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G Bangladesh Defense Forum
Short Summary: Tracking activities of various sections in Bangladesh to influence press freedom.

Saif

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Date Occurred: Nov 13, 2024
External forces must not interfere with the media

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Dr Iftekharuzzaman, executive director of Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB), talks about the current state of press freedom in the country, recent attempts by certain groups to suppress some media outlets, and the potential way out of the situation with Naznin Tithi of The Daily Star.

Why is the media still unable to operate freely following the political change in the country, despite repeated commitments from the interim government to ensure press freedom?

Let's remember the background of the anti-discrimination movement, which initially began as a quota reform movement seeking justice in public sector recruitment. The underlying factors behind this movement, however, were multi-dimensional and deeply rooted in institutionalised discrimination across all aspects of life and society, shaped by years of authoritarian rule. The student-led movement was soon joined by the broader public, rallying under the main slogan against all forms of discrimination. On August 5, the authoritarian regime fell. But this does not necessarily mean that we have achieved a discrimination-free Bangladesh, nor can we expect the deep-rooted discriminatory structures and practices to be transformed in the short term.

The people's dream for a "new Bangladesh" includes restructuring the state and establishing a new social and political order, with a clear stance against all forms of discrimination. While the government, the movement itself, and other stakeholders are clearly committed to realising this vision, what we are observing post-August 5 is that various groups, considering themselves victors—whether as direct participants, supporters, or opportunists—do not all share the same understanding or vision of a discrimination-free society. This divergence is now manifesting in different ways.

What reforms does the media need in Bangladesh?

The diversity of our society—in terms of gender, religion, culture, ethnicity, etc—is under severe stress as some groups feel newly entitled to impose parochial agendas. Using labels like "collaborators" or "co-opted beneficiaries" of the previous authoritarian regime, these forces now consider themselves empowered—sometimes excessively so—to impose their own agendas, which are not necessarily aligned with the anti-discrimination movement's spirit.

The media has become one of the targets of these groups, which are now trying to impose their own interpretations of media freedom onto others. Certain sections of the media that have played a very supportive role in the whole movement, advocated for a diverse and inclusive society, and have been consistent with the anti-discriminatory spirit are now being selectively targeted. Media freedom is being subjected to campaigns by forces whose basic conceptualisation, indoctrination, and ways of imposing agendas are discriminatory at their core, which is deeply troubling.

Nevertheless, we cannot ignore the factors that contributed to the transformation of an originally democratically elected regime in 2008 into a draconian authoritarian one. It was designed to monopolise political and governance space and to capture state and non-state institutions to create a superstructure perceived to maintain power indefinitely, without accountability. This setup enabled abuse of power, corruption, and the criminalisation of politics with impunity. It is also a fact that the media was among the institutions targeted for capture and control. As a result, some segments of the media struggled to navigate state-sponsored controls and conspiracies while striving for independence and professionalism, though often at the cost of reluctant self-censorship. On the other hand, many media outlets allowed themselves to be co-opted, benefiting from and even becoming components of the authoritarian superstructure. While no one should condone such collaborators or facilitators of the previous regime, indiscriminately victimising the entire media or launching targeted attacks on select outlets for what occurred under authoritarian rule is unacceptable.

How would you explain the recent attempts by certain groups to silence the media or the mob mentality directed against journalists and specific media outlets? What role has the government played in stopping this?

The interim government has repeatedly stated its commitment to a free press. When the chief adviser met with newspaper editors, he encouraged them to be critical and objective in identifying the government's failures. From the government's side, we have not seen anything detrimental to media freedom, except for the recent indiscriminate cancellation of accreditation of a large number of journalists.

When agitations took place against some of the leading media houses, the government provided them support and resisted such moves. However, certain groups who find themselves to be over-empowered—who may or may not have participated in the movement—continue to act as if it is their time to impose their own agenda to target media that is not in their liking for their own reason. While the government has successfully prevented worse outcomes, there is no guarantee that these forces have been fully controlled or managed to the extent that such indoctrinated groups won't strike back. So, the government must be vigilant to safeguard media freedom. History is replete with examples that failure to ensure free media can only be self-defeating.

Mob justice is the manifestation or a weapon these forces are using. And the media has obviously become one of the targets. However, this is not the first time that it has been used. Mob justice has taken place in other contexts as well since August 5. This is also not unusual in the context of such a huge popular uprising against a deep-rooted authoritarian regime. Many people would consider it normal because people have deep-rooted sentiments against the former regime. People have strong emotions against those who are in any manner considered to be associated with or part of the authoritarian regime and those who facilitated the ruthless killings, tortures, all kinds of discrimination and violation of fundamental rights. Mob justice is the outburst of that emotion of people against such grievances. But there is a limit to it and the government must strategically address and manage it in due process through effective communication.

