[🇧🇩] Extradition of Hasina, Awami Leaders/Beneficiaries and Related News.

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[🇧🇩] Extradition of Hasina, Awami Leaders/Beneficiaries and Related News.
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Hasina to face legal action if she returns to Bangladesh: Law Minister

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Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs Minister Md Asaduzzaman on Thursday said former prime minister and condemned convict Sheikh Hasina will face legal action in accordance with the law if she returns to Bangladesh.

He made the remarks while responding to questions from reporters at a ceremony for signing a Memorandum of Understanding between the National Legal Aid Services Organization and non-governmental organisations BRAC and BLAST on legal aid at the Secretariat.

Asked about a recent interview in which Hasina said she plans to return to Bangladesh in December, the law minister said the Home Ministry is making efforts for her extradition.

"If she comes, the law will take its own course. We will not do anything in violation of the law. We will exercise the authority that the law gives us," Asaduzzaman said.

Asked how Hasina could return as she does not have a passport, the minister said, "How she will come is her problem. It is not our problem."

"When she enters our jurisdiction, I will exercise the authority given to me by law and enforce the law. That's as simple as it is," he said.​
 

Indian authorities examining Bangladesh's request to extradite Sheikh Hasina

Prothom Alo English Desk

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Indian parliament building File Photo

India's relevant authorities are reviewing Dhaka's request for the extradition of former Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, who was ousted from power following the student-led mass uprising in Bangladesh.

According to a Times of India report, the Indian central government conveyed this information to the Parliamentary Standing Committee on External Affairs.

The report stated that, on Thursday the committee presented its report to the Lok Sabha, outlining the steps taken by the government based on the recommendations and observations concerning the future of India–Bangladesh relations, contained in the committee's ninth report on external affairs. The committee is chaired by Congress Member of Parliament Shashi Tharoor.

The Parliamentary Standing Committee had asked the government for an update on the progress of its review after learning of Bangladesh's request for Sheikh Hasina's extradition following her sentencing to death in absentia.

After being ousted from power during the student-led mass uprising in August 2024, Sheikh Hasina fled to India, where she has remained ever since.

Relations between India and Bangladesh deteriorated after the interim government led by Professor Muhammad Yunus assumed office following Sheikh Hasina's removal from power. The interim government formally requested New Delhi to extradite Sheikh Hasina to Bangladesh.

After BNP, led by Tarique Rahman, formed the government following the parliamentary elections held in February this year, the new government also renewed the same request to New Delhi.

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Sheikh Hasina File Photo

Sheikh Hasina, who is currently staying in India, has been holding virtual discussions with leaders of her party, and statements have also been issued in her name. She has also given interviews to various media outlets. However, the Indian government maintains that she has not been permitted to engage in any political activities while in India.

The Lok Sabha's Parliamentary Standing Committee on External Affairs stated that Sheikh Hasina has been allowed to remain in India as part of the country's humanitarian tradition and civilizational values of providing refuge to individuals facing extreme crises or threats to their lives, reports the Times of India.

The standing committee report further stated that the Indian government has made it clear that Sheikh Hasina has not been allowed to use any political platform or Indian territory to carry out political activities.

It highlighted India's long-standing policy of not allowing its territory to be used for political activities directed against another country. At the same time, the committee recommended that the Indian government continue to uphold this principled and humanitarian approach while handling such situations with appropriate sensitivity and in accordance with India's international obligations.​
 

Hasina to make first public appearance on Aug 5 in India: Report

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Sheikh Hasina is set to make her first major public appearance in India since her ouster in August 2024, according to reports.

The former prime minister will address a virtual programme hosted by the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of South Asia (FCC South Asia) in New Delhi on the second anniversary of her exile, Aug 5, bdnews24.com reports citing India Today.

She is expected to discuss her political roadmap and proposed return to Bangladesh.

The event will run from 6pm to 7:30pm at the Sir Mark Tully Auditorium on Mathura Road, with the session also streamed live on the club’s social media platforms.

The programme falls on the second anniversary of the collapse of Hasina’s 15-year rule.

On Aug 5, 2024, student protests over Bangladesh’s quota system escalated into a nationwide movement that ultimately forced her from office.

