[🇧🇩] Indo-Bangla Relation: India's Regional Ambition, Geopolitical Reality, and Strategic Options For Bangladesh

Dhaka committed to boosting Indian Ocean partnership: foreign adviser

Md Touhid Hossain. File photo

Bangladesh has reiterated its commitment to embracing the tremendous opportunities that the Indian Ocean region offers by strengthening partnerships.

"We are committed to strengthening our partnerships across the Indian Ocean, addressing emerging challenges, and embracing the tremendous opportunities this region offers," said Foreign Affairs Adviser Md Touhid Hossain today.

The multiple challenges and other geo-economic and geo-strategic factors require increased cooperation among the States, he said.

Hossain made the remarks while speaking at the plenary session titled "Strengthening Maritime Supply Chains: Overcoming Disruptions and Enhancing Resilience" as part of the 8th Indian Ocean Conference (IOC)-2025 in Muscat, Oman.

Sheikh Humaid Al Maani, Head of the Diplomatic Academy, MoFA, Oman chaired the session.

The foreign adviser said the Indian Ocean region is a crucial strategic area that links the Asia-Pacific and African regions, with profound economic, political and security significance.

The conference provided a platform for participants to engage in "constructive discussions, share ideas, exchange knowledge, identify actionable solutions, and build meaningful partnerships and cooperation" in the region.

"We look forward to working together to ensure a brighter, more prosperous future for all nations of the Indian Ocean and beyond," Adviser Touhid said.

As a littoral state, he said, Bangladesh has long been a centre of maritime activities and it actively participates in various regional platforms, including the Indian Ocean Rim Association and the International Seabed Authority.

The 8th Indian Ocean Conference is being held under the theme "Voyage of New Horizons of Maritime Partnership."

He said Bangladesh places strong importance on maritime cooperation for facilitating the efficient movement of goods, services and people and for advancing food security, energy security, water cooperation, disaster risk reduction and providing fair access to global public goods. Bangladesh advocates for "shared prosperity" through "shared responsibility".

Maritime transport is the main artery of global trade and maritime supply chains remain the backbone of the global economy, he added.

He said eighty percent of global trade by volume, and over seventy percent by value, is transported by sea and the Indian Ocean, the world's third-largest body of water, plays a crucial role in this global trade.

Approximately 80 percent of the world's seaborne oil trade transits through the strategic choke points of the Indian Ocean, making it a vital link between the East and the West.

"Countries depend on the Indian Ocean for the movement of goods through maritime trade routes, safeguarding their economic and energy interests. However, the sector is facing multifaceted challenges that endanger the efficiency, reliability, resilience and sustainability of maritime supply chains," he said.

Maritime supply chain is vulnerable to many challenges like port congestion, capacity limitations, regulatory, operational and administrative issues, cyberattacks, piracy, and geopolitical tensions, which can disrupt the efficiency of maritime supply chains.

"We must also remember that the oceans are not only a driving force for global economic growth but also a vital source of food security," Hossain said.

The oceans are facing growing pressures from population growth, global competition for resources, rising food demand, water scarcity, maritime security threats, climate change, biodiversity loss and marine pollution.

"We need to take appropriate actions to tackle the maritime security threats of piracy, armed robbery, human trafficking, illegal arms trade, and illegal and unregulated fishing, among others. We need to address regulatory and administrative issues," said the foreign adviser.

The global economy, food security, and energy supplies are at increasing risk due to vulnerabilities at key maritime routes, he noted.

"We must take measures to address vulnerabilities and enhance resilience," he said

Strengthening maritime supply chains involves a holistic approach combining technology, infrastructure improvements, strategic planning, risk management strategies and cross-border collaboration.

"We need to facilitate maritime connectivity, reduce the trade barriers," he said, adding that they also need to consider liberalisation of the visa regime, particularly easing visas and other administrative processes for the seafarers, ensuring facilities for them, as their roles are crucial in maintaining the maritime supply chain.

He said the Indian Ocean has historically been a region of great collaboration.

"The benefits of multilateral cooperation in maritime issues are likely to increase over time," Touhid said, adding that to ensure a resilient and improved shared future, it is essential for the countries in the Indian Ocean region to explore opportunities for mutual collaboration across all possible areas.

Each coastal nation should ensure that growth and prosperity in the Indian Ocean region, as well as the surrounding seas and bays, are built on mutual trust, respect.

All nations should understand the idea of equal interests, as all littoral states collaborate to develop together, he added.

"We also must prioritise conservation and the sustainable use of ocean and coastal resources to ensure that the use of these resources does not contribute to the decline in the health of oceanic and coastal environments," the foreign adviser said.​

Bangladeshis’ credit card spending drops in India
Staff Correspondent 16 February, 2025, 22:47


A file photo shows a salesperson swiping credit card of a customer through a POS machine. | New Age photo

Credit card spending by Bangladeshis in India has been falling, while such expenditures in USA, Thailand and Singapore have been rising, according to central bank data.

Industry insiders attribute this shift to India’s restricted visa issuance, which has reduced the number of Bangladeshi patients and tourists visiting the country.

In December 2024, Bangladeshi credit card spending in India fell to Tk 40 crore from Tk 47.2 crore in November.

In contrast, Thailand and Singapore saw substantial increases.

Spending in Thailand reached Tk 64.8 crore in December, up from Tk 42 crore in September, making it the second-largest destination for Bangladeshi credit card transactions abroad.

Similarly, spending in Singapore rose to Tk 41.2 crore in December from Tk 30 crore in September.

Historically, India had been the top destination for Bangladeshi credit card spending abroad. From March 2023 to June 2024, India consistently held the top spot.

However, with the student quota reform protests in July—eventually turning into the movement that led to the fall of the Awami League-led government on August 5—the United States overtook India as the leading destination.

In July 2024, Bangladeshis spent Tk 79 crore in the USA, surpassing India’s Tk 73.2 crore.

By December 2024, the USA maintained the top position with Tk 74.3 crore in transactions, followed by Thailand (Tk 64.8 crore), Singapore (Tk 41.2 crore), and India (Tk 40 crore).

India’s share of total overseas credit card spending by Bangladeshis dropped from 19.95 per cent in December 2023 to just 8.13 per cent in December 2024.

India has traditionally been the most popular outbound destination for Bangladeshis, accounting for around 40 per cent of total travellers due to cultural ties, proximity, and easy visa access.

Following the political transition in August and the formation of the interim government, India scaled down its visa operations in Bangladesh, approving only medical and emergency cases under certain conditions.

As a result, many Bangladeshis seeking medical treatment or travel options have shifted to Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore.

Tourists who previously visited Kolkata are now opting Thailand, Singapore, and Nepal instead.

Meanwhile, domestic credit card transactions in Bangladesh rose by 15.10 per cent in December, reaching Tk 3,215 crore from Tk 2,793 crore in November.

International credit card transactions also increased by 13.98 per cent, amounting to Tk 491.5 crore in December compared to Tk 431.2 crore in November.

Additionally, transactions involving foreign-issued credit cards used within Bangladesh saw an 18.90 per cent rise, climbing to Tk 240.9 crore in December from Tk 202.6 crore in November.​

Dhaka, Delhi agree to establish good working relations: Touhid

Photo: BSS

Foreign Affairs Adviser Md Touhid Hossain today said both Dhaka and Delhi have agreed to establish good working relations by addressing the remaining challenges.

