[🇧🇩] How to make Bureaucracy efficient in Bangladesh?

[Saif]

Date of Event: Feb 24, 2025 Source : https://www.thedailystar.net/opinion/views/news/impact-bureaucratic-inefficiency-the-economy-3830821

Impact of bureaucratic inefficiency on the economy

VISUAL: SIFAT AFRIN SHAMS

The bureaucratic system in Bangladesh is plagued with excessive red tape, which manifests through ineffective procedures and corruption, resulting in overspending on civil service that ultimately limits economic performance. Overlapping regulations and insufficient coordination between government bodies exacerbate the extended timelines required to complete business registrations and obtain land acquisition permits. Manual systems together with hierarchical decision-making and rent-seeking behaviour within bureaucracies simultaneously drive up administrative costs and create delays in making essential decisions. These barriers create obstacles for both domestic and foreign investment while constraining entrepreneurial activities and pushing the working population into the informal economy, which diminishes the tax base and reduces government revenue.

This inefficiency leads to extensive economic consequences. The combination of elevated public expenditure for civil service functions with inadequate accountability measures and inconsistent policy enforcement results in decreased productivity within public services. Businesses face higher expenses because of bureaucratic delays and bribery that degrade their competitive edge and deter investment activities. Infrastructure and export sectors suffer from negative impacts caused by delays in land acquisition and customs clearance procedures. Implementing efficient bureaucratic processes, together with e-government solutions and enhanced transparency, will enable vital reforms to reduce unnecessary spending while unlocking economic growth potential. Tackling administrative inefficiencies will cut government spending while enhancing service delivery and boosting economic growth through improved investment conditions and entrepreneurship opportunities.

Bangladesh's government spending, which stands at 13.02 percent of GDP, far outweighs its revenue collection of only 8.9 percent of GDP, creating a significant fiscal gap. In contrast, Vietnam's government revenue and expenditure are almost balanced at 19.03 percent and 18.77 percent of GDP, respectively. Despite having a similar GDP—$481 billion for Bangladesh and $506 billion for Vietnam—Bangladesh struggles to generate sufficient revenue due to its overreliance on a low-skilled, informal workforce, with 84 percent of workers in the informal sector. Meanwhile, Vietnam has prioritised human development. This structural difference explains Vietnam's higher revenue and more effective government spending, even after enduring wars (1955-1975 and 1979) that left its economy in disarray decades ago.

The government overspends on ministries and administration in a system burdened by red tape, corruption, and inefficiency. The inefficiencies in Bangladesh's bureaucracy aggravate this fiscal disparity. Instead of addressing critical gaps in workforce training (vocational training) and healthcare to improve human development, Bangladesh diverts resources to sustain an oversized bureaucracy. For example, while Bangladesh's government expenditure is relatively lower as a percentage of GDP than Vietnam's (13.02 percent vs. 18.77 percent), it fails to deliver corresponding results. Vietnam's efficient governance enables it to focus spending on areas like skill development and technology integration, yielding higher worker productivity and export revenues. For instance, Vietnam's garment sector, with only 2.5 million workers, is projected to export $48 billion in 2025, compared to Bangladesh's $42.83 billion export earnings in 2023 with 4 million workers—a clear indication of Bangladesh's productivity gap.

Bangladesh's inability to upskill its workforce has dire consequences. A majority of its labour force is confined to low-paying jobs in agriculture, trade, and unregulated sectors like rickshaw-pulling, while Vietnam has created opportunities in semi-skilled and skilled industries, such as machine operation, legal assistance, and customer service. This structural shift in Vietnam has increased its tax base and allowed the government to invest in further human capital development. In contrast, Bangladesh's failure to prioritise workforce training perpetuates a cycle of low productivity, limited revenue, and inefficient spending. The Human Development Index (HDI) disparity between the two countries highlights this gap, with Vietnam consistently outperforming Bangladesh in key indicators.

