[🇧🇩] Insurgencies in Myanmar. Implications for Bangladesh

[Saif]

Bangladesh’s strategic tightrope in Rakhine

The proposal for a Bangladesh-Myanmar aid channel is rooted in a decade of failed diplomacy.

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Bangladesh’s strategic tightrope in Rakhine

A woman cooks next to destroyed houses and burned trees following fighting between Myanmar's military and the Arakan Army in a village in Minbya Township in Rakhine State on May 21, 2024. FILE PHOTO: AFP

In Myanmar's Rakhine State, where the Arakan Army (AA) has consolidated control over significant swathes of territory, an estimated 1.2 million people—Rohingya Muslims and ethnic Rakhine Buddhists—face severe food shortages amid escalating conflict. The UN warns of famine-like conditions, exacerbated by Myanmar's military junta blocking humanitarian access since 2023. For Bangladesh, which already hosts over 960,000 Rohingya refugees (UNHCR, 2023), a proposal to open a cross-border aid channel has sparked fierce debate.

The channel, first proposed by the UN in early 2024, is framed as a lifeline for starving civilians. Yet critics argue it risks drawing Bangladesh into Myanmar's civil war, complicating relations with regional powers like China and India, and inflaming domestic political tensions. As former Bangladeshi Foreign Secretary Shahidul Haque noted in a 2024 interview with The Daily Star, "Humanitarian gestures can become geopolitical traps if divorced from hard-nosed realism."

This op-ed examines Bangladesh's precarious balancing act through the lens of offensive realism—the theory that states prioritise survival in an anarchic international system—while advocating for a strategy that blends principled aid with safeguards for sovereignty.

The origins of the channel: Humanitarianism or realpolitik?

The proposal for a Bangladesh-Myanmar aid channel is rooted in a decade of failed diplomacy. Since 2017, when Myanmar's military expelled over 740,000 Rohingya, Dhaka has repeatedly urged the UN Security Council to enforce repatriation. Instead, geopolitical gridlock—notably China and Russia shielding Myanmar from sanctions—has left Bangladesh bearing what former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina called a "uniquely disproportionate burden."

By 2023, donor fatigue had set in. The UN's $876 million Rohingya response plan was only 40 percent funded (UNOCHA, 2023), forcing ration cuts in Cox's Bazar camps. Meanwhile, Myanmar's civil war escalated, with the AA seizing key towns in Rakhine and Chin States. The UN's 2024 appeal for cross-border aid from Bangladesh emerged as a pragmatic workaround, but one laden with risks.

Myanmar's junta, which brands the AA a terrorist group, has weaponised aid access. After Cyclone Mocha devastated Rakhine in May 2023, the military blocked relief to AA-held areas, worsening malnutrition rates. The AA, while claiming to welcome aid, faces allegations of diverting supplies. A June 2023 report by the International Crisis Group documented AA checkpoints taxing commercial goods in Chin State, raising fears that aid convoys could face similar exploitation.

For Bangladesh, the channel offers leverage. By conditioning aid on Rohingya repatriation talks, Dhaka seeks to shift global attention to Myanmar's atrocities. Yet as one security analyst warned, "Humanitarian aid cannot be transactional. If politicised, it will fail civilians and backfire on Bangladesh."

Stakeholders' chessboard: Who wins, who loses?

Bangladesh's interim government faces mounting pressure. Opening the channel could avert a new refugee wave—35,000 Rohingya fled to Bangladesh between January and December 2024, as per UNHCR. A full-scale famine might push thousands more across the border. However, opposition parties like the BNP argue the channel legitimises Myanmar's junta and the AA. "Why should Bangladesh clean up Myanmar's mess?" asked BNP leader Rumeen Farhana. Others fear entanglement in Myanmar's war. In February 2024, a mortar shell from AA-junta clashes landed in Bandarban, injuring two Bangladeshi farmers.

The junta vs the AA

Myanmar's junta, isolated since its 2021 coup, views Rakhine through a prism of paranoia. It has repeatedly blocked UN aid, fearing it would bolster AA influence. The AA, meanwhile, seeks recognition as Rakhine's de facto authority. For both, the channel is less about saving lives than asserting sovereignty.

