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[🇧🇩] Bangladesh Police and Rapid Action Battalion

G Bangladesh Defense
[🇧🇩] Bangladesh Police and Rapid Action Battalion
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Police brutality: A repressive pattern that refuses to end

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Photo: Palash Khan/Star

The police beating of independent Ebtedayee madrasa teachers at Shahbagh highlights a disturbing and recurring pattern of state repression in Bangladesh. This incident is emblematic of the government's longstanding reliance on violent force to suppress protests, reflecting the deeply entrenched nature of a "police state."

Rather than engaging in dialogue or addressing public concerns, the government often resorts to heavy-handed tactics to quell dissent, as seen in the treatment of these teachers.

A particularly chilling example of such repression is the July-August student movement of 2024 which began as a protest for quota reforms but quickly escalated into a broader anti-government movement. Fuelled by frustrations over job sector discrimination and fears about their future employment, students from across the country rallied for change.

Instead of engaging with their demands, the government unleashed police brutality, leading to 841 deaths and 12,312 injuries, according to government reports. Students were subjected to merciless beatings, gunfire, indiscriminate tear gas, and water cannons. The response to this largely peaceful protest was violent and disproportionate, highlighting the government's preference for control through violence rather than addressing the root causes of unrest.

No occurrence of police brutality in Bangladesh can be termed an isolated incident. The 2018 student protests for safer roads, sparked by the tragic deaths of two students in a traffic accident, saw similar police aggression. Rather than listening to the students' demands for safety, the government responded with excessive force, sending a chilling message to any group that dared challenge the status quo. In both 2018 and 2024, peaceful protests were met with overwhelming force, rather than the thoughtful dialogue and reform that was so desperately needed.

The consistent use of police brutality against peaceful protesters—whether they be students, madrasa teachers, or workers—reveals a troubling pattern. The government's reliance on force instead of engaging in constructive dialogue undermines democracy and the fundamental right to protest.

It is high time for the government to reconsider its approach and prioritise peaceful, open discussions to address public concerns. Only then can Bangladesh hope to build a more just and democratic society where the voices of its citizens are heard and respected.​
 

Police should be more proactive
SYED FATTAHUL ALIM
Published :
Jan 26, 2025 22:17
Updated :
Jan 26, 2025 22:17

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Police guarding barricade put up at the Shahbagh square on Sunday Photo : FE

The frequency of petty as well as serious crimes has registered a sharp rise recently. Increase in the number of petty crimes like stealing, mugging, snatching, etc., means that the police patrol at the crime-prone spots in the city or elsewhere in the country is either lax or absent. But when it comes to rising incidence of violent and organised crimes like robbery, murder, death threats, kidnapping and killing for ransom, it is a matter of serious concern. Most of the time, police response to these violent crimes is rather slow and sometimes quite absent. In response to inquiries from journalists, the answers are usually passive. The matter would be looked into after a case against the reported crime is lodged, the on-duty police officer would usually answer. But such kind of attitude of the law-enforcement agencies towards public security about six months after the current interim government has been in office is unacceptable. One may recall at this point that the Inspector General of Police, Moinul Islam, more than four and a half months ago, on September 10 last year instructed the police to adopt zero tolerance against criminal activities and militancy. But so far no sign of improvement is visible on the law and order front. Worse yet, things have now come to such a pass that at some places of the city, pedestrians are not safe even during daytime, let alone in the evening. Consider the recent case of students on Saturday (January 25) blocking the Dhaka-Mymensingh highway near the Tongi Station Road for 45 minutes between 11:30 am and 12:15 pm. They were protesting frequent incidents of mugging in which many of the victims were students. Demanding safety, students from different educational institutions of the area participated in the road blockade. It could be further learnt from the protesting students that every day on an average some 60 to 70 mugging incidents take place in the Gazipur Stationn Road area and some 20 students have, reportedly, already fallen victim to mugging.

This is the situation in only one spot of this sprawling metropolis of about 20 million residents. There are also places in the city which people consider dangerous. What are the police stations of those areas doing when people on the street are being attacked by thieves under their watch? This is about the safety of general public. Now, how are the business people faring? Alarming reports that members of some underworld criminal and terror gangs, who had since 2001 been in prison, have been released on bail following the political changeover in August last year. Among them are 43 well known top terrors. Some of them have been freed from prison while others have come out of hiding. The members of the business community are concerned as they have regularly been getting phone calls from those terrorists and their agents demanding large sums of extortion money. In this connection, some incidents of kidnapping and murder have already been reported in the media. It would be worthwhile to mention here the hacking of two computer traders in broad daylight in the Elephant Road area early this month. Around 20 assailants, some of them wearing masks, reportedly took part in the attack. Most importantly, the victims were not ordinary traders. As the reports go, they were respectively the president and secretary of the local traders' associations. Before the attack, the victims were learnt to have received phone call from an operative of one of the aforementioned underworld terror gangs demanding a large sum of toll money. As they refused to comply, the gang members made good on their threat.