To address this, Bangladesh must rethink its spending priorities. It is unsustainable for the government to continue funding a sprawling bureaucracy and luxurious administrative expenditures when revenue collection is so weak. By reducing ministries, streamlining governance, and cutting unnecessary expenses, resources can be redirected towards skill development, education, and infrastructure. Investing in human capital would help transition the workforce from informal, low-skilled jobs to more productive sectors, expanding the tax base and reducing dependency on external borrowing. Vietnam's success shows that a country with a similar history of colonialism, war and a comparable workforce can achieve remarkable economic transformation by focusing on human development and efficient governance. Bangladesh has no excuse for falling behind. Instead, it must take bold steps to reform its bureaucracy, reduce red tape, and prioritise its people over unsustainable government spending.

Bangladesh can follow Sri Lanka's lead in introducing bold reforms to reduce government spending by cutting down on unnecessary luxuries and inefficient practices in the public sector, including streamlining ministries. Sri Lanka's President Anura Kumara Dissanayake has set an example by capping the size of ministerial staff, limiting official vehicle usage to two per minister, and ensuring that appointments prioritise existing state service employees. These measures reflect a broader commitment to fiscal responsibility, ensuring tax money is utilised effectively. Bangladesh's government could adopt similar guidelines to reduce overspending. For instance, restricting the perks of ministers, such as luxury vehicles and unnecessary large entourages, would send a strong signal of accountability and free up resources for critical investments in skill development, and infrastructure.

Bangladesh should also consider implementing policies that ensure transparency and efficiency in government expenditures, similar to Sri Lanka's regulations on vehicle procurement and fuel allocations. Reducing ministries and consolidating overlapping functions would streamline governance and cut administrative costs. Sri Lanka's decision to curtail duty-free imports of luxury vehicles for parliamentarians sets a precedent Bangladesh could replicate, ensuring that public funds are not wasted on privileges that primarily benefit officials rather than the public. With a tax-to-GDP ratio of just 8.9 percent, Bangladesh cannot afford to continue overspending on its civil service while neglecting investments that could upskill its workforce and strengthen its economy. By following Sri Lanka's cost-cutting reforms, Bangladesh could create a leaner, more efficient government that redirects resources towards its citizens' long-term development and prosperity.

Ahmed Ashfaque Shahbaz is a PhD candidate focusing on political economy at the University of Exeter in the UK.​

 

[Saif]

Bangladesh’s bureaucracy needs reinvention

Bangladesh’s administrative system is a relic of British colonial rule.

www.thedailystar.net

Bangladesh’s bureaucracy needs reinvention

FILE ILLUSTRATION: BIPLOB CHAKROBORTY

Despite nearing almost six decades of independence, Bangladesh's administrative system remains stuck in the past, a relic of British colonial rule. Originally designed to serve foreign rulers, this bureaucracy now appears more interested in protecting its own privileges than advancing the nation. Outdated methods of handling paperwork and communication create unnecessary obstacles, slowing decisions and holding back progress.

One glaring example of delay is the "noting system," where files must pass through multiple hands for comments and approvals before any action is taken. This confusing process loses time and money that could be used for better purposes, such as building schools, hospitals, and other infrastructures. Even now, high-ranking officials often behave like kings, expecting their staff and the public to show them the same respect people did in colonial times. This old way of thinking focuses more on strict rules than on getting things done and values appearance over helping others.

Despite numerous reform attempts, the core structure of the civil service has barely changed. The Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP), which evolved into Bangladesh's administration cadre, retained its elite status and privileged position. This has created a bureaucratic class that sees itself as the guardian of the state rather than as public servants. As a result, they resist meaningful reforms that could challenge their authority and disrupt their control over government operations.

This rigid system affects every aspect of the country's development. Simple tasks, like getting a business permit or accessing land records, become complicated, time-consuming, and prone to corruption. Resistance to change has also slowed the adoption of digital governance. Instead of using technology to improve services, many bureaucrats view it as a threat to their power. While other Asian countries have successfully implemented e-governance, Bangladesh struggles with endless delays and bureaucratic roadblocks. Digital systems would make processes more transparent, potentially reducing corruption—something many officials are unwilling to risk.

Another problem is that the promotion system is old-fashioned and tends to prefer generalists instead of specialists. As a result, leadership roles often go to people who lack the needed technical skills, leading to the creation of useless policies and bad execution. This stops the country from having the skilled leaders needed to deal with today's problems.

The connection between this ineffective system and Bangladesh's growth challenges is obvious. Although the country has improved in many ways, slow and complicated government processes are holding back economic growth, social progress, and public services.

