[🇧🇩] Liberation War: Sheikh Mujib and Others

[Saif]

Mujibnagar Govt members, including Bangabandhu, Tajuddin ‘valiant freedom fighters’, others are ‘associates’

The Ministry of Law, Justice, and Parliamentary Affairs issued the amended Jatiya Muktijoddha Council (Jamuka) Ordinance on Tuesday night, changing the definition of freedom fighter.

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Mujibnagar Govt members, including Bangabandhu, Tajuddin ‘valiant freedom fighters’, others are ‘associates’

The adviser said that the ordinance cancels nobody’s status. It only redefines the terms.

Staff CorrespondentDhaka
Updated: 04 Jun 2025, 14: 52

Mujibnagar Government members including Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and Tajuddin Ahmed are ‘valiant freedom fighters’, while others are ‘associates’.

The members of the Mujibnagar Government, which was formed on 10 April 1971, during the great liberation war, will be recognised as ‘valiant freedom fighters,’ while people who assisted in the formation of the Mujibnagar Government will be considered ‘associates of the liberation war.’

The Ministry of Law, Justice, and Parliamentary Affairs issued the amended Jatiya Muktijoddha Council (Jamuka) Ordinance on Tuesday night, changing the definition of freedom fighter.

The first government of independent Bangladesh (Mujibnagar Government) took oath on 17 April 1971. Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was declared the president. Syed Nazrul Islam was appointed vice president.

Since Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was imprisoned in a Pakistani jail, Syed Nazrul Islam served as acting president. Tajuddin Ahmad was appointed as prime minister, M Mansur Ali as finance minister, AHM Qamaruzzaman as home minister, and Khondaker Mostaq Ahmad as foreign minister.

According to the new ordinance, Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman along with the four national leaders, will be recognised as ‘valiant freedom fighters’, the interim government’s liberation war affairs ministry adviser Faruk-e-Azam told Prothom Alo.

He said all those who were part of Mujibnagar Government are freedom fighters. However, the officials and employees of the Mujibnagar Government will be considered ‘associates of Liberation War.’

Faruk-e-Azam further said that it was found that some employees of the Mujibnagar Government have been recognised as ‘valiant freedom fighters’ during the verification of the list of freedom fighters. From now on, they will be the ‘associates of Liberation War.’

The adviser said that the ordinance cancels nobody’s status. It only redefines the terms. Those who are currently receiving benefits will continue to do so. Only those who directly fought on the battlefield will be called ‘valiant freedom fighters,’ and others will be the “associates of Liberation War.”

In the ordinance, the government has set five categories to identify the associates of the freedom fighters

The categories are: one, the professionals who stayed abroad and contributed to the liberation war and the Bangladeshi citizens who played an active role in mobilising the global opinions; two, the people who worked as officials and employees of the Government of Bangladesh (Mujibnagar government) formed during the liberation war, physicians, nurses and other assistants employed by the Mujibnagar government; three, all the MNAs and MPAs who were involved with the Government of Bangladesh (Mujibnagar government) formed during the liberation war, and later regarded as members of the constituent assembly; four, all the artistes and crew members of Swadhin Bangla Betar Kendra and all the Bangladeshi journalists in and outside of the country who played role in favour of the liberation war; five, Swadhin Bangla Football Team.

According to Ministry of Liberation War Affairs, the 21 members of Shadhin Bangla Football Team were previously recognised as ‘valiant freedom fighters’. Notable among them are Mohammad Zakaria Pintoo, Kazi Salahuddin, and Enayetur Rahman Khan. From now on, they will be recognised as ‘associates of Liberation War.’

The new definition of the freedom fighter says, the civilians (who were above the minimum age limit set by the government), who took preparation and training for the war inside the country between 26 March and 16 December of 1971 and, the civilians, who crossed the boundary and included their names at various training camps in India and fought in the war against occupied Pakistani forces and their local collaborators - Rajakar, Al Badr, Al Shams, the then Jamaat-e-Islami, Nejam-e-Islam, and Peace Committee members, will be considered as freedom fighters.

