Bangladesh Defense Forum
Demystifying the Bangladesh-India-US triangle
VISUAL: BIPLOB CHAKROBORTY
On the evening of September 23, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi lifted off from New York after several days of engagements, including a QUAD summit and a meeting with US President Joe Biden. Several hours later, Dr Muhammad Yunus touched down in New York for four action-packed days that included meetings with Biden, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, and many other top world leaders—but not the previously departed Modi.
There was something telling about the visits of these two men: the top leaders of Bangladesh and India were each seemingly working at cross purposes, with each going about his business in the US separately and without engaging the other. It's a sobering reflection of the state of Bangladesh-India relations today, following 15-plus years of foolproof, fulsome ties during the Sheikh Hasina era.
Each leader's visit to the US was also indicative of the present state of the Bangladesh-India-US triangle. It can best be described as an isosceles structure, with two long and sturdy sides represented by robust Bangladesh-US and India-US ties, and a short and fragile side marked by shaky Bangladesh-India relations.
Let's first take the Bangladesh-US relations. They're in a good place. Yunus is a man whom Washington likes, knows well, and is comfortable working with. A senior US delegation to Dhaka last month telegraphed a crystal clear message: we're here to help on the development, humanitarian and reforms front. It's a genuine pledge, and it was amplified at the highest level—by Biden himself—days later.
The India-US ties are also strong. Tension points do abound, from the Khalistan issue to each country's friendly ties with the other's main rival. But strong strategic convergences over countering China limit their impact on the relationship. An increasingly multifaceted partnership—manifested by proliferating areas of cooperation on separate non-geopolitical tracks, from trade and clean energy to higher education and science and technology—provides further insulation against shocks to bilateral ties.
But then there's the troubled side of the triangle. Because New Delhi invested so heavily, and for so long, in Hasina and her party, it has limited links to those now in power and lacks the leverage to ensure its interests are properly addressed. Incidentally, this isn't just a BJP problem—the Congress party also enjoyed strong ties with Hasina, which go back to her father's close friendship with Indira Gandhi.
Additionally, while Indian media have wildly exaggerated security risks in post-Hasina Bangladesh, there have been threats to and attacks on Bangladeshi Hindus, prompting them to stage protests demanding more security. Also, hardline religious elements that are no friends of New Delhi have gained more space and influence. And from India's perspective, this isn't just about the return of Jamaat-e-Islami. Jashimuddin Rahmani, head of the banned al Qaeda-inspired militant group Ansar al Islam, was quietly released from jail on August 26. It may have been a matter of due process. But mere days after his release, Rahmani released a disturbing video in which he issued threats against India—including calling on India's enemies to break the country into pieces—if India "cast an evil eye towards Bangladesh." This is deeply concerning for New Delhi.
India's fears about the present are informed by memories of the past: there are documented cases of abuses against Hindus during the BNP-led period of rule between 2001 and 2006. Additionally, during that same period, authorities intercepted a massive arms shipment in Chattogram, bound for rebels in India's restive northeast. According to new scholarship that validates long-standing Indian suspicions, the arms transfer involved several BNP and Jamaat officials and a Bangladesh-based Indian rebel leader.
This helps explain why India is so uncomfortable about Bangladesh's radically changed new political reality, and why it will tread carefully in its relations with Dhaka. The unbanning of Jamaat is especially concerning for New Delhi, and will become more so if the group forms new alliances with other Islamist parties. All this has prompted New Delhi to double down on its long-standing Bangladeshi allies, especially Hasina. India is unlikely to turn her over to Dhaka if there's a formal extradition request. The Hasina factor could deepen bilateral tensions, complicating efforts to address challenges that loomed large even in better times, from border security to the Teesta River issue. It also risks fresh surges in anti-India sentiment in Bangladesh, which hurts bilateral ties as well.
All this said, geopolitics is never cut and dry. Let's clear up some misconceptions about the Bangladesh-India-US triangle.
The Bangladesh-US ties have experienced a reset. Yunus's arrival is a breath of fresh air for a relationship that became increasingly toxic due to US tensions with Hasina over rights and democracy. But the true reset arguably happened back in February, soon after Bangladesh's election (which Washington characterised as not free or fair), when President Biden penned a letter to Hasina welcoming the "next chapter" in bilateral ties—with no reference to rights or democracy. Washington would subsequently identify as priorities a range of issues, including several being emphasised now, such as reforms. The administration apparently concluded it was time to give renewed attention to subjects—strategic cooperation, trade, defence—that had previously helped boost relations, before being eclipsed by tensions over rights and democracy. Yunus's arrival will help consolidate that earlier reset.
