Exponentially.
If we were to disregard mass civilian deaths, it would take India less than a day to overrun Bangladesh and make them beg for surrender.
Last edited:
Delivering Global Defense & Political Insights to You
- Thread starter Saif
- Start date
- Replies 94
- Views 585
Bangladesh Defense ForumExponentially.
If we were to disregard mass civilian deaths, it would take India less than a day to overrun Bangladesh and make them beg for surrender.
- Jan 24, 2024
- 1,741
- 883
- Copy to clipboard
- Moderator
- #92
Don't worry. We have legitimacy where it counts.
- Copy to clipboard
- Thread starter
- #93
Playing too much video games makes you r*tard, you know.
Thankfully for you it does not matter either way.
- Copy to clipboard
- Thread starter
- #95
Aftermath of Sheikh Hasina’s extradition request
THE Bangladesh government lodging a formal request to extradite its former prime minister Sheikh Hasina, through a diplomatic note verbale dated December 23, 2024, is a welcome step...
www.newagebd.net
Aftermath of Sheikh Hasina’s extradition request
by Quazi Omar Foysal 27 December, 2024, 00:00
New Age/Mehedi Haque
THE Bangladesh government lodging a formal request to extradite its former prime minister Sheikh Hasina, through a diplomatic note verbale dated December 23, 2024, is a welcome step towards addressing the allegations of human rights violations and international crimes during the fifteen-year-long tenure of the previous government. The extradition request is based on the 2013 Bangladesh-India Extradition Treaty (amended in 2016). This treaty was concluded during Hasina’s regime and binds both states under international law. As of now, India’s response to the note verbale has been limited to an acknowledgement of receipt. Bangladesh has subsequently revealed that it will remind India of the request but has not specified a timeline.
This decision by the government marks a clear departure from its earlier stance. On October 30, 2024, it had stated that it would request Sheikh Hasina’s extradition from India only after a successful trial outcome. This author has previously argued (New Age, November 9, 2024) that such an approach could potentially undermine the prospect of the extradition process itself. However, as the chief prosecutor of the International Crimes Tribunal-Bangladesh, ICT-BD, has rightly pointed out, the successful extradition of Hasina could pave the way for a more effective and fair trial.
At this juncture, Bangladesh can validly claim that the extradition request meets the conditions stipulated in the 2013 Bangladesh-India Extradition Treaty and does not fall under grounds for rejection. However, the success of the deal depends on whether India accepts Bangladesh’s interpretation of the treaty. Historically, any attempts to extradite high-ranking political figures from allied nations have often produced more heat than light. The Hasina extradition attempt cannot be viewed in isolation, especially considering that she is widely recognised as one of India’s closest allies in South Asia. This complicates the matter further, given the political dynamics at play.
One of the key drawbacks of the 2013 Extradition Treaty is the absence of a compulsory dispute resolution mechanism. Bangladesh must, therefore, pursue the matter through diplomatic channels. While the Indian government has not made any official comments, some political commentators have raised concerns about the political nature of the crime, the fairness of trials and the potential use of the death penalty. In that context, the government should address these issues robustly alongside its diplomatic efforts.
It is often criticised that the call for the trial of Hasina is political in nature. In fact, political crimes are exempted from the purview of the 2013 Extradition Treaty. While the publicly available information about Bangladesh’s note verbale does not mention the forum of the trial, it can be inferred that it involved, as indicated by the ICT-BD chief prosecutor, the trials of international crimes. There is a global consensus that political crimes do not cover international crimes, and this does not attract the definition of political crimes provided in the 2013 Extradition Treaty.
The decision to hold trials for international crimes is viewed by some as politically motivated, though such trials themselves are not inherently political. The allegations of international crimes and human rights violations committed under Hasina’s regime are widely accepted. This view is supported by the OHCHR Preliminary Analysis on Bangladesh (August 16, 2024) and is likely to be reinforced by its upcoming final report. Additionally, the Commission of Inquiry on Enforced Disappearances’ recent findings further substantiate these allegations. Thus, dismissing these accusations as political crimes would be equivalent to an indirect denial of those horrendous crimes inflicted on Bangladeshis during the last 15 years, including the July massacre.
There are some concerns regarding the ICT-BD’s adherence to fair trial standards. The ICT-BD has attracted widespread criticisms, mostly on its fair trial standards and the use of the death penalty, during its functioning in the Awami League era. The current interim government, aware of these criticisms, has amended the ICT-BD Act to replace its Nuremberg-era provisions with Rome Statute-era provisions. These amendments address rules of evidence, the rights of the defence and the rights of victims.
It is interesting to note that when Bangladesh moved to prosecute ICT-BD convicts despite the above-mentioned criticisms, India continued to strengthen its relations with the Awami League government. This pattern persisted even after the Awami League’s controversial re-election in a largely voteless 2014 general election.
