[🇧🇩] Indo-Bangla Relation: India's Regional Ambition, Geopolitical Reality, and Strategic Options For Bangladesh

[Saif]

Chief adviser voices concern over Indian hegemony: Manna

Nagorik Oikya President Mahmudur Rahman Manna has said the Chief Adviser told them that the country is facing a major crisis due to Indian hegemony.

en.prothomalo.com

Chief adviser voices concern over Indian hegemony: Manna
Staff Correspondent Dhaka
Published: 25 May 2025, 23: 02

Nagorik Oikya President Mahmudur Rahman Manna briefs journalists after meeting Chief Adviser on 25 May Prothom Alo

Nagorik Oikya President Mahmudur Rahman Manna has said the Chief Adviser told them that the country is facing a major crisis due to Indian hegemony.

Manna said this during a briefing tonight after a meeting with chief adviser professor Muhammad Yunus at his official residence, Jamuna, today, Sunday.

“The chief adviser stated that the country is in a major crisis due to Indian hegemony. He believes that the entire nation needs to remain united in response,” said Manna.

The chief adviser held a meeting at the state guest house Jamuna with leaders of several political parties, including Mahmudur Rahman Manna, today.

Manna spoke to journalists outside Jamuna later in the evening.

“He started the discussion by saying that we are in a deep crisis. By crisis, he meant the conspiracy of Indian hegemony. Indian hegemony does not want to accept this change in our country at all. If they could, they would destroy us in a single day, and they are doing everything necessary to that end. That’s what he said,” Manna quoted the chief adviser as saying.

Manna added that during the meeting, they urged the chief adviser to become more ‘politically engaged’. They also told him that he should clearly announce the date of the election, framework, and how he intends to conduct it.

“The chief adviser clearly informed them that if there are minimal reforms, the election will be held in December; if there are major reforms, it will be in June. He even offered to write in his resignation letter that the election will not be held after June under any circumstances.” Manna added.

Noting that unity among the people and political parties is weakening day by day, Manna said that the chief adviser is worried and frustrated because of it.

He added that they assured the chief adviser that they would remain united on national issues.

Mahmudur Rahman Manna said the chief adviser also told them that he became disheartened even during a recent meeting of advisory council, which is why he had decided on his resignation.

“A lot of things happened over the issue among them (advisers). He shared a detailed account of how the others stopped him, didn’t allow him to submit the resignation letter, and kept him from stepping down.”​

 

[Saif]

Indian president hopes for ‘democratic, inclusive’ Bangladesh as Dhaka’s envoy presents credentials

Extending a warm welcome to newly appointed Bangladesh High Commissioner, President of India Droupadi Murmu on Thursday said they envision a "democratic, stable, prosperous, and inclusive" Bangladesh. She emphasised that the foundation of bilateral ties between the two nations lies in the shared s

thefinancialexpress.com.bd

Indian president hopes for ‘democratic, inclusive’ Bangladesh as Dhaka’s envoy presents credentials

UNB
Published :
May 29, 2025 21:34
Updated :
May 29, 2025 21:34

Extending a warm welcome to newly appointed Bangladesh High Commissioner, President of India Droupadi Murmu on Thursday said they envision a "democratic, stable, prosperous, and inclusive" Bangladesh.

She emphasised that the foundation of bilateral ties between the two nations lies in the shared sacrifices made during the Liberation War of 1971.

Earlier, Bangladesh High Commissioner to India M Riaz Hamidullah presented his credentials to the Indian President.

The President of India accepted credentials from the Ambassadors/High Commissioners of Thailand, Costa Rica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Türkiye, Bangladesh and Kazakhstan at a ceremony held at Rashtrapati Bhavan.

The Indian president also spoke of the importance of a joint vision for shared prosperity and enhanced connectivity.

She congratulated Bangladesh on assuming the chairmanship of BIMSTEC for a two-year term.

High Commissioner Hamidullah, a senior career diplomat, assumed his duties in New Delhi on April 14, 2025, coinciding with the Bangla New Year, succeeding Mustafizur Rahman.