What makes this situation even more frustrating is how stubbornly the system resists change. Experts point to an "iron triangle"—a powerful alliance between politicians, bureaucrats, and business elites—who benefit from the current system and work together to block meaningful reforms that could improve governance.

The colonial influence on Bangladesh's bureaucracy is still evident in many ways. District commissioners, for example, still live in grand colonial-era residences and follow traditions that appear outdated in a modern democracy. But this isn't just about appearances—it reflects a deeper issue. The system continues to treat citizens as subjects to be controlled rather than as active participants in governance. This concentration of power in the hands of a few makes it harder for ordinary people to influence decisions that affect their lives.

However, there are signs of hope. A new group of civil servants, trained in modern management and aware of the best practices from around the world, is advocating for change from within the system. Young leaders in local areas are changing how things are done by focusing on serving the community instead of trying to rule them. Their method questions long-standing rules and shows what a better system might look like.

For Bangladesh to progress, it is important to make a strong effort to improve the public service. The government should focus on hiring and promoting people based on their skills and qualifications to make sure the best individuals lead. Technology should be fully applied in governance to make operations smoother, increase speed, and lower crime rates. We need better ways for citizens to give feedback so that government leaders are held accountable and serve the people accordingly.

The cost of maintaining the current system is becoming unsustainable. In a world where nations compete based on innovation and adaptability, Bangladesh's bureaucratic inefficiencies threaten to undermine its economic growth and development goals.

Bangladesh's bureaucracy doesn't just need reform—it needs reinvention. A system designed to serve colonial masters must be transformed into one that meets the aspirations of its citizens for a modern, efficient, and responsive government.

The real tragedy of Bangladesh's bureaucratic maze isn't just the wasted time and resources—it's the dreams delayed, and opportunities lost. But with growing public demand for change and reform-minded officials gaining influence, there is hope. The question is no longer whether change will come, but whether it will happen soon enough to meet the challenges of the 21st century. For millions of Bangladeshis that change can't come soon enough.

Dr Habib Zafarullah is an adjunct professor of public policy at the University of New England, Australia, and former professor of public administration at the University of Dhaka. He is the founding president of the South Asian Network for Public Administration.​

 

[Saif]

https://images.thedailystar.net/opinion/views/news/building-citizen-centric-administration-3769256

Building a citizen-centric administration

VISUAL: STAR

The very next day the interim government assumed the state power hundreds of deprived people were seen approaching the government with their grievances. They complained of not getting promotion, placement, or even appointment because of their connections, no matter how distant, with the opposition political party, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party. This speaks volumes about the dysfunctional nature of the Bangladesh Civil Service, which needs urgent overhauling. The 2024 July uprising and the consequent departure of a fascist regime have created a new opportunity for Bangladesh to rebuild and restart afresh. It is crucial to utilise this opportunity to bring about a fundamental change in administration.

Since independence, 20 Committees and Commissions were formed for public administration reform while development partners conducted eight studies to support reforms. But most of them remained unimplemented. Consequently, even fifty-three years after independence, Bangladesh's public administration is still fragile, susceptible to political interference and incapable of serving the citizens as expected. These fundamental weaknesses have made the administration an overly politicised, centralised, unaccountable, inefficient, unethical, rent-seeking and non-transparent institution. Given this context, the interim government has undertaken a step to reform public administration.

Since the most wicked problem of administration now is unrestrained politicisation causing inefficiency and eroding institutional values and dignity, reform should focus on depoliticisation of administration. Systemic changes should be made towards building a "high-performing" and "citizen-centric administration" which would require legal, structural and procedural reforms as well as behavioural /mindset changes of the administrators.

First, the existing laws should be reviewed in terms of their discrepancies, irrelevance, gaps, and inadequacies to address the requirements for making the administration high-performing. Some laws curb the rights of government officials to justice while others increase the scope for corruption for them. For instance, under Clause 45 of the Government Service Act 2018 the government exercises absolute power to send a civil servant after 25 years of service to compulsory retirement without showing any cause. Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) requires prior approval of the government for the prosecution or arrest of public servants. On the other hand, Article 77 of the constitution, requiring the appointment of an Ombudsman for redressal of grievances, complaints investigation and ensuring accountability of public servants, has never been implemented. Legal weaknesses of these kinds need to be addressed.

