[🇧🇩] Everything about Hasina's misrule/Laundered Money etc.

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[🇧🇩] Everything about Hasina's misrule/Laundered Money etc.
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Short Summary: Various misdeeds of Hasina regime
G Bangladesh Defense Forum

High-level probe body to look into corruption in Model Mosque construction: Religious Affairs Adviser
UNB
Published :
Feb 27, 2025 20:35
Updated :
Feb 27, 2025 20:35

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A high-level committee will be formed to look into the allegations of corruption related to the Model Mosque construction, said Religious Affairs Adviser A F M Khalid Hossain on Thursday.

The Religious Affairs Adviser came up with the information after visiting the construction work of a model mosque in Rangunia upazila of Chattogram district.

"After the reports of different media about irregularities and corruption in the construction of model mosques, the government has taken the allegation into consideration, and these will be investigated. Legal action will be taken after receiving the report from the investigation committee," he said.

A committee, headed by an additional secretary of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, was formed three months ago and it is investigating the irregularities and mismanagement of the model mosques, he added.

The construction of the remaining 214 model mosques will be completed within 2026.

In 2017, the then government undertook a project with Tk 9,435 crore for constructing Islamic Cultural Centres and Model Mosques in every district and upazila as well as municipalities of the country.​
 

Bank officers helped S Alam drain Tk 2,000cr
Mostafizur Rahman 02 March, 2025, 00:09

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A recent Bangladesh Bank inspection has revealed that employees of banks previously controlled by S Alam Group systematically facilitated massive, unrecorded cash withdrawals for the controversial conglomerate.

Cash was withdrawn on a daily basis amounting to Tk 2,000 crore in total between January and July 2024 and funneled to S Alam Group, bypassing all regulatory oversight and proper documentation.

The investigation, conducted at Islami Bank’s Khatunganj Branch in December 2024, revealed that Famous Trading Corporation, Rainbow Corporation, Ansar Enterprise, Global Trading Corporation Ltd, and Sonali Traders—collectively withdrew nearly Tk 2,000 crore in cash from their current accounts at the branch.

Most of these withdrawals—Tk 1,486.37 crore—were collected by employees or representatives of S Alam Group, one of the country’s most controversial conglomerates.

Another Tk 253.96 crore was moved through inter-branch transactions before being withdrawn elsewhere.

Between January 2020 and August 2024, these accounts saw a total cash withdrawal of Tk 3,245.56 crore from the bank’s Khatunganj Branch with no verification of the recipients.

Withdrawals were processed using bearer checks, with illegible or incomplete signatures, and national identity verification was deliberately ignored.

Branch authorities admitted that they acted on verbal orders from senior officials of S Alam Group and Islami Bank head office.

Islami Bank’s former deputy managing director Miftah Uddin and chief human resources officer Akij Uddin reportedly issued direct instructions for daily disbursements.

Islami Bank’s current managing director Monirul Mawla did not respond to phone calls made for comments in this regard. Miftah Uddin and Akij Uddin have gone into hiding following the fall of the Awami League-led government on August 5.

Cash was either collected by S Alam Group staff or withdrawn by bank officials for distribution to various locations, including other banks under the group’s control.

In an effort to hide these illicit transactions, Islami Bank used its Suspense Account to adjust unaccounted for withdrawals, with Tk 45.47 crore being moved through 43 Suspense Account debits between October 2022 and August 2024.

But, Tk 17.70 crore still remains unadjusted, highlighting the scale of the misconduct.

Despite the clear evidence of financial wrongdoing, Islami Bank failed to report the suspicious transactions to the Bangladesh Financial Intelligence Unit, breaching the Money Laundering Prevention Act.

It was only after Bangladesh Bank’s investigation exposed the scheme that the bank belatedly filed Suspicious Transaction Reports for a few of the implicated companies.

M Masrur Reaz, chairman and chief executive officer of non-governmental think tank Policy Exchange Bangladesh, told New Age that banks had been controlled and looted by oligarchs, but these individuals were removed now.

He added that a proper assessment was underway through both international and domestic audit firms, with the expectation that the true extent of the damage to these banks would soon be identified.

Reaz also mentioned that the central bank would examine any further risks in these banks and take necessary actions to address them.

Furthermore, he emphasised that all errant individuals, including board members and bank executives, must be held accountable for their actions.

The malpractices extended beyond cash withdrawals, with widespread misuse of inter-branch credit advice, IBCA in short, transactions, according to the Bangladesh Bank report.

Between June 2023 and August 2024, Tk 334.18 crore was withdrawn via 83 IBCAs from 11 branches and sub-branches, often transferred to unauthorised individuals, money changers, bKash agents and bank employees, entirely bypassing financial regulations.

The BB report found involvement of individuals with no legitimate business ties, such as Ahad (Hubaib Uddin Ahad), who withdrew Tk 6.89 crore in cash through 7 IBCAs, despite having no legitimate claim to the funds.

Further investigations revealed his involvement in suspicious fund transfers and possible links to illegal hundi transactions.

