[🇧🇩] Everything about our constitution

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CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM: Political, civic groups least concerned about language

Among the 28 political parties and alliances that submitted their respective proposals to the constitution reform commission, only two proposed that Bangla should remain as the state language and other mother tongues should be given constitutional recognition...

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CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM: Political, civic groups least concerned about language
Sadiqur Rahman 19 February, 2025, 23:48

Among the 28 political parties and alliances that submitted their respective proposals to the constitution reform commission, only two proposed that Bangla should remain as the state language and other mother tongues should be given constitutional recognition.

Civic and professional groups also showed minimal concern over language, as only eight out of 55 recommended that the mother tongues of all ethnic communities be recognised alongside Bangla as the state language.

However, most of the responding parties and groups recommended to the constitution reform commission that ‘Bangalee and ‘Bangalee nationalism’ should be replaced with ‘Bangladeshi’ and “Bangladeshi nationalism” in Articles 6 and 9 of the existing constitution respectively.

The constitution reform commission, along with three other reform commissions on police, electoral matters and the Anti-Corruption Commission, submitted their reports to interim government chief adviser Professor Muhammad Yunus on 15 January.

The full reports of the commissions were made public on February 8.

The constitution reform commission recommends that the state language be Bangla and that the constitution recognises as mother tongues all the native languages spoken by its citizens as mother tongues.

‘There is a bad sore in the constitution regarding the recognition of mother tongues and national identity. We have considered this matter with great importance,’ said Firoz Ahmed, a member of the constitution reform commission.

The Article 3 of the existing constitution states that Bangla is the state language and the Article 23 states that the state shall adopt measures to conserve the cultural traditions and heritage of the people and foster and improve the national language, literature and arts.

According to the third part of the constitution reform commission’s full report, at least 28 political parties and alliances submitted their respective suggestions with only Jamaat-e-Islami and the United Peoples Democratic Front providing specific suggestions on language.

Jamaat-e-Islami recommended Bangla as the state language and advocated for the protection of other languages within the state’s boundaries.

Meanwhile, the UPDF recommended that Bangla be the language of the republic. It also proposed that the state, alongside Bangla, equally supports the preservation and development of the languages of the ethnic communities.

Among the 55 civic and professional groups providing suggestions on constitutional reforms, only eight organisations, including the Bangladesh Adivasi Forum, the CHT Working Group for National Reform, the Uttarbanga Adivasi Forum, the Bangladesh Indigenous Peoples’ Network, Naripokkho, and the Bangladesh Law Alliance, submitted suggestions on language issues.

These organisations advocated for the recognition of the mother tongues of all ethnic communities.

Most political parties and civil society organisations, however, recommended abolishing Articles 6 and 9 of the existing constitution which broadly recognise the Bangla language as a key factor in determining the national identity.

Article 6(2) of the existing constitution states that the people of Bangladesh shall be known as Bangalees as a nation and that the citizens of Bangladesh shall be known as Bangladeshis.

Moreover, the Article 9 states that Bangalee nationalism shall be based on the unity and solidarity of the Bangalee nation which, deriving its identity from its language and culture, attained sovereign and independent Bangladesh through a united and determined struggle in the War of Independence.​

 

[Saif]

Amendments must not serve any group

Eminent jurist Dr Kamal Hossain yesterday said that steps must be taken to ensure that the constitution cannot be manipulated to benefit any particular person or group.

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Amendments must not serve any group
Says Dr Kamal about constitution

Eminent jurist Dr Kamal Hossain yesterday said that steps must be taken to ensure that the constitution cannot be manipulated to benefit any particular person or group.

"We must ensure that any change or amendment to the constitution properly reflects the aspirations of the people of the country. It must also be ensured that the constitution is not manipulated for the benefit of any individual or group."

"No initiative to amend the constitution should be driven by narrow interests. Any amendment should be pursued through extensive consultation and national consensus. Otherwise, these changes will fail to bring about national welfare," he said.

Kamal Hossain, one of the framers of Bangladesh's constitution, was speaking as the chief guest at a discussion titled The 1972 Constitution and Proposed Reforms, organised by the Bangladesh Gonotantrik Ainjibi Samity at the Supreme Court Bar Association (SCBA) auditorium yesterday afternoon.

Bangladesh's constitution reflects the nation's struggle, he said.

