[🇧🇩] Indo-Bangla Relation: India's Regional Ambition, Geopolitical Reality, and Strategic Options For Bangladesh

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Indo-Bangladesh relationship

I BELIEVE that the relationship between Dhaka and Delhi could have been as strong as the one between Washington and London. The Washington-London relationship is special, characterised by mutual respect and trust. But it is unimaginable for America to interfere in Britain’s internal affairs, or...

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Indo-Bangladesh relationship
Abdur Razzaq 29 September, 2024, 00:00

I BELIEVE that the relationship between Dhaka and Delhi could have been as strong as the one between Washington and London. The Washington-London relationship is special, characterised by mutual respect and trust. But it is unimaginable for America to interfere in Britain’s internal affairs, or those of France or Germany.

Why isn’t there a similar relationship between India and Bangladesh? The short answer is that India tends to dominate and exploit Bangladesh, taking undue advantage from defence, strategic and economic perspectives. India often prioritises its own interests over Bangladesh’s legitimate needs. This mindset has existed since before India’s independence in 1947.

In March 1946, the Labour government under prime minister Clement Attlee sent the Cabinet Mission to India to address the country’s complex constitutional issues. The Cabinet Mission rejected the idea of Pakistan, instead proposing a federal India with three groups: Group A (present-day India), Group B (present-day Pakistan), and Group C (Bengal and Assam). The Muslim League accepted this plan, but the Congress, led by Jawaharlal Nehru, rejected it, seeking a united India under Hindu majority rule. Historians agree that the Cabinet Mission plan could have been the best solution, potentially avoiding partition and subsequent wars and creating a subcontinent similar to Western Europe. Moreover, present-day India would have been the leader of the groups. However, that was not to be because of the narrow mindset of the Congress.

Unfortunately, the same Indian attitude persists today. Over the past 15 years, India has supported a brutal dictatorship in Bangladesh, disregarding the will of the Bangladeshi people, leading to widespread anti-India sentiment. India also has strained relationships with other neighbours, including Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nepal and the Maldives.

Our relationship with India depends on whether Bangladesh has a democratic or undemocratic government. It was shameful when the de facto head of Bangladesh’s interim government in 2007, Moin U Ahmed, asked Indian leader Pranab Mukherjee to secure his position. It was even more disgraceful when a foreign minister under Sheikh Hasina publicly asked India to help keep Hasina in power, as if Bangladesh were an Indian colony. Sheikh Hasina herself has declared, ‘I have given so much to India that they could not think of anymore,’ implying that her duty as prime minister was to protect India’s interests. This mentality has led to a belief that Bangladesh cannot survive without appeasing India. However, on August 5, this was proven wrong by our people, led by young students.

We are a nation of 173 million people. Our strength lies in our national unity, democracy, judicial independence, rule of law, economic development and constitutionalism. By preserving these values, we can engage with any regional or global power with honour and dignity.

Our relationship with India has faced significant challenges over the years. In May 1975, the Indian government initiated the Farakka Barrage project as a ‘trial run’ by misleading the Mujib government. This ‘trial run’ has continued for 50 years, causing severe ecological damage, particularly in the Rajshahi region of northeastern Bangladesh. The once-mighty Padma River has dried up over many miles, and the current generation has no idea of its former grandeur. Additionally, we have been deprived of our fair share of water from the River Teesta, which is now a point of contention between China and India.

We have granted India transit and transshipment rights, potentially compromising our sovereignty. The nation remains unaware of the benefits gained in return, despite the past government claims that this would transform Bangladesh into a new Singapore. Furthermore, the public is largely unaware of the terms and conditions of many treaties signed with India, even though Article 145A of our constitution requires all treaties to be presented before parliament. We suffer losses in border and international trade with India, and the Indian Border Security Force frequently kills our citizens at the border with impunity.

It is widely known that India’s foreign policy towards Bangladesh is primarily shaped by its intelligence agency, RAW, which is problematic.