Incidentally, the two most prominent media houses in the country, which are under attack now, were directly victimised in the worst possible way by the authoritarian regime. They were blacklisted from any government programmes or press conferences and deprived of government advertisements. It is no secret that they were consistent targets of manipulation, harassment, and intimidation by the intelligence agencies, the main powerbase of the previous regime. Both houses had to endure a series of politically motivated cases due to their role as free media. Their fate symbolised the criminalisation of free media driven by a hunger for power. Despite this, they survived the challenging situation without compromising their commitment to upholding the spirit of a free press. Whether they are targeted in the "new Bangladesh" because of their alleged "linkage" with India or the previous regime, or for upholding the spirit of a free press, is anyone's guess.

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VISUAL: ANWAR SOHEL

The interim government has announced plans to repeal the Cyber Security Act (CSA). How do you view this development?

It was the right decision and an expected one. There was widespread demand for this from the public, and the civil society and the media played a role in advocating for its repeal. Here, I would like to mention a number of things that should be done. The government should immediately undertake a comprehensive programme of duly compensating the victims of this draconian law and their families and rehabilitate them professionally, psychologically, and socially. Secondly, they should withdraw all the ongoing cases, although there is a legal issue in that. But if the government is willing, there can be ways of addressing the issue. Thirdly, in the present global context, there is no other option but to have a Cyber Security Act. But while drafting the new cyber security law, they should be able to take the right lessons from the DSA and the CSA. It has to be drafted through a fully participatory process, involving all stakeholders, including experts and professionals on cyber security. Plus, whoever is drafting this law must remember that it is not meant to control or dictate terms of freedom of expression or media freedom on cyber platforms—the Internet system, social media, and other digital platforms. The purpose of this law should be restricted to ensuring the safety and security of users on the Internet and the digital sphere. But any form of control of free expression, dissent, free speech, or free media should be outside the new law's scope.

Also, the names such as the Cyber Security Act or the Digital Security Act should not be used anymore. These names have created an atmosphere of intimidation, a sense of insecurity in society. The new law can be called something like the Internet Safety Act. Finally, since the government is the largest user and worst possible abuser of the Internet and digital system as per track record, to avoid conflict of interest, the authority to be created to oversee the implementation of this new law must be an independent body outside the control of the government.

The government has established a media reform commission. What types of media reforms are needed in this changed political climate and how can the media in Bangladesh regain public trust?

First of all, media as a fourth estate must be committed to upholding the fundamental principles of media ethics and integrity. The media as an institution cannot and does not need to be controlled by external forces. But in Bangladesh, we have seen that the media has been subjected to government control motivated by partisan political bias or influence for which draconian laws and state institutions including intelligence agencies were used. One of the tools used against media was divide and rule and cooption. As a result, while a few media houses may have their own integrity and ethical standards and practices, there has always been a lack of efforts on part of the media as a sector to develop and uphold the basic principles of independent and ethical journalism, or professional integrity among media personnel. I think now the media houses should try to sit together in the spirit of a new Bangladesh. They should themselves create a media code of ethics, ethics structures and implementation roadmaps. There must be mechanisms for the media to self-regulate and work transparently and accountably, maintaining professional integrity without external influence, political or otherwise. There has to be some serious system of sectoral oversight rather than anything coming from outside.

Secondly, like anywhere else in the world, media houses here are also essentially business entities. That's part of the reality. Nevertheless, there are good global practices. The capacity of the investors to differentiate between business interests and media freedom is very important. To instil this ideal into the media houses, their investors and media leaders, relevant professionals and experts should come together to make their own policies. However, no matter how much we talk about media reforms, unless and until there is a paradigm shift in the culture and practices of our politics and bureaucracy, which remain hostage to a media control mindset, changes will not happen.

Thirdly, media organisations must ensure that journalists and reporters are properly compensated and protected, with adequate job security and safety from all risks associated with the discharge of their professional duties. Many journalists are underpaid or irregularly paid, which must change for the media to maintain integrity.