During the ceremony, the High Commissioner conveyed warm greetings from the President and the people of Bangladesh, according to Bangladesh High Commission in New Delhi.

He reiterated his commitment to strengthening the multifaceted partnership between the two countries.

High Commissioner Hamidullah also emphasised the importance of fostering connections between the youth of both nations, recognising that they represent the largest demographic segments.

Before his current posting, Ambassador Hamidullah served as Secretary (West & Multilateral) at Bangladesh's Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Dhaka.

Hamidullah served as the High Commissioner of Bangladesh to Sri Lanka and Ambassador to the Netherlands, according to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

He is a career diplomat who belongs to the 15th batch (1995) of Bangladesh Civil Service (Foreign Affairs).

Hamidullah served in various capacities in the Bangladesh Mission in New Delhi and Bangladesh Permanent Mission in New York in the past.

He also served as Director at SAARC Secretariat in Kathmandu.

At the headquarters, he worked in various capacities, inter alia, on multilateral economic issues, South Asian and European affairs and regional cooperation.​

 

[Saif]

54 years of Bangladesh-India relations: Who gained what?

After independence, the first agreement Bangladesh signed with India was a 25-year Treaty of Friendship. Shortly thereafter, a bilateral trade agreement was signed. For war-torn Bangladesh, this trade deal was essential. It can be said that cooperation between the two countries advanced rapidly...

en.prothomalo.com

54 years of Bangladesh-India relations: Who gained what?
After independence, the first agreement Bangladesh signed with India was a 25-year Treaty of Friendship. Shortly thereafter, a bilateral trade agreement was signed. For war-torn Bangladesh, this trade deal was essential. It can be said that cooperation between the two countries advanced rapidly up to 1975. However, that same period also became one of the most active for smuggling, from which Bangladesh suffered the most.

Following the ousting of the Awami League government in 1975, relations with India deteriorated over several issues, including the Farakka Barrage. During the Ershad regime, the relationship saw fewer ups and downs. Bilateral relations came into renewed focus after the Awami League returned to power in 2009. During that time, there were visible improvements in many areas of cooperation between the two countries. The Awami League government also benefited from political support in its efforts to consolidate power. However, after the fall of the Awami League government in the wake of the student-people's uprising, tensions in Bangladesh-India relations have reemerged. Trade-related retaliatory measures have been taken by both sides, and their effects are beginning to be visible in the economy. The extent of the long-term impact remains to be seen.

Now, let us examine the range of agreements and decisions made over the past 54 years between the two countries in the areas of economy and trade—that is, the Bangladesh–India Trade Timeline (1972–2025).

Shawkat Hossain Dhaka
Updated: 29 May 2025, 19: 06


19 March 1972 – Bangladesh-India Treaty of Friendship
The Bangladesh-India Treaty of Friendship was signed in New Delhi, the capital of India, by Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.

The treaty was signed as a gesture of recognition and gratitude for India's role in Bangladesh’s 1971 Liberation War. It was a 25-year strategic and diplomatic cooperation agreement between the two nations. Although initially set for 25 years, the treaty was not officially renewed when it expired in 1997.

For newly independent Bangladesh, the treaty marked its first strategic alliance. However, it has also faced criticism from some quarters as an attempt to establish Indian dominance.

28 March 1972 – First bilateral trade agreement
The first bilateral trade agreement between Bangladesh and India was signed on 28 March 1972. According to reports published in the Daily Ittefaq on 29 and 30 March, the agreement allowed both countries to exchange goods within 16 kilometers of the international border and permitted transit facilities.

The agreement was initially valid for one year, with provisions for review after six months. It was signed on behalf of Bangladesh by the then Minister of Commerce, MR Siddiqui, and on behalf of India by the Minister of Foreign Trade, LN Mishra.

Under the agreement, trade worth Tk 1 billion was expected to take place over the next year. Bangladesh would export to India items such as fish, raw jute, furnace oil, naphtha, jute batching oil, semi-processed cowhide, silk thread, handloom cotton products, molasses, Ayurvedic medicines, and books and periodicals.

