[🇮🇳] West Bengal Election Was Stolen

[Saif]

West Bengal Assembly dissolved after Mamata Banerjee refuses to resign: NDTV

West Bengal Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee’s refusal to resign after her party’s electoral defeat has culminated in the dissolution of the state Legislative Assembly by Governor RN Ravi, NDTV reports. The Assembly’s five-year term was due to expire at midnight on Thursday. In th

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West Bengal Assembly dissolved after Mamata Banerjee refuses to resign: NDTV

Published :

May 07, 2026 21:45
Updated :
May 07, 2026 21:45

West Bengal Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee’s refusal to resign after her party’s electoral defeat has culminated in the dissolution of the state Legislative Assembly by Governor RN Ravi, NDTV repo

The Assembly’s five-year term was due to expire at midnight on Thursday.

In the evening, Raj Bhavan released a letter issued earlier, formally confirming the dissolution of the House, the Indian news outlet said.

The single-line notification was quoted as saying, “In exercise of the power conferred on me by sub-clause (b) of Clause (2) of Article 174 of the Constitution of India, I hereby dissolve the Legislative Assembly of West Bengal with effect from 07th of May 2026”.

Under Article 172 of the Constitution, an Assembly automatically dissolves after completing its term, while the outgoing Council of Ministers continues in a caretaker role until a new government is sworn in, according to NDTV.

However, the political situation in West Bengal had turned contentious after the election results, with Mamata declaring she would not step down despite her party’s defeat.

Her refusal triggered intense political debate over whether she could continue in office in a caretaker capacity, with several BJP leaders demanding her immediate dismissal.

NDTV reported that her stance, described as unprecedented in India’s electoral history, created widespread confusion over the constitutional validity of her continuation in office.

While legally a chief minister may continue in a caretaker capacity until formal certification of election results, implementation depends on the governor’s discretion.

Once the Election Commission certifies the results, continuation in office is limited strictly to caretaker functions, the report added.

The BJP, which secured a decisive mandate in the state election, is expected to have its new cabinet sworn in on Saturday, which would ordinarily leave a brief caretaker period in place, NDTV said.

On Tuesday evening, Mamata had told reporters: “I have not lost, so I will not go to Raj Bhavan. I will not tender resignation.”

Her remarks deepened the political divide, with opposition parties rallying around her while BJP leaders intensified calls for her removal.

Earlier, the Trinamool Congress announced it would approach the court to challenge the election results that ended its 15-year rule in the state.​

 

[Saif]

Suvendu Adhikari to be first BJP Chief Minister in West Bengal, Amit Shah announces

Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) leader Suvendhu Adhikari was on Friday elected the BJP Legislative Party Leader for the party in West Bengal on Friday, paving the way for him to become the first BJP Chief Minister in the history of the State. Senior BJP leader and union Home Minister Amit Shah...

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Suvendu Adhikari to be first BJP Chief Minister in West Bengal, Amit Shah announces

ANI
Kolkata, West Bengal (India)
Updated: 08 May 2026, 17: 58

Union Home Minister Amit Shah congratulates BJP leader Suvendu Adhikari after he is elected as the leader of the West Bengal BJP Legislative Party and set to be the new CM of the state, in Kolkata on 8 May 2026 ANI Video Grab

Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) leader Suvendhu Adhikari was on Friday elected the BJP Legislative Party Leader for the party in West Bengal on Friday, paving the way for him to become the first BJP Chief Minister in the history of the State.

Senior BJP leader and union Home Minister Amit Shah announced the name of Adhikari as the party’s leader after chairing a party meeting in Kolkata today.

“I announce the name of Suvendu Adhikari elected as Leader of West Bengal BJP Legislative Party,” Shah, the Central Observer for the election of the legislative party leader in West Bengal said.

BJP leader Suvendhu Adhikari Bhaskar Mukherjee

He is set to take oath tomorrow on the day, which marks the birth anniversary of Rabindranath Tagore.

Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) leader Nisith Pramanik had backed party leader Adhikari as a key chief minister face in West Bengal, saying that there is “no other alternative” to him as of yet.

Speaking to ANI, Pramanik said the BJP’s win reflects people’s desire for change in West Bengal. He added that tackling “infiltration” and fully fencing the border will be a top priority to protect the state and the country.

He further stated that West Bengal needs a leader like Suvendu Adhikari, calling him the only strong option at present, while noting that the party will take the final decision on the Chief Minister.

Union Home Minister Amit Shah garlands BJP leader Suvendu Adhikari after he is elected as the leader of the West Bengal BJP Legislative Party and set to be the new CM of the state, in Kolkata on 8 May 2026 ANI

“The person who has defeated Mamata Banerjee twice, who has sacrificed his life for his party and the country, Bengal needs such a Chief Minister. There’s certainly no alternative to Suvendu Adhikari in Bengal yet. The party will decide, but this is how it should be. If there is a leader, he should be like this,” he said.

Adhikari also met with newly-elected MLAs of the party and other BJP leaders today.

Adhikari contested from Nandigram and Bhabhanipur, beating outgoing Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee from her stronghold in Bhabanipur by a margin of over 15,000 votes.

BJP has won 207 seats in the 2026 West Bengal Assembly elections, while the Trinamool Congress (TMC) secured 80 seats after ruling the state for 15 years.​

 

[Saif]

How did the BJP gain a stronghold in West Bengal?

The result of the just-concluded West Bengal legislative assembly election is significant not only because of the change of power but also because it marks the emergence of a new structural phenomenon in eastern India and, in addition, a new variable for Bangladesh-India relations.

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How did the BJP gain a stronghold in West Bengal?

Zillur Rahman

BJP's sweep of West Bengal election should be seen not as an isolated phenomenon but as part of the process of political realignment in India. PHOTO: REUTERS

The result of the just-concluded West Bengal legislative assembly election is significant not only because of the change of power but also because it marks the emergence of a new structural phenomenon in eastern India and, in addition, a new variable for Bangladesh-India relations. Winning by gaining 206 seats and nearly 46 percent of votes (an increase of almost eight percentage points from last year) was the result of not only the Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP) electoral campaign but also its ability to consolidate its political base in one of the most problematic states for the right-wing party.

Among the reasons behind BJP’s victory are obviously the powerful anti-incumbent sentiments among West Bengal’s citizens. Growing concerns about lack of employment opportunities, the non-expansion of industrial enterprises, cases of corruption associated with the recruitment practices of Trinamool Congress (TMC), and the functioning of local political patronage networks contributed significantly to it. Welfare programmes, mainly aimed at benefiting women, created a social buffer against discontent but failed to cover demands related to economic development and administration.

Moreover, the BJP succeeded in changing some elements of its previous campaign strategy. Having learned from its failures in 2021, the party made efforts to diminish its “outsider” perception by leveraging local leadership, language, and culture, while developing its organisational capabilities in North Bengal and in border areas.

A third element of the BJP’s success can be attributed to changes in social coalitions on which the TMC relied before. The fact that Hindus consolidated their political preferences and there emerged some division among minorities has become a critical point. Certainly, it cannot be said that the BJP achieved its goal largely through social polarisation; however, the transformation of social coalitions became a crucial factor in this victory.

One of the most controversial features of this election is its pre-campaign phase called Special Intensive Revision (SIR). As a result of the process, about nine million names were removed from voter rolls. It decreased the number of registered voters from around 76 million to about 68 million, with about 2.7 million people not reinstated after SIR. Though it may seem quite normal, its criteria raised significant concerns, specifically regarding “logical discrepancy.”

SIR has caused a paradoxical situation. First, despite the deletion of voters’ names, turnout reached nearly 93 percent. Nevertheless, in 48 constituencies, the number of registered voters decreased, representing a disproportionately large proportion of those deleted. In this case, even though the overall voter turnout increased, the competitive equilibrium shifted in certain areas where this factor was especially important.

