The Arakan Armyโs recent victories have its neighboursโ full attention, but a number of factors continue to prevent formal engagement โ even as Bangladesh struggles to make headway on Rohingya repatriation efforts with the junta.
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Doomed to engage? Bangladesh and the AA
JANUARY 31, 2024
The Arakan Armyโs recent victories have its neighboursโ full attention, but a number of factors continue to prevent formal engagement โ even as Bangladesh struggles to make headway on Rohingya repatriation efforts with the junta.
By FRONTIER
On January 14, the Arakan Army raised the Rakhine national flag over key administrative offices in southern Chin Stateโs Paletwa, declaring the entire township โjunta-freeโ. In the process, the group took control of a nearly 80 kilometre long border with Bangladesh and a key node on a proposed trade route with India.
The dramatic victory came two months after the AA launched a series of attacks against security forces in Rakhine and Chin states, ending an informal ceasefire brokered a year earlier. These territorial gains bring the AA closer to its long-term objective of controlling Rakhine. But they may also prove pivotal in strengthening the groupโs relationships with its neighbours โ India and Bangladesh โ which have long kept the AA at an armโs length, but a close eye on its movements.
While kept under wraps, there has already been low-level, informal engagement between Bangladesh and the AA for years, a source familiar with Bangladeshโs foreign policy on Myanmar confirmed to Frontier. However, most of the communication has taken place between โfield level security forcesโ along the Bangladesh-Myanmar border, and the Bangladesh foreign ministry has โvery little idea about itโ.
A high-level official in the AA, who spoke to Frontier on the condition of anonymity, also confirmed the dialogue, noting that the โBangladesh authorities are more concerned than in previous [years]โ as fighting โcontinues near the border areasโ.
He said the gains since November are โthe most significantโ advancements the AA has made against the military. โNow we are holding more land area than in previous years,โ he added.
Bangladesh has so far refused to engage formally with a non-state actor while prioritising its relationship with the Myanmar junta, which seized power in a 2021 coup. However, sources familiar with the dynamic told Frontier that Dhaka increasingly sees the AA as a key stakeholder, especially on the thorny issue of repatriating the nearly one million Rohingya refugees living in Bangladesh.
โIf there is an autonomous region or any kind of recognition from the Myanmar army that the Arakan Army will report on border issues, that can open a negotiation for a state party to enter with a non-state actor,โ said the source from Bangladesh.
โMyanmar has a record of recognising autonomous regions and special zones. They have also engaged militia groups and armed groups in border and security related issues in earlier days. As they have a record of such incidents, a similar thing could be done in Rakhine State,โ they said.
The AA has long been open about its desire to emulate the level of autonomy achieved by the United Wa State Army, which controls large swathes of territory in Shan State, some of which is formally recognised by the regime. The source said that if this were to happen then Dhaka may be more willing to engage. Another opening would be if the AA had a similar arrangement to the Border Guard Forces, paramilitary groups loosely under the militaryโs chain of command.
A BGF arrangement is exceedingly unlikely, but with the military overstretched by fighting across the country, it could conceivably be forced to recognise AA territory, like the Wa, in exchange for a ceasefire.
โUntil [the AA] is recognised by Myanmar, [Bangladesh] will not be in a position to open any formal channels,โ the source said.
The powers that be
For its part, the AA recognises the need to cooperate with Bangladesh, but remains more dependent on its relationship with another foreign power โ China.
An international analyst focused on Rakhine, who spoke with Frontier on the condition of anonymity, explained that China is the AAโs โmost important stakeholderโ and โhas more influence over the AAโ than any other player.
Beijing also values its relationship with the AA, which has pledged to protect Chinese infrastructure projects, like the two oil and gas pipelines that run from Kyaukphyu Township to Kunming. A Chinese-backed deep sea port and Special Economic Zone are also being planned in the same township.
Showing its ability to influence the situation in Myanmar, China stepped in to broker a ceasefire with AA allies the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army and Taโang National Liberation Army in northern Shan State in mid-January, partly to stabilise the border and safeguard Chinese interests.
