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[🇧🇩] Insurgency in India's North-East---Why does India blame Bangladesh?

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Short Summary: Monitoring the activities of insurgents and proving India wrong about Bangla connection.

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Date Occurred: Nov 17, 2024
Manipur VIOLENCE
India to re-run election at 11 places


India, staging the world's biggest election, will re-run voting at 11 polling stations in the northeastern state of Manipur today after reports of violence and damage to voting machines in the state torn by months of ethnic clashes.

The election authorities declared the voting void at the 11 locations and ordered the fresh poll, the chief electoral officer of Manipur said in a statement late on Saturday.

The main opposition Congress party had demanded a re-run at 47 Manipur polling stations, alleging that booths were captured and elections were rigged.​
 

The Roots of Northeast India's Ethnic Turmoil
The drive to maintain their identity and avoid assimilation is strong among the region's tribal and ethnic groups.
By Akhilesh Pillalamarri
August 11, 2023

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A Naga warrior photographed during the Hornbill Festival in Nagaland, India, December 4, 2016. Credit: Wikimedia Commons/Pralaylahiri

Northeast India, the region of India that lies mostly east of Bangladesh and west of Myanmar, is distinct among the areas of India. For a start, it is connected to the rest of India by the narrowest of corridors, the Siliguri Corridor, which is 20 kilometers (12 miles) in some places.

But its distinguishing features are not merely geographic, but sociocultural. Much of Northeast India is culturally distinct from the rest of India, and many of its peoples were not incorporated into states until the British colonial era. As a result, the region is characterized by ethnic heterogeneity. Outside of the Brahmaputra River Valley of Assam, where wet-rice cultivation aided in the formation of larger, more-centralized polities, it is a kaleidoscope of tribal groups that have not been homogenized by states. The result is a modern tinderbox of competing tribal, ethnic, religious, and political claims that often erupt into violence, as most recently seen in the state of Manipur. How did Northeast India come to be this way?

James C. Scott, an anthropologist who specializes in Southeast Asia, describes the highlands of Northeast India, Southeast Asia, and Southwest China using a concept called "Zomia." Zomia, which consists of the land above 300 meters in this region, is "the largest remaining region of the world whose peoples have not yet been fully incorporated into nation-states." According to Scott, this was by design, as tribal people wished to practice "state avoidance." Elaborating on this in his book, "Art of Not Being Governed," Scott says that these hill tribes are "best understood as runaway, fugitive, maroon communities who have, over the course of two millennia, been fleeing the oppressions of state-making projects in the valleys — slavery, conscription, taxes, corvée labor, epidemics, and warfare."

Yet, even the ethnic demographics of Zomia were not static across time, and many of the migrations of various tribes or the expansion of neighboring states are the precursors of today's tensions in Northeast India.

The edge of classical Indian civilization lay in modern Bengal and the westernmost part of modern Assam for centuries. For much of the first millennium of the common era, the Kamarupa Kingdom was situated here as a frontier territory. East of it lay hills, forests, and swamps settled by people originating in Southeast Asia and China. This was in sharp contrast to the rest of India, into which people have historically usually migrated or invaded from the northwest. Some of the earliest migrants in Northeast India were people who spoke Austroasiatic languages, a family that includes Khmer and Vietnamese. In the Northeast, they are represented by the Khasi people of Meghalaya state. These people may have specialized in dry rice farming in hills. They were followed by various Tibeto-Burman people migrating in several waves, as well as other ethnicities, like the Tai Ahoms. These people all originated in Southeast Asia and modern China, and formed several distinct branches of Tibeto-Burman peoples.

Some, such as the Bodo and Garo who lived in northwest Assam and Meghalaya respectively, seem to have arrived before a later wave of Kuki-Chin-Naga people. Some Tibeto-Burman peoples developed small states and gradually adopted Hinduism, including the Twipra of Tripura, the Ahom of Assam — who eventually conquered and assimilated Kamarupa — and the Meitei of Manipur. Other groups remained as tribes in the hills and resisted the encroachment of states, including the Naga, and the closely related Kuki, Mizo, and Chin peoples. These groups, speaking a plethora of languages, remained a patchwork of competing groups when the British colonized the region.

Whether the tribes of Northeast India made a conscious decision to remain outside of the system of surrounding Hindu and Buddhist states or whether this separateness is a function of ecology and geology, much of northeastern India and neighboring areas of Southeast Asia remained inhibited by non-state tribal groups like the Naga, Kuki, Mizo, Chin, Kachin, and Karen. These groups remained fiercely independent; even during the British period, these hill tribes mostly converted to Christianity and resisted assimilation into the cultures of more numerous neighbors such as the Bengali, Assamese, and Burmese.

Independent India inherited the Northeast — much of which was initially part of the state of Assam — with its sociopolitical structure of independent-minded hill peoples interspersed with state-like structures in the lowlands. Manipur, which was a princely state that later acceded to India in 1949, had its own dichotomy between lowland Meitei and highland Kuki and Naga people. For much of India's post-independence period, the Northeast has seen chronic rebellion, independence movements, and ethnic violence, almost always driven by the same underlying concern: the desire of a people to maintain their identity, avoid assimilation, and push back against encroachment by other groups. Hence, the violence in the last decade alone between Bodos and Bengalis, Bru and Mizos, and now Kukis and Meitei. That is why Assam has been partitioned multiple times to create the new states of Nagaland, Mizoram, Arunachal Pradesh, and Meghalaya; given its ethnic makeup, it may yet spawn several more states such as Bodoland. Now, the Kukis of Manipur are demanding another state. It would not be surprising if the ultimate solution to the Northeast's ethnic turmoil is its division into a dozen more ethnic states.​
 

Northeast Turmoil: Vital Determinants
By Sreeradha Datta *

Northeast India comprising Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland and Tripura is most often in the news for widespread violence and insurgency. At the popular level, conflict is endemic to the region. There is, however, little awareness of the complex nature of the ethnic unrest and separatist movements in the region. Intense and bitter conflict in the region has been attributed to many factors.

In certain ways, the turmoil in the Northeast represents a clash between tradition and culture and forces of change. The geographical isolation of the region, absence of cultural and psychological integration with the mainstream and economic discontent are at the root of the unrest in the Northeast. The unchecked migration often becomes the prime reason for the woes of the region. A section of the population have even maintained that they are not part of India and that their struggle is for independence from the Indian Union. In short, various historical, geographical, cultural, economic and political factors have contributed to tension and conflict in the region.

This paper is an attempt to explore and analyse certain important factors that have led to the turmoil and the prolonged violent unrest plaguing the region. It has been argued that underdevelopment is an important factor in the sustenance of conflict in the region. It is submitted that historical, geographical and cultural factors are at the root of the myriad conflicts in the region and the political-security challenges in the Northeast derive from these factors.

The paper is organised in three sections. The first section discusses the geographical, historical and psychological factors and how they have influenced the making of the crises in the Northeast. The pressure of migration is the most important issue in the Northeast and there is a close relationship between migration and security. The population flow into the region and its role in fomenting unrest is analysed in the second section. The third section dwells upon the economic factors that are at the root of conflict as this aspect is closely related to migration pressures.

Background

The Northeastern region of India covering a total areas of 255,037 sq. km, bordering China, Myanmar, Bhutan, and Bangladesh is a post-colonial region. Until the advent of the British, Northeast was not there as a concept. The geo-political contour of a Northeast frontier first emerged by the turn of the last century, during the eastward sweep of the British leading to the subjugation of the territories between Bengal and erstwhile Burma. The colonial rule rook a long time to consolidate and different units came under British rule at different times, Assam plains in 1826, Cachar in 1830, Khasi Hills in 1833, Naga Hills in 1835, Garo Hills in 1872-73 and Lushai hills in 1890.

If one studies the pre-independence writings, the expression, 'Northeast region' is seldom encountered. The construction of the region called Northeast is a post-1947 development. The partition aggravated its geo-political isolation as the region is linked with the rest of the country by a narrow land corridor and is surrounded on all sides by international borders. Earlier various tribal regions had closer ties with the adjoining areas of Bengal and Burma than with each other, but the partition all but physically separated the Northeast from the Indian heartland. This and the Chinese takeover of Tibet replaced the earlier soft territorial frontier. In other words, an area of more than a quarter of a million square kilometers bordering China, Bhutan, Myanmar, and Bangladesh (erstwhile east Pakistan) now only has a tenuous connection with the rest of the country by the 21-km wide Siliguri corridor. 1 Less than one per cent of the external boundaries of the region is contiguous with the rest of India. While the remaining ninety-nine percent form international borders.

The partition also caused the severance of the inland water, road and railway communications through East Pakistan/Bangladesh and access to the Chittagong port was lost. The Chinese takeover of Tibet and the virtual closure of the border with Burma/Myanmar added to the isolation of the region. All these factors had an effect on the traditional economic linkages with the neighbouring areas and Northeast India could never recover the consequences and trauma of partition.

Isolation and Separateness

Colonial interests dictated the political and administrative arrangements of the region. The prolonged colonial rule consolidated and accentuated separateness. Administrative convenience and strategic considerations led the British to group and regroup territories. Assam emerged as a nodal point in the British administration only after going through a long granulating period. The areas around Assam that were brought under colonial rule at different points of time were treated by the British administration on a separate footing. A series of legal and administrative decisions were taken between 1874 ad 1935 providing for separate and distinct identities of the different areas in the Northeast.

An Inner Line was drawn marking the extent of revenue administration beyond which the tribal people were left to manage their own affairs. Outsiders were prohibited from crossing the Inner Line without permission. According to Section 52A of the Government of India Act of 1919, the Governor-General in Council may declare any territory to be a backward tract and deny application of any Legislative Act in the areas so declared. 2 Subsequently the Government of India Act of 1935 regrouped the backward tracts into two categories, namely, excluded and partially excluded areas in place of backward tracts. 3

The Inner Line became a frontier within a frontier adding to the seclusion of the hills, enhancing the political and cultural distance between them and the plains. 4 One of the important negative fallouts of the Inner Line system has been the perpetuation of the isolationist tendencies in the predominantly hill and mountainous areas of the region. The colonial policy aimed at preserving the separateness of the region continued when the region was reorganised in 1956. Even though most excluded areas became separate entities as union territories and subsequently as States, their integration into the rest of India has been partial and problematic. Therefore, despite conferment of autonomy and statehood, separateness nursed during the colonial period has survived and is frequently expressed through insurgency to bolster demands for autonomy, economic concessions, political representation, and even for independence from the Union.

More important than the geographical isolation and seeds of separateness during the colonial rule, it is the cultural chasm and lack of psychological integration with the rest of the country that makes for the distinctiveness of the region. The nationalist struggle for freedom which otherwise unified the diverse Indian population did not touch the Northeast. The region remained immune to the process of 'Indianness.' The tribal Northeast remained aloof to the unifying influence of the freedom struggle. In the words of Jawaharlal Nehru,

The essence of the struggle for freedom, which meant raising some kind of liberating force in India, did not reach these (tribal) areas, chiefly the frontier areas that are the most important tribal areas. The result is that those frontier areas were not (so) psychologically prepared. In fact, they were prepared the other way by British officers or sometimes by missionaries who were there. 5

The profound economic and political changes in the wake of independence created a sense of unease among the tribal population of the region. Feelings grew that the tribal traditions would be submerged into the mainstream and a new sense of identity and political consciousness led the tribal communities to differentiate themselves from the heartlanders. The attitude of the heartland namely, the Hindu-Hindi belt, towards the region and its people have not helped the situation. There is complete lack of knowledge and awareness of the Northeast, its history, its diversity and its place in other parts of India, thereby reinforcing the psychological distance.

Migration and Economy

Beginning with the British rule, the region has been witnessing regular and at times accelerated phase of economic migration. This influx included migrants from within and outside India. The remoteness of the region, colonial history and the psychological gap are the main determinants of the turmoil in the Northeast. However, it is the demographic changes in the region, which often are the immediate source of conflict. The impact of demographic changes as an important conflict-generating cause has come to the limelight in the last two decades. However, resentment over the large-scale unchecked migration into the region, both from different parts of India as well as from Nepal and East Pakistan/Bangladesh, had been brewing much before the anti-foreigner agitation burst out in late 1970s and later on engulfed various parts of the region. 6

Most of the population groups in the Northeast either have their roots outside India or have migrated to the region from different parts of the Indian heartland. In the pre-British era, major population flows were from east of the region, from Southwest China and Upper Burma. During and after the colonial rule, there was a large-scale influx of Bengali-speaking people, followed by Nepalese and the tribal people from central India. The British economic ventures absorbed Bengali clerks and officials and the central Indian tribal people and Bihari labourers were absorbed in tea gardens and oil fields. The Bengali migrants, particularly Muslim farmers made substantial contribution to the agricultural development of Assam. 7 The Census of 1911 described these migrant farmers as "hardy and prolific cultivators working their way northwards. These people are accustomed to the risk arising from diluvian and devastating floods which other cultivators are unwilling to face." Likewise, the 1931 Census reported: "At first the local people did not accept them joyfully. But as they came to see their knowledge of agriculture, their contribution to the general prosperity of the district—the prejudices and dislikes are beginning to disappear."

Initially the settlement and development of the wasteland was considered a positive fallout of the migration. Gradually the influx began to undermine the economic interest of indigenous people. The new entrants created acute economic problems since the mid-thirties as they began to settle down in forestland, particularly in the tribal areas. Forceful occupation, purchase, mortgage etc. paved the way for the land alienation of the indigenous population. Increased population pressure on land aggravated the problem of landlessness among the indigenous people. Unplanned clearing of the forest led to the problem of soil erosion in the hills and consequent floods in the plains. Trade and commerce was monopolised by the more enterprising capital owning migrants and the migrants also cornered modern professions in large numbers.

The presence of a large number of migrants shook the foundation of the Assamese social structure and created a sons-of-the-soil solidarity among the Assamese. The percentage of the Assamese speaking population considerably declined while the share of the Bengali speaking population has risen considerably. Cleavages also developed between the indigenous Assamese and tribal population. In certain parts of the state, the immigrant population constitutes more than 70 per cent of the total population and in the Char (river island) area 90 per cent are immigrants. 8 In tribal areas like Karbi Anglong district immigrants represent a substantial proportion of the population. Between 1910 and 1980, in terms of population growth Assam became the fastest growing region in the entire subcontinent. The demographic changes resulted in acute conflicts over language, education and employment policies, leading to the fear of being overwhelmed demographically, culturally, and economically by the migrants.

Likewise, as per the 1991 census, the tribes in Tripura constitute only 28 per cent of the state's population but three decades earlier they comprised two-third of its population. 9 As Sanjoy Hazarika notes: "Mass movement in a traditionally insular area invites linguistic, ethnic and religious strife. Settlement of an alien population leads to battle over resources, particularly land." 10

This influx of the economic migrants and consequent undermining of the economic interests of the native population changed the demographic composition of the region, eventually leading to political tension. This tension manifested in different forms ranging from political agitations, violent struggle, militant activities and insurgencies. Consequently, the agitation over the presence and domination of the foreigners and the 'outsiders' has fuelled conflict throughout the region. Insurgents of various hues have cited unchecked migration as the prime reason for their 'struggle' against the established order.

Until recently, migration and security were considered distinct subjects of academic studies and political discourse. Analysts focused mostly on defence strategy and power relations between states. Preserving the territorial integrity of the state and the stability of the government in the face of the external or internal military threat were considered a matter of 'high politics' while migration was considered 'low politics'. However, in recent years there is a growing recognition that migration does not involve only human and personal security and human rights issues but also has internal and international security implications. 11 Migration is now considered one of the 'new security threats' and Myron Weiner has treated population flows as an independent rather than as a dependent variable in his security analysis. He identified five categories of situations where migrants or refugees may be perceived as a security threat. 12 The large-scale migration into the Northeast region fits very well into the category of 'unwanted migrants.'