The Kosovo 2.0 myth or reality?

Opposition claims comparing the channel to NATO's 1999 Kosovo intervention are hyperbolic but reflect valid anxieties. Kosovo's precedent, where humanitarian intervention led to state fragmentation, looms large in Dhaka. A more apt parallel is Syria's cross-border aid mechanism from Turkey (2014-2023), which sustained 4.1 million civilians but enabled Turkish influence over opposition zones. For Bangladesh, the lesson is clear: humanitarian access must be insulated from state-building ambitions.

A path forward

Drawing from political scientist Stephen Walt's balance-of-threat theory, Bangladesh should:

Demand tripartite oversight: Aid convoys require consent from Myanmar's junta, AA, and ASEAN monitors to prevent politicisation.

Secure regional guarantees: India and China must publicly oppose cross-border attacks on Bangladesh.

Link aid to accountability: Use the channel to pressure Myanmar into accepting a UN-supervised Rohingya repatriation process.

Sovereignty as the red line

Bangladesh's dilemma mirrors that of many small states: act as a responsible global citizen while avoiding entanglement in others' conflicts. The channel's success hinges on strict neutrality and multilateral oversight. As international relations scholar Hedley Bull argued, even in an anarchic world, states can cooperate through shared rules, but only if power asymmetries are acknowledged.

For Bangladesh, this means prioritising its constitution's mandate: "The state shall base its international relations on… respect for national sovereignty" (Article 25). Humanitarian imperatives must not override that principle.

Zakir Kibria is a writer and policy analyst.​

 

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Debunking the Rohingya crisis, Bangladesh’s role, and the ASEAN Summit

External forces now shape Myanmar-Bangladesh dynamic in relation to the Rohingya crisis.

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Debunking the Rohingya crisis, Bangladesh’s role, and the ASEAN Summit
Yunus and Anwar Ibrahim

Can the vanguards of democracy that Anwar and Yunus symbolise lead to a solution for the Rohingya at the upcoming ASEAN summit? FILE PHOTO: PID

The balance may be shifting. Resolving the Rohingya crisis is being swayed by more external winds than internal thrusts. Dynamics such as Bamar treatment of the Rohingya, humanitarian care of the evicted Rakhine persons, and Bangladesh-Myanmar discussions on repatriating the displaced persons from Cox's Bazar camps have been overtaken by Myanmar's 2021 coup d'etat and its civil war consequences, regional spillovers thickening across Southeast Asia, and an independent resurgence of "democracy" inside Bangladesh, splashing externally.

In reverse order, Bangladesh Chief Adviser Prof Muhammad Yunus is more cited globally today not so much for his trademark microfinance contributions as his democracy-salvaging attempts since the historic ouster of the Awami League regime through a student-led democratic uprising last year. In comparison to Bangladesh's efforts in reviving democracy, Myanmar's deficiency of democracy has emerged more despairingly.

Democracy is a reform movement in deficient countries. The other side of this movement defends the status quo to keep narratives in the same ballpark. Bamars, the largest ethnic group in Myanmar, who represent that "other" Rohingya side, controlled all of Myanmar from Naypyidaw through the Tatmadaw armed forces. Under today's civil war, reportedly, less than one quarter remains in their hands. The National Unity Government (NUG), a mixed group, influences the rest. Its reformers, the National League for Democracy (NLD), a party of former Nobel Peace Prize winner Aung San Suu Kyi, replaced military rule with "democracy" in 2015 and won again in 2020. After a stuttering start, her party was ousted in the February 2021 coup, after the Rohingya malaise spilled over into Bangladesh.

Other NUG members include discriminated ethnic groups in the northeast, north, and northwest. Because of that discrimination, they defend the status quo (their histories, identities, and interests), but support the reformers to evict General Min Aung Hlaing, the coup leader and current State Administration Council chairman. This gap between the local and provincial priorities and the overarching national priority—such as democracy—matters. These ethnic groups include the United League of Arakan (ULA) and its armed faction, the Arakan Army (AA), along Bangladesh and India's eastern borders; Kachin Independence Army (KIA) along China's southern border; Karen National Union (KNU) along Thailand's border; and Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), both of which function mostly out of Shan state along China's southern border, among others.