"We agreed that we need to reach a good working relationship," the adviser told reporters at the foreign ministry this afternoon, referring to his recent meeting with Indian External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar in Muscat, Oman.

He noted that trade between the two countries has regained momentum and is approaching previous levels, but some issues, such as visa-related challenges, still need to be resolved.

Responding to a query, the adviser said no specific challenges were identified during the discussion, but both sides acknowledged the need to overcome certain obstacles to further strengthen bilateral ties.

Touhid said he invited Jaishankar to visit Bangladesh, highlighting the existing foreign minister-level mechanism. The last foreign minister-level meeting took place in New Delhi.

He mentioned that Bangladesh would arrange Jaishankar's visit once a suitable date is set.

Regarding the extradition of ousted prime minister Sheikh Hasina, Hossain said no specific discussions were held on the matter, but general issues were discussed.

He said it is an independent issue, and Bangladesh requested Hasina's extradition following the court order.

About the pause in US funding, Touhid clarified that the funding cut is not a Bangladesh-specific issue.

He said Bangladesh needs to find ways to overcome the challenges posed by the cuts.

On the sidelines of the 8th Indian Ocean Conference (IOC), Adviser Touhid met Jaishankar in Muscat, Oman, on Sunday.

During the meeting, both leaders acknowledged the challenges in bilateral relations, underscoring the importance of working together to address them.​

Foreign adviser reacts to Jaishankar’s comments on Dhaka-Delhi ties
NGO Bureau finds no entry of $29 million USAID fund
FE ONLINE REPORT
Published :
Feb 24, 2025 20:37
Updated :
Feb 24, 2025 20:37



India has to decide what kind of relationship it wants with Bangladesh, said Foreign Adviser Touhid Hossain on Monday when asked to respond to the comments of his Indian counterpart S Jaishankar.

“Mr Jaishankar said that Bangladesh has to decide what kind of relationship it wants with India, and my comment on the statement is that at the same time, India has to decide what kind of relationship it wants with Bangladesh,” the foreign adviser told the reporters at the foreign ministry.

"This is the issue for both sides, and there is nothing wrong in making this observation.”

"I think we have a very clear decision over the issue, and that is we want good working relations with India. And it is on the basis of mutual respect and reciprocal interest,” the adviser said.

Responding to another question, he said, India needs to decide what kind of relationship they want with us.

"But he (Mr Jaishankar) said that many in Bangladesh are making negative remarks against India. I do not want to say whether it is justified or not, but my point is that people from both sides are making such remarks. A chief minister of one of their states already called for the deployment of UN forces in Bangladesh. Another of their central ministers has been making remarks against Bangladesh frequently. Having this situation, we are trying to advance our relationship.”

"So, our position is that. We need to move forward to have better relations, brushing aside the silly comments made by a handful of people,” he explained.

But Mr Touhid categorically said that the objectionable remarks made by former prime minister Sheikh Hasina, now in India, is an impediment to advancing bilateral ties between Bangladesh and India.

"If any kind of untoward situation arises here, we will address it, but it is recognised by all that her speeches are adding fuel to the fire,” the foreign adviser noted.

"In the same manner, issuing visas to Bangladeshis is absolutely their sovereign right, and we have nothing to say about it. But when we see that the number of visas is reduced, we will definitely look for alternative ways. It is very natural,” he said.

On Jaishankar’s comment about minorities in Bangladesh, he said that India media has created a fake news campaign to establish that minorities are being tortured here, and on the basis of this campaign, many persons are raising such allegations.

“Moreover, minorities living in Bangladesh cannot be the headache of Indians, as minorities in India cannot be our headache. We should stick to a non-interference policy about it,” he said.

He said the government is looking into the issues related to the minority people living here, as they are the citizens of Bangladesh, and they enjoy the same rights as I enjoy here.

"And the government always tries to ensure these rights,” he added.

About Donald Trump’s comment on the 29 million dollar aid to a Bangladeshi NGO, the adviser said the NGO Affairs Bureau of Bangladesh said that they could not find any such entry.

"And no NGO can have a single penny without bypassing the Bureau, he said, adding that he had not any information in addition to that.

Regarding the reports of Bangladeshis fighting in Ukraine, he said that the ministry has asked the mission in Moscow to look into the matter.

But it is hard to prevent; if they are given Russian citizenship, it will be difficult to get them back, he noted.

"Many undesirable things are happening. None want to see that a Bangladeshi is drowned in the Mediterranean Sea, but such incidents are occurring, and we cannot prevent it despite our serious efforts,” he argued.

Asked to comment on the reports that he has failed to give proper leadership in the foreign ministry in the first six months of the present government, the adviser said, "If a better alternative than me is found who can lead the foreign ministry more efficiently, I am ready to welcome him.”​

Jaishankar’s remarks on Bangladesh: A deeper understanding is necessary

India's External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar. FILE PHOTO: REUTERS

India's External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar recently made some strong remarks about Bangladesh at the Delhi University Literature Festival. Here are some key excerpts from his speech, "Things happened there last year, all of you are aware of it… for us what is very troubling, there are two aspects of it… the spate of attacks on the minorities… it is something which impacts our thinking and… we have to speak up about… they have to make up their mind what kind of relationship they want with us. Because every day, somebody in Bangladesh, who is in the interim government… if they stand up and blame India for everything, and some of the things in the reports are ridiculous… I think this is a decision also that they have to make. About what kind of relationship they want.

"We have sent a very clear signal, okay we are a neighbour, we would like for things to calm down… But we would obviously not like to see the messaging and… signalling which is continuously hostile in a way to India."

Let's start from the very beginning—about what happened in Bangladesh last year. In July-August, a mass uprising erupted against Sheikh Hasina's Awami League government. During the protests, approximately 1,500 students, workers, and citizens lost their lives, while around 20,000 others were injured. A United Nations Fact-Finding Mission reported, "The prime minister herself told security force officials to kill protesters to quell the protests and specifically demanded 'arrest the ringleaders of the protests, the troublemakers, kill them and hide their bodies.'"

Despite these serious allegations, Indian officials and some segments of its media have barely mentioned these facts. They have hardly acknowledged that Sheikh Hasina and numerous other Awami League leaders—whom India has sheltered—stand accused of mass murder. If Mr Jaishankar and other Indian officials are truly aware of what happened in Bangladesh, why this omission?

On the issue of minority attacks, this newspaper, along with other media outlets as well as the interim government itself, have acknowledged and reported on incidents of attacks on minorities after the Awami League's unceremonious ouster. Many of these attacks occurred on August 5-8, when the country totally lacked law enforcement services. A number of minority community members—including Hindu Bangladeshis—were attacked, but some of them were attacked because of their political affiliation with the Awami League and the resentment among people towards the former ruling party.

While this context helps explain the attacks, it does not excuse them. The interim government has repeatedly stated that even a single attack on a member of a minority community is unacceptable.

However, segments of the Indian media have been caught exaggerating reports. And the extent of falsification even extended to presenting events in India as occurring in Bangladesh.

In fact, if we consider how some segments of the Indian media, social media, and commentators on other platforms have covered Bangladesh over the past six months, it has been nothing short of an information war against Bangladesh.