Several of the Northeast states witnessed violent movements rooted in the foreigners' issue. The Chakmas are the "foreigners" in Arunachal Pradesh, Bengalis in Tripura, Chin refugees (from Myanmar) in Mizoram and Manipur and Bengalis and other non-Assamese in Assam. A strong 'anti-foreigner movement' against the Chakma residents of Arunachal Pradesh has rocked the state. Chakma refugees were settled in the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA) region (now Arunachal Pradesh) in the 1960s and since 1994, Chakmas and Hajongs have been facing deportation threats and discrimination. 13 All Arunachal Pradesh Students Union (AAPSU) has issued an ultimatum aimed at evicting Chakmas, Hajongs and Tibetans from the state. The issue of granting citizenship to the Chakmas is still hanging in balance in spite of the recommendation of a Parliamentary Committee.

The Chin refugees from Myanmar are no longer welcome in Mizoram. The resentment over the increase in the number of Chakmas in the state is another cause for worry. Mizos allege that a large number of Chakmas from Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) region of Bangladesh have settled in the Chakma Autonomous District Council in the state. The tribal-outsider dichotomy has generated violence in Meghalaya, Tripura and Assam, thus leading to a silent out-migration of the non-tribal population from these states. However, the most widely known anti-foreign agitation took place in Assam when it became an election issue in 1978. The success of Asom Gana Parishad (AGP) in coming to power on the anti-foreigners' platform induced some of the other political parties to pursue similar postures.

The economic and security implications of the mass migration into the region have not been addressed properly. Measures to check infiltration from across the borders have not been successful. 14 Refugee flows into the region have only compounded the picture.

Economic Resources

The Northeast is endowed with an abundance of natural resources but the region continues to remain backward. It is endowed with numerous natural resources such as oil reserves, tropical forests, hydro-electricity potentials of the Brahmaputra and its tributaries, tea, coal, timber, silk and jute. Some of these resources have been exploited while others remain under-utilised. Many analysts have reasoned that the lack of economic development is the most important cause of conflict in the region. High rates of population growth, a restricted range of resources, labour immobility, restricted land market, volatile and uncertain political and social environment and largely subsistence economies are the defining characteristics of the region. Sluggish economic growth, poor infrastructure, lack of market accessibility and under utilisation of the natural resources of the region have plagued the economies of the states of the region. As a result, the economic development has been lop-sided.

The British encouraged the growth of tea plantations at the cost of other industries. The partition dealt a severe blow to the economic prospects of the region by cutting off the existing transport and communication routes. Chittagong port and the CHT area were awarded to Pakistan against the wishes of the overwhelming section of the local populace. The region is yet to recover from the aftereffects of the partition. As B.G. Verghese observes:

The physical and psychological severity of the blow was not fully appreciated elsewhere in the country and the disruption in communications and markets was not repaired soon enough, nor infrastructure developed to match the new needs completed as expeditiously necessary. Isolated and traumatised, the Northeast turned inward, succession of insurgencies and movements to seek separation or autonomy, assert identity or exclude foreigners and outsiders aggravated the hiatus, with the rest of the country coming to think of the Northeast with disinterest as a far-away place, perpetually troubled. Beset with its own internal problems and complexes, the Northeast fell behind economically and despite its inherent wealth remains at the bottom of the heap as a conglomeration of seemingly impecunious special category states. 15

After independence, some efforts were made at industrial diversification, but industries that came up were concentrated in certain pockets of Assam. The region continues to remain mainly agricultural and less than forty per cent of the geographical area is under cultivation. The prospects for modern industries are not bright, as there is a lack of local or regional markets. It is a possible to suggest that one of the important reasons for the economic stagnation of the Northeast is the socio-economic resistance of the people to change and the structural rigidity of a traditional social structure. The resentment and movements against the outsiders have robbed the region of investments, which could have given a fillip to economic development.

Out-migration of people from business class and professions has sent a wrong signal to the investors. Development has been a major casualty of insurgency and rampant violence; and at times the insurgents have disrupted economic development projects either to protest against the perceived extractive and exploitative nature of such projects and/or for keeping out outsiders. Examples are galore: stopping oil exploration and production in Nagaland, preventing railway extension in Khasi Hills, regular and systematic disruption of oil supply and railway lines in Assam.

A closer examination of the turbulence and unrest in the region would reveal a number of underlying economic factors. The lack of economic development "breeds the discontents that feed insurgency." 16 There is a deep sense of economic neglect of the region by the Centre. It is true that the various central governments have been generous towards the region in terms of extending aid and assistance and the central allocations for the states of the region are higher in comparison with other parts of the country. Northeast has the highest per capita investment in the country. In a significant move, in 1996 Prime Minister Deve Gowda had announced a special economic assistance package for the region amounting to Rs. 61 billion. 17 Northeast states enjoy special category status for the development of backward areas.

Modernisation theorists would argue that insurgency and violence are transient pheonomenon that would decline in proportion to economic development. However, massive subsidies, grants and special allocations for the region which are supposed to contain insurgency and propel the region to prosperity, may indeed have exacerbated the problem. 18 The nexus between the politicians, bureaucrats and contractors is responsible for the siphoning off of government funds and a part of this fund finds its way to the underground and finances their violent campaign against the authorities.

It is widely believed that the political discontent in the region has been fuelled by the unemployment problem. Rampant presence of small arms in the region is attributed to this factor. The literacy rate in the region is quite high in comparison to the rest of the country but in the absence of industries and business opportunities, employment prospects for the youth are dim. The resultant discontent and frustration is exploited by the militants to swell their ranks.

Conclusion

The psychological distance from the rest of India, limited economic development and the problems associated with the economic migrants from outside the region have culminated in a number of conflicts in the Northeast. The tribes and various other sections of society have frequently revolted against the established order and have waged armed struggle for secession as well as to bolster various other sets of demands. The proximity of international borders has facilitated external support for various insurgent groups to be active in the region. 19 The demographic changes brought about by the continuous influx of outsiders both from across the borders as well as from different parts of the country have sharpened divisions and 'anti foreigner' sentiment has spawned dozens of movements and agitations. A number of groups and organisations have sought to press for their demands for autonomy, economic concessions and political representation through violent means. The state and the security forces have launched counter offensive and anti-insurgency operations to contain the secessionist forces and their terror tactics.

Several of the insurgent movements have accepted the various packages offered by the government or sought political accommodation with the Centre. However, in spite of the numerous 'peace accords', the region is infested with militants and rebels who are carrying out low intensity conflict in various forms. Each of the states has been rocked by extremist violence in varying degrees. 20 The tribal-outsider dichotomy has the potential to generate violence.​
 

INDIA'S INTERNAL SECURITY CONCERNS: THE NORTH-EAST DIMENSION
April 27, 2022 Rahul Mishra

When India gained independence from the British Empire in 1947, it was faced with several vulnerabilities along its northern, eastern, and western borders. Transfer of power from the British was not only about birth of India as an independent modern nation but also about the carrying forward the international treaties the rulers of British India had signed with its neighbouring countries.

As newly independent nations, several former colonies in Asia found themselves in a rather weak position in handling mutually overlapping territorial claims, differences and disputes with local administrative agency of a neighbouring country, and unhindered movement of ethnic communities oblivious to necessities and procedures of entering a modern nation state's sovereign territory. Put together, more often than not these challenges capped government agencies' enthusiasm towards modernization, and steps to boost connectivity and economic development. Attempts to bring lasting peace to peripheral regions fell prey to insurgency, separatism, and armed violence against the State itself. India was no exception to any of these features.

During the Cold War years, especially after the 1962 India-China war, ethnic-based irredentist separatism in several north-eastern states was funded and supported by Communist China to keep India occupied in the Subcontinent. Some of the leading separatist leaders, such as Isak Chishi Swu and Thuingaleng Muivah—leaders of NSCN-IM (Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland- Isak Muivah)—and even Paresh Barua of the United Liberation Front of Assam, were trained in China. Small arms supply, funding, and support to some of these groups came from China, and Myanmar-based separatist groups.

Lack of enough resources, poor border infrastructure, and boundary disputes with China leading to the 1962 war compelled the Indian State and central government to become more inward looking and turn even its north-western and eastern borders into frontiers rather than bridges and trade corridors. For decades, India kept its bordering areas underdeveloped so that the Chinese troops could not gain easy access if Beijing ever tried to repeat the brief 1962 border war and encroach into Indian territory.

With the launch of its Look East policy in 1992, preceded by a number of peace agreements with rebel groups, India adopted a multi-pronged approach in dealing with a slew of measures, including infrastructure, connectivity, and financial initiatives. Cutting off linkages between local rebel groups and their foreign sponsors was an important part of this objective. As a part of this mission, India sought assistant from its eastern neighbours—Myanmar, Bhutan, and Bangladesh—to flush insurgents and separatists out.

Over past three decades, bookended by its Look East (1992) and Act East (2014) policies, India not only made attempts to link its north-eastern states with neighbouring Southeast Asian countries, but also strove to bring north-eastern states to the forefront of developmental discourse in India. This has particularly been the case over last seven years under the government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi.

However, despite steps taken by the government, the struggle to strike a balance between development and peace still remains a critical challenge for the north-eastern states of India. What makes the situation even more complicated is the fact that several of these insurgent groups are still supported by neighbouring countries, including China. In this regard, a new chapter was opened when terrorists ambushed a colonel of the 46 Assam Rifles and his family in Manipur in November 2021. Six jawans of the Assam Rifles were also injured in the incident. Two Manipur-based terrorist organizations, the People's Liberation Army and the Manipur Naga People's Front, claimed responsibility for the attack. It is believed that most of the work of these organizations is done by Myanmar.

Sources also believe that the terrorists responsible for the attack had entered India's border from Myanmar. It is hardly surprising considering that India and Myanmar have a border of more than sixteen hundred kilometres. This border area is mostly porous. Moreover, a large part of the border has not been fenced; it may not even be possible to do so. These factors complicate the situation for Indian forces, sometimes leading to unfortunate incidents emanating out of mistrust and miscommunications between the forces and common people. In December 2021, for instance, more than a dozen civilians and one member of the security forces were killed in Nagaland after Indian forces mistook a group of labourers for militants and opened fire.

Instability in Myanmar

A sizable chunk of India's security anxieties along the eastern frontier emanate from ethnically-volatile Myanmar. Ever since its independence in 1948, Myanmar has been facing inter-ethnic conflicts and turbulence related to a lack of national ethnic reconciliation. These differences within Myanmar territory have been spilling over to neighbouring India, often leading to similar sentiments on part of some ethnic groups against the state machinery.

The strings of insurgent attacks on Indian forces and common people are also attached to Myanmar's domestic political and law and order situation. Myanmar has been in a state of civil war since the coup in February 2021—a situation that has only quantitatively escalated as the Tatmadaw-rebel group conflict is already a seven decades-old feature in the country. Myanmar's military—the Tatmadaw—is busy fighting dozens of separatist and anti-military, anti-regime armed tribal groups. In the midst of this increased violence, it is a standing danger that the separatist groups of northeast India will become active and violent.

Myanmar-based Naga separatist organizations have played a major role in fuelling separatism in north-eastern India. According to government sources and security experts, the Manipur People's Liberation Army has the support of the Khaplang faction of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland. The National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Khaplang) is a separatist organization led by Khaplang, split from the parent organization, the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Isak Muivah), whose stronghold is in Sagaing province of Myanmar. Sagaing province is adjacent to the border of India. The Khaplang group has carried out several major attacks on the Indian Army in the past, in which the attack in June 2015 is notable.

Significantly, both the Manipur People's Liberation Army and the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Khaplang faction) have not signed any peace agreement with the Indian government. Like many other organizations operating in the north-east, the strings of these groups are directly pulled by the Myanmar state itself. Although the Khaplang faction is not directly connected, its role in the incident was clear.

The unrest in Myanmar, which has been in a state of civil war for decades, and the fierce fighting between various tribal groups and the Myanmar army, have a direct impact on the separatist groups on the Indian side of the border.

The China Connection

China's logistical and moral support to separatist groups in India and Myanmar is not a new phenomenon. This has been a big challenge for the Indian armed forces and security agencies.

The northeast's separatist organizations have always had links with Myanmar, China, Thailand, and sometimes even Bangladesh. For example, in 2017, the Khaplang faction leader SS Khaplang had also gone there for his treatment at Chinese expense (he died of cardiac arrest shortly after his arrival). A major reason for the problem is that most of these separatist groups operating in India and Myanmar get small arms and light weaponry from China. For China, it is an easy and effective source of resource generation.

Arguably, China has been trying to flare-up separatism in India's north-eastern states, particularly in Nagaland, Manipur, and Assam, as part of Beijing's effort to contain India. This is undoubtedly a major reason, but China's interest and hand in illegal arms market, drug trafficking, and exploitation of natural resources through separatist groups in India and Myanmar has been going on for several decades. Unfortunately, both India and the government of Myanmar (i.e. the military) have not been able to stop the smuggling, and inflow of other illegal items. Perpetuation of armed rebellion against India is clearly motivated in part by ensuring the continuation of this illegal revenue stream for China. It is important to mention here that Cox's Bazar in Bangladesh, which is considered a major centre of illegal arms smuggling in South Asia, also has links with China.

The Narcotics Industry Fuelling Crimes against the State

The sub-region joining Thailand, Laos, and Myanmar is called the "Golden Triangle" because it is a major source of illegal drugs. Drugs worth millions of US dollars have been confiscated in the north-eastern states of India over past few months and members of separatist groups have also been caught in all these raids by security forces.

Clearly, drug trafficking is another major source of income for insurgent groups and also a means of cooperation with their partners outside India. Thus, to deal with the problem of separatism in an effective manner, it is necessary that systematic and multi-pronged approach is adopted to cut-off the links of local armed separatist groups with Myanmar, China and other countries.

The Way Forward

Lasting peace and stability has been a distant dream for the people of north-eastern states of India since independence. The difference between the twentieth century and the first two decades of the twenty-first century is that earlier the narrative about north-east India was "security vs. freedom of expression"; it has now changed to "development versus security". Another key change is that unlike in the 1970s and 1980s, more than half of north-eastern states are relatively peaceful and are making advances in terms of economic growth and development. The trouble largely resides in Nagaland, Manipur, and to a certain extent in the Assam state of north-eastern India.

Today, most of the north-eastern states are ready to participate in the mainstream of development and infrastructure development in India with as much vigour and enthusiasm as any other state of southern or western India. Over past seven years, the Modi government has also paid a considerable political attention to this area, while consistently focussing on the field of infrastructure; a lot of progress has been made.

However, much still remains to be done as the goals of maintaining law and order, and ensuring fool-proof security, remain challenged by cross-border infiltration and illicit markets. India's internal security challenges in the north-east are not just about security and law and order problems, they are a compound of inter-related challenges: drug trafficking, illegal small arms trade, human trafficking, natural resource exploitation, and state-sponsored violence against India. So far, neither the central nor state governments have been able to find a panacea to deal with these challenges, certainly not while ensuring a balance with growth and development. With greater political stability in the country and thinning political differences, it seems plausible for centre and state governments to show greater resolve in battling such perennial challenges.

