[🇧🇩] Insurgencies in Myanmar. Implications for Bangladesh

[Saif]

Saudi for quick renewal of 69,000 passports

Saudi authorities on Sunday wanted a faster renewal of 69,000 Bangladeshi passports issued to Rohingya people over the years, prompting the Bangladesh authorities to seek...

www.newagebd.net

Saudi for quick renewal of 69,000 passports
Muktadir Rashid 13 May, 2024, 00:16

Saudi authorities on Sunday wanted a faster renewal of 69,000 Bangladeshi passports issued to Rohingya people over the years, prompting the Bangladesh authorities to seek six more months for necessary steps.

A six-member Saudi delegation, headed by the kingdom's deputy interior minister Nasser bin Abdulaziz Al-Daoud, flagged the issue once again during a bilateral meeting with a Bangladeshi delegation, headed by home minister Asaduzzaman Khan, in Dhaka.

The meeting was held for three hours at a hotel near Hazrat Shahjalal International Airport a day after the arrival of the Saudi delegation on a chartered plane on Saturday night.

This is the second such meeting between Bangladesh and Saudi authorities over the renewal of 69,000 Bangladeshi passports in less than two years.

In November 2022, the Saudi deputy interior minister visited Dhaka and raised the same issue with the home ministry.

All expats living in Saudi Arabia, from children to adults to the elderly, need an Iqama, an official identification document in the kingdom that allows the individual to open a bank account, sign rental agreements, enter government buildings, and even get their first Saudi SIM card.

A copy of the passport is required, among others, to get the Iqama.

Bangladesh officials told New Age that the Saudi authorities had threatened that they would deport thousands of people to Bangladesh if their Bangladeshi passports were not renewed.

Home minister Asaduzzaman Khan, however, believed that the Saudi authorities would not deport them, saying that the delegation had inquired about the process of renewing 69,000 Bangladeshi passports.

He claimed a number of Rohingyas using Bangladeshi passports have gone to Saudi Arabia since the mid-1970s, and their passports needed to be renewed.

Asaduzzaman could not say the exact number but added that many of them travelled to Saudi Arabia in 1973–74.

A document related to the matter read, 'necessary steps will be taken for the renewal of their passports within six months.'

Referring to a Memorandum of Understanding signed between Dhaka and Riyadh regarding the renewal of passports, Asaduzzaman said that the Saudi delegation wanted to know if Dhaka had any problems materialising it.

The minister said that Saudi Arabia wanted to sign an extradition treaty with Bangladesh.

The Saudi deputy minister did not make any comments.

The home minister said that they had discussed ways of extending cooperation to enhance the capacity of the Border Guard Bangladesh and the police.

Dhaka also informed the Saudi delegation that they could consider recruiting Ansar members for jobs in the kingdom.

He also sought their cooperation to resolve the Rohingya crisis.​

 

[Saif]

How China, India and Bangladesh could be drawn into Myanmar’s conflict | Lowy Institute

Rakhine state has become a de facto battleground for the competing interests of Beijing, Delhi and Dhaka.

www.lowyinstitute.org

How China, India and Bangladesh could be drawn into Myanmar's conflict
DAVID BREWSTER
Rakhine state has become a de facto battleground for the competing interests of Beijing, Delhi and Dhaka.

Insurgency in Myanmar's western Rakhine state has particular consequences for the broader region (STR/AFP via Getty Images)
Published 8 Nov 2022

The 2021 military coup in Myanmar sparked renewed civil conflict between Myanmar government forces, the Tatmadaw, and perhaps a dozen insurgent groups seeking their own ethnic states. Many of these conflicts have cross-border implications, but the insurgency in Rakhine state has particular consequences for the broader region. China has already been drawn into the conflict in Rakhine state to protect key interests, and India and Bangladesh could soon follow. This may produce unpredictable outcomes.

Over the last decade or more, Myanmar's Rakhine state, which borders southern Bangladesh, has been the scene of brutal ethnic cleansing. In 2017, the Tatmadaw, working with local nationalists, violently expelled more than 700,000 Rohingya people – mostly Muslims – from Myanmar. Around a million now live in festering conditions in the world's largest refugee camp at Cox's Bazar in southern Bangladesh.

The Bangladesh government takes the position that the presence of the Rohingya people on their territory is only temporary and that, one way or another, they must be repatriated to their homeland in Rakhine. But all attempts have been stonewalled by Myanmar authorities.