Media, unlike most other institutions, have to be accountable to its constituency—the readers and viewers—every day, and in fact, every moment. Therefore, to survive credibly it must develop its own inbuilt system of ethics and integrity. No freedom is unlimited or unaccountable, but in the case of media, the limit to freedom and the process of accountability must be defined and ensured by the media itself within its constitutional mandate.​
 

Government must make itself available to questions from the press

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Visual: Aliza Rahman

I am mindful of the risk that criticism even from a friend keen to see the interim government (IG) succeed could be misrepresented by those who would rather the IG failed. Such people will find nothing in the following to cast doubt on the legitimacy of the IG. Rather, the remarks here are offered in the spirit of constructive advice with a view to helping the IG accomplish its goals.

Democratic governments are held accountable by popular elections, parliamentary scrutiny, and the review of independent institutions such as the courts. Beyond such features, one is hard pressed to find any practice of democracy that does not include the rigours of a vibrant, free press.

At the time of writing this, there are only three members of staff in the press office of the chief adviser. The office's woeful under-resourcing alone, rather than failures of staff, could explain its shortcomings.

Instead of acting as a passive conduit for government bulletins, a press office should take the initiative on communications, anticipating needs and acting accordingly. Consider the IG's announcement on September 17 to grant temporary magistracy powers to the military. Without reasons for such a grant of powers, the announcement naturally raised concerns. The home affairs adviser did subsequently provide further explanation in a speech to new army recruits, but that came two days after news media had reported the story and damage had been done.

Examples of "small" avoidable errors are plentiful; their impact cumulatively, however, is far from small. Here is another example. After first supporting the IG's resolve to reform the constitution, BNP leadership was reported to say, on September 22, that reforms should take place only under an elected government. This came after earlier reported claims that the public would not tolerate an IG staying in place for too long. The press office should have grasped the significance of the BNP statement, not least as a test of the traction that calls for elections might enjoy. A press office with initiative would quickly have landed on a readily available response to provide journalists. With the law adviser's help, the office could have drafted something along such lines as: "The IG shares the BNP's concern for democratic endorsement of a constitution. Constitutions, everywhere, are typically approved by constitutional assemblies and ratified by parliaments. The IG respects the need for the people, directly or through elected representatives, to ratify a constitution." Such a response would not have bound the IG and, moreover, it would have sent a cautionary signal to all those who would call for elections prematurely. As a bonus, it would have reframed the BNP's own statement.

Perhaps the press office's shortcomings are most vividly illustrated by the CA's recent interview with Voice of America and the subsequent furore. Though first reported on October 3, the interview itself took place on September 27. Presumably, a press officer was present (and made a separate recording), as should be the case at all media interviews.

After referencing the destruction of Bangabandhu Memorial Museum and the cancellation of the national day of mourning, while further noting that Sheikh Mujib had long been recognised as the father of the nation, the interviewer asked "What's the viewpoint of your IG?"

To say that the CA's answer was regrettable is hardly controversial. In hindsight, I imagine he wishes he had worded things differently. His reply was: "You're talking about the past. Apparently, you don't remember that a mass uprising has since taken place. You're speaking as if it never happened. You need to see what's happening in this new situation. You do not seem to have any questions about how many students have sacrificed their lives, why they sacrificed their lives. First, we must admit that they, the students, said that we have pushed a reset button. The past is gone for sure. Now we will build up in new way. People also want that. And this new way means we must bring reforms."

What gave rise to controversy, specifically, were the words "...we have pushed a reset button. The past is gone for sure." My own view is that the CA did not intend to be understood as promoting revisionist history or Stalinist photographic airbrushing of a persona newly deemed non gratis. But it is unreasonable to expect everyone to read his words as I did: on its face, the text is indeed troubling.

Moreover, the controversial words aside, the rest of the CA's response to the question reflects a lack of having been prepared by his press team. His tone is defensive, bordering on belligerent, which does not look good at all. My attention here is not on what the CA said but on what the press office failed to do both beforehand and afterward. Professor Yunus is not a seasoned politician emerging from the trials of political interviews over long years. He is an academic. His team should have warned him that, although he will be celebrated by leaders gathered in New York for the UN general assembly, he should not expect an easy ride in every press interview. They should have cautioned him that criticising a journalist for the choice of questions leaves the impression of someone defensive and unfamiliar with accountability. Under the old regime, of course, Awami League politicians all but wrote the questions put to them at press conferences. But that is not the case wherever there is a free press—choice of questions is the interviewer's prerogative.