Dr. Rahul Mishra is a Senior Lecturer at the Asia-Europe Institute, University of Malaya, Malaysia. He is also associated with the University's Centre for ASEAN Regionalism. His latest publications include Asia and Europe in the 21st Century New Anxieties, New Opportunities (Routledge, 2021) and India's Eastward Engagement from Antiquity to Act East Policy (SAGE, 2019).​
 

JOHN RANJAN MUKHERJEE
SLOW ROADS TO PEACE : FUTURE CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS FOR INDIA'S NORTH EAST



The Indian government must bring peace to the region by meeting the aspirations of its people. While Tripura and Mizoram have been peaceful, they need greater central assistance to develop. This would only be possible if peace can be brought to Assam, Manipur, Nagaland, Arunachal, and Meghalaya as all these states are closely interlinked. The Indian government must take steps to avoid the conflagration that is in the offing particularly in Assam, Nagaland, and Manipur. It must stop knee-jerk reactions and faulty political decisions being taken in New Delhi.

INDIA'S NORTH-EAST HAS BEEN BESET BY PROBLEMS ARISING FROM lack of economic development and insurgency since the country's independence in 1947, which are being aggravated by recent regional crises arising out of flawed political decision making. Though the reasons are manifold, they primarily lie within the region's sociological, geographic, historical, economic, and political spheres, and are outlined in this article.

The North East Region (NER) of India consists of the states of Assam, Nagaland, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Tripura, and Arunachal Pradesh (Sikkim, whilst officially part of the region, is not relevant as it is dissimilar to the other NER states and, therefore, is not discussed further). The NER covers an area of about 300,000 square kilometres with a population of about 45 million (according to the 2011 census). It has about 5,100 kilometres of international borders and is connected to the rest of India by a narrow strip of land known as the Siliguri corridor.[1] The NER has a hill and mountain sector forming 70 per cent of the region, which is generally covered with forests and is dissected by a large number of major rivers with deep gorges. These rivers are surrounded by high mountain/hill ranges, which effectively segregate the valleys, making them mutually distinct. It has also ensured that the ethnic groups living in these areas would be naturally isolated from each other. The valleys have provided migration routes into the region. Consequently, the ethnic groups have retained their exclusive identity that has given root to their primordial value system of "my tribe-my land-my autonomy," which has always given rise to strong inter-ethnic rivalry and feuds.

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The plains of the Siliguri corridor and the Brahmaputra valley, being the natural population centres and communication hubs, are the core, while the hill sectors form the fringes of the NER. These valleys, with their fertile soil, abundant natural resources (that include 50 per cent of India's tea, twenty per cent of its oil, undiscovered shale oil, huge forest wealth, and large coal and mineral reserves) have throughout history been a source of attraction for migrating and invading hordes that came through the mountain passes and the river valleys. Such migration has made this region a melting pot of cultures and ethnic groups, giving it a rich and colourful canvas. Being a transit area between high Asia, Indo-China and the Gangetic-Brahmaputra plains, the NER has acquired a distinct individuality as a home to a multitude of ethnic groups.

China claims large areas of Arunachal Pradesh and parts of Bhutan (with whom India has a treaty obligation), and disputes the alignment of the boundary with Sikkim. China has waged a proxy war against India by supporting Indian Insurgent Groups (IIGs) in the NER. Consequently, there is extensive deployment of the Indian armed forces in the NER.

Before its partition, erstwhile East Pakistan (now Bangladesh), had been targeting the entire NER to amalgamate it so as to obtain a strategic space along with its natural resources. The country had therefore evolved a strategy of "Lebensraum," that is, silent and slow demographic invasion through illegal migration changing the demography of the NER, thereby facilitating the region to ultimately secede to it politically.[4] To this end, Bangladesh had, after the assassination of Sheikh Mujibir Rahman, joined hands with China and Pakistan for many years in waging a proxy war against India by supporting the NER insurgent groups and by the propagation of Islamic fundamentalism, both in Bangladesh and in India's NER. However, the present Bangladeshi Government, under Sheikh Hasina Wajed, has now taken positive steps to stamp out Islamic fundamentalism and in trying to deny support to the NER IIGs.

While Myanmar now has a reasonable relationship with India, it has little control over its northern areas bordering India and Yunnan. Due to ongoing insurgency and the Han-isation of the area, Myanmar's northern region is progressively turning into a Chinese colony, which constitutes a threat to India's security. Myanmar is also being used as a sanctuary by the NER IIGs in concert with the Myanmar's insurgent groups. Nevertheless, Northern Myanmar offers the NER access to China, Thailand, Southeast Asia and the sea. This access is strategically imperative for development of the NER and spreading Indian influence across Southeast Asia.

The earliest inhabitants of the region were of Austric stock (Mon Khmer akin to the Munds in Bihar and the Andamans), now residing primarily in Meghalaya (Khasis and Jaintias) and Karbi Anglong (Karbis were earlier called Mikirs in Assam), and this was coupled with a limited Dravidian and Negritos presence.

A few thousand years BCE onwards, waves of Mongoloid people migrated and established control over the entire area. They spread across parts of North India, Nepal, and Sikkim (Lepchas), North Bengal (Kamtapuris/Koch), Assam (Bodo-Kachari-Dimasa-Chutiya-Marans-Rajbanshis), Garo Hills (Garos of Meghalaya), Manipur (Meitei tribes), Tripuris of Tripura, Bhutan (Bodo groups), and there were a few tribes of Arunachal including the Akas, Adis, Mishmis, and some present day Naga tribes.[7] Thus the claims of some of the tribes including the Nagas that they were the original inhabitants of the region are not true. These tribes established a great kingdom called Kamrupa, extending over Bihar, Bengal, Orissa, the Assam plains, and some hill areas in the NER.

The Aryan migrations spilled east into lower western Assam plains, leading to their adoption of Vedic and Hindu culture. There were also further Tibeto-Burman migrations including some Naga tribes, and the Mizo and Kuki-Chin, into Nagaland, upper Assam, Arunachal, Mizoram, south Manipur, Tripura and Sikkim. By this time Manipur and Tripura also became independent kingdoms strongly influenced by Aryan culture. The Turk-Afghan Sultanate's 12th and 13th century expeditions to conquer Assam from Bengal were repeatedly defeated, however, many of the invading Muslims settled in lower Assam and Cooch Bihar where their descendants live even today.

In the 13th century, the Ahoms, a Shan tribe who were originally from Yunnan in China and who had migrated earlier to Myanmar, invaded upper Assam. They progressively gained control and were perpetually in conflict with the Bodo groups. By the 13th century, the Ahoms gained control of Assam and ruled the region for about 600 years.

In the 16th/17th centuries, Lower Assam was invaded by the Mughals, who gained control over central and lower Assam for about 70 years but, were ultimately pushed back by the Ahoms. By the 17th century, the Ahoms wrested control over most of Assam but still failed to subjugate the hill tribes, who frequently raided Ahom and Bodo areas. They were kept under check through punitive expeditions and raids.

In the 18th century, Ahom rulers persecuted local Vaishnavites who revolted and launched an insurrection, which spread across the Ahom kingdom. The Ahom King appealed to the Burmese King for help. Burmese troops responded promptly and assisted the Ahoms by suppressing the rebels. In the 18th and 19th centuries, due to misrule by the Ahoms, there was civil war and insurgency and the Ahoms again invited the Myanmarese to subdue the rebellion. Consequently, the Myanmarese occupied Ahom dominions for two years, and were simultaneously at war with the Manipuris over possession of territory and payment of tribute.

In the 19th century, the British entered Assam on the invitation of the Ahom rulers to help quell the civil war and insurgency and also to expel the Myanmarese from the kingdom. After helping the Ahoms defeat and remove the Myanmarese, the British, however, progressively took control of the region. Due to the fact that the hill tribes frequently raided their facilities, the British attempted subjugation but found the process too costly. The British therefore gave the tribes partial autonomy and initiated their conversion to Christianity. To prevent depredations, the British inducted Kuki-Chin tribals from the Chin Hills in Burma and settled them as a buffer between the Naga homelands and British-controlled areas, thereby creating further animosity between the tribes. To isolate the hill tribes from plains' politics, the British barred the migration of outsiders into the hills, imposed the "Inner Line" along the base of the hills and drew boundaries on the principle of "divide and rule."

By the 18th century, the Gurkhas from Nepal were attempting to expand their dominions through the conquest and colonisation of areas controlled by the British. The ensuing Anglo-Gurkha War of 1815/16 ended in the defeat of the Gurkhas. The British Army now recruited the Gurkhas and used them to assist in colonising the NER. This involved stationing Gurkha troops all over the region, many of whom settled down permanently and multiplied.

In the 20th century, due to a perceived Russian and Chinese threat, the British adopted a forward policy and subjugated Tibet, Nepal, Bhutan, and Sikkim, declaring them protectorates to create a buffer zone in the North. The Naga and Mizo hills were accorded limited autonomy and the Inner Line System was imposed. In the early 20th century, when Bengal was partitioned and Assam included in East Bengal, Muslims from East Bengal migrated to Assam in large numbers. After the grant of provincial autonomy to East Bengal in 1935, and with Saidullah as the Chief Minister, the migration of the Muslims further increased into Assam, North Bengal, and Tripura, raising their numbers to about 30 per cent of the population. After Indian independence, immigration from East Pakistan continued due to internal strife in East Pakistan. The migration reached almost 10 million just prior to the 1971 Indo-Pak war. As a consequence of the Assam agitation in the 1970s, immigration reduced but did not stop.

The effects of such migration were that Tripura became a tribal minority state, resulting in a long drawn insurgency; Sikkim, which earlier had a Lepcha and Bhutia majority, now has a Nepalese majority; Assam, today has approximately 40 per cent immigrants from Bangladesh, Bengal, Nepal, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, and Rajasthan. The changing demographic profile of the NER gave birth to the Assam, Bodo, Karbi, and Dimasa insurgencies and other sub-nationalist movements. A minority Islamic fundamentalist movement also now exists in Assam. The migrations gave rise to Naxalite, Gurkhas, and Kamtapuri movements. In Meghalaya, the Khasi movement and the anti non-Khasi agitations with harsh anti-immigration policies came into being. Unfortunately, both the central and state governments failed to take suitable remedial action, giving rise to widespread insurgency, strife, and discontent.

During the partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947, road, rail and river communications linking the NER to India were blocked by the creation of a hostile East Pakistan, disrupting the established trading patterns and, consequently, the only link between the NER and India became the Siliguri corridor. Thus, Calcutta's industry and the NER economy fell into decay. Artificial boundaries created between India and Burma split the Naga, Kuki-Chin-Mizo tribes and the Meiteis (Manipuris). These boundaries, coupled with pitting ethnic groups against each other and the segregation of the hill people from the plainsmen, resulted in the present day problems of Naga, Mizo and Meitei demands, for uniting their homelands across British-imposed borders and sowing seeds of ethnic sub-nationalism.

Politically aware hill tribes were scared of assimilation into either the Hindu or the Muslim homeland, or being overwhelmed, and they thus demanded freedom and resorted to insurgency.

The British Forward Policy in bringing areas of Arunachal (North East Frontier Tracts and later the North Eastern Frontier Agency) under their direct control, and independent India continuing with this policy, brought India into direct confrontation with the Chinese, who claimed these areas as their own. The success of socialist movements in Russia and China drew dissenters from the NER into their fold as Chinese support to them escalated. The late 1950s saw the start of the Naga and Meitei insurgency, and then the Lushai (Mizo) insurgency.

These insurgencies were sustained for long periods due to external support, public approbation and a subversive environment in Southeast Asia. India's border dispute with China led to the Indo-China war of 1962, and Western support to India only strengthened China's determination to help the IIGs. India's dispute with Pakistan, led the latter to support these groups through East Pakistan. Unfortunately, India's subsequent alliance with Russia, which had fallen out with China during the Cold War, brought the West clandestinely into the fray against India. Today, ground realities indicate that whenever India is in conflict (in any form) with China, there is an upsurge of insurgency in the NER.

Pakistan, and subsequently Bangladesh, after the death of Sheikh Mujibur Rehman, have supported insurgencies in the NER. After the Naga, Mizo and Meitei insurgencies, we have seen the birth of insurgency in Tripura, Assam, Arunachal and finally in Meghalaya, all of which have now been largely brought under control. Having taken an overview of the NER, let us now look at the situation related to its states.

Assam: Centre Needs to Act

Enclosed on all sides by all the other NER states, Assam's population according to the 2011 census was 31.20 million with a multitude of ethnic groups demanding autonomy due to socio-economic deprivation. The state is overpopulated as it is swamped by immigrants, and migration continues at a reduced pace. Today, its indigenous ethnic groups (400-500 years old or more) constitute only about 35% to 40% of its population. Whereas Hindus were predominant earlier, it now has 28% to 30% Muslims.

A large part of the area is flood plains with extensive floods occurring every year. It is marshy, covered with tea gardens, oilfields, mines, and extensive reserved forests. Consequently, there is a high population density in the available areas, leading to food scarcity. The key reason for the shortage is the exploitative colonial-pattern of the economy which primarily exports local products and serves as a market for finished goods from other states. Assam has been repeatedly balkanised to create the neighbouring hill states, with each of whom it has problems. Its people are not welcome in these states for fear of demographic change. While well-endowed with natural resources, the state lacks industry and markets, and has tenuous lines of communication with the rest of India. In spite of being the hub of the region, it is partly embroiled in insurgency and strife due to government neglect and maladministration.

A profusion of large and small insurgencies are active in the state:

United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) which has camps in Myanmar alongside the National Socialist Council of Nagaland, Khaplang, NSCN (K), and other IIGs. Its operation today is in Upper Assam and in Lower Assam with safe havens in Garo Hills. With Bangladesh and Bhutan clamping down on them, their operations are at a relatively low key. Demographic change due to Bangladeshi migration is the root cause of this insurgency.

The Bodo Movement: The National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) has a few camps reportedly left over in Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Arunachal Pradesh. Its operations are primarily in the Bodo belts north in the Brahmaputra and by the Dimasas (a sub-group of the Bodos) in North Cachar Hills. The causes of discontent lie in migration leading to changed demography, lack of control over resources, and Assamese chauvinism. It has been in the news for trying to drive out the Bangladeshis and other non-Bodo groups through violent attacks. Its operations are otherwise low level.

Ethnic Strife in South Assam: This area has a multitude of small insurgent groups amongst the Karbis, Dimasas, and Nagas, indulging in extortion and kidnapping with their cause being ethnic sub-nationalism. South Assam also has large tracts currently inhabited by Nagas, Kukis, Manipuris, Hmars, Karbis, Dimasas, and Bodos, and claimed by the National Socialist Council of Nagalim (NSCN) as part of 'Greater Nagaland.' These claims, and the attempts by the NSCN to enforce them by forcible occupation, have led to ethnic strife that threatens to escalate out of hand. The government also has to decide how to deal with the Bengali-speaking belt of Cachar, Hailakundi, and Karimganj, which indicate high Bangladeshi and Rohingya immigration patterns.

Islamic Fundamentalism: Due to the large presence of Bangladeshi migrants, Islamic fundamentalism (including fundamentalists who have fled Bangladesh) is now unfortunately taking root, which will need to be dealt with urgently.

The Crises in Assam: The strategies to combat the multiple insurgencies have not worked, or have worked partially, or have proven a complete failure. A brief overview:

The policy framework of announcing a ceasefire or suspension of operations and supposedly cantoning and disarming insurgents, and the surrender policy, has simply not worked as almost every major ethnic faction has indulged in insurgency. This entire mode has been a failure which has led to increased lawlessness, extortion, kidnapping for ransom, and greater sub-nationalistic demands by other ethnic groups, who had till then not been given a share of the pie. It is in fact now almost a state of anarchy. The central government's policy to examine grant of statehood to the Bodos and divide the state is further preparing a recipe for disaster.