Clearly, by attacking leaders of the trading community of the Elephant Road area in question, the terrorists were demonstrating their strength as well as sending signal to others that similar fate is awaiting them lest they are found disobliging to their demands. It appears, the criminal gangs in question have something to do with the political changeover. As the criminals who ran the show during the past regime have fled the scene, the vacuum thus created in the criminal underworld is being filled up by their rivals. Evidently, those underworld gangs are wielding their power. To all appearances, it is business as usual for the criminal underworld. Some gangs enjoy political patronage under a particular government while their rivals get similar protection under another political government. But following the August revolution, the public's expectation was that the age-old sick culture of different political parties providing shelter to different antisocial elements to meet their respective agenda would go. In its place a new culture of clean politics would emerge where hired goons and terrorists will have no place.

But the signs look ominous. It is believed the post-revolution police force would be different from their predecessors under previous governments. In those times, the police's job was to mainly do the bidding of their political bosses in the government rather than serving the people. An offshoot of that culture, on the part of the police, was to look the other way when serious crimes like murder was committed by the underworld gangs enjoying patronage of certain political leaders in power. This evil culture saw its extreme form during the previous autocratic regime. But should we allow those bad old days to return after so much blood of students and ordinary people spilled during the uprising? The police, too, had to pay a heavy price during the uprising as they turned purely into minions of the political thugs of the previous regime and, thus, went against the people they are supposed to serve. Now since the interim government is trying to restore an impartial, rule-based system in every branch of governance, the police are definitely not any exception to that. In the present circumstances, as they are not beholden to any political master, they should be able to exercise full independence in performing their duty. This question arises because it has recently been observed that the police's response to crime, including even the serious ones, is often found lethargic. They are as though waiting for a political master to lord it over them as in the past. No doubt, they are supposed to function under political governments. But that does not mean that they have to serve as a lackey of any political leader. The police need to understand their new role as servants of the state and demonstrate it by swinging into full action in combating crime.​
 

Dismissed police personnel urged not to block roads
UNB
Published :
Jan 31, 2025 20:07
Updated :
Jan 31, 2025 20:07

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Members of Bangladesh Police who were dismissed during the previous government are currently organising various programmes in hopes of being reinstated.

In response, the Police Headquarters has urged the former police personnel not to engage in activities that cause public suffering, such as blocking roads.

In a statement released on Friday, the Police Headquarters announced that it had already received 1,522 applications from dismissed police members seeking reinstatement. The applications include 1,025 constables, 79 naiks, 180 ASIs/ATSIs, 200 SIs/Sergeants/TSIs, 10 inspectors, and 28 non-police members.

The statement further said that a committee, led by the Deputy Inspector General (DIG), is reviewing the applications. The review process includes investigating whether the dismissals were politically motivated or if they were the result of criminal, financial, moral, or departmental violations.

The Police Headquarters emphasised that many of the applications are still pending under the Administrative Tribunal or Administrative Appellate Tribunal, and that efforts are being made to ensure these former officers get justice.

On January 29, 2025, dismissed police members formed a human chain in front of the Police Headquarters, and while a senior police officer spoke with the group to explain the situation, the protestors continued their activities, which led to road blockages and caused public sufferings.​
 

Police reform must break free from colonial legacy

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VISUAL: ANWAR SOHEL

The Police Reform Commission instituted by the interim government in October last year has come up with a set of recommendations for improving police efficiency and transforming the organisation into a people-friendly outfit. The reform proposals focus on various functional areas such as human rights, use of force, arrest, search and interrogation, criminal investigation, police corruption, training, changes of law, regulation, and procedure, among others.

While the recommendations don't show any novelty, they have demonstrably failed to indicate the rationale behind principal changes that need to be made in the Police Act, 1861, Police Regulation of Bengal, 1943, and also the procedural legislation of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. It is now well-established that the 1861 law is an anachronism insofar as managing a 21st-century police organisation is concerned. Let me elaborate on the legislative deficiency and how that has affected the police performance, and what needs to be done.