Having mentioned all of this, it would be incorrect to claim that the BJP gained victory exclusively thanks to SIR. Various factors influenced the process, including anti-incumbent sentiment, the BJP’s strengthening of its organisational power, the reconfiguration of social coalitions, and the messages the party delivered to voters.

However, one of the main themes of the election was precisely the message dominating it. The slogan “detect, delete, deport” reflected a specific attitude towards Bangladesh and its alleged infiltration of West Bengal. These issues were directly associated with the region and its borders and thus constituted an extremely important element of BJP’s strategy.

Border constituencies played a decisive role in determining the election outcome. As calculations show, 44 seats bordering Bangladesh, along with adjacent regions, proved crucial to the BJP’s victory.

From the perspective of Bangladesh, the outcome of the election has significant implications as well. The Petrapole-Benapole corridor is responsible for more than 70 percent of land-based trade between Bangladesh and India. Besides, about 2.8 million people use the border region for transit each year. Therefore, political changes there affect not only the issues of border crossings, visa access, and trade facilitation, but also Bangladesh’s economic interests. Although Dhaka responded pragmatically, focusing on bilateral issues, new opportunities emerged to resolve some of them in Bangladesh’s favour.

For example, the issue of the Teesta water-sharing agreement, long blocked by West Bengal’s state government, may face fewer obstacles now that interests align between the state and the centre. However, further events remain unpredictable. Consequently, the post-election political situation is characterised by two contradictory features: coordination with West Bengal on specific problems and politicisation of Bangladesh-India relations, which might lead to further mutual mistrust.

Against the backdrop of unstable, somewhat fragile relations that have existed since August 2024, such a political strategy can entail adverse consequences beyond diplomatic channels. Cross-border movement and people-to-people contacts may become complicated. Since August 2024, the number of visas and medical travel permits has decreased; in addition, the use of transshipment sites has increased trade costs. The current situation may deteriorate due to a harsher line on border issues.

The West Bengal election should be seen not as an isolated phenomenon but as part of the process of political realignment in India. From the perspective of Bangladesh, its implications will be seen through a gradual change in relations depending on the extent to which electoral rhetoric turns into practical actions.

Zillur Rahman is a political analyst and president at the Centre for Governance Studies (CGS). He hosts ‘Tritiyo Matra’ on Channel i.​

 

[Saif]

Suvendu sworn in as West Bengal CM

Suvendu Adhikari has been sworn in as chief minister of West Bengal, marking a decisive political shift in a state long defined by ideological churn, NDTV reports. He took the oath on Saturday, marking a political journey carrying a sense of symmetry and rupture in equal measure, the Indian news o

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Suvendu sworn in as West Bengal CM

FE ONLINE DESK

Published :
May 09, 2026 14:20
Updated :
May 09, 2026 14:20

Suvendu Adhikari has been sworn in as chief minister of West Bengal, marking a decisive political shift in a state long defined by ideological churn, NDTV reports.

He took the oath on Saturday, marking a political journey carrying a sense of symmetry and rupture in equal measure, the Indian news outlet said.

The Bharatiya Janata Party secured its first-ever victory in the state assembly election, ending the Trinamool Congress’s 15-year rule.

Once a close aide to Mamata Banerjee during her rise as chief minister, Adhikari now occupies the very position she held for over a decade, reports bdnews.com.

From working within the Trinamool Congress machinery to leading the BJP charge, his trajectory has been both abrupt and consequential.

According to NDTV, his transition from Mamata’s trusted associate to her principal challenger has come to define one of the most dramatic realignments in recent Bengal politics.

The report noted that “no other leader in West Bengal has a more dramatic, almost stardom-like ascension than Adhikari”, describing his political arc as one that spans roles as aide, organiser, and electoral force in key constituencies such as Nandigram and Bhabanipur.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Union Home Minister Amit Shah attended the oath-taking ceremony.