Along with them, members of the armed forces, East Pakistan Rifles (EPR), the police, Muktibahini, the government-in-exile and the other forces recognised by that government like naval commandos, Kilo Force and Ansar will be included as freedom fighters.

According to the new definition, all the women tortured by the occupied Pakistani forces and their collaborators will also be included as freedom fighters. Apart from them, all the physicians and nurses and their assistants who gave medical treatment to the injured freedom fighters at Field Hospitals will be regarded as freedom fighters.​

 

[Saif]

CA for presenting true history of Liberation War

Chief Adviser Professor Muhammad Yunus today stressed presenting the true history of the Liberation War impartially through the activities of the Ministry of Liberation War. He said this at a meeting held at the State Guest House Jamuna this afternoon, BSS reports. The meeting was att

thefinancialexpress.com.bd

CA for presenting true history of Liberation War

Published :
Jul 07, 2025 22:15
Updated :
Jul 07, 2025 22:52

Chief Adviser Professor Muhammad Yunus today stressed presenting the true history of the Liberation War impartially through the activities of the Ministry of Liberation War.

He said this at a meeting held at the State Guest House Jamuna this afternoon, BSS reports.

The meeting was attended by Liberation War Affairs Adviser Faruk E Azam, Principal Secretary to the Chief Adviser M Siraz Uddin Miah and other officials of the Ministry of Liberation War.

At the meeting, Adviser Faruk E Azam said the confusing history of the country's Liberation War was presented by constructing various facilities and infrastructures spending crores of taka of the ministry.

Noting that there is no detailed description of the battlefield in these infrastructures, he said there is no description of the freedom fighters too, but only exaggerated information has been presented with pictures and materials of a family.

For example, the adviser mentioned that Taka 23 crore was allocated for the research project titled 'Implementation of Bangabandhu's Ideology and the Spirit of the Liberation War', saying despite taking crores of taka from the ministry, no substantial research was conducted.

The liberation war affairs adviser further said: "Sheikh Hasina had developed the freedom fighters as a privileged class. She had partisanised the property, facilities and money allocated for the freedom fighters. She did Awami League politics by sitting on the infrastructure created for the freedom fighters."

He said the unprotected properties that are under the Muktijoddha Kalyan Trust are valuable assets, so a decision has to be taken regarding these properties.

The Chief Adviser ordered for immediate appointment of a consultant and formation of a subsequent committee to determine how the properties under the trust can be utilised properly and used to increase the capacity of the trust.

He said effective initiatives should be taken about the work of the trust and what enterprises can be established in the properties of the trust. "This trust must be revived," he added.

Prof Yunus advised all concerned to work to present the real history of the Liberation War, through all the projects of the ministry, in the days to come.

In today's meeting, the significant activities taken and implemented by the Ministry of Liberation War Affairs during the interim government and a work plan for the next six months were presented to the Chief Adviser.​

 

[Saif]

Remembering Tajuddin Bhai

I first met Tajuddin Ahmad—or Tajuddin Bhai, as I knew him—in the 1960s, during the pre-Liberation period. After I joined the Awami League, Bangabandhu told me to meet Tajuddin Ahmad, as he would answer all my questions on politics and the party, and that he possessed deep knowledge of both...

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Remembering Tajuddin Bhai

I first met Tajuddin Ahmad—or Tajuddin Bhai, as I knew him—in the 1960s, during the pre-Liberation period. After I joined the Awami League, Bangabandhu told me to meet Tajuddin Ahmad, as he would answer all my questions on politics and the party, and that he possessed deep knowledge of both politics and people.

From my first interactions with him, I recognised a man guided by profound political clarity and unwavering principles. Tajuddin Bhai was not merely a politician; he was a statesman whose vision transcended immediate political calculations to prioritise the long-term welfare of the nation and its people. He delved deeply into every issue, studied problems on the ground, and made every effort to understand how people felt about them.