Failure to resolve the illegal immigration issue is leading to ever-escalating ethnic strife. The Bodos' attempts at ethnic cleansing are an example of the failure of this policy.

While the Fifth and Sixth Schedules of the Constitution provide for grant of some autonomy in managing their affairs, the way in which it has been implemented in Assam is absolutely disastrous. Whilst Assam has over a hundred ethnic groups, it must be realised that it is next to impossible to meet every ethnic group's demand for autonomy in such an environment. Assam today has six autonomous district councils, and eighteen developmental councils, and more are being considered, even though not one of them is performing properly. In addition, almost every ethnic group is demanding—and getting—scheduled tribe/caste status. It is impossible to manage a state in this fashion. What is, instead, required is consociation politics, village level democracy, and economic development. If this is not done, Assam will implode.

With the Bharatiya Janata Party having come into political power by the help of the Asom Gana Parishad (AGP) and the Bodos, and with Hindutva taking root, it is only a matter of time before problems escalate.

The result of the central government favouring the Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland (Isak-Muivah), or NSCN (IM), is that they are taking the boundary dispute to levels of forcibly grabbing the disputed area belt. It is time for Assam to put its foot down and to force the central government to resolve the problem.

Nagaland and Manipur: The Price of Aloofness

In light of the August 2015 Accord signed by the government of India with the NSCN (IM), both the states of Nagaland and Manipur need to be treated together because the NSCN (IM) is a mainly Tangkhul insurgent group based out of Manipur, fighting for sovereignty of the so-called Naga tribes of Nagaland and Manipur, and which is creating the most recent crisis in the NER.

Nagaland lies astride the Patkai and Naga hill ranges of the eastern hills. It has about twenty resident tribes, fourteen of them major groups, conjointly though incorrectly called Nagas. According to the 2011 census, the population is 1.97 million.

Various studies indicate that some of the tribes migrated from the general area of Yunnan over a long period of time. Each of these tribes settled into separate areas in the Naga Hills around the 11th century and had always been antagonistic to each other. They are ethnically, culturally, and ideologically distinct from each other and have enjoyed tribal autonomy, and any threat to their fierce individuality invited violent reaction. The Bodos, Ahoms, Mughals, Manipuris, Myanmarese, and the British found it expensive to subjugate them, and therefore entered into agreements with them in order to maintain peace by allowing them autonomy, and to conduct punitive operations against them if they did not maintain peace. Headhunting was the order of the day till as late as the mid-20th century.

A Naga warrior. Photo by the author.

Under British rule the 'Inner Line Policy' was enunciated in 1873 to prevent their political awakening and to restrict contact with outsiders. This was reiterated in the 'Home Rule Regime' by the Government of India Act of 1935, which declared the Naga Hills District an "Excluded Area." The British tried to control them through conversion to Christianity which partially welded them. Christianity meant literacy and western lifestyles, but it could not change their basic value system. The concept of identity was used to try and get the Naga tribes to band together in order to meet the threat of being swamped by plainsmen.

The tactic did not work as the tribes are still antagonistic to each other, particularly those from Manipur and elsewhere. This is inspite of the fact that the NSCN (IM), primarily a Manipuri Tangkhul militia, controls large parts of Nagaland by force of arms. There are 35 Naga tribes, of which 20 are in Nagaland. The remainder live in Manipur, Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, and Myanmar. According to the NSCN, Naga territory extends from the River Chindwin in Myanmar, including almost the whole of Manipur, as well as Cachar and North Cachar Hills, Tirap, Changlang, and Lohit districts in Arunachal Pradesh with a population of nearly three million.

There is a total lack of a common language and different Naga tribes, and even clans, speak to each other only through Nagamese (modified Assamese) or English. After independence, the Indian leadership decided to continue with the British policy of administration through autonomy and segregation. This only alienated the tribes even more. Their fears only mounted because of maladministration and lack of development, attempts by the Assam government to enforce Assamese as the state language, and the flood of Bangladeshi migration.

In 1947, a Nine-Point Agreement was signed between the government of Assam and the Naga National Council (NNC), wherein considerable autonomy was given, but this did not meet the Nagas' expectations. Angami Zapu Phizo unilaterally declared Naga independence from India in August 1947, as the self- proclaimed representative of the Nagas. In 1951, Phizo organised a controversial plebiscite in Naga Hills District, claiming that the results showed that 99 per cent were in favour of independence. In fact, the so-called plebiscite was held only in Kohima and Mokokchung with limited attendance, and women and other areas of Nagaland had been excluded.

Hostilities started between the insurgents and the government forces from 1953. This led to insurgency and deployment of Security Forces (SF) in the state. Between 1957 and 1960, three Naga People's Conventions were held in Nagaland, seeking peaceful resolution of the problem, and these conventions contributed to the government of India agreeing to their Sixteen-Point Proposal, which led to Nagaland's creation. Notwithstanding these events, insurgency continued with Chinese and Pakistani support. After 1971, insurgency was reduced due to successful counterinsurgency (CI) operations, which forced the hostile bands to flee to Myanmar, as well as reduced Chinese support, the creation of Bangladesh, and non-availability of Pakistani bases. The Shillong Accord of 1975 also helped as the separatist guerrilla army of the National Federal Army (NFG) and the NNC accepted the Indian Constitution and agreed to lay down their arms.

The insurgency stepped up again, however, due to the military coup in Bangladesh, renewed support from Pakistan, China, and Bangladesh, and sanctuary in Myanmar, as well as the birth of the NSCN out of the anti-Shillong Accord factions, and their adoption of a common cause with the Myanmar insurgents. The 1980s witnessed a split in the NSCN on ethnic lines, and a blood feud leading to a power struggle between the two factions of the NSCN to gain control over Nagaland and Naga areas in Manipur, Assam, and Arunachal.

Due to successful counterinsurgency operations and public pressure, NSCN (IM) was forced out of Nagaland to bases in adjoining states as well as in Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Thailand. By the late-1990s, they were forced to ask for a ceasefire, which has been in place since 1997. At that stage NSCN (K) controlled large parts of both Nagaland and Naga inhabited areas in the adjoining states as well. A ceasefire was similarly brokered with the NSCN (K). The ceasefire originally applied to both the NSCN groups, but was "officially" applicable only to Nagaland, as other state governments refused to agree to demands for 'Greater Nagaland.' Talks have been in progress between the government of India and the NSCN (IM) only. The ordinary people are tired of violence and have used the period of the ceasefire to propagate peace. The NSCN groups had used the ceasefire to consolidate their hold over areas, to strengthen themselves, and to eliminate their rivals. Due to the importance given to them by New Delhi, the NSCN (IM) has more or less gained control over the entire state by force, with the exception of north-east Nagaland which remains under NSCN (K) control. The ceasefire has since been abrogated by the NSCN (K) as they felt the government was favouring the IM, leading to resumption of fighting between the Special Forces and the NSCN (K), which is based primarily in Myanmar's Sagaing district.

The NSCN (K) have formed an alliance with the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB), the Kamtapur Liberation Organisation (KLO), and the People's Liberation Army of Manipur (PLA), and they are involved in the process of trying to ally with many others who are not linked to the IM. Both factions have had further splits due to dissident ethnic movements. These include the NSCN (KK) or Khaplang-Kitovi, NSCN (U) or Unification, NSCN (R) or Reformation, the Zeliangrong United Front (ZUF), and other tribal groups. Notwithstanding the above, due to the abrogation of the ceasefire between the NSCN (K) and the SF, violence levels in Nagaland, Tirap and Changlang districts of Arunachal have escalated, with extortion, kidnapping and inter-factional violence becoming almost routine affairs.



Manipur: A Raging Cauldron

The state sits astride the Patkai, Naga, and Manipur hill ranges. About 75 per cent of the state is mountainous, with the hills surrounding the valley on all sides. The valley is about 70 kilometres long and 35 kilometres wide. The hill tribes inhabit the hills and the Meiteis the valley floor. The 2011 census declared its population to be 2.57 million.

The seven main Naga tribes of Manipur are dissimilar and have throughout history been hostile to each other, and are not accepted by the Nagaland tribes. The Aos, Zeliangs and the Angamis spill across the boundary into Nagaland. The Naga tribal residents in Manipur feel neglected and deprived by the Meiteis on issues of economy, jobs, development, culture, and governance, and feel that the Meiteis have wrongfully seized their lands. They similarly believe that forcible settlement of the Kuki-Chin tribes on their lands was wrong.

The majority of Kuki-Chin-Mizo tribes reside in south Manipur in the districts of Chandel and Churachandpur adjacent to Mizoram. There are also two pockets in Senapati district, sandwiched between the Maos, Zeliangs, Tangkhuls and the Meiteis, and some in Imphal. There is a great deal of sub-tribal rivalry between the Kukis, Hmars, Paites, Zous, Zomis, Mizos derived from the fact that Mizos get preferential treatment in Mizoram. Also, that the demand of the non-Mizo, Kuki-Chin tribal group for inclusion in Mizoram and demands for Greater Mizoram have not been met, which is perceived to have been to their detriment. Consequently, they have suffered tremendously at the hands of both the Nagas and the Meiteis. We therefore have a nascent insurgent movement by the non-Mizo, Kuki-Chin groups, which are antagonistic to all other ethnic groups, including the Mizos.

The Meiteis primarily inhabit the valley floor of Manipur extending up to Moreh and along the Bishenpur axis into Cachar district of Assam. They consider themselves superior to all the other ethnic groups in Manipur. They believe they are being oppressed to meet the demands of the tribes inhabiting the hills and are antagonistic towards them. The Meiteis are the most populous ethnic group in the state. Their kingdom reportedly stretched from river Brahmaputra in the north, to river Chindwin (now in Myanmar) in the south, around the period of the birth of Christ. Manipur plains are the core and the surrounding hills are the fringe regions. Hill tribes were permitted local autonomy, subject to their maintaining peace and giving tribute to kings of Manipur. After Aryan migrations into Bengal, the Meiteis were strongly influenced by Hinduism and Vedic culture. In the 16th century, they adopted Vaishnavism and grew powerful in the region, along with the Bodo Cacharis who ruled from Dimapur, the Mughals who ruled Bengal, and the Tripuris and Ahoms. The kings of Myanmar, wishing to expand their territory, then subjected them to repeated invasions. The power struggle with the Bodos, Cacharis and other powers of the region also took its toll. The Manipuri population was decimated and their economy disrupted. Consequently, they were neither able to keep the hill tribes under control, nor the invading Myanmar hordes at bay. In 1824, they appealed to the British for help. The British defeated the Myanmarese, but forced Manipur to cede the rich Kabaw Valley to Myanmar. They also instigated massive migrations of Kuki-Chin-Mizo tribes—to act as a buffer between the Nagas and the British plantations in the Cachar—into south Manipur (Churachandpur and Chandel districts), and parts of central Manipur.

Thus, relations between the British and Manipuris deteriorated, leading to the 1891 Anglo-Manipur war and British annexation of the state. There was political awakening and participation in India's freedom struggle. After partition, the Maharaja of Manipur acceded to the Indian union, which sparked insurgency amongst Naga and Meitei groups who wanted independence.

It needs to be recollected at this stage, that the wave of the Chinese Communist Party Chairman Mao Zedong's socialist philosophy was sweeping across East and Southeast Asia. The Manipur Communist Party reached an understanding with Myanmar communists, who, with Chinese backing, had control over the adjoining areas in Myanmar. Myanmar was to cede the Kabaw Valley back to Manipur, in return for creation of an independent socialist state of Manipur that would ally it to the Chinese communists.

In the 1950s-1960s, due to perceived Meitei exploitation, a number of Manipur Naga tribals joined the Naga movement. Shortly thereafter, as the Mizo insurgency in Mizoram had just started, many Kuki-Chin-Mizo tribals joined their counterparts in the Chin and Mizo Hills, and started agitating that the Kuki-Chin-Mizo belts in Manipur be merged with the Mizo Hills. They also engaged in inter-ethnic depredations for control of south Manipur and the lucrative trans-border trade in drugs and other smuggled goods, timber, and precious stones. By the 1960s-1970s, various Meitei insurgent groups had formed, demanding revival of the pre-Vaishnav Meitei culture and secession from India.

When counterinsurgency operations were launched, many groups moved out to the Chittagong Hill Tracts. The situation worsened due to socio-economic deprivation, rising unemployment, and insurgency. Politicians also started aligning themselves with various insurgent groups, seeking their support for elections and protection. Governance became very difficult as political instability shook the region. Some respite was obtained as the 1971 war operations had terminated Pakistani support, and there had been a series of successful counterinsurgency operations. However, there was a revival of insurgency in the 1980s and 1990s due to increasing frustration, corrupt and poor governance, the continuing feud between the groups, and support from China, Pakistan and Bangladesh.

Many of the Naga insurgents in Manipur are led by Muivah's Tangkhuls in the NSCN (IM)) which emerged from a split in the NSCN in 1987-1988 and who have now gained control of part of the Naga areas in Manipur and adjoining states. Besides secession and sovereignty, their demand is for merger of the Naga tribal areas of Manipur, Assam, Arunachal, Nagaland, and Myanmar, which is one of the reasons for conflict with the Meiteis. Their conflict with the Kukis is for control over drug and other illegal trade with Myanmar, besides the forcible interjection of the Kukis into traditional Naga areas.[29]

Many of the Naga tribals, particularly those adjoining the Chakesang belt are part of the NFG (a derivative of the NNC), as this is an NFG stronghold opposed to the NSCN (IM). Part of Tamenglong district (a ZUF-Zeliang area) continues to support the NSCN (K).

The Kuki-Chin-Mizo tribes argue that as they were settled into their areas by the British, it was the duty of the Indian Government to protect them. They supported the Mizo insurgency in the 1960s and 1970s as they belonged to the same ethnic group as the Mizos of Mizoram, and they demanded a merger of all Kuki-Chin-Mizo areas in Manipur with Mizoram. In the 1980s and 1990s, the Meiteis and then the Nagas engaged in trying to throw out the Kuki-Chin-Mizo tribals from the areas occupied by them and killed a large number of them. They have now fortified themselves into organised insurgent groups whose role is to strike back at depredations against them by the Nagas and the Meiteis and their own sub-groups, with many now demanding a separate state. All these groups now have a ceasefire status with the government.

There is now, reportedly, a truce between most of the Kuki-Chin groups and NSCN (IM), a temporary marriage of convenience, and they have joined forces against the Meiteis with the NSCN (IM) who have promised them Greater Mizoram, when Greater Nagaland comes through. As part of this strategy, NSCN (IM) and allied Kuki-Chin groups are trying to strangle the Meiteis into submission, with hill blockades as part of their strategy, as they jointly control routes through the hills leading into Manipur.

NSCN (IM), the Kukis, and two defunct Meitei groups, now have a ceasefire with the government and it initially applied only to Nagaland. NSCN (IM's) attempt was to get it extended to cover the entire areas claimed by the NSCN (IM). This included almost the whole of Manipur, major parts of south Assam and Tirap, and Changlang and Lohit districts of Arunachal, so they could gain control of the area during the ceasefire. Delhi initially gave their approval to this proposal of NSCN (IM). This led to extremely widespread agitation and strife by the Meiteis and resentment by neighbouring states. Delhi was then forced to officially retract its earlier decision.