Rakhine, the Rohingya home, stands divided between ULA/AA and the Arakan Liberation Party (ALP). The ALP military faction, Arakan Liberation Army (ALA), often collaborates with Naypyidaw's State Administration Council and clashes with the ULA/AA along the Bangladesh borders. They subject the Rohingya people to crossfires in such locations as Buthidaung and Maungdaw, and signal the increasing need for negotiations rather than battleground exchanges to sort local problems.

The growing ULA/AA empowerment gives it greater intra-NUG salience. It has evicted Naypyidaw military forces across Rakhine and finds support from the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC). Bangladesh unofficially satisfies two ULA/AA conditions for a Rohingya solution: recognition of the ULA/AA, and mobilisation of UN-based global support.

NUG's "reformer"claim is, however, tainted. The 2017 Rohingya eviction was an NLD decision to let China complete its economic corridor across Rakhine and Kyaukphyu port in the Bay of Bengal. Such evictions go back to 1785 for ethnic discrimination, not geopolitics.

Resolving a national crisis, such as Hlaing eviction and Rohingya repatriation without fixing local fissures, weakens any Rohingya solution. Without exogenous platforms and management, this may be impossible given the depth of local distrust. If Myanmar's democracy is to work, attention must shift from one Nobel Prize winner, Aung San Suu Kyi, the 2017 eviction perpetrator, to another, Yunus, whose "democracy" bonds extend to Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim. The Malaysian politician visited Prof Yunus on October 4, 2024, and will host/chair the 46th ASEAN annual summit on May 26-27. That summit's theme of "Inclusivity and Sustainability" cannot but prioritise the Rohingya issue.

Prof Yunus's democratic ideologies pushed Gen Hlaing to announce Myanmar's election this year. This is an ASEAN membership requirement. When Prof Yunus attended the BIMSTEC Summit in Bangkok in April, he articulated his "Three Zeroes" agenda and called on the member-states to promote dialogue between conflicting parties in Myanmar to resolve the Rohingya issue. In a landmark move, Myanmar's Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister U Than Shwe announced an agreement to take back 180,000 Rohingya at the summit—against the 800,000 names Bangladesh proposed even as camp denizens have crossed 13 lakh—as part of repatriating one quarter of a million from Cox's Bazar. So clearly, exogenous platforms help.

Democracy is not a new ASEAN issue since the 2008 ASEAN Charter's preamble emphasised "democracy, law, and good governance." Article 1 targets "strengthening democracy," and Article 2 "democracy principles." Even right after Gen Hlaing's February 2021 coup, ASEAN prepared a five-point consensus to end violence, begin dialogue, not only appoint a special ASEAN envoy to Myanmar but also visit Myanmar, and provide humanitarian assistance. Myanmar's civil war made it irrelevant.

Ever since 2021, ASEAN summits have treated the Rohingya issue. Cambodia's Prime Minister Hun Sen emotionally posted the Rohingya issue when he hosted/chaired the 2022 summit, but his meeting with only Hlaing offended NUG leaders. Indonesia's President Joko Widodo organised many meetings and supplied lots of humanitarian aid, but could not convert sentiments into substance at the 2023 summit. The same thing happened in Laos in January 2024 when the country's foreign minister met Hlaing. Opening that closed Rohingya door becomes more urgent constantly.

Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim faces similar clouds this year. A harsher global context awaits him: a new US administration's tariff policies have deepened ASEAN trade relations with China, widened Myanmar's own policy options and doors, and with India preoccupied in Kashmir, China faces less Southeast Asian constraints. So, the obvious question arises: why break Myanmar's status quo? After all, Myanmar's top foreign investors (particularly China, India, and Japan) remain better off with the status quo. China influences ethnic NUG partners, because of those groups overlapping China's borders, since the country itself remains a stranger to democracy, to push Myanmar in that direction. In short, Malaysia's ASEAN summit this month would toss between these ill winds and the hopes that the vanguards of democracy that Anwar and Yunus symbolise. Riddled with mines, those remain the only salvaging elements for a Rohingya resolution. Without intra- and inter-boundary dialogues, no resolution seems feasible, including any "humanitarian corridor," and when displacement camps only grow, creating such passages misses a crucial beat.