Tajuddin Bhai's vision was already evident during the critical early days of our independence. In 1966, when other leaders met Field Marshal Ayub Khan, it was Tajuddin Bhai who articulated the radical demand for autonomy, laying the groundwork for the historic Six Points. His clarity and resolve demonstrated his remarkable ability to see through political turbulence and articulate a compelling path forward, eventually making the Six Points the cornerstone of Bangladesh's autonomy movement.

In March 1969, at the Rawalpindi Round Table Conference, Tajuddin Bhai's insights and guidance were indispensable. He directed us as we meticulously drafted statements defining regional autonomy based on the Six Points. His careful approach reflected his deep understanding of governance, federalism, and the nuanced balance required between regional autonomy and central authority. These discussions laid the groundwork for the decisions that shaped our nation's future.

I recall his role in issuing directives sustaining the Non-Cooperation Movement in March 1971. Tajuddin Bhai's strategic vision was always clear: maintain pressure through non-violent means while ensuring minimal disruption to essential services. His capacity to balance principle and pragmatism was exemplary.

Once the Liberation War began, as Prime Minister of the fledgling nation, he navigated enormous political and diplomatic challenges with courage, decisiveness, and humility.

Even after independence, Tajuddin Bhai's commitment to democratic principles never wavered. He repeatedly stressed the critical need to energise our political structures with youthful idealism and disciplined commitment to democratic values. To him, democracy was not merely about elections, but about institutional integrity, accountability, and the active participation of citizens in governance—ideals he tirelessly upheld throughout his life.

A defining memory is etched vividly in my mind from 1974 at Washington D.C.'s Dulles Airport. After a high-level international meeting, Tajuddin Bhai, Ambassador M. R. Siddiqi, and I stayed back, deeply engaged in a conversation about the future of our country. With characteristic honesty, Tajuddin Bhai expressed deep concerns about the growing inclination towards a one-party system. His fears were not personal, but deeply rooted in his understanding of democracy. He passionately advocated for reforms, emphasising the urgent need to revitalise political structures through engaging young people—idealistic, dedicated, and committed individuals who could breathe new life into the democratic foundations we had worked so hard to establish.

Tajuddin Bhai's resignation later that year deeply saddened me. I recall rushing to express my concerns, sensing a great loss not just for the government but for the entire nation. Later, visiting him at home shortly after his resignation, I found him at lunch—calm yet resolute. His departure was not about personal differences, but stemmed from his unyielding commitment to democracy, accountability, and transparency. His actions were a testament to his integrity and remain a powerful lesson in selfless leadership.

Tajuddin Ahmad's legacy resonates profoundly today. He was a man ahead of his time, recognising early that lasting progress demanded not only independence but robust, accountable, and inclusive political structures. For all of us today, and particularly for young people who will spearhead efforts to shape our country's future, his unwavering belief in the power of democratic principles, his uncompromising integrity, and his exceptional courage should continue to serve as a guide.

Dr Kamal Hossain is a Senior Advocate of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh, an eminent jurist, and one of the principal architects of the Constitution of Bangladesh.​

 

[Saif]

Our finest representative of liberal politics

I did not personally know Tajuddin Ahmad, but he was a contemporary of ours, and the politics he practised was within the Awami League—though there were different strands within the party.

www.thedailystar.net

Our finest representative of liberal politics

I did not personally know Tajuddin Ahmad, but he was a contemporary of ours, and the politics he practised was within the Awami League—though there were different strands within the party. One faction was the right-wing, represented by Khondokar Mostaq Ahmad, and another faction was more liberal, even significantly liberal. Tajuddin Ahmad belonged to the liberal faction. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman maintained ties with both sides, but toward the end, since the Liberation movement had taken shape, he had to move in the direction of the liberal faction.

Sheikh Mujibur Rahman even described himself as a socialist—specifically, a national socialist. Tajuddin, however, never described himself as a socialist or national socialist in that sense. Yet, during the Liberation War, three principal ideas emerged—secularism, democracy, and ultimately socialism. Tajuddin Ahmad supported all three, and the government established under his leadership embodied these three principles. Nationalism, however, was not yet a prominent part of the discourse at that time.