"It is not merely a legal document but a reflection of our dreams, aspirations, and struggles. Discussions on reviewing and reforming the constitution as per the needs of the time are not new, but the question remains -- how much these changes will reflect the will of the people?"

He said if the amendments truly reflect the people's aspirations, this would be the appropriate way to move forward.

"We have witnessed the events of 2024. In particular, the experience of August 5 reminded us that people's aspirations can never be ignored. The student movement is part of our historical continuity, where a generation has taken to the streets for its just demands -- just as we saw in 1952, 1969, and 1971. This movement is not limited to a specific time frame; it is an integral part of our national consciousness."

He added, "The Liberation War of 1971 gave us the dream of an exploitation-free, just, and democratic state. The 1972 constitution was promulgated to realise that dream."

The event, presided over by Senior Advocate Subrata Chowdhury, president of Bangladesh Gonotantrik Ainjibi Samity, was also addressed by former state minister for Information Prof Abu Sayeed, Bangla Academy President Prof Abul Kashem Fazlul Haque, Bangladesh Mahila Parishad President Fouzia Moslem, senior journalist Sohrab Hasan, and Bangladesh Gonotantrik Ainjibi Samity General Secretary Senior Advocate Zahidul Bari, among others.​

 

[Saif]

Major parties oppose MPs’ freedom to vote against their own party in parliament

All three parties insist that MPs should not have freedom in confidence votes, just as with the finance bill. In such cases, MPs must strictly follow their party’s position. According to Article 70 of the existing constitution, MPs cannot vote against their own party. The article states that if...

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Major parties oppose MPs’ freedom to vote against their own party in parliament

BNP has proposed this position after carefully reviewing the region’s long-standing political culture and history. The party believes that ensuring the government’s stability is crucial.

Riadul Karim
Dhaka
Updated: 02 Apr 2025, 15: 20

The major political parties do not want to give members of parliament (MPs) the freedom to vote against their own party in a no-confidence motion.

The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami, and the National Citizen Party (NCP) do not fully agree with the recommendation of the Constitutional Reform Commission, which proposes that members of the lower house of parliament should have full authority to vote against their party on any issue except the finance bill.

All three parties insist that MPs should not have freedom in confidence votes, just as with the finance bill. In such cases, MPs must strictly follow their party’s position.

According to Article 70 of the existing constitution, MPs cannot vote against their own party. The article states that if an MP elected as a party candidate resigns from that party or votes against it in parliament, their seat will be vacated.

Due to this provision, no law or proposal can pass in parliament without the government’s approval. It also prevents the possibility of a no-confidence motion being brought against the Prime Minister or any other official.

The debate over Article 70 has been ongoing for decades. It began when the constitution was first drafted in 1972. Opponents of the article argue that it limits the freedom of MPs and concentrates excessive power in the hands of the Prime Minister.

On the other hand, those in favour of keeping it claim that removing this provision would destabilise the government, potentially causing parliament to collapse within days.

They also argue that its removal could lead to illegal financial transactions aimed at buying votes and influencing MPs to overthrow governments.

The Constitutional Reform Commission, led by Professor Ali Riaz, has proposed changes to this article. It has recommended introducing a bicameral legislature and allowing MPs in the lower house to vote against their party’s stance on any issue except finance bills.

The country’s political culture has not yet matured to a level where MPs can be granted full freedom in confidence votes. If such freedom is allowed, no government will last more than one or two months, leading to instability.

The National Consensus Commission has sought the views of political parties on 166 key recommendations made by five reform commissions, including this one. Several parties, including BNP, Jamaat-e-Islami, and NCP, have already expressed their opinions.

The National Consensus Commission is set to hold separate discussions with the three parties soon.

Validity of the commission’s recommendations

In its report, the Constitutional Reform Commission explained the rationale behind expanding MPs’ voting rights. It stated that Article 70 compels MPs to accept party decisions without asking any question. Although they are allowed to express their opinions within party meetings, they lack the freedom to vote against their party’s proposals. As a result, the Constitution enforces strict party loyalty at the cost of MPs’ ability to represent their constituencies effectively.

The Commission further argued that while Article 70 was originally intended to prevent floor-crossing, its impact has gone far beyond that purpose.

The provision, it noted, contradicts democratic principles. While designed to ensure stability, it has instead weakened political deliberation and party accountability. The restriction limits MPs’ ability to advocate for their constituencies and exercise their independent judgment.