Indian government officials, too, have harped on this matter, with West Bengal Chief Minister Mamata Banarjee even suggesting that India should seek the deployment of UN peacekeeping forces in Bangladesh—raising concerns about Bangladesh's sovereignty.

What about the rights of minorities in India, though? Since 2014, leaders of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) have made many openly hostile remarks against Muslims. Some examples include:

i) On May 14, 2014, BJP leader Giriraj Singh said, "Is it not true that people involved in terror activities belong to a particular religion?"

ii) On September 14, 2014, MP Sakshi Maharaj claimed, "Terrorism is being taught in madrassas."

iii) In March 2016, BJP leader and Union Minister Anantkumar Hegde stated, "As long as Islam exists, there will be terrorism. Until we uproot Islam, we cannot eliminate terrorism."

iv) On February 6, 2018, MP Vinay Katiyar declared, "Muslims should not stay in this country. They have partitioned the country based on population. So why are they still here? They should go to Bangladesh or Pakistan… They have no business being in India."

And these are only a few examples.

On August 14, 2024, Human Rights Watch reported that since March 2024, of the 173 speeches delivered by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, 110 contained Islamophobic remarks.

Yet, Bangladesh has rarely issued statements of concern about minorities in India, treating these issues as the latter country's internal affairs. Notably, India rarely expressed similar concerns about minority rights during Hasina's tenure, despite similar incidents occurring, leading to some deaths and many injuries. Since Hasina's fall, however, India appears to have taken a different approach towards Bangladesh. This raises questions about the sincerity of these recent concerns from India.

Mr Jaishankar has said India has sent a very clear signal that it wants things to "calm down," but it does not want to see hostile messaging from members of the Bangladesh government. Such restraints, however, should be mutual.

In light of that, it is important to mention that BJP leaders have repeatedly accused Bangladeshis of trying to take over the "rightful land" of Indians, referring to them as "Jihadis," "infiltrators," and "termites," who should be identified and drowned in the Bay of Bengal. Do these remarks not come off as hostile?

And what about BJP leader Dilip Ghosh's comment in December 2024—months after the interim government took office—that Bangladesh's forces are no match for India and that Bangladesh's political leaders should "think carefully" about the ongoing turmoil? Was that a friendly message?

Moreover, the continued killings of Bangladeshis by Indian border forces, despite repeated promises of zero border killings, sends more contradictory signals. So does India's failure to share the water of Teesta River with Bangladesh, despite previous assurances.

India should understand that Bangladesh has a legitimate right to feel aggrieved by these and other unresolved matters. And the Indian government should be willing to listen to these grievances instead of ignoring them.

The Bangladesh government, similarly, should listen carefully to the legitimate concerns raised by India. In this case, for example, Mr Jaishankar's point of not sending hostile signals should be taken seriously by the Bangladesh government.

There are two other important lessons that Bangladesh should draw from this situation. First, for years, India engaged only with one political party in Bangladesh—Sheikh Hasina's Awami League—and treated it as the sole representative of the country. Bangladesh must not make the same mistake. India is a vast, diverse nation. The majority of its people, if they truly understood the oppressive nature of Hasina's regime, would likely sympathise with the Bangladeshi people.

Even if there are groups in India we disagree with, we must continue to engage with the broader Indian population. This will benefit both nations.

Second, we must realise that there is no place for ego in foreign policy. Some Bangladeshi commentators have suggested that India's reaction to Hasina's ouster is driven by bruised egos—because India lost a pliant ally and failed to predict the changing political landscape. But foreign policy must not be driven by ego or emotion—and this also applies to us. It should be rooted in pragmatism, common sense, and mutual benefit.

And so, if Bangladesh and India truly want a stable relationship, and we believe they do, both sides must acknowledge their shortcomings and address each other's concerns with sincerity.

Eresh Omar Jamal is head of the editorial department at The Daily Star.​

Will Hasina’s shadow continue to loom over Dhaka-Delhi ties?


VISUAL: SALMAN SAKIB SHAHRYAR

Sheikh Hasina's "leaked" phone call conversations started surfacing about two weeks after she fled to Delhi while facing a people's uprising. The audio clips began circulating on social media with the deposed prime minister feigning a candid conversation, but in fact passing on messages to her party cadres. In one conversation, she said she was not far away, quite close by actually… and she could enter Bangladesh in a jiffy if needed. In another clip, she was heard saying, as she did more recently, that those attacking the houses of Awami League faithfuls had houses of their own, too. The suggestion of counterattacks and incitement of arson was evident.

In his interview with the Indian state-run news agency Press Trust of India about a month after taking over as the interim head of government, Prof Muhammad Yunus was clear: India could keep their trusted ally, but they would have to keep her quiet. The Hindu reported on September 5, "Muhammad Yunus, the head of Bangladesh's interim government, has said that former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina making political remarks from India is an 'unfriendly gesture,' asserting that she must remain silent to prevent the discomfort to both countries until Dhaka requests her extradition."

Yunus was quoted saying, "If India wants to keep her until the time Bangladesh (government) wants her back, the condition would be that she has to keep quiet."

The "leaked" phone conversations stopped surfacing.

Within a couple of months, the ousted premier emerged on social media again, this time addressing large crowds virtually. There was one in London on December 10 that attracted much attention.

The Indian foreign secretary's visit on December 9 provided Dhaka with another opportunity to express its ire about Hasina speaking in public. It was clear from deliberations of both sides that the message had been sent and duly received. Vikram Misri went back to report to the parliamentary standing committee on external affairs, headed by Congress leader Shashi Tharoor, that "India does not endorse deposed Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina's criticism of the interim government in Bangladesh and it remains a pinprick in India-Bangladesh relationship," according to a report in The Hindu. And again, Hasina stopped speaking in public.

More recently, earlier in February, Sheikh Hasina's scheduled address triggered mass anger which is said to have led to the demolition of what remained (it had been partially destroyed in the aftermath of Awami League's fall in August last year) of her father's iconic house on Dhanmondi Road 32. This was the same house where Bangladesh's founding president, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, had been assassinated with his entire family (Hasina and her sister were abroad at that time). This was also the same house that had been one of the nerve centres of Bangladesh's independence movement. It had been turned into a museum and demolition of this house was a loss. But the anger that surged among people was perhaps because Hasina and her cohorts, are still to exhibit even a glimmer of admission, let alone repentance, that they were wrong. The former premier, who will perhaps be remembered as an ousted autocrat, remains boastful and completely oblivious to her misdeeds. Instead, she keeps repeating her intentions to mount a comeback and hold trials of her detractors.

The resulting frenzy lasted for a few days when enraged people also attacked houses of other Awami League leaders in Dhaka and elsewhere in the country, besides the one in Dhanmondi.

The interim government then issued a protest to India saying Hasina should not be allowed to make such "false and fabricated" statements. In response, Delhi summoned the Bangladesh envoy to convey that "India desires a positive, constructive and mutually beneficial relationship with Bangladesh, which has been reiterated several times."

Answering media queries about the Bangladeshi envoy being summoned, Indian foreign ministry spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal went on to add that Delhi had said it was "regrettable that regular statements made by Bangladesh authorities continue to portray India negatively" holding them responsible for internal governance issues. "These statements by Bangladesh are in fact responsible for the persistent negativity."

The foreign ministry official clarified that Sheikh Hasina was speaking "in her individual capacity" and that India had nothing to do with it.