Nationalism came later—after the Liberation—and it was Sheikh Mujibur Rahman who introduced it. Tajuddin, in that sense, stood as a secular democrat whose ultimate position inclined towards socialism. And the historical role he played was something that had been imposed upon him; he hadn't prepared himself for it.

Of course, he had been involved in politics since his student days, but not in the sense of being deeply embedded in student politics. Rather, he was directly involved in mainstream politics from the very beginning.

Many of Tajuddin's friends were socialists and were affiliated with the Communist Party. But Tajuddin never joined the Communist Party himself. One possible reason for this might be that he wanted to pursue a kind of politics that could nationally reflect or represent the public's sentiments, demands, and problems.

And when he crossed the border into India, he didn't go as a fugitive seeking shelter or refuge. He went as a political leader—a leader of the Awami League and an elected representative. That's how he wanted to present himself. When he spoke with Indira Gandhi, he made it clear: "We will take your help, but this is our struggle, and we will fight it ourselves. We ask for your assistance, and if needed, we will take loans from you—which we will repay."

At that moment, Indira Gandhi was facing two major challenges. First, the massive influx of refugees from East Pakistan had become extremely difficult to manage. Second, there was the humanitarian question—people were engaged in a struggle, and it was necessary to politically support that struggle.

There was also a political dimension from the Indian point of view. On one hand, it was a humanitarian refugee crisis. On the other, politically, India had antagonistic relations with Pakistan and wanted to weaken it. This situation presented an opportunity—a war could break out, and through that confrontation with Pakistan, perhaps Pakistan would collapse altogether.

Indira Gandhi had another political objective: in India—especially in West Bengal—the Naxalite movement had become increasingly intense. Suppressing that movement was also one of her goals. And she was able to use both Bengali nationalism (as it emerged in Bangladesh) and Indian nationalism to suppress it, which served her political objective.

Another anxiety Indira Gandhi had at the time was that if this Bengali nationalist movement gained further momentum, there might be attempts to unify the two Bengals. The narrative was: Bengalis are being attacked here, Bengalis are taking refuge there, and many of those taking shelter in West Bengal had already migrated earlier and established roots there. So, her concern was: what if Bangladesh and West Bengal, both Bengali regions, start to move toward unification? That anxiety intensified at the time, and a certain kind of nationalist sentiment began to rise.

At that time, a flag of Bangladesh had been designed. The flag had a red circle in the middle, and within the red circle was a map outlining the region of Bangladesh. Tajuddin was carrying that flag with him. When Indira Gandhi saw it, he told her, "What we are trying to achieve is this—nothing more, nothing beyond this. This is our land—and that's how we want to define it."

This moment captures the uniqueness of Tajuddin's leadership during the war. He had to negotiate with the Indian government under difficult circumstances. At the same time, he faced internal opposition within his own party—some factions even issued a vote of no confidence against him.

Yet, he continued to lead the Liberation War. He had to coordinate not only with political allies but also with military generals who were part of the liberation effort. So, he was navigating pressure from all sides—internal, regional, and international. And amid all this, he served as the spokesperson for Bangladesh.

He was constantly communicating with international correspondents, and what stands out is how calmly and steadily he managed all this. One particularly unique aspect was that he had no family life during that time. Others who had gone abroad were accompanied by their families, but Tajuddin lived entirely alone. This solitary existence—working alone, thinking alone, carrying the weight of leadership alone—is almost unprecedented in our history. He had an exceptionally clear head.

After the Liberation, Tajuddin had a specific vision: he wanted to absorb the Mukti Bahini (freedom fighters) into a national framework, rather than making the state depend entirely on the military. That was his plan. He did make efforts towards this, but ultimately, he couldn't implement it. That failure wasn't due to a lack of trying—it was because his government didn't support him in this endeavour.