India would export to Bangladesh items including cement, asphalt, stone, gypsum, limestone, cotton yarn, chemicals and pharmaceuticals, spices, tobacco, machinery spare parts, and also books and periodicals.

1 November 1972 – First inland water transport agreement
Through the Inland Water Transit and Trade Protocol, Bangladesh and India established a framework for mutual trade and cargo transportation using their internal waterways.

This framework significantly facilitated connectivity between India’s northeastern region and the rest of the country.

According to a Daily Ittefaq report published on 2 November 1972, this new river transport agreement was signed under the provisions of the first Bangladesh-India trade deal.

Initially, the agreement was set to last five years. It granted India access to navigate and transport goods through Bangladesh’s river routes, which had been suspended during the 1965 India–Pakistan war.

The agreement was signed by Pimpunker, Secretary of India’s Department of Transport and Shipping, and Sultanuzzaman, Secretary of Navigation for Bangladesh. As a result of this agreement, direct waterway connectivity between West Bengal and Assam through Bangladesh was established, allowing for cargo transport via river routes.

Notably, this protocol has since been renewed and expanded. For example, it was renewed for five years in 2015, and a second addendum was signed on 20 May 2020, introducing new routes and ports of call.

5 July 1973 – Three-year trade agreement
A three-year trade agreement between Bangladesh and India was signed in Dhaka. Bangladesh’s Minister of Commerce AHM Qamaruzzaman and India’s Minister of Commerce Professor DP Chattopadhyay signed the bilateral agreement.

According to a report published in the Daily Ittefaq on 6 July, the agreement stipulated that goods worth a total of Tk 610 million would be exchanged between the two countries during the first year— Tk 305 million worth on each side. At a press conference following the signing, it was announced that the agreement would come into effect on 28 September and that officials from both countries would meet every six months to review its implementation.

Under the new agreement, Bangladesh would export to India: Raw jute worth Tk 200 million, newsprint worth Tk 45 million, dried and fresh fish worth Tk 35 million, leather worth Tk 10 million, newspapers and magazines worth Tk 2.2 million, ayurvedic and unani medicines worth Tk 500,000, films worth Tk 1 million, silk cotton, medicines, spices, and various other products totaling another Tk 10 million.

In return, Bangladesh would import from India: Coal worth Tk 60 million, raw tobacco worth Tk 52 million, cotton worth Tk 75 million, yarn worth Tk 20 million, textile yarn worth Tk 10 million, newspapers and magazines worth Tk 2.2 million and films worth Tk 1 million.

In addition to spare parts, chemicals, toothbrushes, machinery, bicycles, spices, and more will be imported.

30 September 1974 – Trade and Payments Arrangement Agreement
On 30 September 1974, Bangladesh and India signed the Trade and Payments Arrangement (TPA). This agreement established the foundation for a balanced system of trade and financial settlements between the two countries.Through this arrangement, a clearing account was established between the central banks of the two countries, enabling periodic settlement of commercial transactions.

Later, on 17 December 1974, a protocol was signed to end rupee-based trade and transition to trade using freely convertible currencies.

17 December 1974 – End of rupee-based trade and currency conversion
Although signed on 17 December 1974, the protocol came into effect on 1 January of the following year. Through this protocol, Bangladesh and India agreed to end trade in rupees and conduct transactions in freely convertible currencies. The agreement was signed in Delhi by Bangladesh’s Commerce Minister Khandakar Mushtaq Ahmed and India’s Commerce Minister Debi Prasad Chattopadhyay.

A report published in the Daily Sangbad on 18 December 1974, stated:

“From 1 January, Bangladesh and India will switch from rupee-based trade to trade in freely exchangeable currencies. The original rupee trade agreement was to remain valid until July 1976 under the 5 July 1973, India-Bangladesh trade treaty.”

The Indian commerce minister at a press conference said that both public and private sectors in the two countries had shown reluctance in rupee-based transactions, leading to underwhelming progress in trade. This made a change in the exchange mechanism necessary.