However, these changes could prove short-lived. Another Donald Trump presidency could prompt relations to lose momentum. Key issues now driving partnership—development and humanitarian assistance, climate change—likely wouldn't appeal to him. He probably wouldn't take kindly to Yunus's past criticism of him either. Trump may take a different approach, preferring instead to view the relationship solely through the lens of great power competition, along with trade.
The Bangladesh-India relations are not doomed yet. Though New Delhi will be cautious, it's committed to continued engagement. External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar recently met Bangladesh Foreign Affairs Adviser Md Touhid Hossain in New York, and Indian High Commissioner in Dhaka Pranay Verma met BNP Secretary General Mirza Fakhrul Islam Alamgir. A formal BNP-Jamaat split, perhaps already underway, could provide openings for New Delhi to cultivate a new relationship with BNP. Additionally, India will likely reach out to Bangladesh's army that, because of the recent vacuum, has increased its political influence. Ultimately, India may conclude that given its economic and security interests in Bangladesh, it simply can't afford to lose Dhaka. Conducting delicate negotiations over border security, for example, is easier with a workable relationship with Dhaka.
Washington and New Delhi don't see eye to eye on Bangladesh. Their approaches to the new government are quite different. But they still have shared interests and concerns. Neither wants Dhaka to inch closer to Beijing—though the new government will likely be prepared to move closer to Beijing than did the previous one, because it won't be as concerned about how New Delhi might respond. Additionally, neither wants more space for hardline Islamists which, ideologically speaking, oppose them both. The Rahmani case—even if an unsettling outlier—will worry New Delhi and Washington alike.
Ideally, the Bangladesh-India-US triangle would be equilateral instead of isosceles. But for now, the best bet is to manage its volatilities and imbalances and better understand its intricacies, thereby helping it achieve some stability in a world increasingly on fire.
Michael Kugelman is director of the South Asia Institute at the Wilson Center in Washington, DC.
VISUAL: BIPLOB CHAKROBORTY
On the evening of September 23, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi lifted off from New York after several days of engagements, including a QUAD summit and a meeting with US President Joe Biden. Several hours later, Dr Muhammad Yunus touched down in New York for four action-packed days that included meetings with Biden, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, and many other top world leaders—but not the previously departed Modi.
There was something telling about the visits of these two men: the top leaders of Bangladesh and India were each seemingly working at cross purposes, with each going about his business in the US separately and without engaging the other. It's a sobering reflection of the state of Bangladesh-India relations today, following 15-plus years of foolproof, fulsome ties during the Sheikh Hasina era.
Each leader's visit to the US was also indicative of the present state of the Bangladesh-India-US triangle. It can best be described as an isosceles structure, with two long and sturdy sides represented by robust Bangladesh-US and India-US ties, and a short and fragile side marked by shaky Bangladesh-India relations.
Let's first take the Bangladesh-US relations. They're in a good place. Yunus is a man whom Washington likes, knows well, and is comfortable working with. A senior US delegation to Dhaka last month telegraphed a crystal clear message: we're here to help on the development, humanitarian and reforms front. It's a genuine pledge, and it was amplified at the highest level—by Biden himself—days later.
The India-US ties are also strong. Tension points do abound, from the Khalistan issue to each country's friendly ties with the other's main rival. But strong strategic convergences over countering China limit their impact on the relationship. An increasingly multifaceted partnership—manifested by proliferating areas of cooperation on separate non-geopolitical tracks, from trade and clean energy to higher education and science and technology—provides further insulation against shocks to bilateral ties.
But then there's the troubled side of the triangle. Because New Delhi invested so heavily, and for so long, in Hasina and her party, it has limited links to those now in power and lacks the leverage to ensure its interests are properly addressed. Incidentally, this isn't just a BJP problem—the Congress party also enjoyed strong ties with Hasina, which go back to her father's close friendship with Indira Gandhi.