Different Positions of Parties

According to relevant sources, in its written opinion submitted to the National Consensus Commission regarding the power of MPs to vote against their party, BNP stated that voting against the party should not be allowed in matters involving confidence votes, finance bills, constitutional amendment bills, and national security issues. However, on other issues, MPs should be free to express their opinions.

Explaining the reasoning behind restricting freedom in confidence votes, BNP Standing Committee member Salahuddin Ahmed told Prothom Alo that before the creation of Bangladesh, governments in the subcontinent changed almost daily after 1954.

BNP has proposed this position after carefully reviewing the region’s long-standing political culture and history. The party believes that ensuring the government’s stability is crucial.

According to them, the country’s political culture has not yet matured to a level where MPs can be granted full freedom in confidence votes. If such freedom is allowed, no government will last more than one or two months, leading to instability.

When the Constitutional Reform Commission sought opinions from political parties, Jamaat-e-Islami stated in its proposal that the restriction on floor crossing should not be lifted as yet.

They argued that Article 70 was originally introduced to stabilise the parliamentary system and should remain in place for at least two more terms.

Jamaat-e-Islami reiterated this stance in its opinion submitted to the National Consensus Commission. The party’s Secretary General, Mia Golam Parwar, told Prothom Alo that their submission explained the importance of maintaining restrictions in certain cases, including finance bills and confidence votes.

He stated that a vote of confidence is a matter of party policy, and an MP represents their party in parliament. Therefore, MPs must align with their party’s policy. If MPs do not follow the party’s stance in a no-confidence motion against the Prime Minister or the President, it could lead to a breakdown in party discipline.

When the Constitutional Reform Commission sought opinions from political parties, Jamaat-e-Islami stated in its proposal that the restriction on floor crossing should not be lifted as yet.
The NCP, which led the July uprising, has also expressed the opinion that restrictions should remain on no-confidence votes, similar to finance bills.

NCP Joint Convener and Reform Coordination Committee Coordinator Sarwar Tusher told Prothom Alo that without such provisions, there is a risk of MPs being bought and sold. For the stability of parliament and the government, the party advocates for allowing MPs to freely express their opinions on all issues except money bills and confidence votes.

How Article 70 was added

The origins of Article 70 of the Constitution, added in 1972, are described in the book Bipula Prithibi by the late Professor Anisuzzaman. Professor Anisuzzaman, who was responsible for translating the 1972 Constitution into Bengali, wrote:

“Bangabandhu summoned Kamal twice to advise him on the constitution - I was also with him.… He said that during the Pakistan period, governments became unstable mainly because members of the council frequently changed parties or voted against their own party, violating party discipline. This needed to be stopped. A rule should be established stating that if an elected member disagrees with a party decision or votes against the party, they must resign, or their parliamentary membership should be forfeited. However, there should also be a provision ensuring that in such cases, they are not disqualified from contesting by-elections or future elections. This intention was reflected in Article 70 of the Constitution.”

Despite this, Article 70 was debated within the Constituent Assembly itself. Anisuzzaman noted in his book that National Assembly members AKM Mosharraf Hossain Akand, Asaduzzaman Khan, Abdul Muntakim Chowdhury, and Hafez Habibur Rahman opposed the article.

He wrote, “Hafez Habibur Rahman objected to Article 70 in the strongest terms. In his view, it would lead to party dictatorship and excessive control by party leaders.”

* The report, originally published in the Bangla edition of Prothom Alo, has been rewritten in English by Farjana Liakat​

 

[Saif]

A ‘new constitution’ and my discontents

Constitution-making is invariably an “elitist” chore, as scholars rightly call it “equitable elite bargaining.”

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A ‘new constitution’ and my discontents

FILE VISUAL: ANWAR SOHEL

Since the fall of the Awami League government, we have been debating prospects of transitioning into a new republic with a new constitution. With the inception of the Jatiyo Nagorik Party (JNP), the debates and discussions are now taking a definite shape. We now have several concrete arguments with time—and alongside, the discontents too.

One argument is that the 1972 constitution-making episode was elitist and dominated by one party. It is quite a fair criticism that resonates with many feminist, Marxist scholars about virtually any constitution of the world. However, it is not clear whether any constitution-making episode can stand blameless on this count.