12 January 1976 – Subsequent trade protocol
By then, the Awami League government was no longer in power, and bilateral relations had become strained, leading to a decline in trade. In an effort to improve ties—particularly in trade—a Bangladeshi government delegation led by then-Commerce Secretary Nurul Islam visited India. After six days of discussions with a team led by India’s Secretary of Foreign Trade, PC Alexander, a memorandum of understanding was signed. The protocol established specific trade arrangements for products like coal and newsprint.

4 October 1980 – Renewal of bilateral trade agreement
This was essentially a renewed and expanded version of the original 1972 trade agreement between Bangladesh and India. A Daily Ittefaq headline on 5 October 1980, read: “New Bangladesh-India Trade Agreement Signed Under Conditions of Mutual Benefit.”

The agreement was signed during a visit by Indian Commerce Minister Pranab Mukherjee. On behalf of Bangladesh, State Minister for Commerce Chowdhury Tanveer Ahmed Siddiqui signed the deal. The agreement was valid for three years, with a provision for extension by mutual consent.

8 November 1983 – Renewal of Inland Water Transit Protocol
During the renewal of this protocol, new routes and ports of call were added. After three days of talks in Dhaka, representatives from both countries signed the renewed Inland Water Transit Protocol. A headline in Daily Ittefaq on 9 November read: “Protocol on Indian Ship Movement Renewed.”

11 April 1993 – SAARC Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA)
At the 7th SAARC Summit held in Dhaka, all member states signed the SAARC Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA) agreement.

1 January 2006 – SAFTA Comes into Effect

The South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) replaced SAPTA and became effective on 1 January 2006. The SAFTA agreement was signed on 6 January 2004, during a SAARC summit held in Islamabad. Under SAFTA, member countries began gradually reducing tariffs in mutual trade.

13 August 2008 – Bangladesh included in India’s LDC scheme
At the WTO’s Hong Kong Ministerial Conference, it was agreed that 98.2pc of products from Least Developed Countries (LDCs) would receive duty- and quota-free access. In line with that, India launched the Duty-Free Tariff Preference (DFTP) scheme for LDCs on 13 August 2008, which included Bangladesh.

12 January 2010 – Sheikh Hasina's visit to India
During Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s visit to India in 2010, a number of agreements were signed. At the time, India’s Prime Minister was Manmohan Singh.

Key decisions made during the visit included:

Bangladesh and India agreed to allow each other the use of their sea, rail, and road transport routes.

India decided to allow Bangladesh to use its territory for transit access to Nepal and Bhutan.

In return, Bangladesh would permit India to use the Chattogram and Mongla seaports. These ports would also be accessible to Nepal and Bhutan.

Both countries agreed on the use of Ashuganj (in Bangladesh) and Silghat (in India) as ports of call.

India pledged $1 billion in loan assistance for the reform of Bangladesh’s railway system, improvement of transport infrastructure, and dredging of rivers.

India assured that it would not undertake any activity under the Tipaimukh Dam project that could harm Bangladesh.

The two countries agreed to expedite the signing of a Teesta River water-sharing agreement by arranging a meeting between their respective water resource ministers.

India agreed to supply 250 megawatts of electricity to help Bangladesh address its power shortage.​

In 2010, Bangladesh's Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina with India's Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in Delhi.

6 September 2011 – Manmohan Singh's visit to Bangladesh
During Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s four-day visit to Bangladesh, several agreements were signed:
India announced duty-free and quota-free access for 46 Bangladeshi products.

Agreements were reached on border management, including joint patrols, and consensus to reduce border intrusions and killings.

Residents of enclaves were allowed to travel within designated areas of both countries without passports.

The line of credit was extended, and India agreed to allow parts of the previously announced 1 billion dollar loan to be spent on specific projects.

However, the much-anticipated Teesta water-sharing agreement was not signed.

This was the main focus of the talks, but the agreement fell through after strong opposition from West Bengal’s Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee, who refused to join the visit. Notably, the agreement has still not been signed to this day.

