[🇧🇩] Everything about our constitution

[Saif]

CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM: Political, civic groups least concerned about language

Among the 28 political parties and alliances that submitted their respective proposals to the constitution reform commission, only two proposed that Bangla should remain as the state language and other mother tongues should be given constitutional recognition...

www.newagebd.net

CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM: Political, civic groups least concerned about language
Sadiqur Rahman 19 February, 2025, 23:48

Among the 28 political parties and alliances that submitted their respective proposals to the constitution reform commission, only two proposed that Bangla should remain as the state language and other mother tongues should be given constitutional recognition.

Civic and professional groups also showed minimal concern over language, as only eight out of 55 recommended that the mother tongues of all ethnic communities be recognised alongside Bangla as the state language.

However, most of the responding parties and groups recommended to the constitution reform commission that ‘Bangalee and ‘Bangalee nationalism’ should be replaced with ‘Bangladeshi’ and “Bangladeshi nationalism” in Articles 6 and 9 of the existing constitution respectively.

The constitution reform commission, along with three other reform commissions on police, electoral matters and the Anti-Corruption Commission, submitted their reports to interim government chief adviser Professor Muhammad Yunus on 15 January.

The full reports of the commissions were made public on February 8.

The constitution reform commission recommends that the state language be Bangla and that the constitution recognises as mother tongues all the native languages spoken by its citizens as mother tongues.

‘There is a bad sore in the constitution regarding the recognition of mother tongues and national identity. We have considered this matter with great importance,’ said Firoz Ahmed, a member of the constitution reform commission.

The Article 3 of the existing constitution states that Bangla is the state language and the Article 23 states that the state shall adopt measures to conserve the cultural traditions and heritage of the people and foster and improve the national language, literature and arts.

According to the third part of the constitution reform commission’s full report, at least 28 political parties and alliances submitted their respective suggestions with only Jamaat-e-Islami and the United Peoples Democratic Front providing specific suggestions on language.

Jamaat-e-Islami recommended Bangla as the state language and advocated for the protection of other languages within the state’s boundaries.

Meanwhile, the UPDF recommended that Bangla be the language of the republic. It also proposed that the state, alongside Bangla, equally supports the preservation and development of the languages of the ethnic communities.

Among the 55 civic and professional groups providing suggestions on constitutional reforms, only eight organisations, including the Bangladesh Adivasi Forum, the CHT Working Group for National Reform, the Uttarbanga Adivasi Forum, the Bangladesh Indigenous Peoples’ Network, Naripokkho, and the Bangladesh Law Alliance, submitted suggestions on language issues.

These organisations advocated for the recognition of the mother tongues of all ethnic communities.

Most political parties and civil society organisations, however, recommended abolishing Articles 6 and 9 of the existing constitution which broadly recognise the Bangla language as a key factor in determining the national identity.

Article 6(2) of the existing constitution states that the people of Bangladesh shall be known as Bangalees as a nation and that the citizens of Bangladesh shall be known as Bangladeshis.

Moreover, the Article 9 states that Bangalee nationalism shall be based on the unity and solidarity of the Bangalee nation which, deriving its identity from its language and culture, attained sovereign and independent Bangladesh through a united and determined struggle in the War of Independence.​

 

[Saif]

Amendments must not serve any group

Eminent jurist Dr Kamal Hossain yesterday said that steps must be taken to ensure that the constitution cannot be manipulated to benefit any particular person or group.

www.thedailystar.net

Amendments must not serve any group
Says Dr Kamal about constitution

Eminent jurist Dr Kamal Hossain yesterday said that steps must be taken to ensure that the constitution cannot be manipulated to benefit any particular person or group.

"We must ensure that any change or amendment to the constitution properly reflects the aspirations of the people of the country. It must also be ensured that the constitution is not manipulated for the benefit of any individual or group."

"No initiative to amend the constitution should be driven by narrow interests. Any amendment should be pursued through extensive consultation and national consensus. Otherwise, these changes will fail to bring about national welfare," he said.

Kamal Hossain, one of the framers of Bangladesh's constitution, was speaking as the chief guest at a discussion titled The 1972 Constitution and Proposed Reforms, organised by the Bangladesh Gonotantrik Ainjibi Samity at the Supreme Court Bar Association (SCBA) auditorium yesterday afternoon.

Bangladesh's constitution reflects the nation's struggle, he said.

"It is not merely a legal document but a reflection of our dreams, aspirations, and struggles. Discussions on reviewing and reforming the constitution as per the needs of the time are not new, but the question remains -- how much these changes will reflect the will of the people?"

He said if the amendments truly reflect the people's aspirations, this would be the appropriate way to move forward.