Hasina fled to India after protesters stormed and vandalised government buildings in Dhaka, bringing her long tenure to an abrupt end.

She has largely remained out of the public eye since arriving in India, avoiding public events and formal media engagements.

The International Crimes Tribunal (ICT) sentenced her to death in absentia in November 2025 for crimes against humanity over her government’s violent suppression of the 2024 protests.

Despite the verdict, Hasina has said she plans to return voluntarily to Bangladesh around December, surrender before the courts and seek to revive the Awami League, while dismissing the tribunal’s ruling as politically motivated.

Dhaka has warned that she would be arrested immediately upon entering Bangladesh and face execution under Bangladeshi law, while the government has continued to demand her extradition from India.

Several prominent Bangladeshi political figures, diplomats and public personalities are listed among the participants in the programme, including Hasina’s son Sajeeb Wazed Joy, former education minister Mohibul Hasan Chowdhury Nowfel and Bangladesh Human Rights Watch General Secretary Mohammed Ali Siddiqui.

Former cricketer and MP Shakib Al Hasan, ex-diplomat Aminul Hoque, analyst Abu Obaidha Arin and Bangladesh Human Rights Watch USA director Shah Md Bakhtiar are also expected to join.

The event will be chaired by FCC South Asia President Dr Waiel Awwad.​
 

What are the legal aspects Sheikh Hasina's extradition process ?
Bangladesh's former prime minister Sheikh Hasina, ousted in the mass uprising of 2024, recently announced her intention to return to the country from India. This announcement has two aspects: legal and political. Ali Riaz writes about this in two parts. The first part was published on Saturday.

Ali Riaz

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July uprising graffiti, Mirpur, Dhaka. File photo

In a Reuters interview on 10 July, Sheikh Hasina, convicted of crimes against humanity and in hiding, expressed her interest in ‘returning’ to Bangladesh in December. Although Sheikh Hasina described this as 'returning home' and said she would 'return to surrender,' neither the legal nor the real situation applies in this case.

Since she has been sheltered in India since her flight from Bangladesh on on 5 August 2024, and due to the prisoner exchange and extradition agreement between Bangladesh and India regarding convicted criminals, Hasina’s 'arrival' in Bangladesh is supposed to be determined by that law.

Secondly, since she has already been convicted by the court, she did not appeal, and she has not been granted any kind of bail, the law enforcement agencies are obligated to arrest her if found within the country.

What the legal system says
There are two aspects to discussing Sheikh Hasina's announcement—legal and political. The legal aspect involves the extradition agreement signed between Bangladesh and India in 2013 and amended in 2016. Referring to this agreement, the interim government of Bangladesh has repeatedly requested Hasina’s extradition since 2024, and in December 2024, the government sent a note verbale to this effect. While India acknowledged receipt of that note verbale, it did not make any comment on the matter.

After the International Crimes Tribunal awarded the death penalty to Hasina on 17 November 2025, Bangladesh officially requested India for extradition. It is worth recalling that after the tribunal’s verdict, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs stated in a notice that they were aware of the verdict. However, it was notable that the statement contained quotation marks around the International Crimes Tribunal, indicating India's stance.

In April of this year, after forming a new government, Bangladesh’s Foreign Minister Khalilur Rahman raised the matter during his visit to New Delhi. Subsequently, on 17 April, during the weekly briefing of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal said, "The request is being reviewed as part of the ongoing judicial and domestic legal process" (Bdnews24, 17 April 2026).

Although Jaiswal did not give a direct answer regarding Hasina's recent statement, he said that India’s attitude towards Sheikh Hasina has not changed. He stated, "Any extradition is a legal matter. It will be resolved through the legal process" (Prothom Alo, 14 July 2026). This indicates that what will happen with Sheikh Hasina, who is sheltered in India, is not dependent on her personal will. India has repeatedly stated it has provided 'temporary' asylum to the former prime minister of Bangladesh considering her protection and security in a specific situation.