6 June 2015 – Narendra Modi’s visit to Bangladesh
On 6 June 2015, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi made his first official visit to Dhaka.

During the visit, 22 memorandums of understanding and agreements were signed. Key highlights included:

Land Boundary Agreement (LBA): Implementation of the 1974 treaty and formal exchange of documents. A total of 162 enclaves were exchanged — 111 Indian enclaves (with 17,160 residents) transferred to Bangladesh and 51 Bangladeshi enclaves (with 37,369 residents) to India.

$2 Billion Line of Credit: India announced a new $2 billion loan commitment to Bangladesh.

Coastal Shipping Agreement: This allowed direct cargo shipping between Bangladesh’s Chattogram and Mongla ports and India’s eastern seaports.

Rail Connectivity Agreement: Restoration and expansion of cross-border railway links.

Renewal of Bilateral Trade Agreement.

Expansion of Border Haats (markets).

Power Cooperation Agreement: Promoting electricity trade and interconnection.

Education and Cultural Agreements: Including student and faculty exchanges, joint celebrations of Rabindranath Tagore and Kazi Nazrul Islam, and collaborative research/publications on Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose.

Launch of Direct Bus Service: Between Agartala (India), Dhaka, and Kolkata.

Renewal of Inland Water Trade and Transit Agreement: Originally signed in 1972, this agreement was renewed for five years with an automatic extension clause.

Later, on 20 May 2020, the agreement was further expanded through the signing of a second addendum, introducing new routes and ports, including Haldia in India and Mongla in Bangladesh.

1 July 2015 – Renewal of trade agreement

The five-year bilateral trade agreement between Bangladesh and India was renewed.

5 November 2017 – Power purchase agreement with Adani

In 2017, the state-owned Power Development Board (PDB) signed a power purchase agreement with Adani Power (Jharkhand) Limited. Under the deal, electricity would be supplied to Bangladesh from a 1,600-megawatt coal-fired power plant located in Godda district, Jharkhand, India. The agreement has faced widespread criticism due to the high cost of electricity.

25 October 2018 – Agreement to use Chattogram and Mongla ports for transit
An agreement was signed allowing India to use Bangladesh’s Chattogram and Mongla ports for transit of goods to its northeastern states. The deal faced significant criticism in Bangladesh, with concerns that the country would not benefit financially from this arrangement.

21 July 2020 – First transit shipment
The first trial shipment under the transit agreement was completed, with Indian goods transported via Chattogram Port to Tripura by Indian trucks.

18 March 2023 – Inauguration of the India-Bangladesh diesel pipeline
As part of enhanced energy cooperation, the prime ministers of both countries jointly inaugurated a 131.57-kilometer cross-border pipeline via video conference. The pipeline delivers diesel from Assam, India, to northern Bangladesh. Of the total length, 126.57 km lies within Bangladesh and 5 km in India. Under a 15-year agreement, Bangladesh can import between 250,000 and 400,000 tonnes of diesel annually. The deal was approved by Bangladesh's cabinet committee on economic affairs on 23 August 2017.

1 April 2023 – Permanent access to Chattogram and Mongla ports for India
Bangladesh officially granted India permanent access to use Chattogram and Mongla ports for transporting goods to India’s northeastern states. The National Board of Revenue (NBR) issued a permanent transit order for this purpose.

Previously, in 2018, Dhaka and Delhi signed a related agreement. In 2019, a trial shipment from India was sent via Chattogram Port through Akhaura to Agartala. In 2022, India conducted further trial transits through two additional routes using Mongla Port.

8 April 2025 – India cancels transshipment facility
Following the fall of the Awami League government, India revoked the transshipment facility that allowed Bangladesh to export goods to third countries via Indian land borders. The Central Board of Indirect Taxes and Customs (CBIC) issued the cancellation notice.

15 April 2025 – Bangladesh halts yarn imports via land ports
Bangladesh's National Board of Revenue (NBR) discontinued the import of yarn through land ports such as Benapole, Bhomra, Sonamasjid, Banglabandha, and Burimari. However, yarn can still be imported via sea or other routes.