Adhikari’s cabinet includes several prominent BJP figures, including Dilip Ghosh, Agnimitra Paul, Ashok Kirtania, Kshudiram Tudu, and Nishith Pramanik, who were also sworn in on Friday, the report added.

Governor RN Ravi administered the oath of office and secrecy at Kolkata’s Brigade Parade Grounds.

The event came days after the BJP secured 207 seats in the 294-member assembly.

The ceremony coincided with the birth anniversary of Rabindranath Tagore, adding a symbolic layer to a day already marked by political transformation in Bengal.​

 

[Saif]

West Bengal’s right-wing turn cannot be blamed on Bangladesh

In the aftermath of the 2026 West Bengal election, a familiar pattern has re-emerged across sections of Indian media and so-called secular civil society: the attempt to explain BJP’s sweeping success through the “Bangladesh factor.”

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West Bengal’s right-wing turn cannot be blamed on Bangladesh

Anas Ansar

BJP supporters celebrate with party flags as they return after attending the swearing-in ceremony of West Bengal's newly-elected Chief Minister Suvendu Adhikari in Kolkata, on May 9, 2026. PHOTO: AFP

In the aftermath of the 2026 West Bengal election, a familiar pattern has re-emerged across sections of Indian media and so-called secular civil society: the attempt to explain BJP’s sweeping success through the “Bangladesh factor.” According to this narrative, political developments in Bangladesh—the post-uprising instability, the interim administration under Professor Yunus, and violence against minorities—allegedly triggered a Hindu consolidation in West Bengal and accelerated the rise of Hindutva politics.

This argument is not only intellectually weak; it is a fallacy of political morality and justice. It shifts responsibility away from the deep structural transformation of Indian politics over the past decade and reduces a complex electoral reality to a simplistic cross-border possibility. More troubling is the fact that a section of Bangladeshi media and intelligentsia is reproducing this narrative uncritically, as though Bangladesh itself is somehow responsible for the right-wing turn in parts of India.

The first problem with this argument is its selective use of truth. Since the 2024 political upheaval in Bangladesh, large sections of Indian television and digital propaganda networks have amplified misleading and at times outright false narratives about “systematic” anti-Hindu violence in Bangladesh. There were, undeniably, incidents of violence and intimidation during the transition period, and those incidents deserve condemnation. But what was often missing from mainstream Indian coverage is the equally important reality that thousands of ordinary Bangladeshis—students, Muslim community leaders, neighbourhood volunteers, and civil society groups—mobilised to protect temples, Hindu localities, and minority institutions. That reality complicates the communal script. Therefore, it is ignored.

The second flaw in the “Bangladesh factor” theory is historical amnesia. BJP did not suddenly emerge as a dominant political force because of recent developments in Bangladesh. The party has ruled India for over a decade and has systematically expanded its influence across the country, regardless of political conditions in Dhaka. During this period, especially when Bangladesh was governed by a largely secular but overtly pro-India administration, BJP still consolidated power and expanded influence in states such as Assam and Tripura. If a friendly and strategically aligned Bangladesh could not prevent the rise of Hindutva politics there, how can Bangladesh’s recent internal crisis be an explanation for West Bengal’s electoral outcome?

The answer is obvious: it cannot. The attempt to externalise the causes of Hindutva’s growth obscures the internal transformation of Indian political culture. Over the last decade or so, India has witnessed the normalisation of majoritarian rhetoric, lynching, bulldozer politics, hate speech, hyper-nationalist media ecosystems, and the systematic shrinking of oppositional space. Central investigative agencies have repeatedly been accused of being weaponised against opposition parties. Social media disinformation campaigns have become central to electoral mobilisation. Political dissent is increasingly portrayed as anti-national, while even moderate secular positions are caricatured as “appeasement.”

Within this atmosphere, even inclusive constitutional politics is now attacked. The Congress party and other secular formations are routinely labelled a “new Muslim League” merely for advocating minority rights and equal citizenship (although, to be frank, they have at times themselves compromised on secular principles). This reveals the depth of ideological polarisation within India itself, a reality that cannot be explained away by recent events in Bangladesh.