We desire a good neighbourly relationship with India, based on equality and mutual respect between two sovereign nations. We do not want a repeat of the past government’s submissive foreign policy towards India. Our politicians should recognise that India is not monolithic and should engage with its diverse society to benefit Bangladesh. They need to develop the confidence to do so.

Once we have our internal affairs in order, we should reevaluate and renegotiate all unfair clauses in our agreements and treaties with India, asserting our sovereignty with honour and dignity.

Historically, Indian political leadership has sought to dominate and exploit neighbouring countries, leading to poor and sometimes sour relationships. This is a dark chapter in India’s foreign policy, and ultimately, India is the loser. The sooner India realises this, the better it will be for India, its people, and its neighbouring countries in the Himalayan subcontinent.

Abdur Razzaq is a senior advocate of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh and practising barrister in England.​

 

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Hindus security, Shiekh Hasina’s Extradition, BNP General Secy Alamgir says, “Ice started to melt”

 

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Why is the BJP playing the 'Bangladeshi infiltrator' card?

BJP is making infiltration an election campaign plank in Santhal Parganas and Kolhan.

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Why is the BJP playing the 'Bangladeshi infiltrator' card?

File photo: AFP

Led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, India's ruling Bharatiya Janata Party has placed "infiltration" of Rohingyas and Bangladeshis at the core of its high-decibel campaign for assembly elections in the eastern state of Jharkhand due later this year. At a series of public meetings in a space of one week or so, Modi and his close aide Amit Shah, home minister, amplified the infiltration issue in their separate ways. But some comments made by Shah at one of the rallies drew a sharp retort from the Bangladesh foreign ministry.

Shah may not have been entirely unaware that his remarks in Jharkhand could raise the hackles in Bangladesh like his "termite" description of allegedly illegal immigrants from Bangladesh in the run up to West Bengal assembly elections had done more than three years ago.

It was Prime Minister Narendra Modi who first raised the issue of infiltration at a rally in Jamshedpur, Jharkhand, when he blamed the state's ruling coalition of Jharkhand Mukti Morcha (JMM), Congress and Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD) for change of demography in Santhal Parganas and Kolhan by allegedly facilitating infiltration of Rohingya and Bangladeshis. He said Bangladeshi and Rohingya infiltration poses a major threat to Jharkhand as it is "rapidly changing" the identity and demography of the Santhal Pargana and Kolhan regions. Thereafter Amit Shah, BJP President J P Nadda and senior leader Shivraj Singh Chouhan, in their separate rallies, also flagged the issue.

Nadda in his speech accused the JMM-led alliance of patronising the forces indulging in "love jihad," "land jihad" and "infiltration jihad." Shah too, at a rally at Giridih, said, "If infiltration is not checked, illegal immigrants will become the majority in Jharkhand in the coming 25-30 years. They are marrying our daughters, grabbing land and destroying rich tribal culture."

Hitting back, the JMM and the Congress have maintained that the BJP needs to answer how infiltration was taking place, if at all, since protecting the international borders is the central government's responsibility (BSF which guards the border with Bangladesh). They have also accused the BJP of "playing Hindu-Muslim politics by stoking tensions before the elections."

BJP leader Asha Lakra, a member of National Commission for Scheduled Tribes, had led a team of the Commission to Jharkhand to probe reports of infiltration in the state. She told The Hindu that their probe "confirmed that infiltration is taking place" and has documented purported "evidence" of this in its 28-page report which is largely based on anecdotal material gathered from conversations with "neighbours, panchayat members, and villagers." The report, she said, has been submitted to the Home Ministry.