The change of stance is obvious, as is the message. India could not have been clearer that it is not going to hold back Hasina or discourage her from speaking out publicly. The interim government will have to figure out how to resolve whatever problems that might trigger within Bangladesh.

While there are no laws to restrict exiled political leaders—or autocrats, for that matter—from making public statements, precedence might be said to have contributed to certain protocols for the host country.

For instance, Idi Amin of Uganda was granted asylum in Saudi Arabia but forbidden from engaging in politics. In fact, it is reported that Idi Amin was under constant surveillance to ensure that he had no direct contact with Ugandan politics. He was never allowed to return to Uganda.

Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines was flown to Hawaii with US military assistance where he was given asylum, but the US refused to let him make a political comeback from US soil. Despite his attempts to maintain influence in Filipino politics, the US discouraged him from such engagement.

Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia fled to Zimbabwe with Robert Mugabe's assistance where he was granted asylum. Zimbabwe refused repeated extradition requests from Ethiopia for crimes against humanity, but Mengistu was mostly kept away from politics. He continues to live in Zimbabwe under state protection.

Clearly, then, India's refusal to discourage, or restrict, Hasina indicates that it is not too eager to placate the Bangladesh government. Is this a sign for the kind of relationship India wants with Bangladesh? Although it has not been always articulated, except that one time by the Indian army chief, the Indian undertone has always been that it does not quite consider this interim government worthy of its full attention or due consideration since it is not elected.

The latest statement clarifies that India will let Hasina speak whether it bothers Bangladesh or not. But that is just one aspect. It also suggests that India still considers Hasina valuable (or might we say bankable?) and will not lay down restrictions for such a friend only to please Bangladesh's incumbent government. Although there appeared to have been some encouraging movement on both sides, the bilateral relations have remained somewhat wary.

The interim government has always made it clear that it does not mind if Hasina remains in India for the time being (provided that she refrains from public speeches) until her trial is completed when the Bangladesh government will look to have her extradited. So far, India has not spoken about it definitively and will presumably drag its feet for as long as possible. If the bilateral relations remain as they are, India is unlikely to extradite the ousted premier to face trials in Bangladesh, for which she could be given the capital punishment. But that will be later.

Following the foreign ministers' meeting in the Omani capital, there was little substance in what either of them said about their discussions. They touched all the points but refused to give away the specifics. But since then, Bangladesh's council of advisers have quieted down on their India rhetoric, while Hasina has also gone quiet in what appears to be a strained détente.

Tanim Ahmed is digital editor at The Daily Star.​

Indo-Bangla border haats suspended since August
Shakhawat Hossain 02 March, 2025, 22:26

The operations of border haats between Bangladesh and India, dominated by industrial products from the latter, have remained suspended since August after a mass uprising toppled the Awami League regime on August 5, 2024.

Not only the operations of seven border haats on both sides of the borders, inaugurated since 2011, but also building of physical infrastructure of three has also remained suspended, said commerce ministry officials.

The border haats were envisaged by the governments of India and Bangladesh as an instrument primarily to generate livelihood for people living at the border areas of the two countries.

Each border haat is managed and organised by haat management committee of the respective border haat.

Trade at the border haats is permitted to be carried out either on a barter basis or in currency of the country with which the haats share a border.

Besides the aforementioned haats, the previous AL regime had also reached a consensus with the Indian government to make groundwork for six more in future despite criticisms at home that the border haats encouraged black marketers on both sides of the border.

Sunamganj District deputy commissioner Mohammad Ileas Mia told New Age on Sunday that the concerned authority in Meghalaya suspended the operation of haat in Balat without informing them after the change in regime in Bangladesh in August.

Subsequently, the operation of haat at Lauwarghar in Sunamganj was stopped, he said, adding that they had not received any plea from anybody from the local side to resume the operation of the haat.

Officials said that the Sunamganj DC Office had received some e-mails from the other side of the border to resume the operation.

However, those mails were not generated from official channel, they said.

The border haat at Lauwarghar in Sunamganj on the Bangladesh side and at Balat in Meghalaya on the Indian side was the second among those opened between 2010 and 2015.

The other haats are Kurigram (Rangpur)- Kalaichar (Meghalaya), Purba Modhunagar (Feni)- Srinagar (Tripura) and Tarapur (Brahmanbaria)-Kamalasagar (West Tripura).

The World Bank in a report released on September 24, 2018 in its blog said that the total trade at each haat as estimated by the state governments was $6,00,000 a year.

Even if the purchase limit at the haats were doubled, the number of days of operation increased to two days a week and many more haats, say 50, were established along the border, these markets could generate total trade of $120 million a year, said the WB report.

Three more haats were established at both sides in 2021 despite criticisms in Bangladesh mentioning that industrial products from mainland India such as chocolates, cosmetics, baby food and sharis were available in those haats that undermined memorandum of understanding, said the officials.

The operations of the border haats also remained suspended for almost two years due to Covid pandemic.

The operation resumed on May 2022 because of demand placed by stakeholders from both sides.

With the ongoing suspension since August 2024 the border haat management committees are yet to receive any official plea from stakeholders to resume the operation, said Feni District deputy commissioner Saiful Islam.​

Rethinking Bangladesh-India relations
Md Farid Talukder 03 March, 2025, 00:00



BANGLADESH is a dynamic and strategically significant nation, known for its struggles for language, democracy, and independence. Despite its potential to inspire globally, 53 years after independence, it has failed to establish a strong democratic framework or implement an independent foreign policy. While global democracy has expanded, Bangladesh has regressed over the past 15 years. Since the controversial 2009 election, Sheikh Hasina’s Awami League has used state resources to build a fascist regime, eroding democratic values. The clearest signs are the 2014, 2018, and 2024 elections, where citizens were systematically denied their voting rights.

In The Coalition Years: 1996 to 2012, a book, former Indian president Pranab Mukherjee reveals India’s involvement in securing the Awami League’s 2009 election victory. In the 2014 election, India influenced smaller parties like the Jatiya Party to participate, while major opposition parties boycotted, citing an uneven playing field. The 2018 ‘midnight election’ was rejected by opposition parties due to irregularities, including ballot stuffing at night before the election day. In the 2024 elections, the ‘dummy‘ election, the Hasina regime supported ‘dummy’ independent candidates, who were also from the Awami League, to make the election appear credible, leading the international community to label the election as flawed. Despite these issues, India consistently backed the legitimacy of the elections held from 2009 to 2024, bolstering the Awami League’s grip on power. Besides, India played a significant role in softening international criticism of Sheikh Hasina’s repressive regime until her escape to India on August 5, 2024. Reports indicate India pressured Washington to ease its firm stance on Hasina’s government.

Under Sheikh Hasina, Bangladesh’s foreign policy increasingly fell under India’s regulatory influence, shaping its diplomatic and commercial decisions. A notable example is her 2024 state visit to China, where discussions centred on the Teesta project, a river shared with India, and India has unilaterally exploited it, depriving Bangladesh of fair water rights. China expressed interest in financing the project, even conducting feasibility studies, but India opposed its involvement under the guise of security concerns. Before visiting China, the deposed prime minister, Sheikh Hasina, travelled to India twice and ultimately handed the project to India, despite its lack of feasibility studies or the capacity to execute it effectively. Experts argue that this decision was driven by India’s aim to prevent strong Bangladesh-China ties. During her China visit, Hasina faced a lack of expected protocol and economic support, leading her to cut the trip short and return to Bangladesh.