Therefore, there is no rationale to think that Hasina will be able to decide on this matter alone. Notably, both Bangladesh and India agree that the law will take precedence in this matter. The relevant legal provisions are the extradition treaty between Bangladesh and India and India’s 1962 Extradition Act. For extradition under this treaty, there is a need to advance step by step, and broadly, there are six key steps:

1. Establishing the legal basis for extradition

The extradition process begins with the requesting state proving that the committed crime is an 'extraditable offence' under the treaty. According to Article 2(1) of the treaty, the offence must fulfill the 'dual criminality' principle, meaning the criminal conduct for which extradition is requested must be considered a crime under the laws of both Bangladesh and India, and each must prescribe at least a one-year jail term. Any linguistic or statutory classification differences will not bar extradition [Article 2(3)].

In cases where the individual is already convicted, Bangladesh must have a valid sentence and evidence of conviction by a competent court. In Hasina’s case, the International Crimes Tribunal has issued an arrest warrant and subsequently conducted a trial in absentia, sentencing her to death.

2. Preparation of the extradition request


Once the legal basis is established, Bangladesh must prepare a formal extradition request in accordance with the provisions of Article 10 of the treaty. This request will be sent by the Bangladesh Ministry of Home Affairs to the Indian Ministry of External Affairs via diplomatic channels. According to Article 4 and Article 10(1) of the treaty, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs is the ''central authority'' responsible for processing this extradition request.

The request must include the following documents as stipulated by Article 10(2) of the treaty:

*An accurate description and identification-related information of Sheikh Hasina;

*Description of the material facts of the alleged offences;

*Statutory legal provisions that constituted the said offences; and prescriptions of applicable penalties.

Since the purpose of extradition here is not for trial but rather to execute an existing judgment, Bangladesh is also required to provide the following documents under Article 10(4):

*A certified copy or certificate of conviction and imposed punishment;

*A clear declaration that the judgment and punishment remain legally enforceable under Bangladesh law, specifying how much of the sentence remains to be served.

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Protesters shouting slogans against then-prime minister Sheikh Hasina on 3 August 2024, Dhaka.Reuters

3. Verification of documents

Before advancing to the next step, the attached judicial documents must be properly authenticated according to Article 13 of the treaty. The Indian Ministry of External Affairs will review whether the judgment, punishment, arrest warrant, and accompanying certificates have been properly authenticated and whether all procedural requirements under the treaty have been fulfilled.

Although the 2016 amendment abolished the requirement to establish a ''prima facie case'' through evidence submission under Article 10(3), this amendment principally applies to requests brought for trial. When extradition is requested to enforce a sentence, the obligation for additional supporting documents imposed by Article 10(4) does not fall away due to the amendment.

If the documents are incomplete or insufficient, India may seek supplementary information from Bangladesh under Article 10(5) before taking further action.

4. Potential grounds for rejection
India must then determine whether there is any legal impediment to extradition:

*Political Offence: According to Article 6(1), if the offence is considered of a 'political nature,' extradition may be denied. However, Article 6(2) explicitly mentions that murder, culpable homicide, kidnapping, explosive offences, and serious terrorism-related offences cannot be classified as political offences.

*Good Faith: Pursuant to Article 8(1) of the treaty, if it appears that the prosecution was not initiated in good faith and in the interest of justice, India may refuse extradition.

*Constitutional and human rights obligations: Beyond the treaty, India has constitutional obligations under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution. It has to consider whether extradition would result in torture, arbitrary deprivation of life, execution of the death sentence, or fundamentally unfair trials for the requested person.


Thus, before making any final decision, factors such as the imposition of the death penalty, conducting trials in absentia, and adherence to internationally accepted due process standards may be closely scrutinised.

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Scene of Sheikh Hasina’s escape via helicopter. 5 August 2024.

5. Review under the Extradition Act, 1962

Once the procedural requirements have been satisfied, the Indian government conducts a ‘substantive review’ in light of its internal Extradition Act, 1962, and the relevant treaty. The Indian Ministry of External Affairs considers whether the request fulfills India's internal legal criteria and whether there are any statutory or treaty-based grounds for denying extradition.

This step does not determine the guilt or innocence of the requested individual. Instead, the focus of the review remains on whether the treaty's procedural requirements have been met and whether extradition is legally permissible under Indian law.

6. Decision and transfer

Upon concluding the legal review, the Indian government will decide on whether to approve the extradition request.