Yunus mobilised another exogenous platform for a Rohingya solution: the UN. Its outgoing secretary-general, António Guterres, not only visited Dhaka, but also shared iftar with nearly 100,000 Rohingya in the Kutupalong camp in March, giving the neglected Rohingya what they most deserve: inclusiveness internationally, on an equal footing, not out of "noblesse oblige."

Bangladesh's exogenous reputation depends upon its endogenous treatment of its own election. Squaring the Rohingya circle fortifies two other global wishes: reformers, particularly the expressive youths who voted in 75 countries in 2024 (the most ever in any one year), shifting to negotiations via more streetside protests; and historically discriminated/persecuted groups replacing survival instincts with betterment. Peace, after all, is the springboard of reforms, and the postulated target of all conflicts, meaning zero-sum insulated approaches beg for collaborative, inclusive, and external counterparts—a shift too historically unprecedented to instantly change the ballgame.

Dr Imtiaz A Hussain is professor at the Department of Global Studies and Governance (GSG) at Independent University, Bangladesh (IUB).​

 

[Saif]

Time ripe for talks between Myanmar junta and ousted government, Malaysia's Anwar says

Separate talks with Myanmar's junta leader and his key rivals have borne fruit, Malaysia's Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim said, setting the stage for the first time for direct contact between two sides embroiled in a protracted and devastating civil war. Junta chief Min Aung Hlaing flew into the Tha

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Time ripe for talks between Myanmar junta and ousted government, Malaysia's Anwar says
REUTERS
Published :
May 22, 2025 18:17
Updated :
May 22, 2025 18:17

Myanmar junta chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, who ousted the elected government in a coup on Feb 1, 2021, presides over an army parade on Armed Forces Day in Naypyitaw, Myanmar, Mar 27, 2021. Photo : REUTERS

Separate talks with Myanmar's junta leader and his key rivals have borne fruit, Malaysia's Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim said, setting the stage for the first time for direct contact between two sides embroiled in a protracted and devastating civil war.

Junta chief Min Aung Hlaing flew into the Thai capital Bangkok for a closed-door meeting with Anwar last month and, a day later, the Malaysian leader held online talks with the shadow National Unity Government (NUG).

The NUG includes remnants of an elected government led by Nobel laureate Aung San Suu Kyi deposed in the 2021 coup orchestrated by Min Aung Hlaing.

Both sides were aware of the engagement, two sources with direct knowledge said, underscoring the willingness of Min Aung Hlaing to engage in peace efforts despite branding the government-in-exile as "terrorist".

"We do engage separately, but I think it's time for them to talk," Anwar told reporters in Malaysia's administrative capital Putrajaya on Wednesday. "I mean, the people in Myanmar have to decide for themselves."

A junta spokesman did not respond to calls from Reuters seeking comment.

Nay Phone Latt, a spokesman for the NUG, said the shadow government would be open to talks with the military if it agreed to six conditions.

These include forming a new federal democratic union under a new constitution with no role for the military in politics and the creation of a transitional justice framework.

"If Myanmar's military agrees to that, we will have a dialogue with military authorities regarding the termination of the coup and peaceful transition of power," he told Reuters.

It's unlikely that Myanmar's military, which has ruled the country for most of its post-independence history, will accept those conditions.

But Anwar's initiative, launched on behalf of the Southeast Asian regional bloc ASEAN that he currently chairs, marks the first time the military regime appears amenable to dialogue since Myanmar was plunged into turmoil by the February 2021 coup.

The violence has killed thousands, displaced over 3.5 million people and decimated the economy of the Southeast Asian nation.

An armed opposition, comprising established ethnic armies and new resistance groups formed since the coup, has wrested chunks of territory from the junta, driving it out of border areas and increasingly hemming the territory it controls into the central lowlands.

Malaysian officials have begun outreach to some armed groups in Myanmar, a diplomatic source said, without providing further details.

GROUNDWORK FOR PEACE PROCESS

In Bangkok, Anwar publicly focused on securing a ceasefire extension to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid following a Mar 28 earthquake that killed more than 3,800 people, mostly in central Myanmar.

But the leader also utilised the opening to attempt to lay the groundwork for a broader peace process, according to four people aware of the discussions.