In the current context, it is expected that the government should take adequate steps to ensure the proper implementation of these provisions, which appear to offer greater protections to both the accused and victims than the general criminal justice system of Bangladesh. The successful implementation of the provisions of the amended ICT-BD, alongside addressing other alleged irregularities in Bangladesh’s justice system, will provide a strong counter-justification for India’s hesitance to extradite Hasina.
Furthermore, there remain persistent concerns over the death penalty in the ICT-BD Act. In many extradition cases, the death penalty has been successfully cited as a bar to extradition, largely based on the principle of non-refoulement. Nevertheless, since both Bangladesh and India retain the death penalty, it is difficult to see why India would raise objections to its application in this case. While abolitionists often argue against the death penalty in transitional justice contexts, Bangladesh is not legally obligated to adopt this stance. On a related note, the issue of death penalty abolition may resurface, and it would be prudent for the current government to reconsider this matter.
On the other hand, it is equally implausible to imagine India amending its penal provisions to extradite an accused of terrorism from other death penalty-retaining states, including Bangladesh. This logic should also apply to cases involving serious international crimes supported by credible evidence in the present case.
Pending the anticipated delay by the Indian government, Bangladesh may simultaneously explore alternative forums for Hasina’s trials to facilitate an extradition agreement with India. This approach is supported by several precedents. For instance, former Liberian president Charles Taylor was prosecuted by the Special Tribunal for Sierra Leone in The Hague, Netherlands, rather than in Freetown, to ensure transparency and fair trial standards. Similarly, the deposed Chadian dictator Hissène Habré was tried by the African Extraordinary Chamber, a tribunal established jointly by the African Union and Senegal on the same grounds.
If India continues to delay the extradition deal, Bangladesh could propose an alternative judicial arrangement, potentially in collaboration with the UN or SAARC. International practice demonstrates that holding trials in multiple forums is feasible. In this case, the majority of the accused could be tried at the ICT-BD, while Sheikh Hasina would be tried at a specialised tribunal. In such a scenario, Bangladesh should prioritise the realisation of justice, rather than the forum in which it is pursued.
As events unfold, Bangladesh must remain open to further negotiations with India. Bangladesh should consider offering ‘diplomatic assurances’ to India, including guarantees to ensure Hasina’s fair trial rights and adherence to relevant human rights standards, with provisions for monitoring by India. This approach may become increasingly crucial in the days to come.
The Hasina extradition request serves as a critical test of India’s commitment to mending its recently strained bilateral relationship with Bangladesh, following the toppling of the Hasina government on August 5. In this context, India should approach the issue in good faith, interpreting the 2013 Extradition Treaty legally rather than politically. It remains to be seen whether the extradition request will lead to another irresolvable dispute between Bangladesh and India or whether it will signify a new phase of cooperation in their bilateral relations.
Quazi Omar Foysal is an international law expert, currently serving as a lecturer at American International University-Bangladesh and practising as an advocate at the Supreme Court of Bangladesh.
by Quazi Omar Foysal 27 December, 2024, 00:00
New Age/Mehedi Haque
THE Bangladesh government lodging a formal request to extradite its former prime minister Sheikh Hasina, through a diplomatic note verbale dated December 23, 2024, is a welcome step towards addressing the allegations of human rights violations and international crimes during the fifteen-year-long tenure of the previous government. The extradition request is based on the 2013 Bangladesh-India Extradition Treaty (amended in 2016). This treaty was concluded during Hasina’s regime and binds both states under international law. As of now, India’s response to the note verbale has been limited to an acknowledgement of receipt. Bangladesh has subsequently revealed that it will remind India of the request but has not specified a timeline.
This decision by the government marks a clear departure from its earlier stance. On October 30, 2024, it had stated that it would request Sheikh Hasina’s extradition from India only after a successful trial outcome. This author has previously argued (New Age, November 9, 2024) that such an approach could potentially undermine the prospect of the extradition process itself. However, as the chief prosecutor of the International Crimes Tribunal-Bangladesh, ICT-BD, has rightly pointed out, the successful extradition of Hasina could pave the way for a more effective and fair trial.
At this juncture, Bangladesh can validly claim that the extradition request meets the conditions stipulated in the 2013 Bangladesh-India Extradition Treaty and does not fall under grounds for rejection. However, the success of the deal depends on whether India accepts Bangladesh’s interpretation of the treaty. Historically, any attempts to extradite high-ranking political figures from allied nations have often produced more heat than light. The Hasina extradition attempt cannot be viewed in isolation, especially considering that she is widely recognised as one of India’s closest allies in South Asia. This complicates the matter further, given the political dynamics at play.
One of the key drawbacks of the 2013 Extradition Treaty is the absence of a compulsory dispute resolution mechanism. Bangladesh must, therefore, pursue the matter through diplomatic channels. While the Indian government has not made any official comments, some political commentators have raised concerns about the political nature of the crime, the fairness of trials and the potential use of the death penalty. In that context, the government should address these issues robustly alongside its diplomatic efforts.