If extradition is approved, under Article 16(1) of the treaty, Sheikh Hasina will be handed over to the Bangladeshi authorities at a mutually agreed-upon location within one month of receiving formal notification of the extradition being granted. If Bangladesh fails to remove her from India within this period without sufficient cause, India reserves the right to deny future extradition requests for the same offence (Article 16(2)).

After the transfer, Bangladesh is bound to adhere to the ‘principle of specialty’ under Article 12 of the treaty. This means Hasina can only be tried or punished for the offences for which extradition was granted, unless India later consents to additional offences. Additionally, except under circumstances expressly allowed by the treaty, Bangladesh cannot re-extradite her to a third country without India’s consent.

India shall follow the Extradition Act, 1962, when considering extradition. According to it, if India receives an extradition request for any person, the government shall appoint a magistrate who will examine the allegations, evidence, and related matters. In that case, Hasina will have to appear before the magistrate.

Since it is not mandatory for this to take place in an open court, how the magistrate will obtain her statement is not predetermined. If, upon considering the documents, the magistrate decides that the allegations would have been acceptable to an Indian court, he will issue a report to the central government. If the accused has any written statement, he may also attach it. Based on this, the Indian government will decide on extradition.

Bangladesh has followed the first two steps. How the other steps of the treaty will be followed is practically dependent on the will of the Indian government. Consequently, the timing and manner of implementing these specific procedural steps remain uncertain. These steps, under the Indian government’s discretion, also depend on politics and India-Bangladesh relations. India may refuse the request if it feels it was not initiated in the spirit of good faith or in the interest of justice, as described in Article 8(1) of the extradition treaty.

India is unlikely to make any decision in the near future. Doing so would not be politically favourable for India and would pose a direct and severe threat to the relationship between the two countries. It is also observed in cases involving other countries that the entire process often takes several years to complete. Therefore, India’s argument would be that it is doing nothing exceptional by taking its time on Hasina’s extradition.

#Ali Riaz is a former vice-chairman of the Interim Government’s National Consensus Commission and a Distinguished Professor in the Department of Politics and Government at Illinois State University, USA.​
 

Hasina will be taken straight from airport to gallows upon return: Nahid

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National Citizen Party (NCP) Convener and Opposition Chief Whip Nahid Islam on Monday said whenever ousted Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina returns to Bangladesh from India, students and the public will take her directly from the airport to the gallows.

“Sheikh Hasina will be taken straight from the airport to the gallows. If Tarique Rahman [Prime Minister] strikes a deal with Delhi to arrange her return, we are ready to carry out Hasina's execution,” he said while addressing a discussion titled “One-Point Demand in the Voice of Martyrs’ Families and the Injured”, organised by the NCP at the Institution of Diploma Engineers, Bangladesh auditorium in Kakrail.

Nahid said families of 1,400 martyrs and 30,000 injured fighters of the July uprising will take to the streets and remain there until Hasina's execution is carried out, if she returns to Bangladesh.

Accusing the BNP government of shielding its own wrongdoing in the same manner as the Awami League once did, he said BNP leaders themselves have admitted that nothing has changed in the past five months, with bribery and corruption continuing as before.

The NCP leader alleged that a narrative is being pushed portraying Prime Minister Tarique Rahman as good while blaming others, similar to the propaganda once used to defend Hasina.

He alleged that the public continues to suffer due to gas shortages in households and lack of electricity, while politicisation persists across institutions, including the police.

Nahid alleged widespread extortion and corruption, claiming the only change over the past two years is that Tarique Rahman returned from London to become prime minister.

Expressing disappointment over the lack of government initiatives for the families of martyrs, he said BNP has yet to take any steps for the martyrs and the injured, stressing that martyrs’ families are a national asset who gave their lives for the liberation of the people, not to install anyone in power.

“We did not launch this movement to attain power. We declared the abolition of the fascist system. We will not allow this country to become a haven for autocracy, corruption and extortion again,” the opposition chief whip said.