Equally important is the glaring contradiction that advocates of the “Bangladesh factor” refuse to confront. If the rise of Islamist rhetoric and the visibility of Jamaat-e-Islami in Bangladesh were truly decisive in shaping regional political psychology, then Bangladesh’s own February 2026 election should have produced a dramatically different outcome.

Instead, despite online mobilisation and heightened visibility of Islamist groups, the overwhelming majority of voters supported BNP—a centrist, nationalist, and comparatively moderate political force. The society, in other words, did not move towards theocratic politics despite intense speculation and fearmongering.

Yet Indian commentary continues to portray Bangladesh as the source of communal radicalisation while refusing to examine the radicalisation within India itself.

This is why the current narrative is so dangerous. It transforms Bangladesh into a convenient moral alibi. Rather than confronting the entrenched structures of hate politics, communal polarisation, media sensationalism, and democratic erosion within India, responsibility is projected outwards.

Against this backdrop, it is disappointing that a section of Bangladeshi media and intelligentsia are also echoing these framings almost verbatim. Instead of critically interrogating Indian media narratives—many of which have long been complicit in legitimising exclusionary nationalism and anti-minority hysteria—they are internalising the accusation and engaging in collective self-blame.

Bangladesh certainly has its own democratic crises and a history of political violence and minority rights issues, and no serious observer can deny that. But acknowledging those realities does not require accepting a deeply flawed narrative that treats it as a catalyst for the rise of Hindutva in India.

The electoral transformation of West Bengal must be understood within the context of India’s own political evolution: the consolidation of majoritarian nationalism, the collapse of oppositional cohesion, the extraordinary power of propaganda machinery, and the long-term ideological project of the Hindu right.

Blaming Bangladesh may be politically useful. But it is analytically dishonest, and dangerously evasive.

Dr Anas Ansar is assistant professor of Department of Political Science and Sociology and member of the Centre for Peace Studies at North South University.​

 

[Saif]

Are you sure that Shuvendu is a Bangladeshi citizen by birth?

 

[Bilal9]

Are you sure that Shuvendu is a Bangladeshi citizen by birth?

Naw - my sources were not very reliable, I found out. But his family (father) may have had Bangladesh connections.

 

[Saif]

Do Mamata and the Trinamool Congress have a political future?

Mamata’s rump would be Trinamool Lite — still around, still vocal, but no longer the machinery through which Bengal’s political economy ran.

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Do Mamata and the Trinamool Congress have a political future?

Jannatul Naym Pieal

When the Trinamool Congress lost power in West Bengal last month, few predicted that the party would fragment as rapidly as it has.

Mamata Banerjee had built something monolithic: a political machine that dominated India’s most fractious state for 15 years, a personal fiefdom so complete that Time magazine named her one of the world’s most influential people on multiple occasions. She had achieved the unthinkable: overthrowing 34 years of Communist rule. She kept the Bharatiya Janata Party at bay for a long time, even as it expanded across much of the rest of India.

But none of this prepared us for the deeper tragedy now unfolding: that Mamata may have to return to the National Congress she broke away from in 1998 — the very party she spent decades fighting — simply to survive as a national political figure.

The TMC won 26 million votes and 80 seats, retaining more than 40 per cent of the popular vote. By any measure, this was a defeated opposition that should have regrouped quietly.

Instead, within weeks, three-quarters of the party’s legislators revolted against both Mamata and her nephew Abhishek, her presumed heir. Twenty of the TMC’s 28 Lok Sabha MPs signalled that they would break away.

What began as a state-level mutiny became an existential implosion.

This speed reveals what the TMC actually was: not a traditional party but a franchise model in which local strongmen were granted autonomy in exchange for loyalty to the centre.

The structure held because two things remained constant: Mamata’s brand value and the state machinery’s capacity to dispense patronage and protection. The moment power disappeared, the logic inverted completely.

Trinamool Congress supporters attend a party rally. Photo: Collected

The franchise collapses

A political party anchored in ideology can survive defeat.