Studies on constitutionalism have always been saturated with discussions on how dominant political parties' ideologies influence constitution building—be it a one-party, authoritarian, or a liberal-democratic state. In appraising the one-party dominance over the 1972 constitution-making episode, we must consider the historical contingencies too, characterised by the Liberation War, its antecedents and political aftermath, the need for post-war reconstruction and solidification of a constitutional identity. Some say that the constituent assembly members were elected under the Legal Framework Order (LFO) 1970 of the erstwhile Pakistan, and hence, the constitution they drafted needs to be replaced with a new one. However, it must be noted that following the constitutional subversion facilitated by Ayub Khan, the LFO came as a remarkable political win, posing one concrete opportunity for democratic transition. Therefore, the significance of the moment within which the LFO came into being cannot be overstated.

Pertinently, the Proclamation of Independence (which we all agree to be our first constitution) as adopted on April 10, 1971 (with retrospective effect from the March 26, 1971), the representatives elected in the 1970 elections constituted themselves into a "Constituent Assembly" for drafting a constitution for an independent Bangladesh. Following the war, the Provisional Constitution of Bangladesh Order of 1972 further defined the same elected representatives as the "Constituent Assembly" who, in fact, later drafted and adopted the existing constitution of Bangladesh. While the JNP vows to protect the ideals of shammo, manobik morjada, and shamajik shubichar (that were categorically enshrined in the Proclamation of Independence), the process of adopting a new constitution as laid down in the same document cannot be ignored. If we adopt historiographical lenses, then the immense political significance of 1970 elections and its aftermath can also not be downplayed as that would undermine both the wartime and post-war politico-constitutional consensus. Against this backdrop, the dominance of the Awami League among the elected representatives in the 1970 elections must be seen as rather a historical fact, which cannot be accounted for through myopic presentist lenses.

In any case, constitution-making is invariably an "elitist" chore, as scholars rightly call it "equitable elite bargaining." Whoever makes the constitution at a given point of time are always, invariably, the political elites, impersonating "we, the people" at times through "elections", through "eliciting opinions from the people" or at other times, through "referenda". Now that the JNP is asking for a new constitution, and as the idea of a new constitution seemingly stems from their political vision for a "second republic", won't claims about their dominance, at least in terms of steering the process, be legitimate too?

To simplify matters, some propose having a parliament act as a constituent assembly (put in place through simultaneous elections). Such an arrangement will be all the more "exclusive" and "elitist," potentially rendering the parliament cum constituent assembly authoritarian as virtually subservient-to-none. Similar experience in Venezuela under Nicolás Maduro provides a cautionary tale in this regard. Alternatively, such an arrangement can usher in major political instability and long-term disunity too, particularly amid a rapidly shifting political landscape like ours.

Interestingly, I may say, based on questionable lack of women's representation and lack of an explicit feminist methodological approach to drafting constitutions, that virtually all constitutions are unfairly dominated by men (e.g., one "sex") and their exclusionary ideologies. This argument will not be tenable because of the systemic inequalities that exist and because women as a group do not have the political capital as such. Indeed, for those who are left out of the process, a constitution-making episode will always look "exclusionary," "elitist," and dominated by "others," and because constitutions are only imperfect ideological settlements that only a sustainable culture of democracy can carry forward.

Another key argument is that the existing constitution is "fascistic." Authoritarianism or fascism is an indefensible political vision, a conscious governance choice, and an inanimate constitution cannot be blamed for that unless it explicitly provides for one-party rule or authoritarianism. In many authoritarian or paternalist countries, apparently good reading constitutions are kept simply as tools of window dressing. The democratic subversion in the post-independence Bangladesh was facilitated by a series of constitutional amendments, which irreparably whittled down constitutional checks and balances (e.g. fourth constitutional amendment), subverted the constitutional mandate of democratic rule (e.g. fifth and seventh constitutional amendments), and monopolised a static constitutional narrative and thereby contributed to democratic backsliding (e.g., fifteenth constitutional amendment). But these were but amendments—not the constitution itself. The Awami League government, time and again, co-opted constitution-based rhetorics while remaining authoritarian, but that is a classic example of abusing the constitution, not of "using" one. Instances of abusing the constitution were prominent during other military and non-military regimes too. Indeed, blaming the constitution for explaining the political follies and calling for its replacement without addressing its political understructure is quite enervated and does not align with the vigour and acumen that our youth shows otherwise.