He was also very firm on one principle: whatever assistance he received from India, he would repay it. He was clear that he would not take anything as charity. He was strongly opposed to accepting loans from imperialist countries. At the time, the World Bank was a powerful actor, but Tajuddin refused to accept aid from them. He actively obstructed those efforts. Even when the Americans and the World Bank wanted to provide aid, he declined.

Secondly, since Tajuddin took on leadership during the war, there was naturally an element of jealousy from Mujib's side—along the lines of: "I wasn't here, and he's doing this work during the 1971 war."

Then, those followers known as the Mujib Bahini were actually formed by the Indian government. The Indian government created them but did not inform Tajuddin. This group was anti-leftist; their objective was that if Sheikh Mujib could not return, they would control the movement. Even if Mujib did return, they wanted to ensure that the leftist elements would not gain influence or power. That's why they restructured the Mujib Bahini.

Tajuddin, however, did not approve of the Mujib Bahini at all. Their ideology was different, and the difference between the Mujib Bahini and Tajuddin reflects Tajuddin's political outlook and ideology.

The Mujib Bahini was anti-leftist, and their main purpose was to prevent leftists from gaining power or leadership roles by any means. Tajuddin, on the other hand, was liberal and tried to accommodate everyone.

Sheikh Mujib's followers convinced him that Tajuddin would become his rival and try to take away his power. So, Sheikh Mujib was urged to remove Tajuddin. Interestingly, Sheikh Mujib never wanted to go to Mujibnagar—the place regarded as the provisional government headquarters during the Liberation War. He also never showed much interest in knowing the detailed story or history of the struggle. This was a weakness of his.

If Mujib had taken that leadership himself during the 1971 war, it might have been different. But Tajuddin never saw himself as a rival to Sheikh Mujib. He always respected Sheikh Mujib, calling him "Mujib Bhai", and wanted to remain under his leadership. He was never a "first man" type of leader. Instead, he wanted to be the party secretary, and as secretary, he was respected and accepted.

Ironically, the people who came to power after Sheikh Mujib's assassination identified Tajuddin as their number one enemy—and that is why they killed him.

One thing that stands out is that Tajuddin never went to India as a refugee; he went as a political representative of Bangladesh. In August 1975, when the anti-liberal forces took over—especially through the army—his friends advised him to leave the country. They warned him that those now in power would not tolerate him. But just as he had stayed in the country during 1971, he chose to stay again, even five years later. He refused to flee.

His friends told him that at the very least he could take shelter in India, where he would be safe. But he remained—and was arrested and then killed. He was our finest representative of liberal politics.

But perhaps the greater tragedy was not just his death, but the fact that after Liberation, he was pushed aside. His experience, his vision—none of it was reflected in the post-war governance of the country. He wasn't forced out; he voluntarily stepped aside once he realised he was no longer wanted. He didn't join JASAD either, although they had invited him. He didn't associate with them or any other party.

He remained committed to the liberal politics within the Awami League—even when right-wing forces, including Khandakar Mushtaque and elements of the Mujib Bahini, began to dominate. Some parts of the Mujib Bahini later drifted towards ultra-leftist politics, but Tajuddin was not comfortable with them either.

He knew he could have become President. But he deeply loved Sheikh Mujib—he considered him like an elder brother. While others began calling him "Bangabandhu," Tajuddin continued to refer to him as "Mujib Bhai." If anyone was truly equal to Mujib in terms of integrity, sacrifice, and vision, it was Tajuddin. And perhaps that's why a certain kind of jealousy grew around him.

Tajuddin Ahmad shared a very intimate relationship with Maulana Bhashani. During the 1954 elections, Maulana did not initially support the United Front (Jukto Front), as he observed that elements of the Muslim League had infiltrated it. Sheikh Mujib, too, was reluctant at first, but eventually, both accepted the United Front.

During the election campaign, Maulana Bhashani personally came to Tajuddin's constituency to campaign for him—something we do not hear of him doing for others. That constituency was considered dangerous and hostile, with armed elements active in the area. It was so inaccessible that Maulana had to be taken there on the back of an elephant.