Secondly, the structure of administration requires some fundamental changes including: i) rightsizing government through setting up cluster ministries such as regulatory, infrastructure, development etc; ii) abolishing the divisional administration since it does not add any value to administrative efficiency; iii)rebuilding a pyramid-shaped administration and preventing it from being top-heavy; iv) reducing the number of cadres in civil service through the amalgamation of similar types of services; v) resolving inter cadre discrimination by abandoning the policy of offering supremacy to administrative cadre over the other cadres in terms of promotion, facilities and status, and creating equal opportunities for all cadres; vi) decentralization of administration through adequate delegation and devolution of authority to the front-line employees, field offices and local government.

Furthermore, procedural reform should include streamlining the systems of recruitment, promotion and transfer of civil servants to prevent political maneuvering. Following the mechanisms adopted by Southeast Asian countries including South Korea, Singapore and Malaysia, reforms can adopt a three-prong approach: meritocracy, technocracy, and performance-based management. Meritocracy ensures the selection of qualified, politically neutral personnel; technocracy makes the process transparent; and performance-based management ensures efficiency and productivity.

Although we have a merit-based recruitment system in civil service, the process has many weaknesses. First, the question pattern of the BCS recruitment examination does not reflect any commitment to recruit competent officials since it only promotes rote learning. To secure merit-based recruitment similar to that India, BCS recruitment examination needs to introduce analytical and case study-based questions to test the ability of candidates to apply knowledge in practical situations. Second, viva carries 200 marks, which creates a scope for exerting political interference in recruitment. Marks allocated for viva should be reduced from 200 to 100. Third, police clearance actually aims to confirm political identity of a candidate rather than assuring his/her involvement with any activity subversive to the state. This should be stopped.

Regarding promotions, which are mostly determined by political considerations rather than merit, no clear criteria for promotion currently exist. This creates confusion and potential favouritism. To overcome this situation, a well-articulated promotion policy needs to be framed. Revival of Senior Service Pool (SSP) should be given serious thought. Officials of different cadres (other than the technical ones) may wish to enter SSP through a special exam. Based on the performance of the exam, officials would get promotion.

Also, there is no standardised policy to guide the decisions regarding transfer/posting, leading to confusion and dissatisfactions among civil servants. Career Planning and Training Unit (CPTU) of the Ministry of Public Administration (MoPA) should preserve career planning and training data of all officials, based on which, decisions on posting and transfer should be made.

Besides, technocracy, meaning the digitisation of administration, would ensure transparency in its operation. Following the Malaysian approach, the Human Resource Management Information System (HRMIS) can be introduced. HRMIS automates the recruitment process, from job posting to candidate onboarding and thus offers transparency in human resource situations, job vacancies and posting across departments. Introduction of technology will also reduce the scope for political interventions.

Most modern civil services now operate with both individual and institution-based performance monitoring, evaluation and review systems, which is nonexistent in the Bangladesh Civil Service. At the agency level, each ministry may have a Key Result Area (KRA). In light of that employees can be assessed on the basis of performance linking rewards and promotions directly to measurable results achieved. A performance management unit responsible for setting agency targets, measuring progress and ensuring accountability, needs to be set up in each agency.

In addition to that, a change in the mindset and attitude of civil servants is required—from being self-serving to citizen-centric and professional officials. There should be a code of conduct and ethics that uphold professionalism, democratic values and institutional integrity. A designated body/unit can be established in each ministry to ensure the enforcement of code of conduct and ethics. The unit can offer one/two weeks or monthly non-residential courses for senior civil servants.

The current reform initiative may face various challenges. One of the biggest challenges might be the lack of political will of the elected government to implement the reforms. Lack of institutional capacity both technological and behavioural to implement the reform might be another challenge. To overcome these challenges, consensus of political parties must be ensured during the process of designing reforms and parties must be committed to incorporating the reform issues into their election manifestoes and to implement them. Finally, a high-powered administrative body has to be created to oversee/monitor the progress of implementing the reform.

Dr Ferdous Arfina Osman is professor at the Department of Public Administration of the University of Dhaka.​