There is now, however, an unofficial ceasefire in the claimed areas of the NSCN (IM), between the NSCN (IM) and their surrogate groups and the SF, apparently out of fear that talks with the authorities will otherwise break down. Consequently, the NSCN (IM) have had a free run in the claimed areas, much to the chagrin of the Meiteis, the Kuki-Chin groups, the NSCN (K), the residents of these areas, and the region's state governments. The NSCN (K), (KK), ZUF, NFG, most Meitei IIGs, do not currently have a ceasefire with the government. Consequently, operations by the SF against them continue. Meanwhile, extortion, kidnapping, and inter-ethnic violence have become the order of the day. Most of these IIGs have shifted their sanctuaries to Myanmar, Bangladesh, and adjoining states.

Since the counterinsurgency operations are currently only against insurgent groups who are not party to the ceasefire, these groups are aggrieved. The problem is compounded by the actions of the NSCN (IM) in trying to strangle the Meiteis into submission by frequent blockade of all roads leading into Manipur for long periods. With their backs to the wall, the Meiteis feel alienated and betrayed. This is even more so on account of the fact that the Meitei population at large has repeatedly proved their loyalty by fielding maximum people from the north-east in the national sports teams, the bureaucracy, police, armed forces, and other central services.

The recent Naga Accord between the government of India and the NSCN (IM), and the attempts to bring about a settlement to the insurgency problem, are developing into a major crisis for the region. This is the state of affairs in spite of the promises made by the central government that any settlement with the Naga tribes will not impinge on the territorial integrity and rights of the neighbouring states.

All Naga tribes, whether in Nagaland, Manipur, Assam, Arunachal, and all other ethnic groups in the region, believe that the government of India have stabbed them in the back by doing a deal with the Tangkhuls. They refuse to accept the Tangkhuls being designated by the government to rule over them and take over their tribal rights. There is, therefore, likelihood of much greater violence which will engulf not only the affected states but the entire region.

The NSCN (IM) have reportedly established new training and operational camps recently in the forests of Manipur and are expanding and rearming to prepare for forcible imposition of their dictat on other groups. They are increasingly using the weapons of extortion and kidnapping. All other groups are also, therefore, trying to expand, to be able to confront the conjoint efforts by both the government of India and the NSCN (IM). The NSCN (K) and its surrogates are also trying to co-opt others into their group, as well as to expand. Also in spite of the government's best efforts, they have failed to get the Myanmar Army to act against the NSCN (K) and its surrogates in Myanmar. The Meiteis had also passed three bills to safeguard themselves, related to citizenship rights, which had led to recent violence by the hill tribes in Manipur. The Kukis and the Meiteis are openly threatening extreme violence if their rights are impinged upon, as are the governments of Assam and Arunachal. The authorities are now hoping that with a BJP government having now come to power in Manipur they would be able to resolve the problem related to the state.

Meghalaya: Sunshine over Land of Clouds

Meghalaya is a hill state with Assam to its north and east, and Bangladesh to its south and west. Its population is 2.96 million (2011 census).

The British annexed Meghalaya in 1835 and set up their headquarters at Shillong for control of the NER, while allowing limited autonomy. This area was not given an 'Excluded Area' status and was amalgamated into Assam. The British set about 'civilising' the tribals through conversion to Christianity. As they were not segregated, they progressively accepted their merger with the Indian Union more gracefully, whilst maintaining their culture modified by Christian and Western influence. Demands for a separate state were raised in 1949. In 1952, the Khasis and Mizos led the demand for a separate tribal identity on grounds of neglect. The call for throwing out non-tribals started in 1957. Perceived social deprivation led to frustration and agitation against the Assam government. Seeing the Naga example, the youth began an insurrection to enforce their demands. New Delhi decided to grant them statehood in 1972, thereby partially resolving the problem.

Today, Meghalaya has a nascent Khasi/Jaintia insurgent movement organised into the Hynniewtrep National Liberation Council (HNLC) and twelve Garo insurgent groups (the most potent being the Garo National Liberation Army (GNLA) with ULFA, NSCN (IM), NDFB, with Chinese and Pakistani support), which propagate either secession or statehood and an anti-migrant philosophy. Whereas previously the anti-migrant philosophy was primarily one of targeting the Bengalis and Nepalese, the Khasis have also started targeting all other communities including tribals from other north-eastern states.

There is also growing mutual alienation between the Khasis and the Garos on ethnic grounds amid talk of splitting the state further. In the late 1990s and at the beginning of this century, security had turned extremely volatile with extensive extortion being the order of the day. The police have largely regained control and are now relatively more effective in maintaining law and order. The situation in the Garo Hills has, however, deteriorated considerably. Anti-migrant and politically-sponsored Khasi-Garo agitations continue unabated across Meghalaya with frequent strikes and curfews.

Meghalaya is well-endowed with natural resources, but since it has little industrial development, its economic situation is poor. The socio-economic crisis is worsened by ethnic strife and nascent insurgency, which needs to be resolved by good governance.

Mizoram: Textbook Transition to Peace

Towering at a mean altitude ranging between 3,000-4,000 feet above sea-level, Mizoram has Manipur and Assam to its north, Tripura and Bangladesh to its west, Myanmar to its east, and Bangladesh to its south. Its 2011 census population is 1.09 million. Mizoram has a demographic advantage over other north-eastern states: it is relatively homogenous (75% of its people anthropologically belong to the Kuki-Chin-Mizo group of tribes) with adjoining areas of Myanmar (Chin Hills), south Manipur, south-eastern Tripura, and adjacent areas of Assam having similar Kuki-Chin-Mizo ethnic profiles. Distinctive, fierce and warring, the Mizos started migrating from the Chin Hills in Myanmar into the Mizo Hills around the 11th century.

The Bodos, Manipuris, and the British initially permitted them autonomy. It was only after the Mizos repeatedly raided British colonies and plantations in the 19th century that the British subjugated them and colonised the Mizo Hills. Even so, the British allowed them autonomy in all tribal affairs. Even here they were segregated through promulgation of the 'Inner Line' and conversion to Christianity. Prior to conversion to Christianity, their religion was animism and beliefs based on the primordial value system of "tribe-village-land-autonomy." Conversion to Christianity has not changed this system substantially. Animosity towards other tribes of the northeast, therefore, persists. It is due to ethnic considerations that the demand of the Mizos has always been for a Greater Mizoram encompassing all Kuki-Chin-Mizo inhabited areas. It is also due to these considerations that Mizoram still has problems with its minorities and a nascent insurgency led by the Hmars who operate from sanctuaries in Manipur.

Just prior to independence, demands were made initially for autonomy, which changed into secession to form Greater Mizoram. That, after a long period of insurgency, changed to incorporation into the Indian Union, subject to grant of autonomy. Unfortunately, due to faulty policy the Inner Line restriction was continued, and discontent and alienation set in as a result of governmental neglect, lack of development, maladministration, and imposition of Assamese as the state language. Under severe famine conditions in Mizoram from 1959 to 1961, the people witnessed mismanagement and lack of assistance from the government. The popular discontent manifested in formation of the Mizo National Front (MNF) in 1961.

The MNF declared Mizoram independent unilaterally in 1966 and commenced insurrection. They received support from Pakistan, Bangladesh, China, and the Kuki-Chin tribes in the neighbouring areas. Counterinsurgency operations were launched immediately and proved particularly successful after Pakistan was defeated in the 1971 war. Mizoram was then declared a Union Territory and elections were held. With a political process having been initiated, the MNF progressively lost popular support. Talks were then initiated with the insurgents. The operations culminated in the Mizo Accord in 1987, with insurgents coming over-ground and surrendering their arms, accepting the Indian Constitution, and forming a government. The grant of statehood brought peace to the Mizo Hills. Since then Mizoram has progressed by leaps and bounds and is amongst the most peaceful states in the northeast.

Tripura: Good Governance Delivers Peace

A state with an ancient history, Tripura's eastern and south-eastern parts are covered in low hills, tapering out into the plains of central and northern Tripura. Its 2011 census population is 3.67 million.

Presently tribal people reside primarily in the hill regions, with the plains populated by Bengalis. The predominant tribes were of Bodo origin called Tripuris, who established a kingdom in the middle ages consisting of the Arakan, the Chittagong Hill Tracts, western Bangladesh, south Assam, and present day Tripura. Till the middle ages, they were a power centre in the region. The population till 1921 was predominantly tribal, however consequent to the British policy of encouraging immigration from East Bengal to under-populated areas, there was extensive migration which continued till well after the partition, independence, and then again in 1971, due to which tribal numbers were reduced to about 28%. The Chakmas (4% to 5%) and Riangs (4%) are mainly recent immigrants who fled from the Chittagong Hill tracts and Mizoram following agitation and rebellion by them, against the Bangladesh and Mizoram government and the consequent clamp-down on them.

The state was beset by insurgency by tribals against the non-tribals. The key causes for the insurgency were overwhelming demographic change which threatened to wipe out the tribals and their distinctive culture, dislocation of the tribals from their traditional habitats, and socio-economic deprivation. However, insurgency was brought under control and the state is peaceful due to excellent administration in the state and concerted efforts by the present government towards development of tribal areas.

Arunachal: New Opportunities for Peace

The largest hill state of the region, Arunachal Pradesh covers the mountain ranges of the eastern Himalayas and is located to the north, east and south-east of Assam. Its 2011 census population is 1.38 million.[36] It has well over 100 ethnic groups, of which 20 are considered to be major tribes.

The majority of people are animists with primordial beliefs. The first missionaries into Arunachal were the Rama Krishna Missions, who are well liked for their efforts in the social field. Due to their missionary efforts, Arunachal today has a fair number of followers of the Hindu faith. The tribes of Tibetan origin are uniformly Buddhist. Christianity is also spreading due to the efforts of missionaries. Arunachal is one part of India that still totally believes in the primordial value system of "tribe-village-land autonomy," and makes concerted efforts to protect it.

Arunachal is the most recent state to be opened up to administration. It was only in 1882 that exploration by the British began, consequent to the British adopting a forward policy of defending its frontiers, with reference to Russia and China. The Bodos and Ahoms left the Arunachal tribes well alone and allowed them autonomy. The British had named the area the North East Frontier Tracts, and by 1914 attempted to administer it with near total autonomy in all tribal matters. The region was given 'Excluded Area' status. As the area was totally segregated and largely unexplored, it remained unaffected by politics. After independence, India continued the British policy. In 1954, the area was renamed North East Frontier Agency (NEFA) and due to the border dispute with China, the Indian Army moved in. In 1957, due to the Naga insurgency, Tuensang Frontier Division, with a primarily Konyak Naga tribal population, was merged with the Naga Hills.

Since the 1962 debacle, the Indian Army has taken adequate measures to ensure that the border is adequately defended. The 'panchayat system' was introduced in 1967. In 1972, Arunachal Pradesh became a union territory, and in 1987 it was granted full statehood. Since the 1960s, Tirap, Changlang, and parts of Lohit district of the state have been severely affected by the NSCN insurgency, due to the claims of the NSCN that it is part of Nagalim. The area is witnessing a power struggle between the NSCN factions to gain control over the region. This is all the more so since the NSCN (K) has sanctuary in Myanmar across the border from these districts. Further, the NSCN (K) have given sanctuary to the ULFA, PLA, KLO, NDFB, Maoists and other Meitei insurgent groups who are able to frequently transit through these districts to Assam/Nagaland and North Bengal. As there is no longer a ceasefire with the NSCN (K), violence in this area has escalated. With BJP having wrested power in the state, the central government is hoping that problems in the state will be resolved.

Arunachal has tremendous forest wealth and in all probability extensive mineral deposits, which have not yet been exploited. It also has great potential in the field of hydroelectric power, again yet to be exploited. Once this is done Arunachal will be able to supplement its income substantially, through sale of power to Assam and the NER.

The Indian government has reiterated its commitment to develop the NER not only by "Looking East" but also by its policy to "Act East." However, in order to achieve these goals, it would be imperative for the government to bring peace to the region by meeting the aspirations of its people. While Tripura and Mizoram have seen peace for some time now under their respective governments, they need greater central assistance to develop. Unfortunately, this would only be possible if peace can be brought to Assam, Manipur, Nagaland, Arunachal, and Meghalaya as all these states are closely linked to each other. It is therefore imperative that points enumerated above under each state be attended to on the highest priority to avoid the conflagration that is in the offing particularly in Assam, Nagaland, and Manipur. The central government must stop knee-jerk reactions as at present, and salvage the extremely serious situation that is now emerging due to faulty political decisions being taken in New Delhi.

Lt.-Gen. John Ranjan Mukherjee (PVSM, AVSM, VSM) is a retired general of the Indian Army, and former General Officer Commanding Kashmir (15 Corps), and Chief of Staff Eastern Command. He is the author of An Insider's Experience of Insurgency in India's North East, and The Indomitable Rhino Warriors of India's North East: History of the Assam Regiment. He belongs to the Assam Regiment, which recruits men only from the North Eastern Region of India. He has served 26 years in the North East, and has lived with the men of his regiment and people from the region almost all his life, and is married to a Mizo lady.
 

One killed, three injured in fresh gunfight in Manipur's Kangpokpi
Online Desk 29 April, 2024, 00:11

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One person was killed, and three others were injured in a fresh incident of gunfight between armed groups in Kangpokpi district of strife-torn Manipur in India in the early hours of Sunday, The Hindustan Times reported, referring to officials.

The deceased, identified as Lammang Kipgen, 44, a Kuki 'village volunteer' (armed civilian), was killed at Leimakhong at about 2.30am when the area was attacked by armed miscreants.

Accusing Meiteis armed miscreants of being responsible for the death, the Committee on Tribal Unity (COTU), a Kuki group based in Kangpokpi, called for a 12-hour shutdown in the district from 12:00pm to 12:00am on Sunday.

Sunday's incident comes a day after two CRPF personnel were killed, and two others were injured in an attack by armed miscreants at Naransena in Bishnupur district of the state.

Manipur has been roiled by ethnic clashes between Meiteis, who are a majority in Imphal Valley, and Kuki-Zo ethnic group, who are dominant in a few hill districts, since May last year. The violence has claimed at least 223 lives and displaced around 50,000 people, the report said.​
 
Sorry!!! The following article is in Bengali.