The current Police Act was principally aimed to administer a static, immobile, and backward rural society living in villages and small towns in the 1800s. It envisaged exercise of authority without local accountability. It presupposed a society without constitution, basic and fundamental rights, organised public opinion, and mass media projecting and agitating the public interest.

The Police Commission, 1902-03 presided over by Sir Andrew Fraser reported that the 1861 system had completely failed to produce an efficient and professional police force in the region. One of the major causes of failure of the 1861 law, according to this commission, was undue interference with the police by the civilian authorities. However, it was strange that despite gathering compelling evidence to support, in addressing adequately the fundamental and chronic organisational deficiencies of the police organisation created under the Police Act, 1861, no action was taken.

A reasoned view in this regard is that the colonial rulers purposely designed the police organisation in such a manner so as not to attract better talent, thereby ensuring built-in subservience of the police to the executive, regardless of the resulting corruption, lack of professional excellence, police high-handedness, and police-public estrangement.

In the years that followed the Fraser Commission report, the mass political agitation for freedom threw up unprecedented challenges to the skills and strength of the police in the subcontinent. What we saw during those tumultuous years ending in 1947 was a hardening of the foreign rulers' attitude, enactment of draconian legislations, and making the police respond to the national struggle with fury and unbridled violence.

If the Bangladesh Police of today wishes to be a modern organisation, the solution lies in doing away with the illogical concept of dual control introduced under the Police Act and allowing necessary operational autonomy to the fractured police command and then holding it effectively accountable when things go wrong.

The principal reason the police commanders generally lack essential leadership qualities is that the existing police organisation was not meant to reward initiative, promote merit, or manage and sustain organisational change. It was in fact designed to promote and sustain a culture of status quo, with police hierarchy playing a second fiddle to their "bosses" outside the organisation.

In practical terms, the way forward is that the government leaders proactively give up their long-held powers of "superintendence" over the police in favour of apolitical public safety commissions charged with the responsibility of designing and implementing measures necessary to ensure political neutrality of police operations.

As a first step, the responsibility of the maintenance of law and order will need to rest unambiguously with the police. The police hierarchy will have to be made responsible not merely for the organisation and the internal administration of the force, but also exclusively for all matters connected with maintenance of law and order. In short, policing operations will no longer have to be subjected to general control and direction from outside the police department.

Without enabling the police to function freely, fairly, justly, and independently, there can be neither justice nor an enviable order. Since the sole purpose of police is to enforce the laws of the land, without fear or favour to anybody, it is crucial to render it politically neutral. Such neutrality has been achieved in other countries by placing the police under apolitical control, thus creating a cushion between political expediency and law enforcement. In the absence of such a cushion, persons of influence simply won't let police do its mandated duty.

Under the circumstances, the first order of business is the enactment of a new police law to replace the present archaic legislation. As it is, the act is weak in almost all the parameters that must govern democratic police legislation. For example, the Police Act has made it easier for others to abuse and misuse the police organisation, mainly because: a) the law gives the government the authority to exercise superintendence over the police, without defining the word superintendence or prescribing some guidelines to ensure that the use of power will be legitimate; b) it does not establish any institutional and other arrangements to insulate the police from undesirable and illegitimate outside control, pressures and influences; c) it does not recognise the government's responsibility to establish an efficient and effective police force; and d) it does not make it necessary to outline objectives and performance standards, nor does it set up independent mechanisms to monitor and inspect police performance.

The police law needs to be in consonance with the requirements of democratic policing, which the current law is not. These requirements insist on the existence of a police force that is subject to the rule of law, rather than the whims of the party in power, can intervene in the life of citizens only under limited and controlled circumstances, and is publicly accountable. Without rectifying these issues, building a modern, pro-people and democratic police organisation will not be possible.

Muhammad Nurul Huda is former IGP of Bangladesh Police.​
 

INDEPENDENT POLICE COMMISSION: A bleak prospect
Md Motiar Rahman 24 February, 2025, 00:00

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A policeman detains a student during a rally seeking reforms in civil service job reservations in July 2024 in Dhaka. | Agence France-Presse/Abu Sufian Jewel

THE establishment of an independent police commission as an oversight body in Bangladesh is crucial for ensuring accountability, transparency, and efficiency in law enforcement. While the police play a vital role in maintaining law and order, allegations of corruption, political influence, and human rights violations have raised serious concerns about their role in enforcing law and order. A well-structured commission could address these issues by monitoring police activities and enforcing legal and ethical standards.