Why has BJP made infiltration as the main election campaign plank in Santhal Parganas and North Chotanagpur and Kolhan region in the southern part of the state? The party's leaders claim the issue finds resonance among the tribals in the state's Santhal Pargana district which accounts for 18 of the 28 Scheduled Tribes (ST)-reserved seats in the assembly whose total strength is 82 including a nominated member. The party, which now has just four MLAs in Santhal Parganas, is aiming to increase the number against Jharkhand's ruling alliance led by regional outfit Jharkhand Mukti Morcha led by Hemant Soren who has inherited the political legacy of his father Shibu Soren. The BJP hopes its espousal of the cause of tribals in Jharkhand would find resonance beyond the state's borders. It is relevant to point out that infiltration has been a major poll plank of BJP in West Bengal and Assam which have for decades witnessed the influx of undocumented people from Bangladesh.

The BJP has sought to make a political capital out of an order of the Jharkhand High Court about the institution of an independent fact-finding committee to probe the "infiltration of Bangladeshi immigrants" in Santhal Parganas. This, according to the court, is necessary because of the "conflicting" stands taken by the Centre and the state on the subject. The court has been hearing a Public Interest Litigation since 2022 which alleged Bangladeshi infiltration in Santhal Pargana area. "The State is disputing the infiltration issue, while the data, which has been furnished, as has been taken note in the order (August 8) with respect to decrease of the tribal population from 44.67% in the year 1951 to 28.11% in the year 2011 reflects otherwise," noted the court order. "However, linkages to Bangladeshi immigrants in any of these land related cases have not been established so far," reads an affidavit submitted by the Union Ministry of Home Affairs. Amit Shah has welcomed the Jharkhand High Court's directive to form a committee to investigate the infiltration from Bangladesh and said the Centre would soon form a committee with the help of the Jharkhand government to probe it.

The Indian government's anti-money laundering agency Enforcement Directorate has initiated an investigation under the stringent Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA) against illegal infiltration of Bangladeshis and Rohingya in Jharkhand, a section of the Indian media reported. The ED's enforcement case information report under PMLA is based on a FIR of Ranchi police registered at Bariyatu on June 6 but the ED will look into the larger issues including the money generated from infiltration being channelised into politics. The case is a first under PMLA as the ED is investigating the involvement of suspected human trafficking agents.

Jharkhand police's FIR relates to the trafficking of six girls—Rohingyas and Bangladeshis—who were apprehended during a raid. Subsequent investigation showed they had obtained identity papers and Aadhaar cards in Hindu names based on fake documents arranged by human trafficking agents from Kolkata. The ED has already gathered details from other central agencies related to the operation of a syndicate engaged in trafficking Bangladeshis and Rohingya through forests in Jharkhand. A network operating out of Kolkata is engaged in forging documents to help the alleged infiltrators pass themselves off as Indians from Bengal, sources said.

Pallab Bhattacharya is a special correspondent for The Daily Star. He writes from New Delhi, India.​

 

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India needs to pursue equal partnership with Bangladesh

If Bangladesh and India are to forge a more equitable friendship, three existing bilateral issues need to be addressed.

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India needs to pursue equal partnership with Bangladesh

Gautam Adani, founder and chairman of India’s Adani Group, meets former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina at Gono Bhaban on July 15, 2023. PHOTO: X/Gautam Adani

India is often portrayed as Bangladesh's closest ally. The two nations share a strategic partnership grounded in shared history, economic interdependence and strong cultural ties. However, this relationship has frequently been characterised by a power imbalance, with India being in a position to exert dominance over Bangladesh. If Bangladesh and India are to forge a more equitable friendship, three existing bilateral issues need to be addressed.

A vexing issue that has been in deadlock for decades is the disadvantages imposed on Bangladesh for being a lower riparian state. Even though the recent floods cannot solely be attributed to India opening the Dumbur dam, the situation serves as an eye-opener on our water-sharing agreements (or lack thereof), flood management capacity, and the need for bilateral negotiations where both countries can mitigate the damages from heavy rainfall without harming the other. Teesta River's water-sharing agreement is one example. If current trends continue, the Teesta water shortage could lower Bangladesh's rice production by roughly 8 percent by 2030 and 14 percent by 2050. This scarcity raises production costs and risks for farmers and also triggers social issues such as migration, displacement, and poverty.