While arguing for a new republic, the JNP often refers to France, which I do not think offers a useful, appropriable example for our context. A cardinal yet uncomplicated rule of adopting constitutional experiences is that we cannot transplant an idea without accounting for the overarching politico-cultural contexts. Indeed, transplanting an 1852 idea into a 2025 postcolonial independent country sounds perversely counterintuitive as there are literally no parallels that we can draw to begin a sensical comparison (other than the fact that France opted for a second republic).

Pertinently, contemporary instances only show how new constitution-making episodes can potentially bring in disunity, violence, and instabilities. We do have the inspiring instance of South Africa, which chose to undo its constitutional order rooted in apartheid, racialised political and governance structure, and explicit electoral discrimination against the non-Whites. What do we seek to undo? Persistent culture of rights violations, authoritarian governance, and democratic deficit? But the existing constitution permits/endorses none of these. Certainly, state powers could be better organised and less concentrated in the existing constitution, but that does not make the entire constitution expendable and does not necessitate making an entirely new one. Finally, any new constitution will not be entirely "new" as such unless we opt for something other than a liberal democratic constitutional order. In fact, some scholars suggest that the very idea of replacing an old constitution with a new one is a "myth" and is only possible in theory. In practice, there will always be constitutional/legal continuity. A so-called new constitution will perhaps only arrange things in a different order, expand on or restrict certain rights, and may dilute some commitments. What troubles me is the idea of going over the entire process all over again, of deepening and entrenching divisions, producing new binaries, reinforcing the existing ones, and so on. And the people who lie in the fringes and the margins will not be able to withstand that.

Psymhe Wadud teaches law at the University of Dhaka and is in charge of Law & Our Rights at The Daily Star.​

 

[Saif]

Advisor Asif Nazrul says it may take 2-3 years to draft a new constitution

Law Advisor Asif Nazrul has said it may take “two to three years” to draft a new constitution, cautioning against the assumption that the July Charter could be adopted swiftly or without significant debate. Speaking at an event in Dhaka on Sunday, he also indicated that the current par

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Advisor Asif Nazrul says it may take 2-3 years to draft a new constitution
bdnews24.com
Published :
May 11, 2025 20:21
Updated :
May 11, 2025 21:49

Law Advisor Asif Nazrul

Law Advisor Asif Nazrul has said it may take “two to three years” to draft a new constitution, cautioning against the assumption that the July Charter could be adopted swiftly or without significant debate.

Speaking at an event in Dhaka on Sunday, he also indicated that the current parliament will need to continue amending the 1972 Constitution in the interim.

Addressing concerns about what would happen if the new constitution is not completed on time, he said: “If they can’t do it within 90 days, will the existing constitution continue? This is where I object. In our neighbouring countries, we’ve seen it take eight or nine years for a constituent assembly to finalise a new constitution through parliamentary amendments.”

Asif estimated that it could take two to three years to finalise the new constitution. He added that the current parliament will have to make amendments to the 1972 Constitution until a new one is adopted.

He made these remarks on Sunday at an event hosted at the International Mother Language Institute in Dhaka. The discussion was organised by the Citizens' Coalition on the group’s seven-point proposal for constitutional reform.

During his speech, Asif pointed to precedents in Bangladesh’s political history, and said that while drafting a constitution, a parliament cannot devote all of its time to the task. It can only afford to spend two days a week on the constitution, making it an unrealistic expectation for an assembly to draft a new constitution within 90 days.

He also weighed in on the Charter of the July Uprising, saying it is receiving “too much emphasis.”

“We seem to be assuming that everyone will agree on every aspect of the July Charter. That won’t be so easy. Perhaps only the most fundamental parts of it can be retained. This needs careful consideration, though the idea itself is a very good one,” he said.​

 

[Saif]

MPs may enjoy freedom in parliament except on no confidence motions, finance bills

This consensus was reached during discussions between political parties and the National Consensus Commission on Tuesday. However, further talks will be held on Wednesday

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MPs may enjoy freedom in parliament except on no confidence motions, finance bills
Staff Correspondent Dhaka
Published: 18 Jun 2025, 21: 38

MPs may enjoy freedom in parliament except on no confidence motions, finance bills PID

Political parties have reached a consensus on amending Article 70 of the constitution, appointing opposition party members as heads of several parliamentary standing committees, and reforming the process of appointing the chief justice.