Despite being neighbours, Pakistan and Bangladesh have experienced a strained relationship in the past. Particularly for the past 15 years, many in Bangladesh believe that, due to Pakistan’s strained ties with India and under India’s pressure, Bangladesh has been unable to establish a mutually respectful relationship with Pakistan.

Moreover, India has strategically and profitably used Bangladesh’s territory for connectivity with its seven northeastern states (the Seven Sisters). However, when Bangladesh sought to establish road links with neighbouring countries like Nepal and Bhutan, India did not respond positively to using its territory for these connections.

These events clearly demonstrate how India has confined Bangladesh’s independent foreign policy.

Even after the fall of Sheikh Hasina following the July mass uprising, there has been no visible shift in India’s perspective on Bangladesh that developed during her tenure. The UN Human Rights Commission has found Sheikh Hasina’s direct involvement in the mass killings during the July uprising. However, Hasina still finds refuge in India. In addition, she continues to use phones and social media platforms from there to direct her party members to carry out killings and other forms of repression against students and protesters involved in the uprising.

The Bangladesh government has formally requested India to stop Hasina from using its territory for conspiracies against Bangladesh. Unfortunately, India has taken no visible effective action in response. Indian media outlets spread misinformation about the Bangladesh government, and India still views the overthrow of Hasina’s regime as a conspiracy, with some Indian leaders issuing threats to annex Bangladesh. After crippling Bangladesh’s democracy, human rights, social system, and global respectful positions, Hasina fled to India. This presents a new opportunity for Bangladesh to restore its democracy, rebuild a fair social system, and foster respectful diplomatic relationships with the global community.

Bangladesh has recently signed an important agreement with the US-based company, Argent LNG, as part of its effort to expand international business ties. In this context, Bangladesh continues to work on strengthening its ties with both neighbouring and distant countries.

Moreover, whenever Bangladesh endeavours to strengthen its business ties with China and Pakistan, India lodges complaints with the United States and western nations, alleging that Bangladesh is tilting toward China and attempting to brand it as a ‘militant state.’ This poses a significant challenge to Bangladesh’s foreign policy. Given India’s systematic interference in Bangladesh’s politics, cultures, economy, and foreign policy spheres, it appears that India carries a colonial attitude towards Bangladesh.

Bangladesh, with a population of nearly 200 million, is a huge market with significant potential to grow politically and economically. If Bangladesh, a small country, strengthens its economy, politics, and foreign policy, it could, as India anticipates, further inspire the people in India’s various states struggling for independence. This is perhaps why India seeks to establish control over Bangladesh, aiming to achieve two main objectives: first, to reap economic benefits, and second, to ensure Bangladesh does not become a model that can stir further ongoing movements for political economy and independence in some Indian states.

Md Farid Talukder is an assistant professor of management at McNeese State University, Louisiana, USA and chairman of the South Asia Initiative, a US-based think tank.​

India’s influence and the quest for a democratic South Asia

Visual: Monorom Polok

During British rule, present-day India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh were part of the same colonial structure: British India. Therefore, we have a shared history of resistance against British imperialism, where the people of the subcontinent fought together, bound by common aspirations and cultural connections. However, to counteract this unified struggle, the colonial rulers and their local allies, including the emerging capitalist class and ideological forces, contributed to creating communal divisions. This led to the rise of Hindutva politics and, as a reaction, Muslim-centric political movements, strengthening identity politics. As a result, those who were earlier involved in the anti-British movement later became adversaries based on religious identity. When the British eventually left, the region was left in turmoil, where Hindus and Muslims saw each other as enemies while the British remained the common "friend" of all.

During British rule, investments were made in various sectors, leading to the emergence of a capitalist class that later became the driving force behind the region's development path. After independence, under Jawaharlal Nehru's leadership, India adopted policies that facilitated the growth of a state-sponsored capitalist class. Because of sustained political stability, this capitalist expansion continued uninterrupted, leading to the rise of powerful business groups and a strong industrial foundation in India. However, by the late 1980s, Congress began to weaken, allowing Hindutva politics and the BJP to gain significant traction. Over the past two decades, we have witnessed how large capital and Hindutva politics have merged, reinforcing each other. This connection became especially evident in the 1990s.

While India has witnessed the expansion of large capital, what has been the condition of its people? India is home to some of the world's richest people, but it is also home to the largest number of poor people, where caste- and class-based discrimination is rampant, despite the country's consistent economic growth.

Meanwhile, to sustain its expanding capital, India needs more markets and raw materials. Thus it is easier to understand why India seeks to assert its influence beyond its borders. Alongside economic expansion, the country has also aspired to become a global military power. In the 1990s, India became a nuclear-armed state, conducting nuclear tests that prompted Pakistan to do the same. India has one of the largest military forces globally and is the largest importer of arms.

Within India's own borders, there has been a heavy militarisation process, closely linked to capital interests. In mineral-rich areas, entire communities have been displaced to pave the way for corporate exploitation; this has even led to the emergence of armed resistance movements. Today, a number of areas in India is under some form of militarised control. The most extreme example of this is Kashmir. Beyond Kashmir, military forces have been used to displace people in resource-rich areas under the guise of "development."

Due to the nature of global capitalism, Indian capital cannot always be separated from multinational capital. Indian capital is practically interlinked with, among others, US, Japanese, and German capital through subcontracts, partnerships, and joint ventures, forming a multinational economic dominance. This is why the US has been promoting India as the regional leader for decades. Washington relies on India as a strategic counterbalance to China, seeking to establish its footing in the region through India.

International financial institutions like the World Bank and Asian Development Bank (ADB) have promoted policies such as structural adjustment programmes, privatisation, commercialisation, and globalisation. Indian capital has been one of the major beneficiaries of these policies. This is evident in the various agreements Bangladesh has signed with India concerning electricity, water, rivers, and industrial sectors. While these agreements reflect competition between capital interests, they also highlight strategic alliances.

Over the past decade, Bangladesh has entered into agreements with India that have significantly favoured the latter's big capital interests. Previous governments also made unequal agreements with India, but the Sheikh Hasina administration showed unprecedented submission. Hasina needed a guarantee of perpetual power without elections, leading to her complete dependence on India. She openly admitted, "What we have given to India, they will remember forever." She further stated that she expected no return. However, it now seems she does seek something in return: her own security.

Whenever Bangladesh's issues with India are discussed, the 1971 Liberation War is brought up. It is true that India supported Bangladesh during our Liberation War. When Pakistan's military launched a brutal genocide, around one crore Bangladeshis took refuge in India. The Indian people provided invaluable support, demonstrating unparalleled empathy and solidarity. We must always remain grateful for this. However, it is important to note that the government in power at that time was led by Congress, not the BJP, which did not even exist then.

Another critical question is: just because the Indian people supported Bangladesh in 1971, does that mean Bangladesh should now be indebted to the Indian government? Should Bangladesh be forced to favour Indian conglomerates like Adani? Must we sacrifice the Sundarbans, our airports, seaports, and borders to serve India's interest over our own? A state is never benevolent—its actions are always driven by strategic interests. India's decision to support Bangladesh in 1971 was also strategic. However, the support from the Indian people was driven by humanity and ideology. While we remain thankful for the Indian people's past support, that does not mean that we have to give in to India's capitalist exploitation.