Even though Sheikh Hasina's government allowed India several benefits, including the upcoming railway line that will allow the transport of goods and travel of passengers (including military personnel) from India to its seven northeastern states via Bangladesh, Dhaka continues to be sidelined. Under Hasina's government, Dhaka had not been able to leverage its concessions to India to make progress with Teesta or other shared rivers. The interim government now has an opportunity to address this issue and build strong political consensus for a more equitable and sustainable water-sharing and flood mitigation arrangement between the two neighbours.

The second issue is the border killings between India and Bangladesh. Despite the close friendship between the two countries, the border is riddled with mindless deaths of Bangladeshis at the hands of the Indian Border Security Forces (BSF). Ain o Salish Kendra, a human rights organisation in Bangladesh, conservatively reported that between 2013 and 2023, 332 people were killed by the BSF, averaging 30 deaths per year. Aside from the killings, the BSF has also subjected Bangladeshis at the border to gruesome torture and abductions. It makes little sense for two countries that share exemplary ties to allow such lethality on their border. Although the leadership in India pledged zero deaths, this reality is yet to materialise as state promises are unaligned with BSF actions at the border. If the previous home advisor's words are an indication, the Bangladesh Border Guard (BGB) will no longer remain passive and retreat in border conflicts in the face of aggression from the Indian side. But more importantly, it is pertinent for the interim government to address the crisis and catalyse strong political will from its Indian counterparts to end the killings and bring to book the BSF soldiers who engaged in prior misconduct that led to the loss of lives and lifelong injuries of Bangladeshis.

A third contentious point that requires a comprehensive reassessment is Adani's Godda power plant in Jharkhand which charges Bangladesh an exorbitant, above-market rate. The deal was initiated back in 2015 by Modi—who Adani's chairman is close to—and signed in 2017 with Hasina's blessing, despite the deal not being favourable for Bangladesh, as reported by The Washington Post.

Even though a report by the non-profit AdaniWatch suggested Bangladesh might have at least two ways to exit the contract, it turns out that Adani made sure to insert clauses that prevent Bangladesh from leaving even if Adani breaches the contract. First, private coal-fired power plants in India can export electricity if only India has a power surplus, which it currently does not. Second, the contract states that the Bangladesh Power Development Board (BPDB) must pay a levy of taxes and duties that Adani itself is exempt from, especially since it was declared a Special Economic Zone (SEZ). BPDB was supposed to be officially informed of these changes for a price adjustment within 30 days, but Adani failed to do so. BPDB still went ahead with the contract, even fast-tracking it under the political compulsion of the Hasina government. Unfortunately, as The Daily Star pointed out, Bangladesh can only leave if Adani's breach of contract negatively impacts the latter's ability to produce electricity. As it stands, making unethical profits off the backs of Bangladeshi tax-payers will not be harming Adani's bottom line anytime soon.

Despite the ironclad agreement, there may be a way out. Unresolved disputes may be "settled in accordance with the Rules of Arbitration of the Singapore International Arbitration Centre, 2016, 6th Edition," according to a lawyer interviewed by The Daily Star. If such a pathway can be pursued, the interim government may probe into the matter to identify any scopes for dispute resolution. Getting out of this contract or renegotiating the prices would drastically minimise costs in a country that is already plagued with debts and dwindling foreign reserves.

Whether it's our riparian rights, contentious border killings, or power deals designed to empty Bangladesh's coffers, it is true that Bangladesh often gets the short end of the stick. But Bangladesh can leverage its advantage as a zone of influence for great power politics and make use of its concessions to its upper riparian neighbour to ensure the sustainable prosperity of its land and people. It is also in the best interest of both India and Bangladesh to ensure the survival and thriving of their long-lasting exemplary friendship—with transparency and broad political consensus benefitting both countries equally.

