[🇧🇩] Insurgencies in Myanmar. Implications for Bangladesh

[Saif]

https://www.newagebd.net/post/opinion/309726/repatriation-without-rights

Repatriation without rights

The photograph shows a view of the Kutupalong Rohingya camp in Ukhiya, Cox’s Bazar. | Agence France-Presse/Munir uz Zaman

THE Rohingya crisis remains one of South and Southeast Asia’s most enduring humanitarian and political failures. Since the mass expulsion of Rohingyas from Myanmar’s Rakhine State in 2017, Bangladesh has hosted more than one million refugees in Cox’s Bazar and Bhasan Char while Myanmar has failed to create the conditions for their safe return. What began as an emergency has become a protracted crisis marked by statelessness, insecurity, aid dependency and diplomatic fatigue. Repatriation continues to be presented as the preferred durable solution, yet every major initiative has failed because the central political issue remains unresolved: the Rohingyas cannot safely return to a country that still denies them citizenship, protection and equal belonging.

Bangladesh and Myanmar signed a bilateral repatriation agreement only months after the 2017 exodus. Yet the arrangement was non-binding and failed to address the guarantees that mattered most to the refugees, including citizenship, freedom of movement, property restitution and independent monitoring. Since then, every major repatriation effort has followed the same pattern. Attempts in 2018 and 2019 collapsed because refugees refused to return without credible assurances of safety and rights. A China-facilitated pilot initiative in 2023, which included visits by Rohingya representatives to Rakhine, also stalled as renewed fighting, cyclone damage and deteriorating security made even limited returns unrealistic. More fundamentally, refugees remained unconvinced that conditions had changed. Their reluctance was not a rejection of repatriation but a rational response to continued uncertainty. Returning to fenced settlements or tightly controlled villages without legal status would simply replace exile in Bangladesh with confinement in Myanmar.

These repeated failures expose the central weakness of the repatriation agenda. Too much attention has been given to moving refugees across the border and too little to creating the conditions that would allow them to return as citizens with rights, security and dignity. Myanmar’s 1982 citizenship law, long-standing restrictions on movement and entrenched discrimination remain fundamental obstacles. The 2021 military coup has made matters worse, fragmenting authority and turning Rakhine into an active conflict zone contested by the Myanmar military, the Arakan Army and other armed groups. Bangladesh is therefore no longer negotiating with a single reluctant government but with an increasingly fragmented political and security landscape.

The challenge extends well beyond Bangladesh and Myanmar. China has sought to mediate because stability in Myanmar serves its strategic interests, but its diplomacy has focused more on facilitating dialogue than addressing the rights that underpin sustainable return. India has balanced humanitarian concerns with security and geopolitical priorities, while ASEAN has struggled to move beyond its tradition of consensus and non-interference. Western governments have backed accountability efforts and imposed sanctions, yet these measures have done little to change realities inside Rakhine. The result is a fragmented diplomatic response in which no external actor has applied sufficient leverage or sustained pressure to make a rights-based solution politically unavoidable.

Bangladesh’s position has become increasingly difficult. Its humanitarian response has evolved into a long-term national responsibility, placing growing pressure on land, forests, water resources, public services and host communities. Security concerns have also intensified as trafficking, armed groups and criminal networks exploit a refugee population with limited education, livelihood opportunities and freedom of movement. At the same time, declining international funding has reduced food assistance, healthcare and education, deepening frustration in the camps and encouraging dangerous onward journeys by sea to countries such as Indonesia and Malaysia. Yet these mounting pressures cannot justify premature repatriation. Any return must remain voluntary, safe, dignified and firmly grounded in rights.

The crisis also exposes the limits of humanitarianism. Aid can keep people alive, but it cannot resolve statelessness or political exclusion. For years, the international response has operated on separate tracks: humanitarian agencies sustain refugees in Bangladesh, legal institutions pursue accountability, diplomats negotiate repatriation and development partners support host communities. Each effort is necessary, but together they have failed to produce a coherent political strategy. The Rohingya have too often been treated as beneficiaries of assistance rather than stakeholders in decisions about their future. Any durable solution must give them a meaningful voice in shaping the conditions of return, including citizenship, security, education and mechanisms to monitor implementation.