He personally campaigned in support of Tajuddin Ahmad, despite usually campaigning more broadly against the Muslim League rather than endorsing individual candidates. In Tajuddin's case, however, it is well known that he made an exception and personally supported him.

Professor Serajul Islam Choudhury is an eminent intellectual, thinker and writer.​

 

[Saif]

‘Tajuddin was objective, fact-based — quite unlike many other Awami League leaders’

The Daily Star (TDS): How and when did you first come into contact with Tajuddin Ahmad?

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‘Tajuddin was objective, fact-based — quite unlike many other Awami League leaders’
In this conversation with The Daily Star, Muyeedul Hasan, who served as Special Assistant to Tajuddin Ahmad, Prime Minister of the Bangladesh Government-in-Exile, reflects on his early encounters with Tajuddin. He is also the author of Muldhara ’71, widely regarded as one of the most authoritative books on the Liberation War of Bangladesh.

Tajuddin Ahmad, Prime Minister of the Bangladesh government-in-exile, with D. P. Dhar in 1971. Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi had appointed Dhar as Chairman of the Policy Planning Committee in the Ministry of External Affairs—a one-man taskforce created specifically to coordinate India’s strategy for the liberation of Bangladesh.

The Daily Star (TDS): How and when did you first come into contact with Tajuddin Ahmad?

Muyeedul Hasan (MH): I first met Tajuddin Ahmad in 1961, when I was working for The Daily Ittefaq and had been writing editorials for about a year. One of my colleagues — a woman who oversaw the women's page — once asked if I had ever spoken with Tajuddin Ahmad, noting that he was somewhat different from most political leaders. Curious, I decided to meet him. So, we went to his house on Karkun Bari Lane. His room was simple, with just two chairs. I noticed that he read all the newspapers thoroughly. He began the conversation by discussing my writings.

Muyeedul Hasan

What struck me as different about Tajuddin was that he rarely commented on individuals. Instead, he was deeply interested in writing — what was being published, who wrote what, and how good a particular piece was. That was something quite unique about him.

Also, I had the rare opportunity to spend an extended period with Tajuddin Ahmad — from February 1962 until mid-June. We were imprisoned together in Dhaka Central Jail during that time.

This was when Ayub Khan announced his second constitution. In response, the student community began mobilising for protests. The government anticipated unrest by the Awami League and arrested many of its members. Some leaders from the Communist Party, including Ranesh Dasgupta and others, were also detained. We were kept separately, near Urdu Road.

In that section were Tajuddin Ahmad, Manik Miah, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, Abul Mansur Ahmad, Kafiluddin Chowdhury, and Korban Ali — all prominent Awami League figures. I was arrested too, even though I was only an assistant editor at The Daily Ittefaq at the time. It seemed that my association with the paper — as the youngest member of the editorial section — was enough for the authorities to assume I was an Awami Leaguer.

The then Chief Justice of Pakistan, Muhammad Shahabuddin, had led a commission to review the proposed constitution. A series of editorials about that was published in The Morning News over 11 or 12 days.

There were 24 of us imprisoned together, and soon there was a scramble over who would get to read the newspaper — pages would tear in the chaos. So, from the second day, a system was established: Abul Mansur Ahmad and Manik Miah decided that only two people would read and summarise the constitutional reports. They would then brief the rest of us, along with their critical observations.

Tajuddin and I were part of that small reading group. He was about ten years older than me and a much more accomplished scholar. While working together in jail with Tajuddin Ahmad, I noticed that our reasoning often aligned. He was objective, fact-based — quite unlike many other Awami League leaders.

For four and a half months in prison, we worked together each morning, reading reports, underlining key points, and preparing materials for presentation to the group. Through that process, an intellectual bond formed between us.

After our release, we saw each other occasionally — perhaps once every month or two — usually when he visited the Ittefaq office.