His initiative is slated to dominate the ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur next week, with dedicated talks among bloc members focused on the conflict ahead of the gathering.

Anwar described his push as "the first serious attempt at engagement" by the bloc.

"We have to move beyond that," he said on Wednesday.

ASEAN has been calling for a cessation of violence since the 2021 coup, pushing a peace plan known as the "Five Point Consensus" that has made little progress and barred Myanmar's ruling generals from the bloc's summits.

Backroom work for the Bangkok talks had started before the earthquake, three sources said, but the disaster provided an opportunity for Anwar to directly engage on humanitarian issues with Min Aung Hlaing, who has been shunned for nearly four years by successive ASEAN chairmen.

"The humanitarian exercise is important in itself, but to achieve it, we need a ceasefire. And a temporary ceasefire will in turn open up possible future pathways towards peace and reconciliation," George Yeo, a former Singaporean foreign minister who is currently an advisor to Anwar, told Reuters.

ELECTION PLANS

The NUG had initially opposed the Anwar-Min Aung Hlaing talks in Bangkok, urging "utmost caution" for any unilateral engagement with the junta chief.

Since the Bangkok talks, the junta has announced extensions to a ceasefire initially agreed upon to support humanitarian relief following the quake - but it still kept up a deadly military campaign, including in areas devastated by the earthquake.

ASEAN Secretary-General Kao Kim Hourn this week declined to comment on the military's continued offensive, saying it was unclear who had violated the ceasefire.

In the short term, the regional bloc needs to push the warring sides in Myanmar to respect the ceasefire.

"If everyone respects the ceasefire and sees the vital importance of humanitarian assistance, it could be a beginning point to bring the various sides for talks," commented veteran diplomat and former Thai vice-minister for foreign affairs Sihasak Phuangketkeow.

The renewed move to intensify dialogue in Myanmar also comes amid a junta plan to hold a general election in December, an exercise derided by its critics as a sham to keep the generals in power through proxies.

ASEAN had earlier said that the junta should prioritise making peace, instead of holding an election.

"Dialogue is important for the election, without it there is no legitimacy," Sihasak said.

"We have to be realistic enough to see that an election is not the end of the conflict."​

 

[Saif]

Myanmar ex-general killed in attack

A retired Myanmar general who formerly served as ambassador to Cambodia was shot dead on Thursday, two military sources said, in an attack claimed by anti-coup fighters...

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Myanmar ex-general killed in attack
Agence France-Presse . Yangon 22 May, 2025, 23:34

A retired Myanmar general who formerly served as ambassador to Cambodia was shot dead on Thursday, two military sources said, in an attack claimed by anti-coup fighters.

Myanmar’s military seized power in a 2021 coup, sparking a civil war pitching it against pro-democracy guerrillas and resurgent ethnic armed groups that have long been active in the Southeast Asian country’s fringes.

Most combat is confined to the countryside and smaller settlements, although sporadic grenade and gun attacks on police and junta-affiliated targets are regularly reported in the largest city Yangon.

A source close to the military said former general and Cambodia ambassador Cho Tun Aung ‘was shot and killed’ outside his Yangon home around 8:30am as he gave alms to monks collecting donations.

‘He used to donate meals every morning,’ the source said. ‘The shooters used this opportunity to assassinate him.’

A military officer confirmed Cho Tun Aung had been shot and killed without providing further details.

The attack was claimed by the Golden Valley Warriors, a little-known group that said Cho Tun Aung had been a confidant of junta chief Min Aung Hlaing and was teaching at a defence academy in his retirement.

‘Our Golden Valley Warriors team conducted the shooting after collecting and verifying information for a long time,’ the statement said.

The junta has suffered stinging territorial setbacks in recent months but analysts say it is far from defeat, with a powerful air force supplied with Russian jets and military backing from China.