The way forward requires realism rather than rhetoric. Repatriation should remain the long-term objective, but only after verifiable changes inside Rakhine. Refugees need more than transport across a border; they need a credible pathway to citizenship, freedom of movement, access to services, protection from abuse and either the restoration of, or compensation for, lost property. Any future agreement should include independent international monitoring with meaningful access to return areas. Diplomacy must also adapt to Myanmar’s fragmented political landscape by engaging relevant actors without compromising the principle that rights, not expediency, should determine the terms of return.

Nor can the camps in Bangladesh remain indefinite waiting rooms. Refugees need education, skills development, legal protection and limited livelihood opportunities to prevent social deterioration and preserve their capacity to rebuild their lives when return eventually becomes possible. These measures should not be viewed as local integration but as responsible crisis management. International partners must also do more by sustaining humanitarian funding, expanding resettlement for the most vulnerable, supporting host communities and maintaining coordinated diplomatic pressure on Myanmar. Accountability efforts must continue because impunity remains one of the principal obstacles to safe return.

Ultimately, the Rohingya crisis is not a logistical failure but a political one. Refugee lists, reception centres and pilot projects cannot substitute for citizenship, security and recognition. Bangladesh seeks relief from a burden it cannot carry indefinitely; Myanmar continues to avoid confronting the policies that created the crisis; regional powers prioritise stability; and donors struggle to sustain international attention. The Rohingya seek something far simpler: the right to return home as equal citizens. Until repatriation efforts are anchored in that principle, they will continue to produce agreements without trust, announcements without returns, and roadmaps without roads.

Dr Mohammad Zaman is an expert in resettlement and development. His recent edited book (co-editors Robert Anderson and Kawser Ahmed) is titled Rohingya Stories: History and Geopolitics in a Multipolar World (Springer, 2025).​

 

[Saif]

A new political voice is emerging from the Rohingya diaspora. Why it matters

As the Rohingya crisis deepens, a digitally connected diaspora is emerging as a new political force capable of shaping its future.

www.thedailystar.net

A new political voice is emerging from the Rohingya diaspora. Why it matters

Anas Ansar

The Rohingya crisis has undergone a significant transformation over the past five years, particularly since the military coup in Myanmar in 2021. As the civil war continues to intensify, the prospects for durable solutions to protracted displacement and a return to their homeland remain a distant reality. Amidst this politics of forgetting, nearly a decade after almost a million Rohingya fled Myanmar for Bangladesh, a new generation of Rohingya is building something that did not exist in quite this form before: a transnational, digitally connected political community. The world should start listening to it.

On Aug 25, 2017, the Rohingya exodus began on a scale that few could have imagined. In the weeks that followed, roughly 700,000 Rohingya men, women and children fled Myanmar’s Rakhine State for Bangladesh, joining hundreds of thousands who had escaped earlier waves of persecution. Today, more than a million Rohingya refugees live in Bangladesh, most in the sprawling camps of Cox’s Bazar, next to a porous borderland.

Nearly a decade later, however, the central question is no longer simply how to sustain the camps, what is needed on a daily basis or under what terms Bangladesh should engage in repatriation dialogue. It is about what kind of political community is emerging from this prolonged exile—and whether the international community is prepared to recognise it as part of the solution.

The Rohingya did not simply become refugees in 2017. They emerged as a diaspora, and this distinction matters.

For decades, persecution, exclusion from citizenship and repeated displacement had already scattered Rohingya communities across South and Southeast Asia. The 2017 catastrophe accelerated that process dramatically, expanding the Rohingya presence into countries including Malaysia, Indonesia, Australia, the United States, Canada and parts of Europe.

Exile, therefore, has produced something paradoxical. The Rohingya are geographically fragmented, politically marginalised and largely immobilised. Yet they are also more connected to one another than at any previous point in their history.

Much of that connection is digital.

The emergence of a Rohingya “digital diaspora” deserves far more attention from policymakers than it has received. Social media has become a space in which Rohingya dispersed across countries can preserve memories, debate identity, share information, support one another and advocate for political recognition.

The significance is not merely technological. It is political.