The Tatmadaw is in retreat and could be expelled from much of Rakhine state. This has some potentially far-reaching consequences for the broader region.

The situation has been further destabilised in the last several months by renewed fighting between the Tatmadaw and local separatists, the Arakan Army, who have taken control of large areas, including the north, much of central Rakhine, and the border with Bangladesh. The Tatmadaw is in retreat and could be expelled from much of Rakhine state. This has some potentially far-reaching consequences for the broader region.

China has significant interests in Rakhine, principally the protection of its transport and economic corridor between southern China and the Bay of Bengal, a key element in the Belt and Road Initiative. This includes the newly-built Kyaukphyu port on the Bay of Bengal and a pipeline and planned road and rail links between the port and southern China. Together, these give China direct access to the Bay of Bengal for the first time in history, with considerable implications for the regional balance of power.

With renewed fighting in Rakhine, China is seeking to protect its investments in the Kyaukphyu corridor by providing substantial support for the Arakan Army, including money and arms. This allows China to gain leverage against the Tatmadaw and hedge its bets.

In 2017, more than 700,000 Rohingya – mostly Muslims – were expelled from Myanmar. Around a million now live in festering conditions in the world's largest refugee camp at Cox's Bazar, southern Bangladesh (Allison Joyce/UN Women/Flickr)

Chinese support for the Arakan Army also provides other benefits, particularly in relation to India's competing Kaladan project in Rakhine, which would connect the Bay of Bengal with India's northeast. The Kaladan project involves construction of new port facilities at Sittwe, a river transit system and a road to India's Mizoram state. When completed, this would provide a direct link between the Indian Ocean and India's northeast states, which are only otherwise tenuously connected with the rest of India.

Delhi hopes the Kaladan corridor will be a driver of economic development in India's northeast. It is also anticipated that it will reduce India's reliance on Bangladesh for transit routes – with some important implications for relations between those two countries.

But there have been long delays in completing the Kaladan corridor, and the Arakan Army has recently seized key territory along the corridor, which gives it considerable bargaining power with India. It is not clear whether India will do a deal with the Arakan Army, or if it will just double down on its long-running support for the Tatmadaw.

Neighbouring Bangladesh also has crucial interests in Rakhine. Fighting in the state is increasingly spilling across the border, stymying Bangladesh's hopes to repatriate Rohingya refugees. Aside from whether Myanmar authorities would ever allow the return of the Rohingyas they recently expelled, the international community would not countenance the repatriation of refugees into a war zone. There seems little chance that Bangladesh could move forward with repatriation in the foreseeable future with the Tatmadaw's agreement.

The takeover of Rakhine state by the Arakan Army would come with risks for all concerned, including whether it could achieve lasting stability and security.

For years, Bangladesh has approached its difficult neighbour with great caution, seeking to de-escalate and de-militarise cross-border violations. But with frustrations building in Dhaka, there may be a hardening in its response and a search for new approaches to the Myanmar problem.

The Tatmadaw claims that the Arakan Army already finds safe havens in ethnically related communities in remote Bangladesh border areas. Bangladesh officially denies this. But there may be growing temptations in Dhaka to assist the Arakan Army's ambitions for an autonomous state. Indeed, Arakan Army control of Rakhine probably provides the only realistic pathway for the repatriation of at least some Rohingyas.

The Arakan Army recently pledged to recognise the citizenship rights of what they call "Myanmar Muslims" and to allow those who still remain in Rakhine to "participate" in any future administration. But many Rohingyas view these statements with deep scepticism given long-running Arakanese nationalist sentiments against Rohingyas. Indeed, some recent incidents, such as shelling of border areas, suggest that the Arakan Army may be trying to fuel tensions between Bangladesh and the Tatmadaw for their own ends.

The takeover of Rakhine state by the Arakan Army would come with risks for all concerned, including whether it could achieve lasting stability and security.

The Tatmadaw's response is difficult to predict. India, too, has strong reasons not to see a group that is in league with China take control of Rakhine. A fully independent Rakhine state could also lead to the further splintering of Myanmar, with unpredictable consequences.