চাকমাদের নিয়ে ভারতে আবার টানাপোড়েন কেন

ষাটের দশকের মাঝামাঝিতে বিশেষ পরিস্থিতিতে চাকমা জনগোষ্ঠীর কিছু মানুষ ভারতে পুনর্বাসিত হয়েছিলেন। গত দুই দশকে অরুণাচল ও মিজোরামে হঠাৎ চাকমাবিরোধী মনোভাব বেগবান হয়ে উঠেছে। তাঁদের অন্য প্রদেশে স্থানান্তরেরও দাবি উঠেছে। দক্ষিণ এশিয়ায় ক্ষুদ্র জাতির মানুষ কীভাবে ভূরাজনৈতিক পরিকল্পনার শিকার হচ্ছেন, তা নিয়ে লিখেছেন আলতাফ পারভেজ।

দক্ষিণ-পূর্ব এশিয়ার ইতিহাস বিষয়ের গবেষক
প্রকাশ: ০১ মে ২০২৪, ১২: ০৯

এশিয়ার প্রধান দুই শক্তি চীন-ভারতের কাজিয়ার বড় এক বিষয় অরুণাচল। বিরতিহীনভাবে সেই বিতর্ক চলছে। এই অরুণাচলেই ৬০ বছর আগে উদ্বাস্তু চাকমারা বড় সংখ্যায় আশ্রয় পান।

পুরোনো জনপদ ছেড়ে নিরুপায় চাকমাদের ওই 'অভিযাত্রা'য় তখনকার চীন-ভারত দ্বন্দ্ব গুরুত্বপূর্ণ এক উপাদান ছিল। সম্প্রতি একই চাকমাদের নিয়ে ভারতের উত্তর-পূর্বাঞ্চলের বিভিন্ন জনপদে নতুন করে টানাপোড়েন শুরু হয়েছে। অনেকেই এর মধ্যে শুধু ভোটের রাজনীতি দেখছেন। তবে এ রকম পর্যবেক্ষণের আড়ালে ঢাকা পড়ছে দক্ষিণ এশিয়ায় যুদ্ধকালীন রাষ্ট্রীয় বিভিন্ন কর্মসূচির অপর এক মানবিক বিপর্যয়ের দিক।


যুদ্ধের পর অরুণাচলে যেভাবে এলেন চাকমারা

অরুণাচল ভারতে প্রদেশের স্বীকৃতি পায় ১৯৮৭ সালে। এর আগে এটা ছিল নর্থ-ইস্ট ফ্রন্টিয়ার এজেন্সি (এনইএফএ)। এরও আগে ছিল আসামের অংশ। যে বছর বঙ্গভঙ্গ রদ হলো, সে বছরই আসাম কেটে এনইএফএ হলো। ১৯৪৭–এর 'দেশভাগ' শেষে এনইএফএ ভারতের একক জিম্মায় যায়। চাকমাদের সেখানে যাওয়া এই অধ্যায়ের ঘটনা। পার্বত্য চট্টগ্রাম তখন পাকিস্তানভুক্ত।

১৯৪৭-এর শুরুতে পুরোনো ভারতবর্ষের আরও বহু এলাকার মতো পার্বত্য চট্টগ্রাম নিয়েও বিতর্ক ছিল—এই জনপদ ইসলামাবাদ বা নয়াদিল্লি কার অধীনে যাওয়া উচিত। শেষ পর্যন্ত 'সামগ্রিক ভূখণ্ড বিনিময়' শেষে অমুসলমানপ্রধান হয়েও এই এলাকা পাকিস্তানভুক্ত হয়। তবে তাতে দেশভাগকালীন বিতর্কের রেশ মিইয়ে যায়নি। ফল হিসেবে পাকিস্তানের শাসকদের সঙ্গে পার্বত্যবাসীর আস্থা-বিশ্বাসের টানাপোড়েন ছিল।

এ রকম পটভূমিতেই ১৯৬০-এর দশকের শুরুতে কাপ্তাইয়ে জলবিদ্যুৎকেন্দ্র বানায় সরকার। তাতে রাঙামাটিকেন্দ্রিক অনেক জমিজমা ডুবে যায়। প্রধানত চাকমা সম্প্রদায়ের অনেক মানুষকে এলাকা ছেড়ে নানা দিকে ছড়িয়ে পড়তে হয় তখন। নতুন করে বসতি গড়তে তাঁদের কারও কারও নজর পড়ে সে সময় এনইএফএর দিকে।

ঠিক কাছাকাছি সময়ে ১৯৬২ সালে এনইএফএ এলাকায় চীন-ভারত যুদ্ধ হয়ে গেছে এক দফা। নয়াদিল্লির সরকার এ সময় এনইএফএতে 'নতুন বসতি'র ব্যাপারে আগ্রহী ছিল। বিবদমান এলাকায় চীনা নয় এমন নাগরিকের উপস্থিতি তাদের জন্য একধরনের প্রতিরক্ষাব্যূহের ভূমিকা পালন করছিল। চীন-অরুণাচল-মিয়ানমার সীমান্তবর্তী 'বিজয়নগর' ও তার আশপাশে এ রকম একটা 'স্কিম' নেওয়া হয় তখন।

চাকমা উদ্বাস্তুরা তখন হাঁটতে হাঁটতেই রেডিওতে শুনছিলেন তাঁদের ওদিকে পুনর্বাসিত হতে বাধা নেই। বাস্তবেও তখন তাঁদের দীর্ঘ সময় শরণার্থী হয়ে থাকতে হয়নি। কয়েক দিন হেঁটে লুসাই পাহাড় পাড়ি দেওয়ার পর স্থানীয় জনজীবনে এবং ভোটের প্রক্রিয়াতেও শরিক হতে বেশি দিন লাগেনি তাঁদের।

প্রতি পরিবারকে পাঁচ একর জঙ্গল-জমি দেওয়া হয়। ১৯৭৮ সাল থেকে সেসব জমি পাঁচ বছর মেয়াদে লিজ আকারে নবায়নও হতো। এসব পরিবারের হাতে কিছু অর্থকড়িও দেওয়া হয় শুরুতে। কেউ কেউ বনে নিরাপত্তার প্রয়োজনে বন্দুকের লাইসেন্সও পান। তবে কেন্দ্রীয় সরকারের ইতিবাচক মনোভাব সত্ত্বেও নাগরিকত্বের প্রশ্নটি বরাবরই ঝুলে ছিল। ইতিমধ্যে বাংলাদেশ স্বাধীন হয়েছে এবং এনইএফএ অরুণাচল হয়ে গেছে।

গত শতাব্দীর শেষ দুই দশকে এসে অরুণাচল ও মিজোরামে হঠাৎ চাকমাবিরোধী মনোভাব বেগবান হয়ে উঠতে শুরু করে। এই শতাব্দীতে এসে ২০১৭ সালে এ নিয়ে দাঙ্গাও হয় এক দফা। স্থানীয় অনেক নেতা মাঝেমধ্যেই সদম্ভে বলেন, এখানকার চাকমারা 'অবৈধ অভিবাসী'। তার মধ্যেই এবার ভোটের মৌসুমে শোনা গেল অরুণাচল থেকে চাকমাদের আসামে স্থানান্তর করা হবে। এ প্রচারণায় অরুণাচলের চাকমা সমাজে শুরু হয়েছে উদ্বেগ। এবারের নতুন বছরের বিজু উৎসবেও ছিল ওই উদ্বেগের ছায়া।

চাকমারা অনেকে প্রশ্ন তুলছেন, আমরা কি প্রজন্মের পর প্রজন্ম উদ্বাস্তুই থাকব? কী দোষে এই দুর্গতি? চাকমাদের পাশাপাশি কিছু সংখ্যায় হাজং জনগোষ্ঠীও স্থানান্তরের কথা প্রচারিত হচ্ছে অরুণাচলজুড়ে। এঁরাও সেখানে থিতু হন ১৯৬৪ থেকে ১৯৬৯-এর মধ্যে। তাঁরা থাকেন তিরাপ জেলায়—একেবারে মিয়ানমার সীমান্তের কাছাকাছি।

অরুণাচলে আন্তজাতি টানাপোড়েন যেভাবে শুরু

অরুণাচলের পত্রপত্রিকার ভাষ্যমতে, সেখানে চাকমা ও হাজং জনগোষ্ঠীর সংখ্যা ৭০ হাজার থেকে ১ লাখ। তবে এঁদের কতজন বা এঁদের পূর্বপুরুষদের কতজন উদ্বাস্তু হয়ে সেখানে যান, সেই সংখ্যা নিয়ে বিতর্ক রয়েছে। অনেকে এটা পাঁচ হাজার বলে দাবি করেছেন। কারও কারও মতে সংখ্যাটা আরও বেশি।

২০১৫-১৬ সালে রাজ্যের মুখ্যমন্ত্রী প্রথম আনুষ্ঠানিকভাবে বলেছিলেন, এখন তাঁরা সংখ্যায় ৬৫ হাজার ৮৭৫। ১৯৮৬ সালে এ বিষয়ে রাজ্য সরকার যে 'শ্বেতপত্র' প্রকাশ করে, তাতে বলা হয়েছিল, শুরুতে ২ হাজার ৭৪৮টি পরিবারের ১৪ হাজার ৮৮৮ জনকে এখানে থাকতে দেওয়া হয়।

আদিতে পুনর্বাসিত ব্যক্তিদের সংখ্যা যা–ই হোক—১৯৬৪ থেকে পরবর্তী চার-পাঁচ বছরজুড়ে মিজোরাম হয়ে এঁরা অরুণাচলে যান বলে কথিত রয়েছে। তখন এসব মানুষ থিতু হয়েছিলেন রোহিত, নামশাল, চাঙলাঙ, তিরাপ, লংদিুং এবং পাপুম পারে জেলায়। এ রকম প্রতিটি জেলা আজকের আপার আসাম ও মিয়ানমারসংলগ্ন অরুণাচলে পড়েছে।

তবে এসব অঞ্চলের এখনকার চাকমা বা হাজংদের ৯০ শতাংশ নতুন জন্ম নেওয়া মানুষ। প্রথম প্রজন্মের সর্বোচ্চ ১০ শতাংশের মতো কেবল বেঁচে আছেন। এখানকার চাকমা সমাজের অনেকেরই স্থানীয় নানা ধরনের সনদও আছে। ভোটার আছেন প্রায় ৭ হাজার ৭০০ জন। (দ্য অরুণাচল টাইমস, ২৮ এপ্রিল)

চাকমাদের ঘিরে সৃষ্ট টানাপোড়েন অরুণাচল ছাড়িয়ে মিজোরাম ও আসাম পর্যন্ত বিস্তৃত। মিজোরামে এমনও হয়েছে যে অন্যান্য ট্রাইবের তরুণ-তরুণীদের মতো সমযোগ্যতার পরও অনেক চাকমা পড়ালেখা বা চাকরিতে বঞ্চনার শিকার হন বলে অভিযোগ রয়েছে। কোথাও কোথাও বিভিন্ন সময় ভোটেও বাধা পান তাঁরা। ইতিহাসের কৌতুক হলো নিজেরা আসামভুক্ত থাকার সময় ওই রকম আন্তজাতি বঞ্চনার বিরুদ্ধে সোচ্চার ছিলেন মিজোরা। এখন তাঁদের বিরুদ্ধে একই অভিযোগ তুলছেন রাজ্যের চাকমারা।

কিন্তু গত শতাব্দীর শেষ দশকে এঁদের নিয়ে প্রথম আপত্তি তোলে 'নিখিল অরুণাচল প্রদেশ ছাত্র ইউনিয়ন' বা 'আপসু'। তাদের দাবি দুটি—চাকমাদের নাগরিকত্ব দেওয়া হলেও অরুণাচলে থাকতে দেওয়া যাবে না এবং প্রদেশ থেকে সরিয়ে নিতে হবে। ১৯৯৪ সালে 'আপসু' চাকমাদের 'কুইট অরুণাচল' নোটিশ দেয়। পরের বছর অর্থনৈতিক অবরোধ আরোপ করে।

ভারতের সুপ্রিম কোর্ট অবশ্য ১৯৯৬ সালে এক রায়ে চাকমাদের জোর করে স্থানান্তরের বিরুদ্ধে নির্দেশ দিয়েছিলেন। ২০১৫ সালেও আরেকবার উচ্চ আদালত বলেন, আপসুর ভূমিকা প্রতিরোধ করা রাজ্য সরকারের দায়িত্ব। অর্থাৎ ভারতীয় উচ্চ আদালত এ পর্যন্ত অন্তত দুবার উত্তর-পূর্বাঞ্চলে চাকমাদের নাগরিকত্ব ও সুরক্ষার পক্ষে দাঁড়িয়েছেন। যদিও সংশ্লিষ্ট রাজ্য সেসব রায় বাস্তবায়ন করেনি।

বরং এ নিয়ে রাজনীতি চলছে দশকের পর দশক। বিশেষ করে আসামে বাংলাভাষীদের বিরুদ্ধে 'বিদেশি খেদাও' আন্দোলনের রাজনৈতিক সফলতায় অরুণাচলে-মিজোরামে স্থানীয় একদল রাজনীতিবিদ একই পথে জনপ্রিয়তা পেতে চাকমাদের টার্গেট করেছেন। ইতিমধ্যে অরুণাচলে অনেক চাকমা পরিবারকে রেশন দেওয়ার পুরোনো সুবিধা প্রত্যাহার করা হয়েছে। এ রকম প্রবণতা তাঁদের মধ্যে ভীতি বাড়িয়েছে।

উত্তেজনা যখন মিজোরাম ও আসামেও

চাকমাদের ঘিরে সৃষ্ট টানাপোড়েন অরুণাচল ছাড়িয়ে মিজোরাম ও আসাম পর্যন্ত বিস্তৃত। মিজোরামে এমনও হয়েছে যে অন্যান্য ট্রাইবের তরুণ-তরুণীদের মতো সমযোগ্যতার পরও অনেক চাকমা পড়ালেখা বা চাকরিতে বঞ্চনার শিকার হন বলে অভিযোগ রয়েছে। বিশেষ করে প্রশাসনিক উচ্চ পদে তাঁদের নিয়োগ অতি বিরল। কোথাও কোথাও বিভিন্ন সময় ভোটেও বাধা পান তাঁরা।

ইতিহাসের কৌতুক হলো নিজেরা আসামভুক্ত থাকার সময় ওই রকম আন্তজাতি বঞ্চনার বিরুদ্ধে সোচ্চার ছিলেন মিজোরা। এখন তাঁদের বিরুদ্ধে একই অভিযোগ তুলছেন রাজ্যের চাকমারা। ২০১৭ সালে নিজ সমাজের বঞ্চনার অভিযোগের সঙ্গে সংহতি জানিয়ে রাজ্যের একমাত্র চাকমা মন্ত্রী পদত্যাগও করেছিলেন। তাঁরা তখন রাজ্য ভেঙে তাঁদের এলাকাটা 'কেন্দ্রশাসিত' করার দাবি তোলে। এই দাবি আদায়ে সফল হওয়ার কৌশল হিসেবে চাকমারা নিজ এলাকায় সংখ্যাগরিষ্ঠই বিজেপির সমর্থক বনে গেছেন।

মিজোরামে লোকসংখ্যার মাত্র ৯ শতাংশ চাকমা। বাংলাদেশ সীমান্তের কাছাকাছি কমলানগরকে কেন্দ্র করে গড়ে ওঠা চাকমা এলাকাটি গত প্রায় ৫০ বছর হলো 'স্বশাসিত এলাকা' হিসেবে আছে। মিজোরা অবশ্য এখন এই মর্যাদা প্রত্যাহার চান।

আসামের 'আসু' এবং অরুণাচলের 'আপসু'র মতো মিজোরামেও বড় জাতির শিক্ষার্থীদের শক্তিশালী সংগঠন 'মিজো জিরলাই পল' (মিজো ছাত্র সমিতি) চাকমাবিরোধী আন্দোলন করে চলেছে দীর্ঘকাল। এরা খুবই প্রভাবশালী। চাকমাদের প্রতিপক্ষ জ্ঞান করে তারা বলছে, ১৯৫০–এর পর থেকে যেসব চাকমা এদিকে এসেছেন, তাঁদের যেতে হবে। মিজোদের সঙ্গে চাকমাদের এ রকম টানাপোড়েনের ছাপ পড়ছে আশপাশের অন্যান্য জনপদেও। বাংলাদেশে বসেও সেটা টের পাওয়া সম্ভব।

আসামেও শ পাঁচেক চাকমা পরিবার আছে। এখানে তারা শিডিউল ট্রাইবের মর্যাদা পায় (অরুণাচলে যা নয়)। তবে আসামের চাকমাদের খুবই দরিদ্র অবস্থা। এরপরও এবারের লোকসভা নির্বাচনে হঠাৎ এই রাজ্যে আলোচনার বিষয় হয়ে উঠেছে এ জাতি।

অরুণাচল থেকে এই জাতিসত্তার আরও মানুষ এনে নতুন নাগরিকত্ব আইনের আওতায় তাঁদের এখানে পুনর্বাসিত করা হবে—এ রকম খবরে আসাম বেশ তোলপাড় এখন। অসমিয়া মানুষ এবং দল হিসেবে কংগ্রেসের তীব্র সমালোচনার মুখে পড়েছেন মুখ্যমন্ত্রী হিমন্ত বিশ্বশর্মা। এই বিতর্কের শুরু কেন্দ্রীয় মন্ত্রী কিরেন রিজিজুর এক মন্তব্য থেকে।

কিরেন অরুণাচল থেকে লোকসভার সদস্য। এবারের নির্বাচনী প্রচারকালে তিনি বলেছেন, যেহেতু অরুণাচল 'ট্রাইবাল এলাকা' হিসেবে 'সংশোধিত নাগরিকত্ব আইনে'র আওতার বাইরে পড়েছে, সে কারণে এই রাজ্যের চাকমা ও হাজংয়ের আসামে পুনর্বাসিত করা হবে। এ নিয়ে তাঁর সঙ্গে আসামের মুখ্যমন্ত্রীর কথা হয়েছে বলেও দাবি করেন তিনি। এই মন্তব্যের তীব্র বিরোধিতা দেখে এখন বিজেপির এই দুই নেতাই অস্বীকার করছেন বিষয়টি। তবে স্বভাবত অসমিয়ারা এতে উত্তেজিত এবং আসাম-অরুণাচল-মিজোরামজুড়ে চাকমা প্রশ্ন আবার বড় আকারে বিতর্ক তুলেছে।

কিরেন উত্তর-পূর্ব ভারতে বিজেপির অন্যতম প্রধান স্তম্ভ। তিনি এ–ও বলতে চাইছেন, নাগরিকত্ব সংশোধন আইন জারির পর চাকমাদের ব্যাপারে সুপ্রিম কোর্টের অতীত নির্দেশনা আর কার্যকর নেই। অর্থাৎ তাঁদের অরুণাচল ছাড়তে হবে। মানবাধিকারকর্মীরা প্রশ্ন তুলেছেন, এই মানুষেরা যাবেন কোথায়? কেনই–বা যাবে? কেনই–বা তাঁদের ডেকে নিয়ে অরুণাচলে পুনর্বাসিত করা হয়েছিল?