"We have witnessed the events of 2024. In particular, the experience of August 5 reminded us that people's aspirations can never be ignored. The student movement is part of our historical continuity, where a generation has taken to the streets for its just demands -- just as we saw in 1952, 1969, and 1971. This movement is not limited to a specific time frame; it is an integral part of our national consciousness."

He added, "The Liberation War of 1971 gave us the dream of an exploitation-free, just, and democratic state. The 1972 constitution was promulgated to realise that dream."

The event, presided over by Senior Advocate Subrata Chowdhury, president of Bangladesh Gonotantrik Ainjibi Samity, was also addressed by former state minister for Information Prof Abu Sayeed, Bangla Academy President Prof Abul Kashem Fazlul Haque, Bangladesh Mahila Parishad President Fouzia Moslem, senior journalist Sohrab Hasan, and Bangladesh Gonotantrik Ainjibi Samity General Secretary Senior Advocate Zahidul Bari, among others.​

 

[Saif]

Major parties oppose MPs’ freedom to vote against their own party in parliament

All three parties insist that MPs should not have freedom in confidence votes, just as with the finance bill. In such cases, MPs must strictly follow their party’s position. According to Article 70 of the existing constitution, MPs cannot vote against their own party. The article states that if...

en.prothomalo.com

Major parties oppose MPs’ freedom to vote against their own party in parliament

BNP has proposed this position after carefully reviewing the region’s long-standing political culture and history. The party believes that ensuring the government’s stability is crucial.

Riadul Karim
Dhaka
Updated: 02 Apr 2025, 15: 20

The major political parties do not want to give members of parliament (MPs) the freedom to vote against their own party in a no-confidence motion.

The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami, and the National Citizen Party (NCP) do not fully agree with the recommendation of the Constitutional Reform Commission, which proposes that members of the lower house of parliament should have full authority to vote against their party on any issue except the finance bill.

All three parties insist that MPs should not have freedom in confidence votes, just as with the finance bill. In such cases, MPs must strictly follow their party’s position.

According to Article 70 of the existing constitution, MPs cannot vote against their own party. The article states that if an MP elected as a party candidate resigns from that party or votes against it in parliament, their seat will be vacated.

Due to this provision, no law or proposal can pass in parliament without the government’s approval. It also prevents the possibility of a no-confidence motion being brought against the Prime Minister or any other official.

The debate over Article 70 has been ongoing for decades. It began when the constitution was first drafted in 1972. Opponents of the article argue that it limits the freedom of MPs and concentrates excessive power in the hands of the Prime Minister.

On the other hand, those in favour of keeping it claim that removing this provision would destabilise the government, potentially causing parliament to collapse within days.

They also argue that its removal could lead to illegal financial transactions aimed at buying votes and influencing MPs to overthrow governments.

The Constitutional Reform Commission, led by Professor Ali Riaz, has proposed changes to this article. It has recommended introducing a bicameral legislature and allowing MPs in the lower house to vote against their party’s stance on any issue except finance bills.

The country’s political culture has not yet matured to a level where MPs can be granted full freedom in confidence votes. If such freedom is allowed, no government will last more than one or two months, leading to instability.

The National Consensus Commission has sought the views of political parties on 166 key recommendations made by five reform commissions, including this one. Several parties, including BNP, Jamaat-e-Islami, and NCP, have already expressed their opinions.

The National Consensus Commission is set to hold separate discussions with the three parties soon.

Validity of the commission’s recommendations

In its report, the Constitutional Reform Commission explained the rationale behind expanding MPs’ voting rights. It stated that Article 70 compels MPs to accept party decisions without asking any question. Although they are allowed to express their opinions within party meetings, they lack the freedom to vote against their party’s proposals. As a result, the Constitution enforces strict party loyalty at the cost of MPs’ ability to represent their constituencies effectively.

The Commission further argued that while Article 70 was originally intended to prevent floor-crossing, its impact has gone far beyond that purpose.

The provision, it noted, contradicts democratic principles. While designed to ensure stability, it has instead weakened political deliberation and party accountability. The restriction limits MPs’ ability to advocate for their constituencies and exercise their independent judgment.

Different Positions of Parties

According to relevant sources, in its written opinion submitted to the National Consensus Commission regarding the power of MPs to vote against their party, BNP stated that voting against the party should not be allowed in matters involving confidence votes, finance bills, constitutional amendment bills, and national security issues. However, on other issues, MPs should be free to express their opinions.

Explaining the reasoning behind restricting freedom in confidence votes, BNP Standing Committee member Salahuddin Ahmed told Prothom Alo that before the creation of Bangladesh, governments in the subcontinent changed almost daily after 1954.

BNP has proposed this position after carefully reviewing the region’s long-standing political culture and history. The party believes that ensuring the government’s stability is crucial.

According to them, the country’s political culture has not yet matured to a level where MPs can be granted full freedom in confidence votes. If such freedom is allowed, no government will last more than one or two months, leading to instability.