15 April 2025 – Expiry of rice import allowance
The government had previously allowed duty-free rice imports through Hili and Benapole land ports. As of 15 April, this allowance expired, and no extension was granted.

17 May 2025 – India imposes restrictions on land port imports
India's Directorate General of Foreign Trade (DGFT) announced restrictions on the import of certain goods from Bangladesh via land ports. Affected items include ready-made garments, processed foods, and plastics. These goods can now only be imported through Kolkata and the Haldia seaport.
India's decision includes four key points:

First, Bangladesh will no longer be allowed to export garments using any Indian land ports. Such exports must now go through Kolkata’s Haldia Port or Mumbai’s Nhava Sheva Port.

Second, Bangladesh will not be permitted to export processed foods, beverages, furniture, plastic products, yarn, and yarn-based items to the Indian states of Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura, and Mizoram via land customs stations.

Third, processed foods, beverages, furniture, plastic products, yarn, and related items also cannot be exported through West Bengal’s Changrabandha and Fulbari customs stations. This means such exports will not be allowed via Bangladesh’s Burimari (Lalmonirhat) and Banglabandha (Panchagarh) land ports either.

Fourth, India has not imposed restrictions on imports of fish, liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), edible oil, or crushed stone from Bangladesh. Furthermore, there will be no restrictions on the export of Bangladeshi goods to Nepal and Bhutan via Indian ports.

Final word
All things considered, although Bangladesh has maintained close political and economic ties with India since its independence, there has been a persistent imbalance in the give-and-take dynamic. The relationship began with the 1972 Treaty of Friendship, but over the past 54 years, Bangladesh has granted India transit rights, access to the Chattogram and Mongla ports, the opportunity to export electricity, and the use of its waterways, roads, and railways. It has also enabled connectivity to India’s northeastern states. India has gained tangible benefits from coastal shipping, the diesel pipeline, electricity exports, lines of credit, border markets, and trade agreements.

In return, Bangladesh has received some financial assistance, limited duty-free access for certain products, and promises of infrastructure development. However, the long-anticipated Teesta water-sharing agreement remains unsigned. Bangladesh has also gained little financial benefit from transit rights. Though loans were provided, they often came with conditions—such as the mandatory purchase of Indian goods and use of Indian contractors—which raised questions about project quality and relevance.

Recently, trade relations have further weakened due to India’s imposition of restrictions on imports and exports via land ports, the withdrawal of transshipment facilities, and Bangladesh’s decision to suspend yarn imports through land ports.

In summary, over the last 54 years, India has gained more strategically and economically, while Bangladesh is still waiting for the promises and equitable opportunities to be fulfilled.

*This analytical report, originally published in Prothom Alo print and online edition, has been prepared in English by Rabiul Islam.​

 

[Saif]

Dependency by design?

Was Bangladesh's reliance on Indian transhipment inevitable - or did it unfold from failures that could, and perhaps should, have been foreseen and averted? More provocatively: was this dependency merely a by-product of internal inelasticity caused by shortcomings, or a consequence of strategic pas

thefinancialexpress.com.bd

Dependency by design?
A retrospective on Bangladesh's transhipment reliance on India
Hossain Mohammed Omar Khayum
Published :
May 30, 2025 23:53
Updated :
May 30, 2025 23:53

Was Bangladesh's reliance on Indian transhipment inevitable - or did it unfold from failures that could, and perhaps should, have been foreseen and averted? More provocatively: was this dependency merely a by-product of internal inelasticity caused by shortcomings, or a consequence of strategic passivity enabled by Bangladesh's then political alignment with India? These questions matter because they lie at the heart of our policy expertise, political will, national sovereignty, and economic competitiveness.

For several years, India facilitated transhipment of Bangladeshi goods - by land, rail, sea, and even air - to destinations like Nepal, Bhutan, Myanmar, and some parts of Europe. This may seem like a win-win to some, but this surface-level convenience conceals deeper vulnerabilities. How did we end up depending on a not-so-neighbourly neighbour, however friendly presented at the time, for something as foundational as trade access and supply chain movement?