This consensus was reached during discussions between political parties and the National Consensus Commission on Tuesday. However, further talks will be held on what the new process for appointing the chief justice should be.

The meeting reached decisions, and these are: members of parliament (MPs) will enjoy full freedom to vote against their own party in parliament on any issue except finance bills and no confidence motions.

The positions of committee chairpersons of four key standing committees— Public Accounts Committee (PAC), Committee on Estimates, Committee on Public Undertakings, and Standing Committee of Privileges — will be distributed to opposition parties in proportion to the number of seats they hold in parliament.

The meeting began at the Foreign Service Academy’s Doyel Hall in Dhaka around 11:45 am and ended at 5:30 pm with a one-hour lunch break. After the meeting, commission vice-chairman Professor Ali Riaz briefed the journalists on the day's decisions. Talks would continue with the political parties on Wednesday.

Representatives from 29 political parties and alliances, including BNP, National Citizen Party (NCP), Islami Andolon, Nagorik Oikya, Gono Odhikar Parishad, and Ganosamhati Andolan, participated in Tuesday’s talks. Jamaat-e-Islami, however, did not take part.

On the other hand, the NCP raised questions on how the process of reaching consensus. Senior joint convener Ariful Islam Adib also alleged that discussions are being centered around one individual from a particular party.

He also questioned the method by which parties were invited. Gono Odhikar Parishad president Nurul Haque echoed similar concerns. The discussion was broadcast live on BTV News.

Chief Adviser Professor Muhammad Yunus inaugurated second phase of discussion on 2 June to address key reforms that lacked agreement in the first phase of talks. Topic-based talks resumed on 3 June, focusing on Article 70, committee chair appointments, and reserved women's seats—but no consensus was reached. That adjourned discussion resumed yesterday, Tuesday. The agenda included these three issues plus the formation of a bicameral legislature and reforming the chief justice appointment process.

No consensus was reached yesterday on the proposal to increase the number of reserved women's seats to 100 and elect them through direct votes. Due to differing views among the parties, this topic will be revisited next week. Although there was some general agreement on formation of a bicameral parliament, several parties disagreed in principle. No consensus has yet been reached regarding how upper house elections would work or what powers it would hold.

Article 70 of Constitution

The Article 70 of Constitution does not allow sitting MPs to vote against their own party. If a person elected as an MP from a political party resigns from the party or votes against it in parliament, their seats is declared vacant.

The Constitutional Reform Commission had proposed changing this clause. According to their proposal, lawmakers would be free to vote against their party on any matter except the finance bill. After lengthy discussion, it was decided that MPs would have the freedom to vote against their own party except on finance bills and no confidence motions.

During the discussion, BNP standing committee member Salahuddin Ahmed proposed adding two more exceptions: constitutional amendment bills and bills related to national security.

He said everyone could agree on finance bills and no confidence motions, but other than this, if a party has any commitment, they will remain independent on that.

NCP joint convener Javed Rasin disagreed with adding more exceptions, arguing that in the past, national security had been used as a pretext to enact draconian laws, as well as constitution was amended to serve personal or party interests.

At one point in the talks, commission vicec chairman Ali Riaz said consensus was reached on two issues—finance bills and no confidence motions. If any party disagrees when the draft of the National Charter will be prepared, their dissent can be noted in the appendix.

Later in the press conference, Ali Riaz said, “We have agreed to amend the existing Article 70 so that MPs will be bound to vote in favour of their party only on finance bills and no confidence motions. For all other matters, they will enjoy freedom to vote as they choose.”

Reserved seats for women and appointment of chief justice

At present, the constitution reserves 50 seats for women in parliament, and that are allocated to the parties proportionally based on their 300 directly elected seats. A proposal was made to increase this to 100 seats and elect them through direct voting. However, no decision was reached even after discussions on 3 June and again on Tuesday.

Ali Riaz told journalists that they had long discussions on women’s representation in parliament. There was a consensus on permanently reserving 100 seats for women, but discussions will continue on the method and process. There are various proposals, and the commission hopes to reach a consensus next week.

According to the constitution, the president appoints the chief justice, but constitution does not specify who should be chosen. Some changes were proposed recommending that the president appoints the senior-most judge from the Appellate Division as chief justice.