Among others, NCP Member Secretary Akhter Hossen, Chief Organiser for Chief Coordinator Nasiruddin Patwary, Northern Region Sarjis Alam, Jatiya Nari Shakti Member Secretary Mahmuda Mitu, its Chief Organiser Nusrat Tabassum, and members of martyrs’ families were present at the discussion.​
 

Politics of Hasina’s extradition and Bangladesh–India relations

Bangladesh's former prime minister Sheikh Hasina, who was ousted in the July 2024 mass uprising, recently declared that she intends to return to Bangladesh from India. This article, published in two parts, examines the legal and political dimensions of that announcement. This is the concluding installment.

Ali Riaz

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Bangladesh's former prime minister Sheikh Hasina, who is living in India as a fugitive after being convicted in Bangladesh, has repeatedly stated in recent weeks that she wants to "return" to Bangladesh. She made the remarks in interviews with Reuters on 10 July and AFP on 29 July. However, she is undoubtedly aware that any return would have to proceed under the Bangladesh-India Extradition Treaty and India's Extradition Act of 1962, mechanisms that Bangladesh has repeatedly invoked in seeking her extradition.

There is little reason to believe that Hasina or her advisers are unaware of the legal framework. Consequently, politics—not law—appears to be the principal motivation behind her statements.

Nor is it likely that Hasina would make such declarations without at least the knowledge of, and perhaps some indication from, sections of the Indian authorities. The politics behind her remarks has two dimensions: one related to Hasina and the now-banned Awami League, and another concerning Bangladesh-India relations.

Hasina's immediate objective appears to be energising the Awami League activists inside Bangladesh. Her supporters have already been carrying out limited political activities, and she seems eager to encourage them to become more active. The apparent calculation is that sustained activism could increase pressure on the Bangladeshi government.

For nearly two years, Hasina has used social media to provoke tensions and encourage violence. These efforts have failed to restore her political legitimacy, and her latest declaration is, in effect, an acknowledgment of that failure. By presenting supporters with a clear objective—her return—she also seeks to give them a rallying point.

Another purpose of her announcement is to discourage any attempt to reorganise the Awami League without her leadership, particularly from within Bangladesh. As long as legal proceedings continue, she can claim that she wishes to return but is prevented from doing so because of legal complications, placing the blame on the Bangladesh government.

Observers of Indian foreign and regional policy have warned that such an approach would be counterproductive. It is understandable that India wants to keep Hasina politically relevant in Bangladesh. From India, she has continued political activities and allegedly encouraged violence inside Bangladesh.

The timing of her announcement is also significant. She chose July so that she could remain a central topic of discussion during the second anniversary of the mass uprising that ousted her from power. It is reasonable to assume that she hoped political parties in Bangladesh would disagree over how to respond.

Despite differences among political parties over elections and post-election issues, they remain united on the questions of Hasina's trial and extradition. Only those who helped legitimise her authoritarian rule have voiced dissent. It is also plausible that she chose this timing to create uncertainty around Victory Day celebrations in December and reinforce the Awami League's long-standing claim to exclusive ownership of the legacy of the Liberation War.

These considerations are not necessarily decisive for India, but they are useful to Indian policymakers. There has been no visible shift in India's broader approach toward Bangladesh or in its longstanding policy of keeping Bangladesh within India's sphere of influence. Following Bangladesh's February 2026 election, the BNP-led government has taken concrete steps to improve relations with India, and India has signaled a positive response.

However, the substance of India's actions remains open to question. Continued allegations of "push-ins" across the border, ongoing border killings, land allocation in West Bengal for new border fencing, statements by BJP leaders and their allies in neighbouring Indian states, the announcement of plans to implement the National Register of Citizens (NRC) in West Bengal, and slow progress in addressing Bangladesh's trade deficit all send less encouraging signals.

Another important issue is the Ganges Water Sharing Treaty, which expires in December this year. For years, the Teesta water-sharing agreement has been the principal unresolved issue in water relations between the two countries. But unless a new Ganges agreement acceptable to Bangladesh is reached before the current treaty expires, it could become a new source of difficult negotiations.

There has been little sign of any change in this thinking. Regardless of what the law may require, political considerations make India unlikely to support Hasina's extradition. The question is whether its role will remain limited to offering her refuge.