Of all Myanmar's internal conflicts, this is the one to watch. The conflict in Rakhine, fuelled by major power competition and the Rohingya crisis, may have significant ramifications far beyond Myanmar's borders.​

 

[Saif]

Recruits march to training as junta presses conscription

Myanmar’s embattled junta is pressing ahead with military conscription, state media said yesterday, with video footage showing new recruits being marched to training centres across the country.

www.thedailystar.net

MYANMAR CONFLICT
Recruits march to training as junta presses conscription

Myanmar's embattled junta is pressing ahead with military conscription, state media said yesterday, with video footage showing new recruits being marched to training centres across the country.

The military is struggling to crush widespread opposition to its rule following its 2021 coup that ended an experiment with democracy and plunged Myanmar into turmoil.

In February the junta said it would enforce a law allowing it to call up all men aged 18-35 to serve in the military, sending thousands queueing for visas outside foreign embassies in Yangon.

Junta number two Soe Win visited Yangon on Monday and was briefed on "systematic selection" of those being called up, the Global New Light of Myanmar newspaper said. The first batch of recruits began training in April, according to broadcaster MRTV, which did not say how many had been signed up. Recruits from the second batch have begun arriving at their training camps, according to a montage broadcast by MRTV last week.

The images showed dozens of men, purportedly at different locations, walking in lines to training centres, some led by soldiers or marching bands.​

 

[Saif]

Myanmar junta presses conscription

Myanmar’s embattled junta is pressing ahead with military conscription, state media said on Tuesday, with video footage showing new recruits being marched to training centres across the country...

www.newagebd.net

Myanmar junta presses conscription
Agence France-Presse . Yangon 14 May, 2024, 23:32

Myanmar's embattled junta is pressing ahead with military conscription, state media said on Tuesday, with video footage showing new recruits being marched to training centres across the country.

The military is struggling to crush widespread opposition to its rule following its 2021 coup that ended an experiment with democracy and plunged Myanmar into turmoil.

In February the junta said it would enforce a law allowing it to call up all men aged 18-35 to serve in the military, sending thousands queueing for visas outside foreign embassies in Yangon.

Junta number two Soe Win visited Yangon on Monday and was briefed on the 'systematic selection' of those being called up, the state-owned Global New Light of Myanmar newspaper said.

The first batch of recruits began training in April, according to state broadcaster MRTV, which did not say how many had been signed up.

Recruits from the second batch have begun arriving at their training camps, according to a montage broadcast by MRTV last week.

The images showed dozens of men, purportedly at different locations across the country, walking in lines to training centres, some led by soldiers or marching bands.

Groups of women and soldiers formed tunnels to greet some of them with flowers or place garlands on their necks.

One group of men were wearing identical T-shirts with 'Natmauk' on the back, the images showed.

Natmauk is the home town of Aung San, who spearheaded the independence struggle against British colonial rule and is revered by Myanmar's military, which he founded.

His daughter, democracy figurehead Aung San Suu Kyi, has been detained by the military since the coup and jailed on charges critics say are designed to remove her from politics.

After arriving at their training centres the second batch of recruits 'took a medical test and were issued with food, military equipment and a stipend,' MRTV said.

It did not say how many men were included in the second batch.

The military service law was authored by a previous junta in 2010 but was never brought into force.

It allows the military to summon all men aged 18-35 and women aged 18-27 to serve for at least two years.

The service term can last up to five years during a state of emergency, which the junta has extended multiple times since its coup.

Around 13 million people will be eligible to be called up, a junta spokesman has said, though the military only has the capacity to train 50,000 a year.

Local media have reported cases of young men being pulled off the streets in Yangon and other cities and taken away to undergo military training.

The junta has denied the reports.

The 2021 coup re-ignited conflict with established ethnic minority armed groups and birthed dozens of newer pro-democracy 'People's Defence Forces' now battling the military across Myanmar.

The conflict has displaced around 2.7 million people, according to the United Nations.

Rights groups say the junta has burned villages, carried out extrajudicial killings and used air and artillery strikes to punish communities it suspects of opposing its rule.​

 

[Saif]

Rohingyas: A permanent guest syndrome?

It's been seven years since the Rohingyas arrived in their latest edition and this time caught most international attention. They had been coming here for a long time, expelled by the Myanmar authorities as outsiders historically. Various Bangladeshi regimes have responded as per their percep

thefinancialexpress.com.bd

Rohingyas: A permanent guest syndrome?
AFSAN CHOWDHURY
Published :
May 13, 2024 22:15
Updated :
May 14, 2024 21:25

Reuters file photo

It's been seven years since the Rohingyas arrived in their latest edition and this time caught most international attention. They had been coming here for a long time, expelled by the Myanmar authorities as outsiders historically. Various Bangladeshi regimes have responded as per their perceptions of advantages and difficulties.