The other big power in the equation is India, which has also refused to publicly engage the AA. Frontier understands informal engagement is ongoing, although Indiaโs Ministry of External Affairs declined to comment on the matter. However, the recent seizure of Paletwa could further force New Delhiโs hand.
The township is a key part of Indiaโs multi-million dollar Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Project โ an ambitious endeavour to connect the port of Kolkata port with Indiaโs landlocked northeast, using a combination of sea, river and land routes via Sittwe and Paletwa. While the project has been in development for more than a decade, it has yet to be completed, and has seemingly been overtaken by recent events.
Mr Angshuman Choudhury, an associate fellow at Indiaโs Centre for Policy Research, said the project no longer makes practical sense, but remains politically relevant.
โBangladesh has allowed us to use [its ports] so why do we need to take the longer circular route to get to Sittwe through Paletwa? The logic behind why the project was created no longer holds,โ said Choudhury, who added the main reason to continue pursuing it would be to maintain a โcompetitive edgeโ with Chinaโs development projects.
But the recent fighting has shown New Delhi that, to keep this edge, it may have to increase engagement with stakeholders beyond the junta. India has been frequently criticised for normalising relations with the military regime in an attempt to counter China. But as the regime loses more territory to ethnic armed groups that enjoy a close relationship with Beijing, India may also need to adjust to a new reality.
โIn light of the recent offensives, Delhi is realising that it has to deal with the Arakan Army in some form. If it wants to resume the Kaladan project, thereโs absolutely no way Delhi can go around the Arakan Army,โ Choudhury said.
Rohingya refugees walk towards the Balukhali refugee camp in Bangladesh in November 2017, after fleeing from Myanmar. (AFP)
The repatriation conundrum
The repatriation of Rohingya refugees also presents an opportunity for the AA, but one that comes with potential pitfalls. Nearly 700,000 members of the persecuted Muslim minority group were forced across the border in 2017, during a campaign of murder, rape and arson by the Myanmar military, at times supported by mobs of Rakhine nationalists. Most of the displaced come from Rakhineโs Maungdaw and Buthidaung townships, which also share a border with Bangladesh, but one that remains contested between the AA and military.
China has attempted to broker a repatriation agreement, but the ambassador to Bangladesh, Mr Yao Wen, acknowledged in early January that efforts have โfaced some difficultiesโ. โUnder Chinese mediation we wish to have a ceasefire in the Rakhine Stateโ as a precondition for the repatriation, he added.
Mr Mohammed Mizanur Rahman, Bangladeshโs Commissioner for Refugee Relief and Repatriation, told Frontier that repatriating โthe whole [Rohingya] populationโ is โthe number one priority of Bangladeshโ.
โWe are struggling to address the demands of these one million people, and the number is only increasing,โ he said.
Rohingya refugees refuse to return to Myanmar until they are allowed to go back to their original homes and their right to citizenship is recognised. Instead, the junta has erected enclosed villages where returnees would be closely monitored and their movements tightly restricted.
โThe so-called model villages are not villages, they are detention camps. In the future, they will be like concentration camps. [Rohingya] will not be allowed to leave the area, there are fences and watchtowers,โ said Ro Nay San Lwin, the founder of the Free Rohingya Coalition. โNobody wants to move from the Bangladesh camp to the Myanmar camp.โ
Rahman said these concerns were raised directly by Rohingya communities to a Myanmar military delegation that visited the refugee camps last year, but there was โno satisfactory reply receivedโ.
โIt was good that there were talks between the two groups but there was no successful completion of the negotiations,โ he said. โI have found that there is a lack of preparation and a lack of willingness [from Myanmar] so far.โ
The regimeโs unwillingness or inability to secure repatriation creates an opening for the AA, which has sought to portray itself as more inclusive towards the Rohingya than the central authorities or previous Rakhine nationalist movements. But many Rohingya on the ground remain sceptical and complain about being trapped in the crossfire between the military and the AA.