Meanwhile, discussions are underway on implementing the Teesta project with Chinese assistance. Prime Minister Tarique Rahman's visit to China has also raised the prospect of closer Bangladesh-China ties, including a comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership and consideration of a China-Bangladesh economic corridor through Myanmar. At the same time, India's concerns over Bangladesh's improving relations with Pakistan are understandable. Bangladesh also has new opportunities to expand its trade relationship with the United States. Together, these developments provide the BNP government with greater room to pursue a foreign policy that is less dependent on India.

After India's unwavering support for Hasina's government during its 14 years in power, and its decision to shelter her after the 2024 uprising while allowing anti-Bangladesh propaganda to operate from Indian territory, considerable public resentment toward India has emerged in Bangladesh. The BNP government cannot easily ignore this sentiment.

In an interview with BBC Bangla in October 2025, Prime Minister Tarique Rahman remarked, "If India gives shelter to an autocrat and becomes unpopular among the people of Bangladesh, there is nothing we can do. The people have decided to keep their distance from them. So, I must stay with my people."

India's continued sheltering of Hasina, its protection of fugitive Awami League leaders, and its failure to take meaningful action after reports emerged in August 2025 that the Awami League had opened an office in Kolkata all suggest that New Delhi's Awami League-centered policy remains unchanged. Some in India appear to hope for the Awami League's return to Bangladeshi politics. Whether India will actively facilitate such a return remains an open question.

Observers of Indian foreign and regional policy have warned that such an approach would be counterproductive. It is understandable that India wants to keep Hasina politically relevant in Bangladesh. From India, she has continued political activities and allegedly encouraged violence inside Bangladesh.

However, a report presented by the Indian government in the Lok Sabha on 30 July stated that India's policy of not allowing its territory to be used for political activities directed against another country also applies to Hasina. This should be regarded as a positive step. India should make it clear that this policy will be consistently enforced. Whether that happens should become evident in the near future.

Recent discussions in Dhaka between India's ambassador, Dinesh Trivedi, and Bangladesh's Foreign Minister Khalilur Rahman also produced agreement that bilateral relations need a "reset." (Prothom Alo, 29 July, 2026)

It is also worth recalling how Indian policymakers viewed the situation after Hasina took refuge in India in August 2024. Former senior Indian diplomat TCA Raghavan told the BBC that providing Hasina refuge during a moment of danger was consistent with India's principles, and that exposing her to greater danger was "not an option." He also argued, "If we do not stand by Sheikh Hasina now, no friendly leader anywhere in the world will be able to trust India." (BBC Bangla, 24 August, 2024)

There has been little sign of any change in this thinking. Regardless of what the law may require, political considerations make India unlikely to support Hasina's extradition. The question is whether its role will remain limited to offering her refuge.

India may also use Hasina as a source of diplomatic leverage in its dealings with Bangladesh. One method has been allowing her to make statements capable of creating instability inside Bangladesh, thereby placing pressure on the government. Her recent remarks suggest such a strategy may continue. There is little reason to think Hasina would object, since her main goal is to remain politically relevant.

During her years in India between 1975 and 1980, Hasina also prioritised her own political future. But Bangladesh-India relations were very different then. India had not yet developed today's regional ambitions, and its leaders were more preoccupied with domestic political challenges. Hasina was therefore not viewed as a strategic asset in Indian policymaking.

India's political and economic interests in Bangladesh were also much more limited. It is natural that India would seek to preserve the asymmetrical relationship it established between 2009 and 2024. Given India's role in sustaining Hasina's government during that period, it would not be surprising if it now expected her to continue serving its interests. As long as she remains abroad, Hasina is likely to reappear periodically as a source of tension, irritation, and political division in Bangladesh. Indian policymakers, however, should recognise that such a role ultimately harms diplomatic relations between the two countries.

One hopes that Bangladesh's government, policymakers, and political parties will carefully consider these realities when formulating their positions, public statements, and strategies. At the same time, they should continue to apply united pressure on India for Hasina's extradition to ensure justice and fulfill the commitments made to those killed and injured during the July 2024 movement.

* Ali Riaz is a Distinguished Professor in the Department of Politics and Government at Illinois State University and former vice-chair of Bangladesh's National Consensus Commission under the interim government.​
 

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