Afia Ibnat is a political analyst and executive member of a local non-profit.​

 

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Dhaka, Delhi stress promoting bilateral relations

Bangladesh and India have emphasized that the two neighbouring countries need to work together in promoting bilateral relations for the welfare of their people. This was observed today, Wednesday while Indian high commissioner Pranay Verma paid a courtesy call on the foreign affairs adviser Md...

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Dhaka, Delhi stress promoting bilateral relations
BSS
Published: 02 Oct 2024, 22: 48

Indian high commissioner Pranay Verma makes a courtesy call on the foreign affairs adviser Md Touhid Hossain at the foreign ministry in the capital on Wednesday BSS

Bangladesh and India have emphasized that the two neighbouring countries need to work together in promoting bilateral relations for the welfare of their people.

This was observed today, Wednesday while Indian high commissioner Pranay Verma paid a courtesy call on the foreign affairs adviser Md Touhid Hossain at the foreign ministry in the capital, a foreign ministry’s press release said.

During the meeting, the two sides discussed a range of bilateral issues, with particular emphasis on the resumption of regular visa processing by the Indian high commission.

Both the foreign adviser and the Indian envoy underscored the importance of activating the regular bilateral mechanisms between the two countries.

Touhid referred to his the meeting with Indian external affairs minister S Jaishankar on the sidelines of the 79th United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in New York in this regards.

They also explored opportunities for enhanced cooperation in trade, ongoing development projects, and fostering stronger people-to-people connections between Bangladesh and India.​

 

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'India needs a clear security assurance from Bangladesh'

If Dhaka assures Delhi that it will address India's security concerns, this could serve as the foundation for a strong relationship.

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'India needs a clear security assurance from Bangladesh'

The India-Bangladesh relationship experienced some strains in the aftermath of the Awami League's fall and Sheikh Hasina being sheltered in India. Prof Sreeradha Datta, a South Asian expert who teaches international affairs at the Hariyana-based OP Jindal Global University, shared her views on the future of Bangladesh-India relations with The Daily Star's Diplomatic Correspondent Porimol Palma.


How is India looking at Bangladesh after Bangladesh's recent political change?

Historically, we have supported the Awami League (AL). We perceive that there is a possibility of an Islamist party takeover in Bangladesh if the AL is not in power. However, that is not the current reality in Bangladesh. It is true that India has worked extensively with the AL, which has increased bilateral trade volume and has also benefited Bangladesh. However, India does not have any policy that would prevent it from collaborating with any other government in Bangladesh.
The relationship with a sovereign state must be based on equity. This principle has been repeatedly emphasised by the current leadership in Bangladesh. Nevertheless, claims that India was responsible for the recent floods in Bangladesh's southeastern region are unfounded. Additionally, some senior Indian leaders have made remarks that were unnecessary and did not benefit either side.

What should be the immediate steps to improve the relations?

I believe Dhaka and New Delhi are already in contact. I propose that both countries hold formal dialogue at the earliest opportunity to resolve any outstanding issues. India needs a clear assurance that there will be no anti-Indian activities originating from within Bangladesh. The core problem is that India believes only the AL can address its security concerns, which I consider a misguided perception. If Dhaka assures Delhi that it will address India's security concerns, this could serve as the foundation for a strong relationship. At the same time, the interim government can also communicate to India which issues it should urgently address regarding Bangladesh.

The interim government has not said anything that can create such a perceived threat for India. So, why is India worried about it?

There have been attacks on Hindus in Bangladesh recently, and we understand the reasons behind these incidents. However, many other events are occurring that are not receiving adequate attention. What we are observing is that the BNP seems to be becoming quite vocal. Although the BNP is separate from the interim government, it appears that the party is gaining strength. The interim government should have the authority to manage any aggressive rhetoric, as it conveys the wrong message. Some experts argue that religious fundamentalism is not a big factor in Bangladesh, and I share this belief.