যেভাবে ক্ষুদ্র জাতিসত্তাগুলো মুশকিলে

ভারতে কোনো রাজ্যই তার অভ্যন্তরীণ রাজনৈতিক স্পর্শকাতরতার কারণে এখন অপর রাজ্যের অভিবাসী গ্রহণ করার অবস্থায় নেই। ফলে অরুণাচলের চাকমাদের আসামে স্থানান্তরও অতি দুরূহ এক প্রস্তাব। কিন্তু এরপরও এই বিতর্ক তৈরি করা হলো কেন?

হয়তো ভোটের আগে স্থানীয় লোকজনকে খুশি করতে। তবে কৌতূহলোদ্দীপক বিষয়, যেসব কারণে ১৯৬২ সালের পর অরুণাচল সীমান্তে চাকমা-হাজংদের পুনর্বাসিত হতে 'কর্তৃপক্ষ' সদয় ছিল, সে রকম বাস্তবতা এখন নতুন উদ্যমে হাজির দেখা যাচ্ছে চীন-ভারত সীমান্তের দুই দিকেই।

২০২০ সালে লাদাখে চীন-ভারত সংঘাতের পরই উভয় দেশ তাদের সব জনমানবশূন্য সীমান্ত এলাকায় কৃত্রিম 'গ্রামাঞ্চল' পত্তন করার উদ্যোগ নেয়। অমিত শাহ এ বছরের ২৫ জানুয়ারি রীতিমতো জনসভায় দাঁড়িয়ে বলেছিলেন অরুণাচল, সিকিম, হিমাচল, লাদাখ ও উত্তরাখন্ডে আগামী ১০ বছরের মধ্যে তিন হাজার 'গ্রাম' গড়ে তোলা হবে। বাস্তবে ২০২৩-এর ফেব্রুয়ারি থেকে এই কর্মসূচি চালুও হয়ে গেছে।

চীনও সীমান্তে তার দখলে থাকা এলাকায় 'শাওকং' নামের 'বর্ডার ডিফেন্স ভিলেজ' তথা সীমান্ত গ্রাম বানাচ্ছে। ভারতও অনুরূপ কর্মসূচি নিয়ে এগোচ্ছে। ভারতীয় অংশে ১৯টি জেলাজুড়ে প্রায় ৩ হাজার ৪০০ কিলোমিটার সীমান্তে বাস্তবায়ন শুরু হওয়া এই কেন্দ্রীয় কর্মসূচির দাপ্তরিক নাম ভিভিপি বা 'ভাইব্রেন্ট ভিলেজ প্রোগ্রাম'। কেবল অরুণাচলে হবে এ রকম ৪৫৫টি নতুন গ্রাম।

স্বাভাবিকভাবেই এসব গ্রামে বহু জায়গা থেকে বহু নতুন মানুষের বসতি হবে। যেভাবে নেহরুর আমলে হয়েছিল অরুণাচলের সীমান্ত এলাকায়। উভয় দেশ এভাবে এসব এলাকায় যার যার ভৌগোলিক ও জনমিতিক দাবি পোক্ত করতে চায়।

প্রশ্ন হলো চাকমাদের তাহলে ৬০ বছর পর শুধু শুধু উৎকণ্ঠায় ফেলা কেন? ক্ষুদ্র জাতিগুলো দক্ষিণ এশিয়ায় আর কতকাল বড়দের ভূরাজনৈতিক পরিকল্পনার ভার বইবে?

আলতাফ পারভেজ দক্ষিণ এশিয়ার ইতিহাসবিষয়ক গবেষক​
 

INDIA'S MANIPUR STATE
2 hurt as gunmen ambush CM's security team


Armed men ambushed a convoy carrying the security team of the chief minister of India's troubled northeastern state of Manipur yesterday, wounding two people, but the leader was not with them at the time, officials said.

Fighting between Manipur's majority Meitei and minority Kuki communities over sharing economic benefits and quotas given to the latter has killed at least 220 people and displaced 60,000 in the last year, with sporadic clashes continuing.

Chief Minister N Biren Singh was due to visit the state's Jiribam region today, after violence flared there following the discovery of the body of a 59-year-old Meitei man last week.

The security team attacked yesterday was going to make "arrangements and checks" for his visit, officials said.

Attackers opened fire on one vehicle in the convoy, "leading to a firefight," a security officer said on condition of anonymity. "The assailants will be brought to justice," Singh wrote on X.

Houses in the region, two police outposts and a forest department office were torched by "unknown miscreants" following the death of the Meitei man, police said.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi's Bharatiya Janata Party-led alliance lost both seats in Manipur to the main opposition Congress in recent national elections - the first polls since violence began in the state.

Singh still runs the state's local government for the BJP.

"In the last year, due to the complexity of the violence, neither the state nor central government has been able to take strong actions against the groups on both sides," he told the Indian Express newspaper on Sunday.

"This has led to dissatisfaction amongst the valley people," he said.

The state of 3.2 million people is divided into two enclaves - a valley controlled by the Meiteis and the Kuki-dominated hills, separated by a stretch of "no man's land" monitored by federal paramilitary forces.​
 

Indian soldier killed in Manipur attack
New Age Desk 14 July, 2024, 21:58

A Central Reserve Police Force jawan was killed in a gun attack by suspected militants at Mongbung village in Manipur's Jiribam district on Sunday morning, police said.

A policeman also suffered injuries he has been admitted to a hospital, they said.

The deceased has been identified as Ajay Kumar Jha, 43, a resident of Bihar, reports PTI.

'He suffered bullet injuries in the head and was declared brought-dead in hospital. The injured policeman is undergoing treatment, but he is out of danger,' a police officer said.

In a post on X, Chief Minister N Biren Singh condemned the attack and prayed for the speedy recovery of the injured.

'I strongly condemn the killing of a CRPF personnel in an attack carried out by an armed group, suspected to be Kuki militants, in Jiribam district today.

'His supreme sacrifice in the line of duty shall not go in vain. I further extend my sincere condolences to the bereaved family of the deceased soldier, while praying for the speedy recovery of the ones injured during the attack,' Singh said.

Gunshots were reportedly heard in the village on Saturday night, too, the officer said.

Additional security forces have been deployed at Mongbung from adjacent hill areas following Sunday's attack, another official said.

A vehicle belonging to security personnel has been damaged in the gun attack, he added.

Manipur has been rocked by ethnic violence between Meitei and Kuki communities since May last year, which has claimed more than 200 lives.​
 

Massive deployment of troops sparks fresh fears in Manipur
Pradip Phanjoubam

1722240110707.png


For almost 15 months, violence and conflict have continued in India's northeastern state of Manipur. Senior journalist and founder editor of Imphal Review of Arts and Politics, Pradip Phanjoubam, in an interview with Prothom Alo's Suvojit Bagchi, speaks about the elections in Northeast India, unrest in Manipur, China's growing strength in South Asia and other contemporary and complex issues.
Updated: 29 Jul 2024, 13: 54

Prothom Alo : Out of seven Northeast Indian states, BJP or its allies won no seats in four where they won five of six seats in 2019. Do you think Manipur violence played a role?

Pradip Phanjoubam: That is one of the major factors but there are other factors. Each state is different in its own way. One thought was that BJP is against Christians and it was a major factor in Mizoram and Meghalaya. In Nagaland, the ruling party has been facing anti-incumbency.

Prothom Alo : In that case, do you think what Assam's chief minister Himanta Biswa Sarma said about Christians voted en-bloc against the BJP has an element of truth in it?

Pradip Phanjoubam: They have been making all this rhetoric against the Christians (and) the Christians felt they have been targeted and they voted against the BJP.

Prothom Alo : And churches have been demolished, places of worship targeted…

Pradip Phanjoubam: In Manipur, it is a little different. What we are getting from the media has been little different from the actual happenings. All the Naga churches are standing but the Kuki churches have gone. So, it is more ethnic than being religion-driven. Voting pattern in Manipur has also been a lot different. In Manipur valley the factor was anti-incumbency, government's inability to address the crisis.

Manipur has two constituencies. One in the valley– the Inner Manipur– and the other in the hills– the Outer Manipur. In Outer Manipur there was anger and it was not an individual decision to vote (against BJP); in some of the constituencies over 90% of the votes went to one candidate. In Churachandpur (south Manipur) district – which was in the eye of the storm – apparently there was a community decision to not vote and in some of the polling booths almost 100% of votes were polled for one candidate. It is en-bloc voting as Biswa Sarma has said. Yet in Churachandpur, religion is not always the factor. Majority of the MLAs are from the BJP. They were promised a separate administration in the last election and BJP did not respond. They were upset.

We have Kuki concentration in two districts– Churachandpur and Kangpokpi. In Kangpokpi (north-central district), Kukis boycotted the election, only the Naga's voted and so you can see an equitable sharing of votes.

Prothom Alo : What should the new central government do in Manipur and what are the issues to address immediately?

Pradip Phanjoubam: The government will have to make a beginning and that beginning has to be the end of hostility. The centre should have made clear after the first week of violence that law has to be in the hands of the state. Now law has disappeared or everybody has hands on the law. All are arming themselves in the name of self-defence as they are also feeling insecure. If the state could provide protection to all, things would have been different.

Now, there are so many troops here that people are suspecting that there is possibly another agenda. The state (government) is totally incapable and has no clue. The centre has flown in so many troops and together with the state constabulary they must have stationed between 60,000 to 70,000 boots on ground, maybe more. I think there is some plan afoot and there is a bit of uncertainty in the government as well.

Prothom Alo : What kind of plan do you apprehend?

Pradip Phanjoubam: The state government was virtually in a state of animated suspension. The chief minister was removed from the head of the fight command.

He could call meetings but not part of the decision-making regarding law and order, Centre was doing it. Amit Shah said, the valley should be managed by the police and the hills by the central forces. That caused another kind of division as the valley started suspecting central forces of siding with the Kukis and Kukis suspected that the police were with the Meiteis. There should be no such division in the forces. There were mistakes– either deliberate or inadvertent.

Prothom Alo : In this context, do you think BJP's over-dependence on two chief ministers of the Northeast– Biswa Sarma in Assam and Manipur's N Biren Singh will reduce?

I think so. Himanta is supposed to head NEDA (North East Democratic Alliance). But all the states governed by alliance partners have voted against the BJP…there is a backlash against the BJP. If they are not careful, they could be wiped off as was the case with the Congress. It seems that the shadow of the past has been returning.

Prothom Alo : Voice of the People Party or Zoram People's Movement are independent local parties not aligned to the BJP or India alliance and they did well in the election. But in the Northeast we have seen parties often align themselves with the ruling parties in the centre. Like in Tripura recently. Is there any such possibility?

Pradip Phanjoubam: They may try to align with the party in the centre. In the Northeast, parties feel a little insecure to be left on their own and tend to think that they are better off if allied with the ruling party, though there are also rebels here. Three decades back the centre never trusted the regional parties, argued about foreign hand destabilising states and imposed President's rule or engineered defections. It had a psychological impact, especially in weak states.

Prothom Alo : The situation in Myanmar is worsening by the month. What is the expected impact of this on both Myanmar and the North East?

Pradip Phanjoubam: Indeed, Myanmar's situation is influencing the politics in the North East. In Manipur, arms and the population has been entering and allegedly it is fomenting trouble here. Besides there is this drug business. They are coming because of compulsion or it could be because of economic reasons as that side too is also impoverished.

The question is, whether Myanmar chaos will continue and the junta will be overthrown or not. The impression that I get from experts– like Richard Horsey (Crisis Group's Myanmar adviser) or Emma Leslie (international Myanmar observer) who are working there– is that the rebellion will continue and the military will suffer setbacks in different pockets but it would not be a comprehensive defeat for the military. The opposition is not united. Kachins don't see eye to eye with Chins or Chins to Arakans etc. and there is resistance within the Bamar community (the largest ethnic community) in the Irrawaddy plains.

Even in the hills, so many of the communities are divided in the sense that some are Christians– like the Kachins or the Chins– and then there are so many states with ethnic populations which are Buddhists like the Arakan or the Shan. Even within the states there are so many communities, it is so much like the Northeast that you can't say that this is one block and that is another block. So, if the rebels win, they will win in different pockets and it can't be comprehensive in nature, unless the military decides to give up which is unlikely. Besides, China is very interested in Myanmar.

If China can make friends with India, they will be happy as it will let them access these routes. Besides, both countries would not engage in the arms race which I think is good for both. But since India is off the radar for now, China will be increasingly looking at Bangladesh, Nepal or Bhutan, etc

Prothom Alo : How?

Pradip Phanjoubam: They do not have a sea route to the Indian Ocean. Since all their resources are coming from Africa or the Arabian Peninsula, it is important for them to have access to the Indian Ocean which they don't have. Right now, they use the Malacca Strait, which is a roundabout and the Strait is controlled by the United States. So, they are desperate to have a land route to the Indian Ocean, which is why they would invest any amount to be on the right side of the power in Myanmar. Right now, they are wooing the junta. If they find that the junta is losing, then they will use the rebel groups to ensure that the junta does not go away from China. If Aung Sun Suu Kyi comes to power, she will be given a red-carpet treatment too. The reasons for these are manifold. China has a pipeline running from Sittwe to Kunming, they have a Belt-and-Road initiative which is running straight through Myanmar and now a high-speed rail connectivity.

They also have another route via Pakistan reaching Gwadar port. That route apparently is topographically difficult. There is Karakoram range and it passes through Balochistan in places where the Pakistan government is weak. So, China would prefer an easier land route through Myanmar. If China is interested in one sector these days, then West– especially US– will take a keen interest in that sector. So, Myanmar is emerging as another nodal point for the new Cold War.

