “National Security Strategy” announced in 2025 reflects this approach. Similarly, the US aims to shape the Middle East through Israel. Any government in these regions deemed “opposed to American interests” could face intervention by organisations like the CIA or Delta Force.
Geopolitical commentators are calling this a modern, renewed version of the United States’ old “Monroe Doctrine.” Nearly two centuries ago, President James Monroe spoke of regarding South America as a kind of colonial sphere. Under Trump, this new neo-colonial ambition is now taking shape as a completely new world order.
As part of this objective, Iran was targeted after Venezuela. Due to a lack of political freedom and an authoritarian government, many Iranian cities have long experienced anger and protests. The US sanctions, combined with Israel’s attacks last year, have worsened Iran’s economic situation. The local currency has plummeted, fueling widespread public dissatisfaction. Protests have erupted on the streets across the country this week.
Protests have spread across Iran. Iran has accused the United States of fueling these demonstrations. AFP
Taking advantage of this opportunity, the United States and Israel are attempting to bring the exiled heirs of the Shah, who was overthrown in 1979, back to power. Encouraged by the US, a civil war has already erupted in the country. Through this, the Trump administration aims to seize Iran’s oil resources, much like it did in Venezuela.
This would mean gaining control over two of the three countries with the largest oil reserves in the world. The third country, Saudi Arabia, is already governed by Washington’s long-standing allies. If the Iran operation succeeds, the US would be able to easily control the oil market, prices, and distribution.
What will China do now?
Naturally, the question arises: what will China do now? The world has observed that during the US attack on Iran last June (Operation Midnight Hammer), China did not firmly stand by Tehran. Similarly, in Syria, Libya, and Venezuela, Beijing neither established effective resistance against US interventions—whether covert or overt—nor has it wanted to. Russia’s role has been similar. So, will Trump’s ongoing aggressive military and economic programmes continue unchecked? In such an insecure world, what protection do smaller nations have?
At present, China appears to be avoiding any direct involvement in wars, choosing instead to focus entirely on achieving technological superiority. Beijing believes that renewable energy and artificial intelligence will transform the world in unimaginable ways. Through technology, China hopes to gradually undermine the United States’ global dominance, which has been built on longstanding military and financial structures, primarily via peaceful means. China also believes that artificial intelligence will soon significantly enhance its military capabilities.
Last year’s India-Pakistan conflict provided some practical validation of China’s assumptions. During that conflict, Pakistan successfully employed Chinese satellite jamming technology against Indian fighter jets obtained from France, surprising the Western world. However, the US’s ability to carry out a coordinated land, sea, and air operation in Venezuela to abduct Maduro remains a major demonstration of its military and intelligence capabilities. Similarly, Delta Force eliminated Iran’s General Qasem Soleimani and Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden.
Washington’s military and intelligence capacity allows it to take aggressive actions in multiple regions against multiple powers simultaneously. Yet, while these operations highlight the US’s military superiority, they do not necessarily guarantee global leadership or directly halt China’s economic and technological rise. Even Trump’s widely publicised tariff war starting January last year did not succeed in fully containing China.
For these reasons, US policymakers have now adopted a more overt strategy to target China’s strategic positions. But from China’s perspective, in most past cases where the US has intervened abroad, Washington has struggled to exit conflicts with an image of clear success. In every engagement, it has had to rely continuously on its own “agents.” Now, it may also have to bear the cost of such “support” to control resources in these countries.
Starting a war or intervention is relatively easy, but exiting it can become extremely difficult—a lesson illustrated by Russia’s four-year-old campaign in Ukraine. China is likely extremely cautious about engaging directly in conflicts based on such experiences. Yet, the question remains: can China protect smaller nations seeking independence from US aggression, or provide any practical assurance?
Experience in Syria, Iran, and Venezuela suggests the answer is negative. Neither China nor present-day Russia has made any principled commitment to stand by “friendly” nations under attack. Their public position is limited to strong words of condemnation and official statements. China is also particularly cautious not to jeopardise its access to US markets. While the competition between China and the United States over market expansion and resource acquisition appears intense, the differences in political and economic principles are not as vast. In fact, Beijing has no intention of using the Maduro abduction as a reason to block Trump’s upcoming visit to China in April.
Reflections on the global situation
“Operation Absolute Resolve” in Venezuela is clearly the result of a long-standing secret plan. However, it remains uncertain whether China was fully aware of these plans, whether it provided Venezuela with the necessary support to resist the aggression, or whether “friendly” countries can expect any such assistance from China in the future. Some even argue that the narrative of China ending the US-centered world order is itself a mindset created by Washington, aimed at legitimising its aggressive policies at home.
In such a situation, as the world enters a new, brutal future, what can the people of small nations do to safeguard their resources and sovereignty? Citizens of these countries face a stark reality: without a principled global alliance that is democratic, pluralistic, and respects non-interference in other nations’ internal affairs, it is extremely difficult to resist aggressive powers like Trump. Yet, at present, no such anti-imperialist global solidarity exists. This is reminiscent of the situation described by Antonio Gramsci in Mussolini’s fascist prisons: “The old is dying, but the new cannot be born; this is the time of the monster.”
Today, everywhere, the “monster” is simultaneously accuser, judge, and police. It is truly an age of uncertainty—what the Greeks called an interregnum. It is also a time to investigate the causes and drivers behind the campaigns through which America sought to eliminate socialist systems from the world 35 years ago, particularly regarding the provision of energy resources and other support.
#Altaf Parvez is a researcher on history
Chinese Defense
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