Dhaka said the Indian media has exaggerated the events of attacks on minorities. What is Delhi's understanding?

I agree that there is a lot of disinformation. However, a perception has developed in India that Hindus in Bangladesh are coming under attack because Hasina is not in power. While we know that such incidents are not as prevalent as portrayed in the media, the general public has developed a negative perception. On August 15, Prime Minister Narendra Modi spoke about the persecution of Hindu minorities in Bangladesh, but he failed to mention that others were also killed. He could have addressed that point. It's important to understand that this matter is related to our domestic politics. What I'm saying is that a negative perception is being cultivated. Therefore, the leaderships should meet and issue a joint statement affirming that the relationship will be as it should be between two sovereign states.

Border killings and water issues have been thorns in the relationship. How do you see it?

Border killings can be stopped if the two countries work together. Even if the number of killings is low, they should not occur between two friendly nations. In 2010, we stated that we would establish an agreement for the basin-wide management of our transboundary rivers and address the problems of other rivers, if not the Teesta. Why has this not been implemented? India must resolve the water issue. Just as security is important for India, water is equally important for Bangladesh. Even if there had been an interim arrangement for water sharing, the typical anti-India sentiment would not be as strong as it is now. Given that the water-sharing issue has always been an emotional one for Bangladesh, India must do the right thing.

There is a perception that India benefited more from the agreements or MoUs signed during the AL regime. There is a discussion those may be reviewed.

It may not look good to India, but Bangladesh can certainly review those agreements. I know that many MoUs may not have been discussed in parliament. I believe that the connectivity projects implemented thus far benefit both countries. However, if Bangladesh wants to review any deal, such as the one concerning transit, it is entitled to do so. India has not acted in a non-transparent manner. In fact, I think it would be beneficial for the MoUs to be revisited. Doing so will clarify whether the MoUs are useful or not.

Work of some projects under the Line of Credit remains suspended as Indian contractors are yet to restart working. Why?

I believe it is due to a lingering sense of fear. While we are not certain yet, the information we are receiving is somewhat unnerving. If the Bangladeshi authorities assure India that they have no security concerns, then things will proceed.

The interim government said it may take steps to bring back Sheikh Hasina for legal reasons. Will it create any friction in the relationship?

I believe there are various aspects to consider—both from legal and technical perspectives. Bangladesh needs to take these into account. Sheikh Hasina will not be extradited simply because Bangladesh wishes it. We cannot disregard India's relationship with the AL or Sheikh Hasina. Nevertheless, we would like to work with Bangladesh.

Our foreign adviser said India's relationship needs to be with the people of Bangladesh, not only with AL. What are your thoughts?

I agree 100 percent. India should work with whichever government is in office in Bangladesh. The problem arose with the government that was in power from 2001 to 2006, which soured relations. Later, we found that the AL was friendly towards India. In a multiparty system, any government can be elected to office. Why should India not work with it?

Sadly, it was the BNP that fostered anti-India sentiment in Bangladesh from 2001 to 2006. During the BNP-Jamaat regime, a large quantity of arms and ammunition, reportedly meant for the Indian separatist organisation ULFA (United Liberation Front of Assam), was seized in Chattogram in 2004.

The interim government wants to revitalise SAARC. What's your view?

SAARC is important for cooperation in South Asia, but Pakistan needs to change its behaviour. We have always said we are willing to work with Pakistan if it does so, but it hasn't.​

 

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An astute strategic prism

THE sweeping protests in July-August that ousted Bangladesh’s prime minister Sheikh Hasina’s authoritarian rule, won the country an innovative brand — the ‘new’ Bangladesh minus the earlier steamroller governance. In the wake of that upheaval, which still rings throughout the country, two...