However, its formation faces significant challenges, including political interference, institutional resistance, financial constraints, and public scepticism. Politicians, bureaucrats, and law enforcement agencies often resist such reforms due to fears of losing control, disrupting existing power structures, and facing greater accountability. The absence of a strong legal framework further complicates efforts to establish a truly independent oversight mechanism.

Since the police administrative reforms commission has recommended its creation, it is essential to analyse the political, administrative, and systemic challenges that hinder its establishment. Interestingly, the report of the reforms commission highlighted that only the young student representative of the police reform committee, speaking on behalf of the youth, advocated for the establishment of an independent police commission to ensure a fair, transparent, and legally accountable police system. In response, the Bangladesh Police headquarters submitted a comprehensive framework for the proposed commission.

However, the ministry of home affairs disagreed and put forward a different version, highlighting conflicting perspectives on the formation of an independent police commission. Despite these developments, the police reforms commission unanimously recommended the formation of an independent and accountable police commission. However, instead of taking a decisive stance, it deferred the decision on whether the commission should be a statutory or constitutional body to expert opinion, thereby delaying the process. This cautious approach appears to be a strategic move to avoid immediate action, given the complexities involved in its formation.

Bangladesh now lacks a comprehensive legal framework for establishing and operating an independent police oversight body. While some existing laws address police accountability, they are often inadequate or poorly enforced, making it difficult for a police commission to function effectively or hold law enforcement officers accountable. Additionally, most existing laws, such as the Police Act 1861, do not provide for independent oversight, necessitating new legislation. In this context, institutional reform in Bangladesh is often hindered by bureaucratic inefficiencies and slow policy implementation.

Even if the government decides to establish a police commission, delays in policy formulation, approval, and execution could significantly obstruct its creation and effectiveness. However, the current interim government presents a unique opportunity to introduce such reforms without facing resistance from political parties. Since the president has the authority to promulgate ordinances without requiring parliamentary approval, this is an opportune moment to establish a legal framework as a statutory body for a police commission, laying the foundation for greater accountability and transparency in law enforcement.

However, creating it as a constitutional entity is impossible due to the absence of a functioning parliament. While immediate reform within the existing legal framework remains feasible, it requires strong political will from the elected government in the future. Notably, the proposal for forming the commission came solely from the young student representative, while other committee members — including civil bureaucrats, police officers, educationists, human rights activists, and a woman professor — might have tacit consent.

This lack of collective support raises concerns about institutional resistance or a preference for maintaining the status quo. Given the legal and political landscape, establishing a police commission under the interim government is possible, but without decisive action, the prospect of forming it under a future political government appears bleak—perhaps nothing more than a forlorn hope.

Political influence poses a significant challenge to the establishment of a police commission in Bangladesh, as law enforcement agencies often face pressure from political leaders, compromising their impartiality and decision-making. If a police commission were to be formed, there is a substantial risk that political interests would undermine its independence and effectiveness. Ensuring the commission remains free from political control is a major concern, given that politicians frequently use the police to suppress opposition, manipulate elections, and maintain control over dissenting voices. They exert influence over police appointments, transfers, and promotions, aligning law enforcement with their interests rather than allowing it to function autonomously. Establishing an independent Police Commission within a robust legal framework would help mitigate such interference, making it more difficult for politicians to manipulate law enforcement for personal or partisan agendas.

Additionally, many politicians rely on law enforcement to harass, intimidate, or arrest opposition leaders and activists, with reports from human rights organisations highlighting the misuse of the police for politically motivated cases and arbitrary arrests. Electoral manipulation is another major concern, as ruling parties often use law enforcement agencies to influence voter turnout, intimidate opposition supporters, or overlook electoral violations committed by their members. A police commission with strong oversight powers could help ensure police neutrality during elections, thereby preventing political interference in democratic processes. This potential loss of control over law enforcement makes many politicians hesitant to support the creation of such an institution.

Although the police force is primarily a law enforcement agency, it is often controlled by civil bureaucrats, particularly through the ministry of home affairs and senior government officials. The establishment of a police commission would introduce an independent oversight body, reducing bureaucratic influence over law enforcement decisions. This shift in authority is likely to be strongly resisted by civil bureaucrats, as it would limit their ability to manage police operations and enforce administrative control.

A police commission would also challenge the existing patronage system, where senior officials reward loyal officers and punish those who do not comply with their directives. Through control over transfers, promotions, and disciplinary actions, many officers build patron-client relationships with bureaucrats, securing career benefits and protection from accountability. An independent commission enforcing merit-based promotions and disciplinary measures would disrupt this system, significantly weakening bureaucratic control over the police.