When the Constitutional Reform Commission sought opinions from political parties, Jamaat-e-Islami stated in its proposal that the restriction on floor crossing should not be lifted as yet.

They argued that Article 70 was originally introduced to stabilise the parliamentary system and should remain in place for at least two more terms.

Jamaat-e-Islami reiterated this stance in its opinion submitted to the National Consensus Commission. The party’s Secretary General, Mia Golam Parwar, told Prothom Alo that their submission explained the importance of maintaining restrictions in certain cases, including finance bills and confidence votes.

He stated that a vote of confidence is a matter of party policy, and an MP represents their party in parliament. Therefore, MPs must align with their party’s policy. If MPs do not follow the party’s stance in a no-confidence motion against the Prime Minister or the President, it could lead to a breakdown in party discipline.

When the Constitutional Reform Commission sought opinions from political parties, Jamaat-e-Islami stated in its proposal that the restriction on floor crossing should not be lifted as yet.
The NCP, which led the July uprising, has also expressed the opinion that restrictions should remain on no-confidence votes, similar to finance bills.

NCP Joint Convener and Reform Coordination Committee Coordinator Sarwar Tusher told Prothom Alo that without such provisions, there is a risk of MPs being bought and sold. For the stability of parliament and the government, the party advocates for allowing MPs to freely express their opinions on all issues except money bills and confidence votes.

How Article 70 was added

The origins of Article 70 of the Constitution, added in 1972, are described in the book Bipula Prithibi by the late Professor Anisuzzaman. Professor Anisuzzaman, who was responsible for translating the 1972 Constitution into Bengali, wrote:

“Bangabandhu summoned Kamal twice to advise him on the constitution - I was also with him.… He said that during the Pakistan period, governments became unstable mainly because members of the council frequently changed parties or voted against their own party, violating party discipline. This needed to be stopped. A rule should be established stating that if an elected member disagrees with a party decision or votes against the party, they must resign, or their parliamentary membership should be forfeited. However, there should also be a provision ensuring that in such cases, they are not disqualified from contesting by-elections or future elections. This intention was reflected in Article 70 of the Constitution.”

Despite this, Article 70 was debated within the Constituent Assembly itself. Anisuzzaman noted in his book that National Assembly members AKM Mosharraf Hossain Akand, Asaduzzaman Khan, Abdul Muntakim Chowdhury, and Hafez Habibur Rahman opposed the article.

He wrote, “Hafez Habibur Rahman objected to Article 70 in the strongest terms. In his view, it would lead to party dictatorship and excessive control by party leaders.”

* The report, originally published in the Bangla edition of Prothom Alo, has been rewritten in English by Farjana Liakat​

 

[Saif]

A ‘new constitution’ and my discontents

Constitution-making is invariably an “elitist” chore, as scholars rightly call it “equitable elite bargaining.”

www.thedailystar.net

A ‘new constitution’ and my discontents

FILE VISUAL: ANWAR SOHEL

Since the fall of the Awami League government, we have been debating prospects of transitioning into a new republic with a new constitution. With the inception of the Jatiyo Nagorik Party (JNP), the debates and discussions are now taking a definite shape. We now have several concrete arguments with time—and alongside, the discontents too.

One argument is that the 1972 constitution-making episode was elitist and dominated by one party. It is quite a fair criticism that resonates with many feminist, Marxist scholars about virtually any constitution of the world. However, it is not clear whether any constitution-making episode can stand blameless on this count.

Studies on constitutionalism have always been saturated with discussions on how dominant political parties' ideologies influence constitution building—be it a one-party, authoritarian, or a liberal-democratic state. In appraising the one-party dominance over the 1972 constitution-making episode, we must consider the historical contingencies too, characterised by the Liberation War, its antecedents and political aftermath, the need for post-war reconstruction and solidification of a constitutional identity. Some say that the constituent assembly members were elected under the Legal Framework Order (LFO) 1970 of the erstwhile Pakistan, and hence, the constitution they drafted needs to be replaced with a new one. However, it must be noted that following the constitutional subversion facilitated by Ayub Khan, the LFO came as a remarkable political win, posing one concrete opportunity for democratic transition. Therefore, the significance of the moment within which the LFO came into being cannot be overstated.

Pertinently, the Proclamation of Independence (which we all agree to be our first constitution) as adopted on April 10, 1971 (with retrospective effect from the March 26, 1971), the representatives elected in the 1970 elections constituted themselves into a "Constituent Assembly" for drafting a constitution for an independent Bangladesh. Following the war, the Provisional Constitution of Bangladesh Order of 1972 further defined the same elected representatives as the "Constituent Assembly" who, in fact, later drafted and adopted the existing constitution of Bangladesh. While the JNP vows to protect the ideals of shammo, manobik morjada, and shamajik shubichar (that were categorically enshrined in the Proclamation of Independence), the process of adopting a new constitution as laid down in the same document cannot be ignored. If we adopt historiographical lenses, then the immense political significance of 1970 elections and its aftermath can also not be downplayed as that would undermine both the wartime and post-war politico-constitutional consensus. Against this backdrop, the dominance of the Awami League among the elected representatives in the 1970 elections must be seen as rather a historical fact, which cannot be accounted for through myopic presentist lenses.