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An astute strategic prism
M Rashiduzzaman 07 October, 2024, 00:00

A student carrying the national flag takes part in a protest march as protesters on August 3 demanded justice for victims arrested and killed in the student-mass uprising. | Agence France-Presse/Munir uz Zaman

THE sweeping protests in July-August that ousted Bangladesh’s prime minister Sheikh Hasina’s authoritarian rule, won the country an innovative brand — the ‘new’ Bangladesh minus the earlier steamroller governance. In the wake of that upheaval, which still rings throughout the country, two hot-button disputes re-emerged from its not-so-hidden past: While Hasina’s sudden tumble ripples like a political earthquake in India, will New Delhi be a threat to Bangladesh’s future stability and sovereignty? Should Bangladesh reset its ideological and identity sensitivities as a bulwark against a future despotic menace? Both are existential questions. But Dr Muhammad Yunus is now busy navigating between the populist cry for a retribution against the perpetrators of the banished tyranny, responsible for wanton killings and repression, and the simmering demands for an early restoration of an elected democracy.

The post-Hasina leaders need an astute strategy to deal with the emerging Bangladesh-India encounters and the ideological contents for the country’s national integrity and sovereignty. Neither the strategic imperatives nor the ideological probes will take care of themselves — not in ‘new’ Bangladesh where Hasina’s earlier autocratic rule is more than a painful remembrance. Her swift collapse has severely jolted India, the persistent benefactor of the hegemonic leadership that rigged three consecutive elections boycotted by opposition parties. And the maximum number of Bangladeshis are more confident now, which is likely to pop up in their domestic and diplomatic aspirations.

Geopolitics, however, does not give Bangladesh easy choices in dealing with its big and powerful neighbour that surrounds the country from three sides. But India’s enormous size and its military as well as economic prowess have not yet offered an unrestrained diplomatic advantage over Bangladesh, still blistering against its ousted autocrat, now sheltered in India. New Delhi’s old political ties to the Awami League and its remnants scattered across the band evoke deep suspicion in Bangladesh. Not long ago, the Guardian, the British newspaper, disparaged India’s strategy of putting all its diplomatic eggs in the basket of one leader (Hasina) and one party (Awami League) as a ‘myopic’ venture. India hopes for Bangladesh’s ‘eternal obligation’ to yield to New Delhi’s wishes because of its overt and covert help towards the 1971 struggle for independence. Narendra Modi’s brazen anti-Muslim policy is humiliating to the Bangladeshi Muslims although the Hasina government did not raise an eyebrow against India’s Hindutva zealots. It will be a thorn in the future Indo-Bangladesh relations. New Delhi tries to handcuff Dhaka’s domestic and foreign policies on grounds of the (Bengali) Hindu minority’s alleged insecurity in Bangladesh while the Indian media continue to smear Bangladesh’s current interim regime for its apparent capitulation to the Islamic militants and their leaders. Badruddin Umar, a senior socio-political commentator in Dhaka, recently pointed out that the Indian intellectual community has been mostly silent about the unprecedented protests that recently dislodged a dictatorship after an enormous loss of lives and destruction of infrastructures.

Hasina’s rapid plunge on August 5 dramatised India’s loss in Bangladesh, but India’s popularity faltered with the bulk of Bangladeshis, not long after the 1971 independence. As New Delhi became the enabler of the Hasina-led single party (the Awami League) juggernaut, India’s unpopularity spiralled in Bangladesh throughout the last decade. India will be a threat to Bangladesh’s internal politics and stability if New Delhi tries for a ‘regime change’ by rehabilitating and regrouping Hasina and her Awami League. She has settled in a virtual exile in India, but scores of AL leaders have also fled to India and the whispering reminiscences of the 1971 Indian military intervention stoke up anxiety in Bangladesh. The Bangladeshis itch for Hasina’s extradition to face a domestic or international trial for the hundreds of students and ordinary citizens deliberately killed or wounded by the politicised police, security forces and the AL-hired goons during the tumultuous civil unrest in July-August. China, New Delhi’s archrival, may now extract more geopolitical advantages from the post-Hasina regime; it will not be welcome to India and the western rivals vying for influence in the region.