The bureaucratic system in many developing countries, including Bangladesh, has been widely criticised for corruption, inefficiency, and a lack of transparency. Some civil bureaucrats use their authority over law enforcement agencies to protect personal interests, silence whistleblowers, or shield themselves from corruption investigations. With independent investigative powers, a police commission could expose such misconduct, increasing accountability and reducing opportunities for abuse. This potential threat to bureaucratic authority makes many officials reluctant to support the establishment of a truly autonomous oversight body, as it could limit their ability to manipulate law enforcement for personal or political gain.

If a police commission is established but its members are appointed directly by the political government, there is a significant risk that it will not function as an independent body. Politicians may strategically appoint individuals who are loyal to the ruling party or those who have a history of complying with political directives rather than upholding justice and accountability.

This would compromise the commission’s ability to act impartially, as members may hesitate to investigate misconduct or take actions that could go against the interests of those who appointed them. Without a transparent and independent selection process, the commission could become a rubber-stamp institution, serving political interests rather than ensuring genuine oversight of law enforcement.

For the commission to function effectively and maintain public trust, its appointment process must be transparent, merit-based, and free from political influence. This requires clear and objective selection criteria, a diverse representation of experts, and the involvement of independent oversight bodies. To prevent undue interference from political parties or government officials, safeguards such as fixed terms for commission members, restrictions on their political affiliations, and strong accountability mechanisms should be in place. By prioritising neutrality, the commission can uphold its integrity and avoid becoming another politically motivated entity that serves partisan interests rather than the public good.

Resistance from within law enforcement agencies poses a significant challenge to the establishment of a police commission. Some members of the police force may view the commission as a threat to their authority, fearing increased scrutiny, restrictions on discretionary power, and potential disciplinary actions. As a result, they may resist its interventions, creating obstacles in its operations.

Additionally, there could be a lack of cooperation in providing essential documents, evidence, and reports necessary for investigations, either due to institutional reluctance or deliberate attempts to conceal misconduct. Overcoming this resistance requires strong legal mandates, clear enforcement mechanisms, and a cultural shift within law enforcement that encourages accountability and transparency. Training programmes, awareness campaigns, and collaboration with independent oversight bodies could help bridge the gap and foster a more cooperative relationship between the police and the commission.

Moreover, the rigid structure of service rules and departmental regulations known as ‘blue bastion’ shapes the mindset of police officers, making them largely resistant to reform. Police leadership tends to maintain the status quo in daily operations, rarely initiating change unless faced with pressing challenges. Instead of proactively seeking reforms, officers often raise concerns with higher authorities, and only when a crisis of significant magnitude arises do the leadership consider corrective measures, which may eventually lead to future reform initiatives.

As a government-appointed position, the IGP serves at the discretion of the ruling party, reinforcing a system where the police act in alignment with political interests. This politicisation, coupled with job insecurity, creates a precarious environment for police officers, making them reluctant to support reform efforts, as doing so could jeopardise their positions and career stability.

Public trust in law enforcement agencies in Bangladesh is relatively low due to past incidents of police misconduct, extrajudicial killings, and widespread allegations of bribery and corruption. Many citizens view the police as being influenced by political and financial interests rather than serving the public impartially. For a police commission to be effective, it must not only function independently but also earn the confidence of the people. If the public perceives the commission as merely another bureaucratic institution and commissions lacking real power or the will to enforce accountability, it risks becoming ineffective.

Transparency in its operations, active community engagement, and visible action against misconduct are crucial in shaping public perception. Additionally, educating citizens about the role, powers, and responsibilities of the commission, as well as ensuring public participation in the oversight process, will be essential in fostering trust and legitimacy.

Establishing and maintaining an independent police commission in Bangladesh requires substantial financial and administrative resources, but budgetary constraints could limit its effectiveness. Insufficient funding may lead to inadequate staffing, outdated infrastructure, and restricted investigative capacity, weakening its oversight role. Additionally, recruiting qualified personnel who can impartially oversee police activities is challenging due to political and bureaucratic influences on hiring decisions. Politicians or officials opposed to strong police oversight may deliberately undermine the commission by restricting its budget, limiting access to police records, or refusing to implement its recommendations.

To function independently, the commission must have a sustainable funding mechanism, legislative protections, and institutional autonomy. Adequate financial support is essential for recruiting skilled personnel, investing in modern forensic tools, and conducting thorough investigations. Without sufficient resources, it may struggle to implement reforms, monitor law enforcement agencies, or enforce accountability. Ensuring financial autonomy through a dedicated budget, external funding mechanisms, or legal safeguards is crucial to prevent political interference and operational limitations. A well-resourced commission will be better equipped to fulfil its mandate, strengthen law enforcement accountability, and build public trust in the justice system.