Ethnic armed groups have proven the military’s most capable opponents but often have ambitions limited to their own areas, while pro-democracy guerrillas are scattered and poorly coordinated.​

 

[Saif]

Extreme desperation may have led to 400 Rohingya refugees dying at sea, UN agency says

A dire humanitarian situation in Myanmar and Bangladesh may have led to deaths of an estimated 427 Rohingya refugees at sea, the United Nation's refugee agency said on Friday. "The dire humanitarian situation, exacerbated by funding cuts, is having a devastating impact on the lives of Rohingya, wi

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Extreme desperation may have led to 400 Rohingya refugees dying at sea, UN agency says
REUTERS
Published :
May 23, 2025 20:35
Updated :
May 23, 2025 20:35

Rohingya refugees hold placards while attending a Ramadan Solidarity Iftar to have an Iftar meal with United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres and Muhammad Yunus, Chief Adviser of Bangladesh Interim Government, at the Rohingya refugee camp in Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh, March 14, 2025. Photo : REUTERS/Mohammad Ponir Hossain/Files

A dire humanitarian situation in Myanmar and Bangladesh may have led to deaths of an estimated 427 Rohingya refugees at sea, the United Nation's refugee agency said on Friday.

"The dire humanitarian situation, exacerbated by funding cuts, is having a devastating impact on the lives of Rohingya, with more and more resorting to dangerous journeys to seek safety, protection and a dignified life for themselves and their families,” said Hai Kyung Jun, Director of UNHCR’s Regional Bureau for Asia and the Pacific.

​

 

[Saif]

'Bangladesh working to end Rohingya-locals conflict'

Bangladesh government is always ready to resolve the conflict between the Rohingya people staying in Bangladesh and the local population, said Shamsuddauja Nayan, additional commissioner of the Refugee Relief and Repatriation Commission (RRRC). He said that one should be aware of the dissemination

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questions.

'Bangladesh working to end Rohingya-locals conflict'

OUR CORRESPONDENT
Published :
May 29, 2025 09:31
Updated :
May 29, 2025 09:31

Bangladesh government is always ready to resolve the conflict between the Rohingya people staying in Bangladesh and the local population, said Shamsuddauja Nayan, additional commissioner of the Refugee Relief and Repatriation Commission (RRRC).

He said that one should be aware of the dissemination of wrong information and creation of rumours through social media regarding the Rohingya refugee camps.

He said this at a workshop on peace mediation and promotion in the Ukhia-Teknaf area organised by national NGO FIVDB with the grant and technical support of GIZ SHADE Project on behalf of the international aid agency BMZ on Wednesday morning in a conference room of a hotel in the city with the participation of district-level stakeholders.

At the workshop, Shamsuddauja also said that everyone should work together to resolve the conflict between the Rohingyas and local residents. Mediation can play an important role in this regard. Besides, presenting accurate information will help increase public awareness.

Speakers at the workshop highlighted that GIZ and FIVDB are implementing a special project with the financial support from the German government for the socioeconomic development and support from the host community of Cox's Bazar and the Rohingya community residing in different camps in Ukhia-Teknaf to resolve intra-and inter-community conflicts.

The workshop mentioned that the mediator system would play an important role in maintaining peace and order between the Rohingya community living in Ukhia-Teknaf and the local residents in resolving the conflicts. In addition, due to the mediation system, local residents are getting quick solutions to their problems rather than waiting to get a solution through traditional legal systems of the country.

In that case, 320 mediators have been trained under this project to create an environment for conflict resolution in a quick but transparent way. Of these, 50 percent are men and 50 percent are women. And 50 percent from the host community and 50 percent from the Rohingya community are working under this project.

Representatives from various local and foreign NGOs, INGOs, including UNHCR, IOM, were present at the event.

They expressed their views, wishing for the development and progress of the project.

Senior Assistant Judge and District Legal Aid Officer Shazzatun Nessa Lipi, Senior Assistant Secretary and Camp In-charge of camp 25 & 27 Khanzada Shahriar Bin Mannan, Senior Assistant Secretary and Assistant Camp In-charge Mostaq Ahmed, Assistant Camp In-charge Shafiqul Bari, GIZ SHADE Project's Head of Programs Alexander Betz, Conflict and Crisis Adviser Zahid Hasan, FIVDB Executive Director Bazle Mostafa Razee, and Mohiuddin Sardar also spoke at the workshop.

Mobasserul Islam, Law Specialist of SHADE project of GIZ and Hasan Ahamed Chowdhury- coordinator of FIVDB, presented the activities of the programmes and answered different questions.​