In any case, constitution-making is invariably an "elitist" chore, as scholars rightly call it "equitable elite bargaining." Whoever makes the constitution at a given point of time are always, invariably, the political elites, impersonating "we, the people" at times through "elections", through "eliciting opinions from the people" or at other times, through "referenda". Now that the JNP is asking for a new constitution, and as the idea of a new constitution seemingly stems from their political vision for a "second republic", won't claims about their dominance, at least in terms of steering the process, be legitimate too?

To simplify matters, some propose having a parliament act as a constituent assembly (put in place through simultaneous elections). Such an arrangement will be all the more "exclusive" and "elitist," potentially rendering the parliament cum constituent assembly authoritarian as virtually subservient-to-none. Similar experience in Venezuela under Nicolás Maduro provides a cautionary tale in this regard. Alternatively, such an arrangement can usher in major political instability and long-term disunity too, particularly amid a rapidly shifting political landscape like ours.

Interestingly, I may say, based on questionable lack of women's representation and lack of an explicit feminist methodological approach to drafting constitutions, that virtually all constitutions are unfairly dominated by men (e.g., one "sex") and their exclusionary ideologies. This argument will not be tenable because of the systemic inequalities that exist and because women as a group do not have the political capital as such. Indeed, for those who are left out of the process, a constitution-making episode will always look "exclusionary," "elitist," and dominated by "others," and because constitutions are only imperfect ideological settlements that only a sustainable culture of democracy can carry forward.

Another key argument is that the existing constitution is "fascistic." Authoritarianism or fascism is an indefensible political vision, a conscious governance choice, and an inanimate constitution cannot be blamed for that unless it explicitly provides for one-party rule or authoritarianism. In many authoritarian or paternalist countries, apparently good reading constitutions are kept simply as tools of window dressing. The democratic subversion in the post-independence Bangladesh was facilitated by a series of constitutional amendments, which irreparably whittled down constitutional checks and balances (e.g. fourth constitutional amendment), subverted the constitutional mandate of democratic rule (e.g. fifth and seventh constitutional amendments), and monopolised a static constitutional narrative and thereby contributed to democratic backsliding (e.g., fifteenth constitutional amendment). But these were but amendments—not the constitution itself. The Awami League government, time and again, co-opted constitution-based rhetorics while remaining authoritarian, but that is a classic example of abusing the constitution, not of "using" one. Instances of abusing the constitution were prominent during other military and non-military regimes too. Indeed, blaming the constitution for explaining the political follies and calling for its replacement without addressing its political understructure is quite enervated and does not align with the vigour and acumen that our youth shows otherwise.

While arguing for a new republic, the JNP often refers to France, which I do not think offers a useful, appropriable example for our context. A cardinal yet uncomplicated rule of adopting constitutional experiences is that we cannot transplant an idea without accounting for the overarching politico-cultural contexts. Indeed, transplanting an 1852 idea into a 2025 postcolonial independent country sounds perversely counterintuitive as there are literally no parallels that we can draw to begin a sensical comparison (other than the fact that France opted for a second republic).

Pertinently, contemporary instances only show how new constitution-making episodes can potentially bring in disunity, violence, and instabilities. We do have the inspiring instance of South Africa, which chose to undo its constitutional order rooted in apartheid, racialised political and governance structure, and explicit electoral discrimination against the non-Whites. What do we seek to undo? Persistent culture of rights violations, authoritarian governance, and democratic deficit? But the existing constitution permits/endorses none of these. Certainly, state powers could be better organised and less concentrated in the existing constitution, but that does not make the entire constitution expendable and does not necessitate making an entirely new one. Finally, any new constitution will not be entirely "new" as such unless we opt for something other than a liberal democratic constitutional order. In fact, some scholars suggest that the very idea of replacing an old constitution with a new one is a "myth" and is only possible in theory. In practice, there will always be constitutional/legal continuity. A so-called new constitution will perhaps only arrange things in a different order, expand on or restrict certain rights, and may dilute some commitments. What troubles me is the idea of going over the entire process all over again, of deepening and entrenching divisions, producing new binaries, reinforcing the existing ones, and so on. And the people who lie in the fringes and the margins will not be able to withstand that.

Psymhe Wadud teaches law at the University of Dhaka and is in charge of Law & Our Rights at The Daily Star.​