The people of Bangladesh have specific grievances, problems, and opinions regarding India. Among these are water and river disputes, border killings, transit issues, unbalanced trade, and political interference in Bangladesh's internal affairs. And grievances against India's current foreign policy stance are not limited to Bangladesh alone; it has also attempted to exert influence over Nepal, Bhutan, the Maldives, and Sri Lanka. Consequently, India has different levels of distrust, conflicts, and tensions with these countries as well. The problems between us, therefore, are not just communal issues; rather, they stem from the "big brother" attitude of a powerful state and its large capital.

For the interest of the people of the region, we badly need a peaceful, democratic South Asia. To eliminate unrest, violence, and inequality in South Asia, we need collective efforts. In this regard, it is also important to recognise how the Indian people themselves are victims of the existing system. Ultimately, the interests of the people of South Asia, including India, are fundamentally aligned.

Our common struggle should, therefore, be for a South Asia free from oppression, inequality, and imperialistic control. To achieve this, it is now more crucial than ever to build solidarity among the people of the entire region.

Anu Muhammad is former professor of economics from Jahangirnagar University.​

India seeks friendly ties with Bangladesh: Rajnath Singh
Dhaka
Published: 09 Mar 2025, 14: 40


Indian defence minister Rajnath Singh UNB

Indian defence minister Rajnath Singh has said that India seeks to uphold amicable relations with Bangladesh, just as it does with all its neighbouring countries.

“India always wants to maintain good relations with its neighbours, and Bangladesh is no exception. Former prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee used to say that we can change friends, but not our neighbours. So, we would like to maintain good relations with Bangladesh,” Rajnath said in an exclusive interview with IANS on Saturday.

At a media briefing in New Delhi on Friday, official spokesperson at the Indian Ministry of External Affairs Randhir Jaiswal said they support a “stable, peaceful, inclusive and progressive” Bangladesh in which all issues are resolved through democratic means and by holding “inclusive and participatory” elections.

He expressed concerns over "deteriorating law and order situation" in Bangladesh which has been further exacerbated by the release of violent extremists who were sentenced for serious crimes.

Officials of Bangladesh and India held the 86th meeting of the Joint River Commission in Kolkata where they discussed the pros and cons of renewing the 30-year-old Ganges water-sharing treaty which comes up for renewal next year.

Spokesperson Jaiswal said the two sides discussed technical issues pertaining to the Ganga Water Treaty, measurement of water flows and other issues of mutual interest.

On alleged violence against minorities, including Hindu minorities in Bangladesh, the MEA Spokesperson said they expect Bangladesh to thoroughly investigate and bring all perpetrators of killings, arson and violence to justice without making such distinctions.​

The peculiar case of India-Bangladesh relations
Ali Ahmed Ziauddin 13 March, 2025, 00:00



FRIENDS or foes? Neither can decide! At best it’s peculiar, at worst, vague and a sordid affair. Both, until recently, claimed to be best friends, ie, until the July-August 24 upheaval. India is furious, and its leaders don’t mince words. I wonder why such vitriol. On the face of it, they are angry over the communal atrocities for 2-3 weeks following Hasina’s overthrow. It’s deplorable and indefensible. The interim government timely condemned, regretted and took prompt measures to rein in the mayhem. Yet, Indian fury doesn’t seem to dissipate. The ongoing media campaign even six months later seems more like a coordinated effort to malign Bangladesh. It’s important to note we didn’t invent communalism; it’s a majoritarian, disgraceful evil trait present in vicious form across the subcontinent ever since the early decades of the 20th century. And the less we mention the systemic torment of the Muslims in India for the past decade, the better.

Bangladesh endured several political turmoils in its brief history and India had duly expressed concern. But this time it seems to have turned bitter. It has acted as if India lost something very precious. Has it? If so, what is it? But before inquiring into the intangibles, it is vital to look into the evolution of Indo-Bangla relations ever since our liberation war and how we have reached this point.

There is no such thing called unconditional friendship. Every relationship has its share of ups and downs, ambiguities, tensions, and also external factors on a varying scale, whether it’s conjugal, parental, among siblings, or among friends. But in these cases when differences are intractable, the impact remains limited, while the same cannot be said about neighbouring states of varying size and power. They may lead to tension and even deteriorate further, especially among neighbours sharing history, geography, and culture. This rule generally applies to all.

The contentious issues

THE first crack in the blood-soaked alliance forged during the liberation war appeared right after victory. The Indian packed all the military equipment left behind by the Pakistanis that justly belonged to liberated Bangladesh. The goodwill the Indian army had earned from the people took a dent. It worsened when the Indian civil servants who had hoped to administer the new country at the district level were not allowed. And when prime minister Sheikh Mujibur Rahman firmly made it clear he wanted the Indian army to leave as early as possible, it further displeased many in the then Indian leadership. Some sections of Indian elites had secretly wished Bangladesh would join India; they had regarded the creation of Pakistan as an affront, so when it fell apart, they argued there was no logic to remain separate anymore. Little did they guess that the taste of freedom has its own dynamic. We had fought for independence from Pindi not to lose it to Delhi. Although the Indian side was disappointed, they duly withdrew the forces from Bangladesh within 2/3 months but nursed a grudge against Bangladesh for its refusal to bend to their will. This resentment lingered while new frictions over multiple other issues piled on.

The next tense moment was when Mujib went to Lahore to attend the OIC summit. It was only natural for us to pursue our own policy priorities; Indians, however, were upset; of all the places to Pakistan and so soon? They were perhaps under a false impression that we would coordinate with them on foreign policy. India was jolted to see Bangladesh under Mujib was firm to pursue an independent course within the ambit of the non-aligned movement and OIC. This triggered some snide remarks from a few senior Indian politicians, such as ‘Mrs. Gandhi helped create another Pakistan.’ Soon afterwards, the Farakka barrage went into operation, completely insensitive to the environmental and economic havoc it would cause in Bangladesh.

And then came the bloodied political changeover of August 1975; India-Bangladesh relations took a nosedive. Mistrust and hostility replaced trust and friendship. While we rightly feared Indian intervention, the Indians were equally right in fearing the ghost of Pakistan perhaps got resurrected in Bangladesh. In such a climate, constructive engagement was difficult. Apart from the brief Ganges treaty in 77, our friendship was at loggerheads. Any scope to harass or discomfit each other became the norm. Sheltering and arming the Santi Bahini became a handy tool of the Indian side to put pressure on Bangladesh. Likewise, we did not shy away from sheltering many of the insurgents from the northeastern Indian states. This was one of the key reasons, apart from claims of illegal migration, why India began to erect fences on the border from the mid to late eighties, which, however, couldn’t stop either the insurgents or the migrants. It had a multi-dimensional negative impact on the already tense relationship that sadly still lingers on.

By the early nineties, though regular diplomatic contacts were maintained and we had become fellow members of SAARC, yet beneath the surface there was little warmth in the friendship. The destruction of Babri and the ensuing communal clash in India reverberated in Bangladesh; it made matters worse. When we raised the Farakka issue in the UN, it embarrassed India, alright, but it didn’t get any attention from others. While the Indians viewed our diplomatic outreach with the outside world with derision, we quite naturally regretted such an attitude. In hindsight, it seems the result of nearly two decades of a series of futile expectations in an unhappy relationship that neither side could resolve took its toll.