Additionally, while Indian media have wildly exaggerated security risks in post-Hasina Bangladesh, there have been threats to and attacks on Bangladeshi Hindus, prompting them to stage protests demanding more security. Also, hardline religious elements that are no friends of New Delhi have gained more space and influence. And from India's perspective, this isn't just about the return of Jamaat-e-Islami. Jashimuddin Rahmani, head of the banned al Qaeda-inspired militant group Ansar al Islam, was quietly released from jail on August 26. It may have been a matter of due process. But mere days after his release, Rahmani released a disturbing video in which he issued threats against India—including calling on India's enemies to break the country into pieces—if India "cast an evil eye towards Bangladesh." This is deeply concerning for New Delhi.
India's fears about the present are informed by memories of the past: there are documented cases of abuses against Hindus during the BNP-led period of rule between 2001 and 2006. Additionally, during that same period, authorities intercepted a massive arms shipment in Chattogram, bound for rebels in India's restive northeast. According to new scholarship that validates long-standing Indian suspicions, the arms transfer involved several BNP and Jamaat officials and a Bangladesh-based Indian rebel leader.
This helps explain why India is so uncomfortable about Bangladesh's radically changed new political reality, and why it will tread carefully in its relations with Dhaka. The unbanning of Jamaat is especially concerning for New Delhi, and will become more so if the group forms new alliances with other Islamist parties. All this has prompted New Delhi to double down on its long-standing Bangladeshi allies, especially Hasina. India is unlikely to turn her over to Dhaka if there's a formal extradition request. The Hasina factor could deepen bilateral tensions, complicating efforts to address challenges that loomed large even in better times, from border security to the Teesta River issue. It also risks fresh surges in anti-India sentiment in Bangladesh, which hurts bilateral ties as well.
All this said, geopolitics is never cut and dry. Let's clear up some misconceptions about the Bangladesh-India-US triangle.
The Bangladesh-US ties have experienced a reset. Yunus's arrival is a breath of fresh air for a relationship that became increasingly toxic due to US tensions with Hasina over rights and democracy. But the true reset arguably happened back in February, soon after Bangladesh's election (which Washington characterised as not free or fair), when President Biden penned a letter to Hasina welcoming the "next chapter" in bilateral ties—with no reference to rights or democracy. Washington would subsequently identify as priorities a range of issues, including several being emphasised now, such as reforms. The administration apparently concluded it was time to give renewed attention to subjects—strategic cooperation, trade, defence—that had previously helped boost relations, before being eclipsed by tensions over rights and democracy. Yunus's arrival will help consolidate that earlier reset.
However, these changes could prove short-lived. Another Donald Trump presidency could prompt relations to lose momentum. Key issues now driving partnership—development and humanitarian assistance, climate change—likely wouldn't appeal to him. He probably wouldn't take kindly to Yunus's past criticism of him either. Trump may take a different approach, preferring instead to view the relationship solely through the lens of great power competition, along with trade.
The Bangladesh-India relations are not doomed yet. Though New Delhi will be cautious, it's committed to continued engagement. External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar recently met Bangladesh Foreign Affairs Adviser Md Touhid Hossain in New York, and Indian High Commissioner in Dhaka Pranay Verma met BNP Secretary General Mirza Fakhrul Islam Alamgir. A formal BNP-Jamaat split, perhaps already underway, could provide openings for New Delhi to cultivate a new relationship with BNP. Additionally, India will likely reach out to Bangladesh's army that, because of the recent vacuum, has increased its political influence. Ultimately, India may conclude that given its economic and security interests in Bangladesh, it simply can't afford to lose Dhaka. Conducting delicate negotiations over border security, for example, is easier with a workable relationship with Dhaka.
Washington and New Delhi don't see eye to eye on Bangladesh. Their approaches to the new government are quite different. But they still have shared interests and concerns. Neither wants Dhaka to inch closer to Beijing—though the new government will likely be prepared to move closer to Beijing than did the previous one, because it won't be as concerned about how New Delhi might respond. Additionally, neither wants more space for hardline Islamists which, ideologically speaking, oppose them both. The Rahmani case—even if an unsettling outlier—will worry New Delhi and Washington alike.
Ideally, the Bangladesh-India-US triangle would be equilateral instead of isosceles. But for now, the best bet is to manage its volatilities and imbalances and better understand its intricacies, thereby helping it achieve some stability in a world increasingly on fire.
Michael Kugelman is director of the South Asia Institute at the Wilson Center in Washington, DC.
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