The creation of a police commission raises critical questions about the balance of power between the ministry of home affairs and the police. While the government must retain a degree of control to ensure national security and policy alignment, excessive interference can compromise operational efficiency and fairness. Striking the right balance is crucial. The ministry should retain its authority over broad policy directives, budget allocation, and legislative oversight.

However, operational decisions — such as criminal investigations, deployment, and disciplinary actions — should be left to the police commission to ensure impartiality. The commission must have the authority to oversee police appointments, promotions, and disciplinary actions without political interference. It should also have the power to initiate enquiries into misconduct, ensuring that accountability mechanisms remain independent of government control.

To ensure the commission’s effectiveness, its legal framework must clearly define its powers, functions, and limitations. If structured as a constitutional body, its independence would be more robust. If placed within the constitutional framework but under parliamentary oversight, safeguards must be established to prevent political manipulation. Additionally, the commission should operate transparently, engaging with civil society, human rights organisations, and the judiciary. Public reporting on police performance and accountability measures would help maintain oversight and prevent abuse of power.

The establishment of an independent police commission in Bangladesh is a crucial step toward ensuring accountability, transparency, and efficiency in law enforcement. However, numerous challenges — including political interference, bureaucratic resistance, financial constraints, and legal loopholes — pose significant obstacles to its creation and effectiveness. Without strong legal safeguards, financial autonomy, and a transparent appointment process, the commission risks becoming a politically influenced entity rather than an independent oversight body.

Addressing these challenges requires a firm commitment from policymakers, civil society, and the public to push for meaningful reforms. With the right framework, adequate resources, and institutional independence, a well-functioning police commission can enhance public trust, ensure fair policing practices, and uphold the rule of law in Bangladesh.

Md Motiar Rahman, a retired deputy inspector general of police, works at Anjuman Mufidul Islam.​
 

82 police officers made OSD
FE ONLINE DESK
Published :
Feb 25, 2025 22:39
Updated :
Feb 25, 2025 22:39

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Eighty-two police officers who served in elections during the Awami League government have been made Officers on Special Duty, or OSD.

OSDs are usually political victims, having no work to do either in the policymaking or the implementation process of the government.

The home ministry issued three notifications on Tuesday with this information, reports bdnews24.com.

Of the 82 officers, one holds the rank of additional inspector general, while 15 are superintendents of police.

The rest are deputy inspector generals, or DIGs, and additional DIGs.

Earlier, the government had withdrawn the medals of 103 officers who served in police and RAB in the 10th parliamentary elections.

The list also includes the names of former inspector generals Benazir Ahmed, Chowdhury Abdullah Al Mamun, former Dhaka Metropolitan Police commissioner Asaduzzaman Mia, and some army officers who once served in RAB.

During the tenure of the ousted Awami League government, its main rivals, the BNP and Jamaat-e-Islami, along with other like-minded parties boycotted the 10th and 12th national elections in 2014.

However, in 2018, although they participated in the polls, there were allegations that the Awami League won the elections by sealing and stuffing the ballot boxes the night before.

After the fall of the Sheikh Hasina government on Aug 5, 2024, in a mass uprising, the interim government is taking action against the officers who served in those elections.

In addition to withdrawing the medals of police officers and making them OSDs, 33 deputy commissioners who served as returning officers in the 11th parliamentary elections have been made OSDs.

They were last seen performing various duties as joint secretaries.​
 

Police must prove their worth
SYED MUHAMMED SHOWAIB
Published :
Feb 26, 2025 22:36
Updated :
Feb 26, 2025 22:36

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There is a growing sense of unease over the perceived decline in law and order situation across the nation. Near my house, the local branch of retail chain Shwapno sends its female employees home before nightfall due to safety concerns, resulting in understaffing at night. Last night a friend's daughter fell ill but he refused to take her to the hospital. He was more fearful of the supposed muggers than the illness itself. If this is the reality in our capital where security measures are supposedly the strictest, imagine the vulnerability felt in smaller towns and rural areas.

How did we get here? How did it come to the point where a cornered home affairs adviser had to arrange a midnight press briefing just to give the semblance of hope in maintaining law and order?

It has been over six months since the mass uprising when the people's wrath forced the former prime minister to flee the country. People became cheerfully optimistic as Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus was appointed Chief Advisor. The sight of students directing traffic became symbols of a new dawn.