However, when they arrived this time, it was a tsunami of arrival - 700,000 in number at least -and the rest is known. What we don't know is what exactly is going on there between not just the two countries directly involved but the big powers pulling the strings to make it happen for their own benefit.

Does Bangladesh matter in all this? That string pulling is happening not because Bangladesh matters but other states linked to Bangladesh do. And Bangladesh can hardly decide the drift of things. Its denial of its own limited external sovereignty and that it's not bilateral but tri-lateral and multilateral relations that decide matters has continued to weaken Bangladesh's official stances. Given the political power equation scenario at the international problem, the Rohingya problem is not just an issue of refugees but an indicator of our global political-economic status.

Humanitarian issues, IOM and other interventions are a constantly asked question. That is another dimension of the crisis which is real, humane and about human suffering that not many bother about in the issue. International relief and humanitarianism is a reality but does it stand alone from the rest of global politics?

The response to the humanitarian crisis has fewer issues that impact on internal and external policies globally so the international community has been very supportive of the problem and helping out Bangladesh with resources and support.

However, if one goes back in time, one can see that the funding countries didn't support Bangladesh in any international way for repatriation of the refugees. That is only to be expected as Bangladesh has been caught in a very uncomfortable international, diplomatic and real crossfire. So what does IOM and other's presence mean in relation to the Rohingya crisis?. It's possible they want prolonging the same as long as it suits the bigger boys. .

The IOM DG Pope recently visited Bangladesh and offered hope and promised to raise more money. She said, "I am deeply grateful to our generous donors for their support and commitment to addressing the urgent humanitarian needs of Rohingya refugees and vulnerable populations in Bangladesh. Their substantial contributions will not only make a tangible difference in the lives of those in need, but they also demonstrate our collective responsibility to uphold the principles of solidarity and compassion on a global scale. Together, we are not only assisting Bangladesh but setting a powerful example for collaborative action in tackling migration challenges worldwide."

The IOM newsletter says, "In March, IOM appealed for USD 119 million to support nearly a million Rohingya refugees in what has been called the world's largest refugee settlement in Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh, and the vulnerable community generously hosting them. In a momentous step towards preserving Rohingya cultural heritage, DG Pope inaugurated the World Tour of the Rohingya Cultural Memory Centre (RCMC). This exhibition will showcase, in several global locations, the rich cultural heritage of the Rohingya community and raise awareness about their plight." The signal is clear. It's as far as one can go in calling the problem or situation permanent.

Permanent visitors' status is not something anyone is talking about but it's clearly there on the table. Bangladesh has no control over the problem because it's also a battle between China and the West at one level and a regional political situation that is not under anyone's control. When the Rohingya deluge came, Myanmar's boss was Suu-Kyi. She was the West's pet 'democrat" at the receiving end of unconditional support for expelling the refugees if the reality is held up.

At that point as now, Bangladesh didn't matter and doesn't now either. What was good for Suu-Kyi's continuation in power was good for the US as she was seen as a bulwark against Chinese clout.

China has meanwhile helped the Myanmar army topple Suu Kyi but the Myanmar regime is weak and not really a big help to its primary patron. At the same time they have become directly involved in the yaba trade that has created a vested interest group amongst the power structure in Bangladesh.

That has made the Chinese feel better not to mention Myanmar and of course those who matter in many parts of the Bangladeshi power structure. Most yaba is produced in the Chin state which is an "independent " state" run by the Chin Liberation Army. It may be an accident that the Chin state's biggest backer is China.

Bangladesh is not a party to the coming and going of the Rohingyas so it's basically playing the role of a forced host. And the Rohingya's living here as refugees serve most if not all the purposes. They are hated as "Muslim dark skinned Bengalis" and really don't fit into the power framework that China supports there.

The West on the other hand see it as an opportunity to argue that the West sanctioned pro-Chinese Myanmar regime is pretty awful though it had also supported Suu-Kyi when they were initially thrown out at a mass scale.

Meanwhile, the smart ones in both Myanmar and Bangladesh make serious money from the yaba trade, the most openly criminal activity possible. No one minds really. That being the case, the chances of the Rohingyas returning are slim to slimmer. Unless of course, some equations change in global politics.​