The AAโs purported inclusiveness has done little to attract more engagement from Dhaka, which is more concerned with who wields power.
โDhaka has traditionally seen the Myanmar military as the most institutionalised and strongest actor in the country and also understands that the Myanmar military is a permanent actor in the country, no matter the political system,โ said U Kyaw Lynn, an independent analyst focused on Rakhine. โThey donโt want to jeopardise their relation with the Myanmar military, they want to appease the military leadership.โ
The source familiar with Bangladeshโs foreign policy on Myanmar said since 2017, Myanmar authorities have accused Dhaka of supporting armed groups, including the AA and Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army.
โMyanmar always tries to blame Bangladesh for assisting insurgent groups, which is a baseless allegation. But if [Bangladesh] raises any concern over the recent incidents and developments in Myanmar, that will give the space to our counterpart to raise questions again. That is why Bangladesh has refrained from taking any measure,โ they said. โOur priority is to maintain friendly relations with our neighbouring countries.โ
Because of this, Bangladesh has decided to wait on the military to make the first move when it comes to bringing the AA into the fold.
โThey are definitely one of the most important stakeholders, but it is not our duty to engage them โ it is the Myanmar authoritiesโ duty to engage them in this repatriation process,โ said Rahman.
But Bangladesh might be waiting for a while. The international analyst said the junta, formally known as the State Administration Council, will be reluctant to hand over responsibility.
โI donโt think the SAC would be willing to give up that role because it would imply that theyโve lost control of the border or are no longer willing to enforce border control. They would be saying that the AA controls who comes and goes, which would be difficult for them to stomach,โ he said.
โThe AA also hasnโt really delved into the repatriation issue, the conditions arenโt there and it isnโt a priority for the AA. Itโs also a poisoned chalice. They want to let the SAC deal with it โ theyโre going to look bad on the international stage and it will strain their relationship with Bangladesh, so letting the SAC deal with it is strategic from the AA side,โ he added.
Between a rock and a hard place
Taking ownership of the repatriation process could put the AA between a rock and a hard place in terms of international and domestic expectations, as many Rakhine Buddhists are still deeply hostile towards the persecuted Muslim minority.
For now, fighting continues to rage in Rakhine, which the AA has used as justification to put off the issue. Rohingya activist Nay San Lwin said the AA has not yet sat down with Rohingya representatives, even though itโs vying for control over the population.
โThey havenโt offered to have any dialogue yet. If they are ready to sit with us, we are always ready,โ he said. โIn the media they are saying that they respect the human rights [of Rohingya] but the reality is we have to wait and see.โ
When asked whether repatriation was a priority for the AA, the high-level AA official referenced the fighting and alluded to a long-held Rakhine nationalist grievance, that posits the Rohingya are actually more privileged than the Rakhine, despite facing decades of state-sanctioned persecution that Amnesty International has labelled an apartheid.
โThe Arakanese people are also running away from their towns, away from the military bombardmentโฆ Whenever there are problems in border areas, the Muslims have the ability to run away to Bangladesh but the Rakhine have nowhere to run out. So it is more serious and you see more problems for the Rakhine people at this time,โ said the official. (Many Rakhine use the term โMuslimโ to refer to Rohingya because they refuse to recognise it as an ethnic group.)
But despite the officialโs claims, much of the fighting is occurring in Rohingya villages, and the community was disproportionately affected by Cyclone Mocha last year.
While the foreign analyst said that itโs difficult to predict what role the AA will have in repatriating Rohingya, โitโs inevitable at some point in the future that the AA will administer control over large parts of central and northern Rakhineโ and with this will come a level of responsibility โ one that could potentially jolt Bangladesh out of its complacency.
โThe AA taking more positions and more territory from the SAC has been the trajectory. Itโs safe to say whatever happens over the next few months, the AA will definitely have spread its position vis-a-vis the SAC in northern Rakhine โ the SAC will come out weaker and the AA will come out stronger.โ