The Communist movement Mamata overthrew in 2011 had been embedded in everyday livelihoods for decades. The TMC never built anything like that. It rested on two fragile pillars: one woman’s personality and access to state resources.

Mamata maintained control through powerful local leaders who were given autonomy in their own territories. Power brought patronage, protection and opportunities for enrichment. Intra-party rivalries were fierce but manageable through sheer force of will.

The moment she lost the election, all calculations changed.

Local strongmen who had staked their livelihoods on Mamata’s invincibility faced a choice: loyalty to a diminished patron facing the risk of legal investigations, or accommodation with the new authority in power. Nearly every prominent TMC leader chose the latter.

Arrests began immediately. Party offices were deserted. Organisational networks were dismantled. Within weeks, figures who had once commanded fear in their strongholds were abandoned by their own supporters.

This is not theatre. It is the systematic demolition of the infrastructure through which power flowed.

The franchise model required the continuous dispensation of resources and protection. Without it, local strongmen had no reason to remain.

Former minister Ujjal Biswas was arrested and paraded. Riju Datta, a close aide of Abhishek’s, publicly thanked the BJP for protecting his family and alleged that his own party had abandoned him. Party workers fled their neighbourhoods in panic. The edifice crumbled.

The state assembly rebellion exposed the deeper wound.

Ritabrata Banerjee, a former CPI(M) member who later joined the TMC, led 58 MLAs against the high command. The flashpoint was Mamata’s unilateral decision to appoint Sovandeb Chattopadhyay as Leader of the Opposition. Rebels alleged that their signatures had been forged on the endorsement letter.

This reveals something structural: even in opposition, Mamata governed through unilateral diktat, expecting everyone to obey without question. When she held power, this worked because she controlled enforcement. Once she lost power, it triggered rebellion.

The TMC had never been a functioning party but a personal kingdom. Now that it had fallen, its constituent parts were attempting to save themselves.

Ritabrata’s faction claimed that they still considered Mamata their supreme leader — a formulation that satisfied the two-thirds anti-defection requirement.

But everyone knew what was really happening. The franchise holders were watching which way the wind was blowing. The original TMC, they seemed to be saying, would be the one repositioning itself alongside the new power.

Mamata’s rump would be Trinamool Lite — still around, still vocal, but no longer the machinery through which Bengal’s political economy ran.

Against this backdrop, the Congress offer becomes intelligible. Sonia Gandhi and Rahul Gandhi have reportedly reached out to Mamata with a proposal: return to Congress, assume the position of national vice-president, and preserve her relevance while the TMC implodes at the state level.

Both sides officially deny it. But politically engaged observers know that conversations are taking place.

The cruelty deserves underlining.

Twenty-eight years ago, Mamata split from Congress because she would not tolerate its hegemony in Bengal. She spent decades positioning herself as the anti-Congress leader, the authentic Bengal voice against metropolitan elites. Now, with her machine disintegrating, she is being asked to return to the structure she spent her career demolishing.

This is not failure in the conventional sense. This is failure with historical irony built into its very skeleton.

The nephew problem and the succession question

Abhishek Banerjee stands at the centre of this collapse in ways that his aunt’s loyalists struggle to articulate and his critics cannot resist emphasising.

At 38, he was supposed to be the future. Instead, he became the principal lightning rod for rebellion.

Almost every faction blamed him for the party’s decay. His influence over I-PAC, the political consultancy that ran the 2026 campaign, was cited as emblematic of a corporate-style management approach that alienated the party’s traditional base.

His systematic sidelining of senior leaders who had been loyal to Mamata fed a narrative that he was consolidating power in preparation for dynastic succession.

Mamata’s rump would be Trinamool Lite — still around, still vocal, but no longer the machinery through which Bengal’s political economy ran. Against this backdrop, the Congress offer becomes intelligible. Sonia Gandhi and Rahul Gandhi have reportedly reached out to Mamata with a proposal: return to Congress, assume the position of national vice-president, and preserve her relevance while the TMC implodes at the state level. Both sides officially deny it. But politically engaged observers know that conversations are taking place.