It is often criticised that the call for the trial of Hasina is political in nature. In fact, political crimes are exempted from the purview of the 2013 Extradition Treaty. While the publicly available information about Bangladesh’s note verbale does not mention the forum of the trial, it can be inferred that it involved, as indicated by the ICT-BD chief prosecutor, the trials of international crimes. There is a global consensus that political crimes do not cover international crimes, and this does not attract the definition of political crimes provided in the 2013 Extradition Treaty.
The decision to hold trials for international crimes is viewed by some as politically motivated, though such trials themselves are not inherently political. The allegations of international crimes and human rights violations committed under Hasina’s regime are widely accepted. This view is supported by the OHCHR Preliminary Analysis on Bangladesh (August 16, 2024) and is likely to be reinforced by its upcoming final report. Additionally, the Commission of Inquiry on Enforced Disappearances’ recent findings further substantiate these allegations. Thus, dismissing these accusations as political crimes would be equivalent to an indirect denial of those horrendous crimes inflicted on Bangladeshis during the last 15 years, including the July massacre.
There are some concerns regarding the ICT-BD’s adherence to fair trial standards. The ICT-BD has attracted widespread criticisms, mostly on its fair trial standards and the use of the death penalty, during its functioning in the Awami League era. The current interim government, aware of these criticisms, has amended the ICT-BD Act to replace its Nuremberg-era provisions with Rome Statute-era provisions. These amendments address rules of evidence, the rights of the defence and the rights of victims.
It is interesting to note that when Bangladesh moved to prosecute ICT-BD convicts despite the above-mentioned criticisms, India continued to strengthen its relations with the Awami League government. This pattern persisted even after the Awami League’s controversial re-election in a largely voteless 2014 general election.
In the current context, it is expected that the government should take adequate steps to ensure the proper implementation of these provisions, which appear to offer greater protections to both the accused and victims than the general criminal justice system of Bangladesh. The successful implementation of the provisions of the amended ICT-BD, alongside addressing other alleged irregularities in Bangladesh’s justice system, will provide a strong counter-justification for India’s hesitance to extradite Hasina.
Furthermore, there remain persistent concerns over the death penalty in the ICT-BD Act. In many extradition cases, the death penalty has been successfully cited as a bar to extradition, largely based on the principle of non-refoulement. Nevertheless, since both Bangladesh and India retain the death penalty, it is difficult to see why India would raise objections to its application in this case. While abolitionists often argue against the death penalty in transitional justice contexts, Bangladesh is not legally obligated to adopt this stance. On a related note, the issue of death penalty abolition may resurface, and it would be prudent for the current government to reconsider this matter.
On the other hand, it is equally implausible to imagine India amending its penal provisions to extradite an accused of terrorism from other death penalty-retaining states, including Bangladesh. This logic should also apply to cases involving serious international crimes supported by credible evidence in the present case.
Pending the anticipated delay by the Indian government, Bangladesh may simultaneously explore alternative forums for Hasina’s trials to facilitate an extradition agreement with India. This approach is supported by several precedents. For instance, former Liberian president Charles Taylor was prosecuted by the Special Tribunal for Sierra Leone in The Hague, Netherlands, rather than in Freetown, to ensure transparency and fair trial standards. Similarly, the deposed Chadian dictator Hissène Habré was tried by the African Extraordinary Chamber, a tribunal established jointly by the African Union and Senegal on the same grounds.
If India continues to delay the extradition deal, Bangladesh could propose an alternative judicial arrangement, potentially in collaboration with the UN or SAARC. International practice demonstrates that holding trials in multiple forums is feasible. In this case, the majority of the accused could be tried at the ICT-BD, while Sheikh Hasina would be tried at a specialised tribunal. In such a scenario, Bangladesh should prioritise the realisation of justice, rather than the forum in which it is pursued.
As events unfold, Bangladesh must remain open to further negotiations with India. Bangladesh should consider offering ‘diplomatic assurances’ to India, including guarantees to ensure Hasina’s fair trial rights and adherence to relevant human rights standards, with provisions for monitoring by India. This approach may become increasingly crucial in the days to come.
The Hasina extradition request serves as a critical test of India’s commitment to mending its recently strained bilateral relationship with Bangladesh, following the toppling of the Hasina government on August 5. In this context, India should approach the issue in good faith, interpreting the 2013 Extradition Treaty legally rather than politically. It remains to be seen whether the extradition request will lead to another irresolvable dispute between Bangladesh and India or whether it will signify a new phase of cooperation in their bilateral relations.
Quazi Omar Foysal is an international law expert, currently serving as a lecturer at American International University-Bangladesh and practising as an advocate at the Supreme Court of Bangladesh.
Similar threads
Latest Posts
-
-
-
South Asia Child of Indus, former Indian PM, Dr Manmohan Singh passed away!!!!- Latest: Krishna with Flute
-
-
-
-
[🇧🇩-Airforce] Bangladesh Air Force and how it is viewed by Indian Air Force.
- Latest: Krishna with Flute
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
South Asia India scrambles as Bangladesh deploys TB2 drones, challenging regional hegemony
- Latest: Krishna with Flute
-
-
-
-