There were several signs visible as early as the 1990s, and especially right from the beginning of the following decade that Bangladesh would need upgraded trade logistics, diversified connectivity, and regional transport cooperation. But the successive governments either underestimated the urgency, over-politicised regional cooperation, or failed to invest early enough in required infrastructure and trade facilitation. So, let's be clear: transhipment through India became necessary not because Bangladesh lacked options, but because it failed to develop and diversify those options in time.

Take ports, for example. Chattogram Port was showing signs of congestion since the early 2000s. Exporters complained of costly delays; global buyers worried about reliability, and reports from the World Bank and domestic think tanks issued repeated warnings. But what happened? The long-envisioned deep-sea port at Sonadia was shelved, reportedly due to Indian discomfort with Chinese involvement in the process and instead, Matarbari's plan was cleared with Japanese backing, which remains under construction. Meanwhile, India modernised Haldia and Kolkata and waited.

Again, despite being the second-largest RMG exporter in the world, Bangladesh's air cargo infrastructure lagged far behind. Considering the country's export basket, the airport cold chains were substandard, logistics were inefficient, and the capacity to ship by air is still minimal. And, investment decisions were not fast or sizeable enough to fix that, while neighbouring economies raced ahead in cargo competitiveness. Some will argue: well, maybe Bangladesh just did not have the resources then.

But this is not a story of capacity, it is of prioritisation. Because the government, especially under the Awami League since 2009, though focused overwhelmingly on increasing exports, failed to recognise how those exports move. While the bureaucracy kept hitting numbers, infrastructure fell behind. The Ministry of Commerce sets goals, but the Ministry of Shipping delayed reforms, and logistical modernity remained buried, glossed over by national plans to promote exports. And that lack of attention led to predictable outcomes - congestion, delay, and loss of competitiveness.

So, when India came offering the transhipment options, ready-built and waiting, it did not need to be coercion - it was packaged convenience. Which leads us to the political question: did Bangladesh's lack of preparation serve Indian interests? On the one hand, it would be naive to blatantly suggest that India orchestrated this outcome, but on the other hand, it would be equally naive to pretend that India did not benefit from Bangladesh's inactivity, or that the Awami League's slippery slope of foreign policy tilts played no role. Having repeated opportunities to establish mechanisms to reach Nepal and Bhutan, deepen ties with China and Myanmar, or at least diversify our transit channels, these did not materialise from the fear of offending India, or the desire to remain in Delhi's good books. Meaning, such moves was either delayed, diluted, or diplomatically downplayed.

In fact, arguably the very absence of urgency in developing sovereign infrastructure was a form of 'strategic myopia'. A silent calculus. Why spend billions and test foreign relations when India is right there, cheering the inertia and opening its gates? But naturally, for sovereigns, dependency once formed, does not stay economic. It becomes political. And, so it became. It narrowed Bangladesh's room to manoeuvre, especially in times of regional tension.

Though the situation is now being addressed, and Bangladesh is investing in Matarbari, exploring multimodal transport, and improving customs systems, these efforts are reactive, not visionary. They come after the costs of dependence have already been absorbed.

Looking back, the signs were clear from the demand side - port warnings, export congestion, air cargo delays, asymmetrical infrastructure etc. And in the market, too, there were signs - growing exports, shifting geopolitics, rising regionalism etc. But the supply side- government - ignored or downplayed until crisis, competition, and congestion forced action. Yet they were not treated with the seriousness they demanded. And this strategic myopia led us to a place where transhipment through India was not a choice, but a necessity, does not matter whether it was negligence or quiet alignment.

So, the lesson here is this: in international trade and/ or geopolitics, failure to prepare often translates into dependence. The true cost of not investing in infrastructure is not just lost time or money, it's lost leverage. Bangladesh must catch up now and do so not just for efficiency, but for autonomy. Because no matter how friendly any partner is, sovereignty should never be routed through someone else's corridor.

Hossain Mohammed Omar Khayum is development economist and policy researcher at the crossroads of history, morality and pragmatism.​