The storm of protests that evicted the Hasina government changed the country’s political calculus. The secular Bengali nationalism that gained an unprecedented ascendancy against the earlier Pakistani Muslim nationalism exhausted its political traction since 1971. Secularism and Bengali nationalism provided an ideological cover for Hasina’s long tyrannical rule. She also postured her regime as a thundering protection against Islamic orthodoxy in Bangladesh. Those appeals, exclusionary in their substances, merit a reset although it is not yet certain if Yunus’s cabinet is ready to step into emotionally charged identity debates.

The western-style secularism has failed to take roots in most Muslim countries, including Bangladesh, mainly because the social, political and religious interactions in the Muslim-majority countries are not identical with those of the European and North American nation-states. The stringent secular rhetoric that indeed equated conventional Islamic expressions with hardline fundamentalism hastened the country’s political polarisation. The Muslim political inheritances of the colonial Bengal, the 1947 partition and former East Pakistan connect with what is independent Bangladesh today. Not surprisingly, the Bangladesh government exiled in India in 1971 did not have enough time to deliberate on the details of the expected country’s ideological and identity configuration. Even though their political and historical contexts did not match, Bengali nationalism sauteed in Rabindranath Tagore’s patriotic song as the national anthem became a convenient choice blessed by India at those critical hours. Later in Bangladesh, the ‘pro-liberation forces’ and their ‘cult of patriotic fervour’, a vocabulary borrowed from (the late) Ashok Mitra, a West Bengali leftist intellectual, denied the Muslim inspiration’s space in the country’s chronicle. But those ideological postures effectively helped the Awami League to consolidate its authority multiple times — by Hasina in recent years, but also by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman at the dawn of Bangladesh.

Muslim distinctiveness, not a religious extremism, is a security asset for Bangladesh’s sovereignty, independence and integrity. Once AK Fazlul Haque, in the 1940s, called upon the people not to apologise for being Muslims. The liberal perception of the Islamic groups as the ‘enemy’ of Bangladesh sovereignty is a dangerous appellation that undermines national harmony. The Islamic parties stand for the curse of the liberal intellectuals and politicians — the stance goes beyond the right-wing parties’ controversial resistance to the 1971 breakup of Pakistan.

In my Asian Survey, November 1994, article, ‘The Liberals and the Religious Right in Bangladesh’, I observed that the right-left controversy eventually destabilised peace and democracy in Bangladesh while, globally, that time-worn dichotomy gradually yielded to a more pragmatic and multilateral view of life. The feisty Muslim consciousness, however, survived through their populist roots. Partly, the liberal-secular clash emanates from the liberal establishment’s ‘blind spot’ about religion. Anyone who appeals to Islamic values endures the relegation as a maulabadi (fundamentalist/fanatic), enemy of Bangladesh independence scratching for zealotry. The Awami League and its liberal allies abused this epithet as a political capital against the so-called religious right. But the country’s strategic future and its democratic development call for participation of all groups including the Islamists in the political process.

Majority of the liberal leaders, their outfits and the cohorts did not raise a hell against the New Delhi-supported authoritarian regime for the last 15 years. Hasina’s ultimate downfall came from the swelling anti-job quota roil that transformed into a fearsome coalition against her long dictatorship. The widening political upheaval involved diverse elements — the opposition-blessed protesters, right-wing Islamic campaigners and the ordinary citizens who came out of their hiding plus a handful of human rights non-governmental organisations. The courageous student coordinators from both sides of the ideological scale blasted through death and destruction conducted by the police and the armed partisans. But it was an effective example of a strategic partnership between the right and the left to exorcise a merciless autocracy that consistently denied democracy, fair election and a peaceful political transition in Bangladesh.

M Rashiduzzaman is a retired academic based in the United States. He occasionally, writes on Bangladesh politics, history and Muslim identity.​