But thankfully by the late nineties such a sullen state of affairs improved considerably. The new Awami League government in Bangladesh was more sympathetic to the Indian concerns, while the new coalition government in India didn’t carry much baggage from the past Congress governments. In quick succession, at the initiative of the then Bangladesh prime minister, Sheikh Hasina, two accords on the Ganges water sharing and CHT created an atmosphere for recalibrating the once mutually beneficial relation. But it was not to be. India felt let down when we refused to sell gas, citing uncertain reserves, and when the border clash resulted in several BSF deaths, the bonhomie ended abruptly. Even after the government change in Bangladesh in 2001, there was no warming up. Once again the relationship entered uncharted territory with little warmth.

But the puzzling part of the India-Bangladesh relations is that while it was shaky and not so warm all this time, the trade balance kept increasing by leaps and bounds in India’s favour. It was worrying; was Bangladesh becoming a captive market of India? The friendship went from bad to worse; it started on the wrong footing early on under the new BNP govternmen in Bangladesh. Right after the election, for a few weeks, there was constant reporting of minority persecution by the ruling party men. Obviously this didn’t go well with India or the people with secular views within Bangladesh.

And then within the next few years, two major incidents jolted the Indians to conclude the Pakistani ISI was very much active inside Bangladesh to the detriment of India’s security concerns. First, to both our utter disbelief, a huge cache of arms and ammo was apprehended in the Chittagong port area meant for an insurgent group in northeast India. Next, the attempt on Sheikh Hasina’s life and other AL leaders in broad daylight justifiably convinced the Indians and many conscious people in Bangladesh that both were the handiwork of ISI, aided by a Bangladeshi intelligence agency and a section of the political leadership. On top of all this, when Bangladesh refused the gas transit facility from Burma to India, the relationship went on a tailspin.

Over the next few years of uncertainty in Bangladesh, other than routine diplomatic communiqués, nothing much or new happened in the relationship. But by 2009, when Awami League returned to power, things began to change quite early in its tenure. Bangladesh put a full stop on assisting the insurgency in northeastern states. It also got rid of all alleged ISI operatives in its territory and then one after another, both countries resolved a number of pending but tricky issues. Starting from the delimitation in the Bay to the land border settlement to taking care of India’s long-sought-after transit facility created the necessary conditions for a mutually beneficial, good neighbourly relation to grow. However, while these goodwill acts were set in motion, dark clouds were appearing on the horizon. The insensitive gestures, the sound bites, and the ugly communal acts in India offered enough ammo to unnerve Bangladeshi sensibilities.

The sudden cancellation of the Teesta deal at the last minute, citing West Bengal’s objections, shelved it into indefinite abeyance; a huge disappointment for Bangladesh. And in recent times, India is planning to lift more water from it upstream. Bangladesh has asked for clarification but hasn’t received any response yet. Moreover, in spite of all the promises, border killings go on unabated, and the trade disparity continues to remain lopsided against Bangladesh. Moreover, when Bangladesh bought two submarines from China, it upset India; some of the Indian diplomats conveyed their displeasure in no uncertain terms. And then the new government in India made it abundantly clear India was no longer a secular state. Carrying a Muslim name became a suspect in India. Their persecution regularly by Hindu extremists in broad daylight has now become nearly a daily spectacle. It reminds us of the position of the Jews in Nazi Germany. While India regularly raised the issue of communal discord in Bangladesh, we remained silent.

India couldn’t care less how such insensitivity might impact the Muslim feelings on the other side of the border. Muslims were labelled ‘termites’ by top political leaders. Such viciousness wasn’t an empty threat; it turned into policy when nearly a million Assamese Muslims were clearly threatened with deportation to Bangladesh. Perhaps India’s pent-up grudge never dissipated; it finds expression in frequent inexplicable frictions. Add to all these incongruities the border killing, fencing, and total silence from the Indian side to even discuss the Teesta deal.

Next came the nasty media campaign in India against Bangladesh for remaining neutral during the border clash with China. Why would Bangladesh take sides? It had no direct interest, but India wasn’t happy. They readily cited India’s role in our liberation war. This is an issue they regularly remind us of, completely ignoring the fact that India got involved because it had a direct strategic interest, not only for altruistic motives. The creation of Pakistan wasn’t only a political setback for India’s dream of an undivided India but evolved into a direct security threat for India. Our liberation war provided an attractive prospect for India to do away with the threat on the eastern front. India needed to break Pakistan; we needed our independence. Both our interests converged; we aided each other to achieve our goals. Yes, both sacrificed a lot, India in terms of resources and we in blood, tear and toil. We certainly recognise India’s contribution in our liberation war, but India too must realise Bangladesh is no one’s gift. This surely doesn’t mean we need to belittle our partnership forged in the battlefield. Instead we ought to be the best of friends as neighbours based on reciprocity, truthfulness, and mutual respect.

Now let’s look at the sordid tale of the Teesta barrage deal. For the past 15 years India simply refused to make a fair deal on Teesta water sharing. Bangladesh approached China to construct a barrage on our side of the river in order to protect erosion and preserve water for irrigation. It was the only rational choice we had in the face of India’s denial to give our due share of water. China did a preliminary study and submitted a detailed report. India threw in a spanner; they proposed to do the project. The spineless and corrupt AL government concurred. India is the primary cause for us to have considered such a costly barrage in the first place. But bewilderingly, it gets to build the remedy! India’s presumed control over Bangladesh via its AL proxy was complete.

Or was it?

The intangible issues

IN PRE-MODERN times, size, strength and resources were the key elements in defining the relation between neighbouring states. With the advent of modern nation-states, this somewhat changed, largely because of the UN charter. It recognises each other’s sovereignty no matter the size or any other condition, and noninterference in the internal affairs of the other is considered sacred. That’s all fair, wise and admirable, at least in the books. But navigating relationships between neighbouring states in real life is entirely different. Here, size, strength, resources, power, and influence provide obvious advantages to one party over the other. The weaker party appeals, complains, and threatens, but to no avail; the stronger party gets its way. The world is witnessing such a skewed relationship between the US, Canada and Mexico. Using this lens may help decipher the mystery of India-Bangladesh relations.

Of course, another dimension of this relation is a few millennia of shared history and geography. No matter how we define the present, we cannot escape this fact. This acts both as a boon and a bane depending on multiple variable conditions. Like the rest of the world, the history of this region too is a mixture of facts and fiction depending on the bias of the reader. History, after all, is a science that tries to understand the past and dares to question why and how they impact the present. In this journey, apart from scant archaeological evidence and scarce written records, much is determined by a compilation of conjectures, not arbitrarily but based on intuitive knowledge following a logical framework. While construing history, the historian surely lives in the present. And the present edifices perhaps innocently but invariably influence the logical framework and the deductive method of his/her conjectures of the past, no matter how little or a lot; it’s inescapable.