Equally important, the team should have primed the CA on the cardinal rule of political interviews—do not answer a question, when it is wise not to do so, but instead pivot to your own talking point. And it is never wise to answer a question that has raised your ire and made you feel defensive, in the way the question quite evidently had Professor Yunus. His own closing words indicate what the focus of his answer should have been: "...we must bring reforms."

No doubt other things were also at play. For instance, we all recognise a prevailing culture of deference towards "superiors," that inhibits constructive criticism, including in private, which, in turn, leaves people in leadership positions unaccustomed to awkward questions.

A competent communications staffer present at the interview would spot right away that the CA's answer to that one question could well cause problems. The press team should have anticipated the likelihood of a social media outcry, with a response at the ready, if required upon the interview's publication a week later. Instead, it took another seven days following publication for the team to react on October 11. Even then, it did so by releasing a written statement rather than through a press conference, where, by fielding questions, it might have hoped to put matters to rest, not just in the media but in people's minds. None of this is how a serious communications operation is run.

The press office has several functions for which it must be adequately staffed. Clearly, it must guide senior IG officials on how to field questions. More generally, it must anticipate reactions to its own announcements; it must be fleet of foot; it must enlist any part of the IG necessary to inform a response to news and events; and it must have the weight of the CA behind it to promptly receive whatever input it needs from others in the IG.

But there is another critical function, one the press team has yet to serve with enough regularity or effectiveness, a function that brings into focus the unique nature of this administration. As discussed above, there is no doubt the IG has a clear mandate. But a mandate does not constitute accountability. And, in the justifiable absence of parliament, there are scarcely any sources of public accountability aside from the press. The press office should be holding press conferences, taking questions from journalists regularly and frequently, even daily—why not? There is no shame in not having answers always at hand; when necessary, answers can be provided later. But the press has to be respected as an institution by which the government is held accountable by the people. Until elections are called and parliament restored, it is arguably the only such institution.

This insight has another important consequence, to which I now turn. As was to be expected, August saw a flurry of media reports of advisers making bold and broad statements of principle—how this or that practice must stop. But lofty platitudes have continued into October amid an endless merry-go-round of roundtables and conferences, with senior IG figures all too often in attendance. One can be forgiven for wondering if some in the IG have failed to grasp a simple fact: they have ceased to be civil society campaigners making demands of the government; in fact, they are the government.

Most of the advisers are drawn from the NGO or academic sectors, where conferences and roundtables are routine. Such roundtables have a virtue in attracting news media for the purpose of legitimate advocacy work. But governments do not need roundtables to attract attention. Moreover, it should be apparent to anyone who's attended any—and, God forgive me, I have attended too many—roundtables hardly ever yield new insights.

Too much of what we hear about government decision-making is through news reports of roundtables. Even if the government were elected, this would be undemocratic, but it is all the more so given that the IG is not elected, and since such forums are invariably gatherings of the Dhaka elite, who are all too often found at the same dinner parties and weddings.

Governing is about getting things done practically and is not the same as NGO advocacy. Advisers should attend roundtables judiciously, turning instead to press conferences and fielding questions from journalists. Press conferences are the right forum for announcing developments in government policy.

One notes, by the way, that where press conferences are routinely held, with press officers taking questions, news media will put their best journalists on the beat, for the obvious reason that good questions will yield material worth reporting. And this, incidentally, will raise the standard of accountability. Accountability is not to be feared but embraced. It makes each of us better, as well as being better for those to whom we are accountable. Besides, shouldn't we act like the change we want to see? If the IG wants governments to be accountable, it can act now.

Roundtables can go ahead but without advisers, and conveners can make written submissions to the IG, with the benefit of discussions already in hand. Advisers and other government officials must be freed from the terrible time-sink of these roundtables. If I mention Dhaka's horrifying perpetual traffic jam and the hours it takes to travel to and from any venue, it is to underline the fact that time is a precious commodity depleting by the day, and especially precious to an IG with an indeterminate future.

Bangladesh needs a properly resourced and responsive IG press office, one that regards its audience as the nation and not the elite. Making itself routinely answerable to a free press is the pre-eminent means, until elections, by which the government can deliver effective accountability. Without accountability, we will all, in time, inevitably wonder: what the heck is the government actually doing? The cumulative effect of inadequate announcements and infrequent press conferences, where questions are taken, will be the draining of trust and faith, and growing doubt in the IG's capacity to deliver. There is still time to fix all this. But how much time is anyone's guess.

Zia Haider Rahman, a former international human rights lawyer and head of research at Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB), is the author of the novel "In the Light of What We Know."​
 

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