From the beginning, I used to write about the economy in Ittefaq, and I realised that we were victims of disparity in many ways. Perhaps I was doing that work quite well. However, I left journalism and the Communist Party at the end of 1966. I saw that the Party leadership was fixated mainly on the Moscow and Peking affairs, with nothing about our local issues. So, I left the Party and got involved in a bit of business. Then the anti-Ayub movement began, Ayub fell, and Yahya came. I suddenly went to Bogura, where people already recognised me from my newspaper writings and my past involvement with the Student Union. As soon as I arrived, the members of East Pakistan Student Union started reaching out to me. They said I had to contest, and I stood in the election for NAP in 1970.

At that time, some of my writings were published—about the Six-Point demands—where I explained how these demands could be achieved, given that there was no scope for their implementation within the framework of a united Pakistan. These articles appeared in Forum magazine. The logic was simple: people would vote in favour of the Six-Point demands, and the Awami League would win. However, I raised a critical question: how would these demands ever be implemented, given that Pakistan's power structure—its army, bureaucracy, and business elites—would never accept them? Then would the Awami League really fight the army for it? No—except for a few leftists and some individuals, no one would. So, if we truly wanted autonomy for Bengal, it was essential to contest the election jointly with the left and allied groups. This perspective went against the official stance of the Awami League. Shortly afterwards, Sheikh Mujib reached out to me through Tajuddin. My concerns had been discussed in the Awami League's central committee, and Sheikh Mujib intended to offer me a party ticket to contest the election and join the party's planning team. He believed this would address my criticisms.

TDS: What sequence of events led to the March 1971 crackdown, and how did the resistance movement emerge in response?

MH: In March 1971, Masih-ud-Daulah, the elder brother of Asaf-ud-Daulah—the former Secretary—was serving in the Pakistan Army as General Staff at the Corps Commander's Office in Dhaka. As G-2 of the Corps Commander, he was responsible for Intelligence and held the rank of Major at the time. Another of his brothers was Anis-ud-Daulah. One of Masih-ud-Daulah's close friends, Anwarul Alam, was also a friend of mine.

Anwarul Alam met me on March 3. He said that an informant had asked him to pass on critical information to the higher political leadership. Preparations for a Pakistani military operation were already at an advanced stage. A tank convoy had been transported from Rangpur to Dhaka, where the tanks were being fitted with rubber belts—making them suitable for movement and combat on the roads leading into Dhaka city. Alam urged me to share this intelligence with the appropriate political circles.

I trusted Alam—not only because of our long-standing friendship and shared political beliefs, but also because I respected his honesty and political judgement. I agreed to relay the message. However, I added that while this information might reach us through other channels, he should ask his source whether there was any possible way to prevent the imminent attack.

Over the next two days, Alam was extremely busy but took considerable risks to reach out to the other side at least twice. He also remained in close contact with me. On the evening of March 5, I finally received a complete response to my question. He told me that the only way to prevent the Pakistani military assault was through a counter-military operation. At that time, Bengali soldiers in the province still outnumbered non-Bengali troops. With their support, it would be possible to simultaneously destroy the Godnail fuel depot, disable the Dhaka airport, and seize the Chittagong seaport. Executing these three operations together would severely cripple the Pakistani military's capabilities.

A freedom fighter stands before Prime Minister Tajuddin Ahmad during the Liberation War, expressing unwavering determination. The moment captures the spirit of sacrifice and resolve that defined 1971.

Thus, it was clear that the number of Bengali soldiers was sufficient to resist the impending attack — but it wouldn't happen automatically. Orders had to be given. And of course, those orders would have to come from the elected leadership — someone who had gained legitimacy through the election. So, I met Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, and he told me to discuss the matter with Tajuddin Ahmad.

After hearing everything, Tajuddin asked me, "Why did Mujib send you to me?" I replied, "Perhaps you'll ask a lot of small, detailed questions and then report back to him. Or maybe he just doesn't want to be involved in this at all and is avoiding me." Tajuddin responded, "It seems your second assumption is correct."

To be continued................​