Applying this method of history reading, one may perhaps begin to make some sense of the shaky Indo-Bangla relation. Trying to view it from either 1971 or 1947 will be partial at best and confusing at worst. It needs to be traced to ancient times. To cut a long story short, in the context of the present purpose, it may be necessary to glance at the roots of the Indian national movement in its formative years. It was led mostly by a privileged elite from the higher castes, who had hoped to create a free, independent, undivided nation-state of India (Akhand Bharat), the last being a cherished dream of all the rulers from early times. Such a dream, however, had a caveat. It was never a historical fact, at least since 1500 BCE, except perhaps briefly under Asoka, which can be viewed as an aberration in view of three and a half millennia of its history. In between, India was dotted with multiple large/small feudal states or principalities before the Common Era, to large and small kingdoms until 1947.

During this period, India was a multi-racial, lingual, religious and regional geographical entity engaged in regular tussles for territorial expansion or supremacy. However, there is another opinion that believes in the historicity of the storylines embedded in the epics that can be traced to mythical times. Even though this view wasn’t dominant, it nonetheless nurtured the idea of recreating Akhand Bharat, where Brahminic doctrine would govern.

Although the mainstream in the national movement spurned this view, it, however, developed a majoritarian complex and expected all other religious and racial groups, backward castes, regions and other minorities to agree to its national narrative. Most of these groups, despite serious concerns, had little choice other than to fall in line. One group that refused to do so was the Muslims. Being the largest minority, they chose to create a separate homeland. In the tumultuous pre-partition times, whether it was a viable proposal was of little concern. Populist politics won the day, resulting in partition. The festering wound of communal divide got constitutional recognition. The dream of Akhand Bharat faded. The carnage that followed left a permanent imprint in the collective memory of the later generations. The pervasive bitterness it created polluted the entire region, be it in inter-state, inter-community or interpersonal.

According to the mainstream Indian opinion, Pakistan and, by extension, the Muslims were the spoilers in shattering the undivided India project. They became the undeclared enemy while Pakistan, in its infancy, lost its way in the world, nagging over Kashmir and blaming India for all ills that befell them. So it’s no wonder that Indo-Pak relations have been nothing but hostile from the very beginning. This was the background when the Bangladesh liberation war burst open in the subcontinent. It changed the power alignment in this entire region. India was presented a golden opportunity by the fools in Rawalpindi, and surely it wouldn’t let it go. India had so much to gain. It could prove the ‘two nation’ theory wrong, solve the security threat on the eastern front permanently, and third, by intervening, it could also earn a lot of goodwill from both Bangladesh and a wide range of world opinion. Moreover, the prospect of Akhand Bharat could be revived sometime in the future. Hence, from the very beginning, Indian policy planners considered Bangladesh somewhat between a friendly neighbour within its sphere of influence and an unruly neighbour that dares to have a mind of its own, thus posing some security threat. It couldn’t decide whether Bangladesh is a friend or a foe. Thus, it never let go of the pressure in various forms.

The key reason for this attitude was they viewed the Bangladesh liberation war as an Indian project and a liberated Bangladesh as a gift from India. Thus, India expected Bangladesh to act accordingly and remain somewhat servile. When the latter refused or showed reluctance to comply, India adopted a different tactic: to patronise, pressure and cajole Bangladesh into submission to its point of view. Obviously, it was humiliating and hard for us, and we naturally resisted. Such policy thrust was never spelled out, but the cat-and-mouse chase was always at play behind the formal façade of diplomatic interactions. In such a canvas in the background, it was hard from both ends to find some kind of equilibrium until AL under Hasina came to power. Her first term, beginning in 1996, was noted by a few vital inter-state accords, ushering in a spirit of good neighbourly relations. However, her second term for the past 15 years slowly turned from initial cooperation to total submission, especially after 2013. The reasons were many, but the two key ones were her desire to effectively silence opposition and, second, squander national wealth for personal and party benefit. She became the mafia boss presiding over a racketeering empire with the unequivocal support of the Indian state in exchange for obliging all Indian demands even to the detriment of Bangladesh’s sovereignty.

It’s for this reason why India was so displeased with Bangladesh when she was overthrown. Ever since, India has been waging an intensive media and diplomatic campaign to smear and discredit Bangladesh from every possible corner. It gives the impression as if India has lost something very precious. What is it? Has it lost a vital pawn in its geopolitical rivalry with China? Or did the grand plot of Akhand Bharat get a rude shock? Or is it the prospect of losing a captive market? Or is it all of these combined? Whatever it may be, Bangladesh has the legitimate right to get rid of a hated tyrant even if one had become India’s satrap. However, both sides should realise history does not end; it evolves.

The way ahead

BOTH countries need to take serious steps to repair, reset, and reinvent their relationship; we don’t choose neighbours; we have to share this part of the world. In the wake of the July-August uprising, going back to business as usual is neither possible nor desired. In light of this broad lesson, the following is a brief road map on how to proceed towards improving an awkward and strained relationship.

Bangladesh must realise it cannot afford to have a hostile relationship with India that may veer off into armed conflict. In such a scenario, we have nothing to gain but everything to lose. We need to be careful not to let any third country use our land to pose any security threat to India. Moreover, we must clarify that we have no interest in building any military alliance with anyone aimed at India, least of all with Pakistan. It’s a failed state and has nothing much to offer; it’s alright to maintain a normal, friendly and trade relation, and that’s all. India is our second biggest trading partner; it would be unwise to disrupt the supply chain. Another sensitive issue is the plight of the minority communities in both countries. We have to take firm and determined measures that will eradicate the causes of concerns of these communities. Lastly, we need not get too agitated over India sheltering Hasina. We have placed our request for her deportation; let India take its time to decide over the matter. A positive Indian response would go a long way in improving relations.

What do we expect from India? India has a Muslim problem. They are viewed as descendants of invaders. It’s true, but judging history through the lens of the present will be grossly misleading. In pre-modern times, all feudal monarchies, irrespective of race, region or religion, acted likewise; they were all predatory by nature. The Hindu, Buddhist monarchies of India were no different. Selective history reading is not only harmful but also gives rise to irrational perspectives and ambitions. If Muslims are accused of desecrating Hindu temples, some Hindu monarchs did the same to several Buddhist monasteries once the latter’s influence waned. Even a few Hindu monarchs are not free of similar charges against defeated fellow Hindu kingdoms. Moreover, some Indian monarchs were no less invaders than the Muslims; otherwise, it’s difficult to explain their inroads into Southeast Asia.

The Indian national movement in its formative years jostled with both modernity and its Brahminic past. It refused to recognise the valid concerns of more than 25 per cent of India’s population, who were Muslims, that triggered the Pakistan movement. Sadly, the friction still endures; now, over the past millennia, nearly 60 crore people of this subcontinent are Muslims; can India wish them away? Pushing them too hard can only result in horrific carnage and catastrophe. Is it desirable in this nuclear age of the 21st century?

A puppet regime in Bangladesh will be counterproductive for India. It may prove to be more of a bane than a boon. Cultivating a development partnership with any third country is Bangladesh’s prerogative, be it with China or any other. Bangladesh is a vibrant country of nearly 170 million people; looking at it only through the lens of security will be a travesty. Bangladesh is an assured market for India; does India want to ruin it? To expect and build a trusting relationship with us, it needs to take a few quick actions, like addressing the issue of water sharing of the common rivers, stopping the anti-Bangladesh media campaign, stopping the border killings and stopping Hasina from inciting agitation in Bangladesh. With these measures from both ends, we can rebuild a more mature and amicable relationship.

Ali Ahmed Ziauddin is a researcher and activist.​