However, six months later, the euphoria has faded, and hope has shifted to mounting concerns over security. Six months later, incidents of muggings and robberies now dominate our media coverage.

We are a nation defined by family bonds. Our deepest anxieties stem from the safety of our loved ones. When parents hesitate to seek healthcare at night or retailers restrict women's work hours, the state's authority erodes. We have a large police force that is responsible for safeguarding our streets. If this police force fails to conduct street patrols and guarantee public safety, people will soon start questioning its very purpose.

On Wednesday, Army Chief General Waker-Uz-Zaman rightly stated that the army alone does not have the capacity to maintain law and order. He was on point when he emphasized that deploying 30,000 soldiers cannot be a substitute for 200,000 police personnel. Needless to say, our citizens should not have to fear walking at night when a 200,000-strong force is paid to keep them safe and maintain order.

Something has clearly gone wrong. Our police have forgotten their duty. Some among them - loyalists of the ousted government - are deliberately neglecting their responsibilities. Many have been transferred from one district to another in the hope of a change in attitude. But it is unreasonable to expect that motivation will magically reappear with a change of scenery.

Then there are those who have simply lost the nerve to enforce the law. They are still traumatized after witnessing angry mobs torch police stations as a tit-for-tat for police brutality during the student-public uprising. These are the police members who shy away from confrontations. Stopping rickshaw pullers driving opposite the traffic flow now terrifies them. Some even fear going home at night unless accompanied by their informants for protection.

Every police member I know - regardless of rank - are engaged in groupthink. They see the world through a lens that makes sense to them but appears absurd to others. When you speak of corruption and wrongdoing within the police force-and there are bad actors in every profession-they take offense, reacting as if the criticism applies to all of them. This is why, as corrupt officers feel insecure, so do the honest ones. And as those are driven by political interests to neglect their duties, so too do those without any political agenda.

This mindset must change. Individual police members must understand that if a colleague is punished for wrongdoing, it is not a personal attack on them.

Police has to look like police and act like police if the government intends to control the rise in mugging. Our army can patrol the streets, but it is the police who must secure the alleyways where most crimes occur. The government must act decisively to restore law and order or it risks betraying the very revolution that brought it to power.​
 

Crime, moral policing: ‘Ensure safety or step down’
Protesters burn effigy of home adviser

Protesters burned an effigy of Home Affairs Adviser Jahangir Alam Chowdhury yesterday, demanding his removal from office over his failure to curb crime.

They accused him of incompetence as incidents of murder, rape, repression, mob violence, and moral policing continue to rise across the country.

The demonstration, organised by Bangladesh Against Rape and Abuse, took place at Lalmatia, Asadgate, featuring women from various sectors.

It followed a recent mob attack on two women in Lalmatia, which sparked widespread public outrage.

Protesters argued that despite repeated outcries, the law-and-order situation is deteriorating, with little to no action taken against perpetrators.

They specifically condemned the inaction against local extortionist Rinku, reportedly affiliated with the Jubo League, who allegedly incited the Lalmatia mob incident.

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Protesters burn the effigy of Home Affairs Adviser Jahangir Alam Chowdhury near the Jatiya Sangsad Bhaban yesterday demanding that he be removed. Photo: Amran Hossain

The protesters carried placards with slogans such as "Stop *&*&*&*&-Shaming!" "Law for Women, But Where is the Law for Men?" and "Ensure Safety or Step Down!"

Addressing the crowd, Adrita Roy, a student of Jahangirnagar University, said, "Two days ago, two female students were attacked by a mob in Lalmatia. Even after the formation of the interim government and changing the home affairs adviser, incidents of rape, torture, and abuse of women have only increased. We fought at the frontline during the July uprising, but those in power are failing to ensure our safety."

She said, "We protested against the ongoing rape and repression and marched towards the home ministry. Yet, the police -- who fail to arrest rapists, control mobs, or catch thieves -- obstructed our precession. Some of our protesters were injured as a result. We later organised a torch procession, giving the home adviser a 24-hour ultimatum to resign and apologise. He has failed to do so. Now, he must be removed."

Lamia Islam, a student of Prime University, echoed these demands, accusing the home adviser of "inciting the mob" with his remarks.

"Smoking in public is a civil offence at best. But physical assault is a criminal offence. How can a home adviser justify such a crime?" she asked.