Whether these accusations are entirely fair matters less than the fact that they became the dominant interpretation among party cadres once the election was lost.

Mamata’s attachment to Abhishek shapes everything about where the party goes next.

She sidelined senior leaders to create space for him and projected him as next in line. Ambitious lieutenants may accept a founder’s authority, but they often balk when leadership passes to a family heir who lacks the founder’s mass appeal or credibility.

This pattern has played out before in Indian politics. But it proved especially destabilising in a franchise model where local power brokers remained in the party because of Mamata’s charisma, not organisational discipline or ideology.

Abhishek himself understood this dynamic.

His corporate approach to party management — his dependence on I-PAC, his distance from ground-level work, and his perceived imperviousness to dissent — reflected an attempt to build modern infrastructure where only personality-based authority existed.

This was not inherently a bad idea. But the execution was catastrophic. Instead of strengthening the party, it centralised power in ways that triggered the very rebellions he had hoped to prevent.

Mamata, facing a choice between her nephew and her party’s survival, chose her nephew. She refused to sacrifice the succession plan. This means that the condition that would most help the TMC recover — Abhishek stepping aside — remains the condition she is least likely to meet.

The party needs organisational renewal and clarity on succession. Mamata cannot provide either without abandoning the project of ensuring Abhishek’s elevation. Abhishek cannot lead a credible revival because his legitimacy depends entirely on being Mamata’s chosen successor, a status that crumbles the moment his aunt loses her authority.

This creates a loop with no obvious exit.

The parliamentary implosion and the legal trap

When rebel TMC MP Kakoli Ghosh Dastidar claimed that 20 of the TMC’s 28 Lok Sabha MPs wanted to formally support the NDA, the immediate interpretation was that the party was finished.

Constitutional experts have since complicated this narrative.

The anti-defection law does not protect MPs simply because two-thirds decide to leave. It protects them only if their party formally merges with another party. An individual or a large bloc breaking away without an organisational merger remains vulnerable to disqualification.

This means that the 20 MPs are playing a dangerous game. They could face disqualification if they vote against the TMC whip without triggering a formal organisational merger.

The BJP wants those seats in the NDA column but cannot simply absorb them without risking disqualification. The rebels want protection but cannot obtain it without Mamata herself dissolving the TMC into the BJP — something she is unlikely to do.

The threat of disqualification keeps her remaining loyalists in the party and constrains rebels from acting with complete impunity.

What this legal maze reveals is that the political collapse, however real and visible in defections, has not yet crystallised into a final organisational reckoning.The TMC is in a state of flux — neither coherent as a party nor fully dissolved into the BJP.

But it also means that the situation is not yet irreversible. If Mamata can hold her nerve, if she can project that there is still a TMC worth fighting for, and if she can create space between herself and her nephew’s liabilities, the rebellion itself could fragment further.

Constitutional scholars are already divided on how a Speaker would rule on disqualification petitions — these disputes almost always become political. The game is far more complicated than the headlines suggest.

From insurgent to supplicant

But there is a deeper question beneath all of this.

Bengal’s electorate has a well-established pattern: once it decides to throw out a ruling party, it does not easily give that party a chance to return.

The Congress lost power in 1977 and never regained meaningful authority. The Communist movement lost power in 2011 and has spent the last 15 years in irrelevance.

When a ruling party loses, the newly empowered authority rapidly colonises all the spaces that the previous power vacated — panchayat networks, block structures, local patronage chains, and municipal positions.

The opposition finds itself excluded from the machinery of distribution. Within a few years, the machinery itself atrophies.

The BJP will pursue this colonisation with precision. It knows how to dismantle opposition networks.

In West Bengal, it now controls the state machinery and enforcement capacity. Every day the TMC fractionalises is a day the BJP consolidates its position at the block, municipality and panchayat levels. By 2029, when the next Lok Sabha election takes place, the party will look radically different.