Several parties argued for keeping alternatives, or choosing the chief justice among the top two or three senior-most judges in the Appellate Division.

Ali Riaz said there is a general consensus on amending Articles 95(1) and 48(3) of Constitution related to the chief justice’s appointment. Except for two parties, most have agreed. Further discussions will be held next week. However, an agreement has been reached on the reform of existing system of appointing the chief justice.

Bicameral parliament

The existing national parliament is unicameral. The Constitution and Electoral Reform Commissions have proposed the bicameral legislature. The lower house would be elected as it is now, while the upper house would have 100 seats, and that would be distributed based on the percentage of total votes a party receives across the country in the lower house election.

NCP agreed with the proposed voting system for the upper house and but they want candidate lists to be published in advance. BNP also supported the idea of a bicameral legislature but disagreed with the proposed election system. They want upper house seats to be allocated based on the number of seats a party wins in the lower house.

However, some parties opposed the idea, arguing that a bicameral system would be too heavy. If implemented, 200 MPs—including 100 indirectly elected women MPs—would not be directly elected, which contradicts the spirit of the constitution.

At the end of yesterday’s discussions, Ali Riaz told the journalists that several parties expressed objections to the idea of a bicameral legislature, but the majority supported forming a 100-member upper house. Talks on its formation, including the election process and powers, are still underway.

“The discussion is progressing. We hope to finalise the National Charter by July, and reach consensus on many important issues,” Ali Riaz said.

Consensus Commission members Badiul Alam Majumdar, Justice Md Emdadul Haque, Safar Raj Hossain, Iftekharuzzaman, and Md Ayub Miah were present at the discussion, while Monir Haidar, special assistant to the chief adviser on consensus, moderated the event.​

 

[Saif]

Why it is essential to formulate a constitutional framework

Discussions are underway regarding appointment of honest, competent, reputable, non-partisan individuals to statutory bodies established by the Constitution and law, based on consensus and transparency.

en.prothomalo.com

Why it is essential to formulate a constitutional framework
Badiul Alam Majumdar
Published: 09 Jul 2025, 08: 34

In the meeting between political parties and the National Consensus Commission, discussions are underway regarding the appointment of honest, competent, reputable and non-partisan individuals to statutory bodies established by the Constitution and law, based on political consensus and transparency. To this end, the commission has proposed the formation of a constitutional body named the National Constitutional Council (NCC).

The proposed members of the NCC would be: 1. The President; 2. The Prime Minister; 3. The Leader of the Opposition; 4. The Speaker of the Lower House; 5. The Speaker of the Upper House; 6. The Chief Justice; 7. The Deputy Speaker of the Lower House; 8. The Deputy Speaker of the Upper House; 9. One member from outside the ruling and opposition parties of both houses of parliament, to be elected by a vote of members from both houses.

At the outset, the Consensus Commission proposed that appointments to key bodies -- including the Election Commission, Human Rights Commission, Anti-Corruption Commission, Public Service Commission, Comptroller and Auditor General, Information Commission, and the proposed Local Government Commission along with the chiefs of the three armed forces and the Attorney General, be made through the National Constitutional Council (NCC).

However, following initial discussions with political parties, it was decided to rename the proposed body as the “Appointment Committee for Constitutional and Statutory Institutions,” replacing the NCC title. It was also decided that the appointments of the chiefs of the armed forces and the Attorney General would be excluded from the committee’s purview.

While most parties supported the revised proposal, a few objected. They argued that forming such a constitutional structure for appointments to constitutional and statutory bodies would undermine the authority of the executive branch. Instead, they proposed that separate search committees be formed under the law to make appointments to each institution. This reasoning, however, is not only flawed. It has already had disastrous consequences, which we have all experienced firsthand.

Past experience has also clearly shown that despite widespread public desire to make the Election Commission truly independent and strong, and despite the President’s repeated initiatives for all-party dialogues, these efforts have failed.
Take the Election Commission, for instance. The commission is constitutionally an independent body, not part of the executive branch. Part IV of the current Constitution of Bangladesh deals with the executive, covering the President, Prime Minister and Cabinet, local government, the armed forces division, and the Attorney General.