Following the rally, protesters marched through Lalmatia before gathering near the National Parliament building, where they set fire to an effigy of the home adviser.​
 

We do need a separate police commission
Home ministry’s refusal to acknowledge this is baffling

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VISUAL: STAR

We are baffled by the position taken by the Ministry of Home Affairs regarding the formation of an independent commission to ensure transparency and accountability in police conduct. According to a report by this daily, the ministry claimed there was no need for such a commission as it already performs this role. Given the police's track records over the past years—especially during Awami League's 15-plus-year rule, and particularly during the July mass uprising—we fail to understand what made the ministry so confident about its own oversight role or capacity.

The proposal to establish this independent body was put forth in January by the Police Reform Commission—one of many extensive measures proposed to the interim government to overhaul the police force. These measures also include regulating police use of force against civilians in line with UN peacekeepers' rules of engagement, combating custodial torture, extortion, legal harassment, arbitrary arrests, and enforced disappearances through modern and technologically advanced means, and amending existing police laws. The goal is to make the force pro-people, accountable, and neutral—not to mention freeing it from the undue influence wielded by the government of the day. Such influence never bodes well, as we know from our experience under the previous regime, when the force was blatantly misused to serve its political interests.

Why, then, is the ministry opposed to independent oversight when one of the interim administration's core goals is to introduce reforms that eliminate past failures in governance, law enforcement, and justice? Why—when the government claims to be establishing a just, modern system—does the ministry insist on retaining the Police Act, formulated in 1861, or the Code of Criminal Procedure, enacted in 1898? Why is it refusing to acknowledge that drastic—rather than cosmetic—measures are necessary to restore police image and credibility?

We fail to see the logic behind the home ministry's position. Most of the reform measures, including the establishment of an independent police commission, were suggested not just by the Police Reform Commission, but also by experts over time and even by the UN. More importantly, the people demand a complete overhaul of the force. So we urge the home ministry to reassess its position and make decisions that align with public interests, which, in this instance, lie in the formation of an independent police commission.​
 

Police alone cannot take on violent mobs
Leaders and influencers too have a responsibility to restore rule of law

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VISUAL: STAR

For any crime or breakdown in law and order, law enforcement is naturally the first to be held accountable. It falls upon police and other security forces now active on the ground to prevent and bring to book those involved in mugging, robbery, rape, extortion, etc. Curbing mob violence is also their responsibility. That such violence has reached an alarming level of late—with at least 119 people killed and 74 injured in 114 mob incidents since August, according to the Human Rights Support Society—is largely due to weak policing. However, placing sole focus or responsibility on security forces risks overlooking the role played by other influential actors in the surge of crimes.

Those getting involved in mob violence, often fuelled by righteous indignation, are partly enabled by the support they receive from a section of social media influencers, the relative silence of political, social, and religious leaders, and the general instability in the country. If we analyse the pattern of some recent incidents—such as the hostile mobilisation at the Shahbagh police station demanding the release of an alleged sexual harasser, or the fallout of alleged public smoking by two women at Lalmatia—the prevailing mentality seems to support, strange as it may seem, both rule of law and frequent exceptions to it, provided they align with the notion of justice held by a certain majoritarian group in society. That the home adviser has survived the metaphorical guillotine (calls for his resignation) after his controversial remark on the Lalmatia incident is likely due to the right-wing support behind such incidents. This situation is further exacerbated by the lack of legal consequences for those taking the law into their own hands.

Of course, righteous indignation or frustration with inadequate judicial mechanisms is not the only motivation behind the formation of mobs. While previously the key reasons included suspicions of theft, robbery, or mugging, after the political changeover on August 5, there have been reports of many opportunistic or politically vengeful mobilisations as well. Think of the mob that stormed a Gulshan flat allegedly linked to Awami League leader HT Imam over a rumour of a secret stash inside, or the two Iranians allegedly robbed of cash and mobile phones in Bashundhara Residential Area. More often than not, such mobilisations led to tragic consequences. Along with deaths in the most brutal fashion, mob beatings have often made for horrifying headlines—the eyes of a victim being gouged out in Bhola, two individuals being beaten and hung upside down in Dhaka's Uttara. The list goes on.

While the government insists that there is no room for mob justice or moral policing in the country, the fact is, its relative inaction has only served to embolden such acts. The effect has transcended mob violence—with clashes, political repression, harassment of women and children, suppression of freedom of expression, and all sorts of crimes being reported across the country. Under these charged circumstances, we urge all stakeholders in post-uprising Bangladesh to help restore the rule of law. That means everyone doing their part as they should—police taking prompt and stern action, political parties disciplining their unruly members, community/religious leaders preventing mob formations, and social media influencers promoting unity rather than division. Leaders and influencers, in particular, must refrain from bellicose rhetoric that only destabilises our society.​
 

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