Prothom Alo : Access through Bangladesh also becomes important…

Pradip Phanjoubam: Yes. If China can make friends with India, they will be happy as it will let them access these routes. Besides, both countries would not engage in the arms race which I think is good for both. But since India is off the radar for now, China will be increasingly looking at Bangladesh, Nepal or Bhutan, etc.​
 

BJP govt has pitted communities against each other in Manipur, which led to riots: Mamata Banerjee
ANIKolkata, West Bengal
Published: 04 Jul 2023, 10: 40

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West Bengal Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee addresses an election rally in support of TMC candidates ahead of the State Panchayat elections, in Jalpaiguri on 28 June, 2023ANI

West Bengal Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee on Monday claimed that the BJP government in Manipur has pitted the indigenous communities against each other in the violence-hit state, which has led to the riots.

"We are witnessing violence in Manipur, where people are not being able to come out of their homes. The BJP government has pitted the communities in Manipur against each other, which has led to these riots," she said.

She said this while virtually addressing party workers in Birbhum on Monday.

She further said that the BJP is also trying to wedge a divide between Kamatapuri and Rajbangshi tribes in West Bengal.

She further alleged, "Here (Bengal) too, they are trying to wedge a divide between Kamatapuri and Rajbangshis. Meanwhile, the Bengal government has set up Kamatapuri Academy, Rajbangshi Academy, and Panchanan Barma University. We recognise all great men from their respective communities and give holidays on their anniversaries."

Ethnic clashes broke out in Manipur nearly two months ago on 3 May after clashes erupted during a rally organised by the All Tribal Students Union (ATSU) to protest against the demand for the inclusion of Meiteis in the list of Scheduled Tribes (STs).

Manipur Chief Minister N Biren Singh on Monday chaired a meeting of the Combined Headquarters (CHQ) to discuss important security matters related to the prevailing situation in the state."

Chaired a meeting of the Combined Headquarters (CHQ) in my office today to discuss important security matters related to the prevailing situation in Manipur. Certain key decisions have been taken to ensure that the violence is stopped immediately in the state, especially at the foothills along the valley," Manipur CM tweeted.

The meeting was attended by senior officers of the state government, the Indian Army and the Para Military forces.​
 

Indefinite shutdown of businesses begins in Nagaland in protest against extortion
The CNCI said harassment of the business community over extortion cannot be tolerated any further.
By: PTI
Kohima | April 27, 2024 13:19 IST
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The shutdown was first observed in the state's commercial capital Dimapur on Friday. (Representative Photo/File)

Markets were shut and private offices were closed as an indefinite shutdown of business establishments began in Nagaland on Saturday to protest against extortion by underground groups.

The shutdown was first observed in the state's commercial capital Dimapur on Friday, following which the other districts joined on a call given by the Confederation of Nagaland Chamber of Commerce & Industries (CNCCI).

The CNCI said harassment of the business community over extortion cannot be tolerated any further.

It urged the government to take immediate steps to stop the "unabated" extortions, intimidations and summons by the underground groups.

The CNCI said that banks, educational institutions, government offices and hospitals have been kept outside the purview of the shutdown.

State Home Commissioner Vikeyie Kenya said that it has "come to the notice" of the government that "rampant collection of taxes" from businesses, particularly in Dimapur, by various groups, most of which have signed ceasefire agreements with the government, has created an unbearable situation.

"Such activities reflect adversely on the law enforcing agency as well as on the state government," he said, directing the police to take stringent measures.

He instructed the district administrations and the police to report any violation of the ceasefire ground rules to the Ceasefire Monitoring Group for appropriate action.

Police should continue arresting "underground cadres" found extorting under the National Security Act (NSA), Kenya said.

The Dimapur police commissioner was asked to increase patrolling in market areas, and also deploy IRBn personnel to instill confidence among the people, he said.

The government also directed that a special cell be formed by the police commissioner to exclusively deal with incidents of extortion, he added.

The Dimapur Chamber of Commerce and Industries (DCCI) said directions of such nature were issued by the state government in the past as well.

"However, considering the government's continued insincerity, it does not seem to hold any water," it said.

The shutdown will continue as long as the government does not take any satisfactory steps, it added.​
 

Hundreds protest in India's Nagaland against controversial law

AFSPA gives the military sweeping powers to search, seize and even shoot suspects on sight without fear of prosecution.

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Human rights groups have called the act draconian and pleaded for its repeal for decades. [Yirmiyan Arthur/AP Photo]

Hundreds of people have walked 70km (43 miles) in India's northeast to demand the repeal of a controversial act that grants special powers to Indian troops, following a deadly incident last month when soldiers killed over a dozen civilians.

They began their protest in Dimapur, a city in Nagaland state, and walked to Kohima, the state's capital, raising slogans against the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA).

The act gives the military sweeping powers to search, arrest and even shoot suspects with little fear of prosecution. Human rights groups have long accused security forces of abusing the law.

Many joined for stretches along the route, wearing traditional attire and holding placards.

The road from Dimapur to Kohima is winding and strenuous, and often dusty in stretches.

"It has been a tiring walk but I participated because we want AFSPA removed," said 55-year-old Khamba Konyak on Tuesday. Khamba is Konyak, a Naga tribe whose 14 young men were killed in December by the Indian Army.

Since the deaths, candlelight vigils and solidarity marches have called for the revocation of AFSPA, which has loomed over the region since 1958 and gives many areas the feel of occupied territory.

"We are members of a helpless public and we have no other way to raise our voice against AFSPA. We can only contribute with our toil and sweat," said 35-year-old Mopa Konyak.

Under the act, local authorities need federal approval to prosecute army or paramilitary soldiers in civilian courts.

Scrutiny of the act has grown in the wake of last month's deadly attack, with the state's Chief Minister Neiphiu Rio announcing that his government wanted to do away with it.

On December 20, Nagaland's assembly unanimously passed a resolution demanding the repeal of AFSPA, but the federal government 10 days later extended the act for six months.

Even as people in Nagaland marched, AFSPA was extended for one more year on Tuesday in neighbouring Manipur state.

"I walked this entire stretch because I am concerned about the future of our children. AFSPA must be removed," said 53-year-old Dauyan Lakban.

Kevitho Kera, one of the organisers, added: "We are Nagas, a warrior race. But today we leave our machetes on the ground and walk peacefully to fight our oppressors with non-violence. How will India respond to our non-violence? Isn't the world's largest democracy ashamed of this draconian law?"

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Nagas hold placards and participate in a 70km (43 miles) walk demanding the repeal of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) in Kohima, in northeastern Nagaland state in India. [Yirmiyan Arthur/AP Photo]


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"We want peace. We do not want violence. AFSPA must be repealed because we are a peace-loving people," said Manpong Konyak, 23. [Yirmiyan Arthur/AP Photo]

Two Naga Woman at the protest demanding the repeal of AFSPA in Nagaland state, India

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Shongmeth Lily Konyak, 25, (left), and Mennyu Konyak, 26, wearing traditional necklaces, stand for a photograph during a protest demanding the repeal of the AFSPA in Kohima. "We want justice for our brothers and we want AFSPA removed from our region," Shongmeth said. [Yirmiyan Arthur/AP Photo]

A Naga Woman at the protest with a mask

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"I am here because I want to fight for my brothers who lost their lives and also to repeal AFSPA so we can live peacefully," said Minnyu Konyak, 16. [Yirmiyan Arthur/AP Photo]

Colourful bag of a Naga at the protest demanding the repeal of AFSPA in Nagaland state, India

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On December 20, Nagaland's assembly unanimously passed a resolution demanding the repeal of AFSPA, but the federal government 10 days later extended the act for six months. [Yirmiyan Arthur/AP Photo]

Nagas at the protest - one man holds a placard with word: "Human!"

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Nagas listen to a speaker after participating in a 70-km (43-mile) walk demanding the repeal of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act in Kohima. [Yirmiyan Arthur/AP Photo]

demanding the repeal of AFSPA in Nagaland state, India

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Langam Konyak, 20, wearing a traditional necklace, says: "Innocent people were killed. We are marching for the good of the Nagas. We want AFSPA removed." [Yirmiyan Arthur/AP Photo]​
 

Why has a state in India's northeast exploded in ethnic unrest?
Rhea Mogul
By Rhea Mogul, CNN


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In this picture taken on May 4, 2023, smoke billows from a vehicle during clashes between two ethnic communities, in Imphal the capital of India's Manipur state. Stringer/AFP/Getty Images

Violence has gripped the northeast Indian state of Manipur, as unrest between ethnic groups saw buildings set ablaze and charred vehicles strewn across roads, leaving at least 58 dead and tens of thousands more homeless.

Officials' repeated pleas for calm have appeared futile, prompting the Indian army to deploy troops in a bid to restore law and order, and authorities blocking internet access for the state's approximately 3 million population.

Residents of Manipur say there has been a breakdown of law and order. The state's government, led by India's Hindu-nationalist ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), last week issued "shoot-at-sight" orders for "extreme" cases, while the army said Sunday it has "significantly enhanced" its surveillance in the state.

Authorities say they are bringing the situation under control, but as the unrest enters its second week, the situation remains hostile in a complex, ethnically diverse and disparate region, that has for decades grappled with insurgencies, violence and marginalization.

Here's what you need to know.

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People are evacuated by the Indian army to a temporary shelter as they flee ethnic violence that has hit the northeastern Indian state of Manipur, near Imphal on May 7, 2023. Arun Sankar/AFP/Getty Images

Where is Manipur?

Manipur, a lush, hilly state which borders Myanmar, has long history of civil conflict since modern India's creation. The state is home to an ethnically diverse group of Sino-Tibetan communities, each with their own unique language, culture and religion.

Like Kashmir in the north, it was once a princely state under British rule, and only incorporated into India in 1949 – two years after the country gained independence from its former colonizers.

Many within the state disagreed with that move, feeling it was hurried and completed without a proper consensus. The region has grappled with violent insurgencies as well as ethnic conflict ever since, resulting in hundreds of deaths and injuries over the decades.

The current outbreak of violence is some of the worst in recent decades.

What prompted the clashes?

Skirmishes broke out in the state capital Imphal on May 3 after thousands of people from the Naga and Kuki tribes took part in a rally against the majority Meitei ethnic group being afforded special status under India's "Scheduled Tribe" grouping.

The Meitei community, a largely Hindu ethnic group who account for about 50% of the state's population, have for years campaigned to be recognized as a scheduled tribe, which would give them access to wider benefits including health, education and government jobs.

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A scooterist rides past a damaged water tanker that was set afire during a protest by tribal and non-tribal groups in the northeastern state of Manipur, India, May 4, 2023. Stringer/Reuters

Scheduled tribes have been among the most socio-economically disadvantaged groups in India and have historically been denied access to education and job opportunities, prompting the government to officially recognize certain groups in a bid correct years of injustice.

If the Meitei community are given scheduled tribe status, other ethnic groups – many of whom are Christian – say they fear they will not have a fair chance for jobs and other benefits.

The clashes turned violent, with video and photos showing angry mobs setting properties on fire. Eyewitnesses told CNN that homes and churches have been burnt, as frightened families desperately try to flee affected areas.

One youth tribal leader in Imphal who spoke to CNN on the condition of anonymity said his house was ransacked and vandalized, forcing him to stay in an army camp.

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In this picture taken on May 4, 2023, security personnel fire tear gas whilst the Meitei community tribals protest to demand inclusion under the Scheduled Tribe category, in Imphal the capital of India's Manipur state. Stringer/AFP/Getty Images

"What we are witnessing here unfortunately is there seems to be a very systematic, well-planned series of attacks. The execution is almost clinical and they know exactly the houses where people from tribal communities reside," said the leader.

"I barely escaped… the mob was already in the house. I climbed the fence over to the neighbors' house. I just came with my laptop bag to this camp. I don't have anything."

What is at the center of the clashes?

The divide between the Meiteis and the other ethnic groups is cut sharply across political and geographic lines.

While last week's protests appear to have sparked the recent violence, tensions between the two groups have been simmering for years over a complex range of issues, including land rights and a crackdown on minority groups.

The Meteis dominate positions within the state government, and have been privy to more economic and infrastructural advancement than the other ethnic groups.

They mostly live in the more developed but geographically smaller Imphal Valley, while the Naga and Kuki groups live predominantly in agriculturally rich and geographically larger protected hill districts.

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People wait at a temporary shelter in a military camp, after being evacuated by the Indian army, as they flee ethnic violence that has hit the northeastern Indian state of Manipur on May 7, 2023. Arun Sankar/AFP/Getty Images

The Naga and Kuki groups fear the change in status could result in their steady removal from a protected area they have occupied for decades and leave them vulnerable to exploitation.

Moreover, tensions in Manipur have increased since the bloody 2021 coup in neighboring Myanmar, after thousands of ethnically Chin people fled the violent crackdown by the Burmese military.

The Kukis, who are from the same ethnic group as the Chins, say the government has unfairly cracked down the group since their arrival, leading to feelings of persecution and abandonment.

What have the authorities said?

Manipur's chief minister N.Biren Singh has said he is "constantly in touch" with India's Home Minister Amit Shah to monitor the situation, adding the situation "continues to improve and normalcy returns."

Shah on Monday told Indian news outlet India Today that the situation was under control. "There is no need for any person or group to be fearful," he said.

Modi, who is in the southern Indian state of Karnataka to campaign for state elections, is yet to speak publicly about the unrest, sparking widespread anger among Manipur's residents.

Authorities in northeast India give 'shoot-at-sight' orders after violent skirmishes over tribal rights

Opposition politicians have accused Modi and his BJP of poor governance.

"As the Manipur violence persists, all right-thinking Indians must ask themselves what happened to the much-vaunted good governance we had been promised," Shashi Tharoor, a lawmaker from the opposition Congress party, wrote on Twitter.

CNN has reached out to the state and federal governments but is yet to receive a response.

What's the situation now?

Many people have fled into neighboring states, including Mizoram, Meghalaya and Nagaland. Governments from other Indian states have been arranging special flights for their residents to be airlifted to safety.

The Indian military said that about 23,000 civilians have fled the fighting, with displaced people being housed on military bases and garrisons in the state. In a statement on May 7, it said that there was a "ray of hope" and a lull in the fighting due to the rescue work carried out by the 120-125 Army and Assam Rifles, which had been "working tirelessly… to rescue civilians across all communities, curb violence and restore normalcy."

While levels of violence are not as widespread as last week, pockets of skirmishes continue to break out in some parts of the state.

In this picture taken on May 4, 2023, smoke billows from a vehicle allegedly burned by the Meitei community tribals protesting to demand inclusion under the Scheduled Tribe category, in Imphal the capital of India's Manipur state.

Over 50 dead, hundreds hospitalized and 23,000 displaced by ethnic violence in India's Manipur

Photos and video shared with CNN show some Kuki settlements barricading themselves from attacks, using wooden poles as a makeshift gate. Malls are up in flames, while reports of looting and arson have emerged.

And thousands of people remain in makeshift camps, not knowing when they will be able to return home.

Fears are swirling over their wellbeing. Video posted to social media shows many packed inside a building, with women, men and children sleeping huddled next to one another. CNN had not independently verified the video.

Tensions remain high and the situation remains volatile. It is unclear when or how the unrest will end, but residents of the state and their loved ones outside or overseas have urged for calm and a restoration of law and order.

CNN's Vedika Sud, Sania Farooqui and Kunal Sehgal contributed reporting.​
 

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