In contrast, Part VII deals with elections, and Article 118 falls under this part, detailing the appointment of the Election Commission. That the Election Commission is not part of the executive branch is further clarified by Article 126, which states that “it shall be the duty of all executive authorities to assist the Election Commission in the discharge of its functions.” Thus, any new provision for appointments to the Election Commission would in no way infringe upon the powers of the executive because the Commission does not fall under it in the first place.

Despite this, the executive branch has historically appointed chief election commissioners, many of whom have been deeply controversial. For example, Justice MA Aziz, a former judge of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, was appointed Chief Election Commissioner on 25 May 2005 but had to resign due to controversies surrounding the voter list.

Later, the higher courts declared his appointment unconstitutional.

In light of such controversies, and under pressure to establish an independent and robust Election Commission, then-President held dialogues with registered political parties in December 2011 and January 2022. These dialogues involved 23 political parties, including the BNP, Awami League, Jatiya Party, and the Communist Party.

Following the dialogue, a four-member “search committee” was formed on 24 January 2012 by presidential order, consisting of Justice Syed Mahmud Hossain of the Appellate Division, Justice Md. Nuruzzaman of the High Court, Comptroller and Auditor General Ahmed Ataul Hakim, and Public Service Commission Chairman ATM Ahmedul Haque Chowdhury.

Unfortunately, the search committee itself included controversial and biased members, defeating its very purpose..

Many readers may recall that former Justice Nuruzzaman had previously been elected general secretary and later president of the Dhaka Bar Association from the ruling Awami League panel. He was appointed Deputy Attorney General in January 2009 and a High Court judge in June that same year. There is even debate over whether he had the required ten years of practice at the High Court prior to his appointment as judge. Based on the recommendations of this search committee, the controversial “Rakib Commission” was appointed in 2012, which paved the way for the one-sided 2014 election and the “election” of 153 members of parliament without contest.

Perhaps the most blatant example of partisan appointments via a search committee is the Nurul Huda Commission. Again, aiming to establish an independent and powerful Election Commission, former President Abdul Hamid conducted dialogues with 31 registered political parties. The process began on 17 December 2016 with discussions with the main opposition party, the BNP.

As a result of the dialogue, another search committee was formed through official notification, headed by former Chief Justice Syed Mahmud Hossain. Based on this committee’s recommendation, a rigged Election Commission was appointed under Nurul Huda, who had once participated in BNP-era protest platforms and was forced into compulsory retirement as a joint secretary during BNP’s rule. This commission went on to deliver the infamous “midnight election” of 2018. Incredibly, 100 per cent voter turnout was reported in 213 polling centers; the BNP received zero votes in 1,177 centers, and even the Awami League got zero votes in two centers.

Similarly, in 2022, a controversial law titled Chief Election Commissioner and Other Election Commissioners Appointment Act, 2022 was enacted. Under this law, a search committee was formed, headed by Justice Obaidul Hassan, and based on its recommendations, the highly controversial Awal Commission was appointed. Under this commission’s leadership, a one-sided and so-called “I vs. Dummies” election was held on 7 January 2024. Once again, the search committee included openly biased individuals such as former Election Commissioner Sohul Hossain, who had sought an Awami League nomination in the 2018 elections.

It is abundantly clear that the Election Commission, as a constitutionally independent institution, is not part of the executive branch. Therefore, appointments made through a constitutional body like the NCC would in no way undermine executive authority. On the contrary, if appointments to such institutions are made based on political consensus, it could open the door to a new possibility of inter-party harmony. As a result, a new political culture may develop in our country, one that seeks resolution through dialogue at the table rather than agitation on the streets.

Past experience has also clearly shown that despite widespread public desire to make the Election Commission truly independent and strong, and despite the President’s repeated initiatives for all-party dialogues, these efforts have failed. Even forming search committees through legislation did not stop the executive branch’s disgraceful behavior.

This is precisely why the Consensus Commission has proposed that appointments to key bodies like the Election Commission be made through a constitutional structure such as the Appointment Committee for Constitutional and Statutory Institutions. We believe such a mechanism would serve as a safeguard for the independence and impartiality of these institutions because appointments would be made with the consensus of senior representatives from all branches of the state and through political agreement, and because such a constitutional framework cannot be overturned or amended by a mere parliamentary majority as is the case with ordinary laws.

* Dr. Badiul Alam Majumdar, Secretary, Citizens for Good Governance (Shujan)​