There is another problem rooted in electoral sociology.

Of the 80 Trinamool candidates who won, more than 70 represent Muslim-dominated constituencies. The party’s consolidation of Muslim voters was crucial to its victories in 2011, 2016 and 2021. But this base is now both a strength and a trap.

If Mamata campaigns with these candidates, the TMC risks being branded a pro-Muslim party, a label the BJP will use to further polarise Hindu voters. If she tries to win back Hindu votes by moving rightwards, she alienates the one captive constituency she retains.

The party is now seen as sectarian by a large portion of the Hindu electorate and lost significant Muslim support this year.

The coalition that once appeared broad is now confined to a demographic corner. This is why the Congress option — the very Congress she fought — has become a conversation worth having in closed-door meetings.

On 2 June, while staging a sit-in at Dharmatala in Kolkata, Mamata made her boldest move since the election defeat.

She claimed that Union Home Minister Amit Shah had personally called her to suppress information about arrests linked to a killing in Bangladesh, referring to the assassination of Osman Hadi.

She alleged that she knew the full story but would not reveal it because doing so might trigger unrest across the border.

The allegations triggered an FIR against her. Bangladesh’s State Minister for Foreign Affairs, Shama Obaed, dismissed her remarks, noting that Bangladesh had no interest in statements made by a political leader following an election.

What matters is the strategic logic. By invoking the Hadi case, Mamata was attempting to signal that she retained intelligence about Indian state covert operations, reposition herself as the target of hegemonic power rather than a discredited ruler, appeal to West Bengali voters with connections to Bangladesh, and, most importantly, recover the insurgent identity that made her formidable.

She was trying to transform herself from the leader of a defeated ruling party into an outsider fighting unjust power.

The problem is structural, not tactical. When Mamata fought the Communists in the 1990s and 2000s, she was fighting an entrenched, ideologically coherent machine with a clear record of violence and economic failure. The Bengali electorate was exhausted by it.

Today, she is the machine that failed, fighting a nationally dominant BJP that controls central agencies, the electoral apparatus and the West Bengal state government.

Mamata Banerjee, founder and president of the All India Trinamool Congress. Photo: Collected

Her insurgent identity, however skilfully resurrected, lacks the demographic and political foundation it once had. You cannot replay the role of a revolutionary outsider when the electorate has already rejected you as an insider.

The reckoning

At 71, stripped of power, surrounded by defectors, facing FIRs, and commanding a party functionally divided between her rump and her nephew’s liability — where does this leave her?

Writing off Mamata would be premature. She has defied political odds before, and done so consistently. But the conditions that enabled her defiance in the past no longer obtain.

The BJP is not the CPI(M). It does not allow opposition leaders room to breathe while it consolidates power.

The arrests of TMC leaders, the dismantling of panchayat networks, and the FIR against Mamata herself — this is the methodical work of an organisation that has studied its predecessors’ errors.

A revival would require more than charisma. It would require a willingness to renew the party and make difficult decisions about leadership. It would mean accepting that the franchise model is dead and that a new organisational architecture is necessary. It would mean having an honest reckoning about Abhishek’s role.

None of this comes naturally to Mamata. Throughout her career, her strength has been her capacity to surprise others. Her weakness has been her inability to surprise herself. She remains invested in the structures that made her powerful, even after they have collapsed.

The future of the TMC is also the future of a particular kind of regional politics in India — one built on personality, patronage and the whims of a dominant leader rather than on organisation, ideology or democratic process.

If the TMC survives in any meaningful form, it will do so only through a transformation of everything that made it what it was. If it does not survive, it will join the Congress and the CPI(M) in the graveyard of once-formidable political machines that could not adapt to the loss of power.

Mamata Banerjee has always found a way to survive. What remains to be seen is whether she can survive the one thing she has never truly faced: the consequences of her own power.

Jannatul Naym Pieal is a Dhaka-based writer, researcher and journalist.​