When a stateless population is denied meaningful political space in its homeland and faces restricted physical mobility in exile, the internet can become a substitute public sphere. It allows people separated by borders and refugee camps to communicate as members of a community with shared interests and aspirations.

Any durable political settlement will require more than negotiations among governments and male political elites. It will require a representative Rohingya constituency capable of articulating what return, citizenship, security, justice and coexistence should actually mean. The digital diaspora could help build that constituency.
Digital platforms have created a “community of hope”, where Rohingya construct a sense of virtual togetherness and collective identity, while also facilitating civic resistance, political mobilisation, and material and emotional support.

That is not a trivial development.

A recent study provides an indication of its scale. Examining Rohingya diaspora activity on Facebook between 2017 and 2022, the researchers identified 47 diaspora pages that collectively published nearly 35,000 posts and generated almost 8 million interactions. These pages were not focused solely on politics. They covered human rights, education, news, youth development, culture and diaspora community life.

In other words, the Rohingya digital diaspora is beginning to look less like a collection of refugee voices and more like an embryonic civic ecosystem.

There is another important dimension: women.

The traditional image of Rohingya political leadership has often been overwhelmingly male. But exile has begun to disrupt that pattern. International attention and the new social spaces created in the diaspora have enabled increasing numbers of Rohingya women to enter civic and political domains historically dominated by men. Education, language skills, technical knowledge, exposure to international organisations and opportunities in host countries have helped determine who can participate and how effectively.

This matters because any durable political settlement will require more than negotiations among governments and male political elites. It will require a representative Rohingya constituency capable of articulating what return, citizenship, security, justice and coexistence should actually mean.

The digital diaspora could help build that constituency.

But it would be a mistake to romanticise social media. The same platforms that can empower persecuted communities can also divide them, amplify misinformation and expose vulnerable people to surveillance and manipulation. Indeed, Facebook was itself implicated in the spread of anti-Rohingya hate and dehumanising narratives before and during the 2017 violence. Researchers have therefore rightly cautioned against excessive “digital optimism”. Unequal access to technology, differences in age, gender and economic status, and the realities of life in refugee camps all shape who gets heard online.

The lesson is not to retreat from digital politics. It is to make it more inclusive, secure and consequential. For governments and international organisations, that should mean a fundamental shift in how the Rohingya are engaged.

The objective in this regard should not be to create a single “Rohingya voice”. Diasporas are rarely that homogeneous. The objective should be to build a legitimate, representative ecosystem in which different Rohingya constituencies can debate their future and develop common positions on the issues that matter most.

That could prove crucial when a political opening eventually emerges in Myanmar.

The international community has spent years searching for a solution to the Rohingya crisis: repatriation agreements, diplomatic pressure, humanitarian assistance, international litigation and accountability mechanisms. All remain important. But sustainable return cannot mean merely transporting people across a border.

Rohingya youth Mohammad Rafiq uses his mobile phone to photograph and tell the stories of Rohingya refugees living in the Kutupalong camp. Such digital storytelling, amplified by the Rohingya diaspora, is helping bring Rohingya voices and their plight to a global audience. Photo: AFP

Return must involve rights.

It must involve security, citizenship or a credible pathway to it, freedom of movement, access to education and livelihoods, restitution and accountability. Most importantly, it must be shaped with the participation of the people who are expected to return.

This is where the Rohingya diaspora could become a game changer. It can transform a population scattered by persecution into a transnational community capable of speaking to governments, courts, journalists and international institutions.

This August, as we commemorate another anniversary of the Rohingya exodus, the question is no longer whether the Rohingya have a future. The question is whether the world will allow them to help define it.

The international community must take into account that, amid the tragedy of exile, something important has been built. A diaspora is quietly emerging as a political community.

And in a crisis defined for decades by the Rohingya’s lack of power, that emerging community—connected across borders and increasingly confident in its own voice—may be one of the few sources of political power the Rohingya can carry with them into whatever future awaits. The Rohingya diaspora may hold the key to solving a crisis the world has learned to ignore.

Dr Anas Ansar is an assistant professor in the Department of Political Science and Sociology and a member of the Centre for Peace Studies at North South University.​