Other significant withdrawals from Islami Bank included Tk 30.81 crore by SM Jamal Uddin, a senior official at First Security Islami Bank, and Tk 73 crore by Mohammad Ali, a cash officer at Union Bank PLC.

Multiple instances of financial misconduct were uncovered, with even a security guard at Islami Bank’s Training Academy withdrawing Tk 5 crore from Islami Bank, allegedly delivered to Akij Uddin’s office.

In another case, Islami Bank’s Gulshan Circle-1 branch issued Tk 10 crore in pay orders to four individuals—two housewives and two students—without proper documentation, following instructions from managing director Monirul Mawla.

This violation of banking regulations facilitated the further misappropriation of funds linked to S Alam Group.

S Alam Group has amassed a staggering Tk 2.25 lakh crore in loans from 10 banks and a non-bank financial institution.

These loans are now turning into defaults, pushing Bangladesh’s banking sector into a severe crisis.

According to the Bangladesh Financial Intelligence Unit, nearly 44 per cent of these loans were taken through shell companies and anonymously, with Tk 97,486 crore being siphoned off in this manner.​
 

UK investigators may assist Bangladesh in alleged corruption probes
bdnews24.com
Published :
Mar 06, 2025 00:04
Updated :
Mar 06, 2025 00:04

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UK-based investigators are considering assisting Bangladesh's interim government in probing major corruption cases, particularly allegations of “illicit financial transfers” during the previous administration.

Sky News, a British news organisation, reports the UK's National Crime Agency, or NCA, is examining how its International Anti-Corruption Co-ordination Centre, or IACCC, can support Bangladesh’s government and law-enforcing agencies in such investigations.

The report follows a statement by Chief Advisor Muhammad Yunus regarding allegations against Labour MP Tulip Siddiq, who is the niece of ousted prime minister Sheikh Hasina.

Sky News cites sources indicating that UK authorities are not directly investigating Tulip.

However, there is growing interest in determining whether money was siphoned out of Bangladesh under the Awami League government and funneled into the UK.

In an interview with Sky News, Yunus described the allegations against Tulip as “serious”, saying: “Her vast wealth in Bangladesh will be scrutinised, and she must be held accountable.”

Following the fall of the Hasina government, a delegation from the UK’s NCA visited Bangladesh in October and November 2024.

The IACCC, funded by the UK government, consists of financial crime experts who collaborate with international partners on grand corruption cases.

While UK sources clarify that no specific probe into Tulip has been confirmed, the possibility of tracing “illicit funds” from Bangladesh to the UK is under review.

The accusations against Tulip stem from her ties to her aunt Hasina, who fled to India in August 2024 after weeks of protests.

The interim government has since accused Hasina of corruption, enforced disappearances, and involvement in the deadly July protests.

Yunus told Sky News that Hasina must face justice, saying: “Whether she is present in the country or not, she will be held accountable for ‘crimes against humanity’.”

He added, “Justice will be served—not just for her, but for her associates, family members, and close aides.”

Following Hasina’s departure, Bangladesh’s Anti-Corruption Commission, or ACC, launched investigations into Tulip and other members of Hasina’s family over allegations of “illicit wealth and money laundering”.

Investigators have uncovered several properties in London linked to Tulip, allegedly gifted by individuals close to Hasina’s inner circle.

The controversy led to Tulip resigning from her UK ministerial role in January, though she continues to deny any wrongdoing.

A spokesperson for Tulip dismissed the accusations as baseless, saying the ACC has not contacted her.

Tulip has also been named in cases related to illegal land acquisitions in Dhaka’s Purbachal, as well as the ownership of a luxury retreat, Tulip’s Territory, in Gazipur’s Kanaiya.

British newspaper The Telegraph also reported her connection to a high-end building named Siddiqs’ in Gulshan, along with another Gulshan property and Hasina’s residence in Dhanmondi.

A previous transaction involving a £100,000 apartment in Dhaka, which Tulip co-owned with another family member before selling it in 2015, has also surfaced in investigative reports.

Despite these allegations, Labour sources said Tulip does not have an overseas bank account, does not own any property abroad and had not been approached by authorities in either the UK or Bangladesh.

They further indicated that much of the allegations against the Labour MP were unfounded and that she had become embroiled in Bangladesh's political disputes, the Sky News reports.

A spokesperson for Tulip said she "totally denies the claims" and had "not been contacted on these matters".​
 

Hasina regime was uglier than fascism

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VISUAL: ANWAR SOHEL

The reference to "fascist" appears prominently in the Preamble proposed by the Constitution Reform Commission. I shall argue that there are good reasons for avoiding that reference.

The very first paragraph of the proposed Preamble asserts that "(we have) forged united resistance against autocratic and fascist rule in order to establish democracy." The second paragraph goes on to proclaim "the ideals of democracy and anti-discrimination that united (us) against fascist rule in 2024." It is obvious that, without naming names, the Preamble is referring to the "July uprising" against Sheikh Hasina's autocratic regime. The student leaders who valiantly led that mass uprising made frequent use of the words "fascism" and "fascist" while describing the regime they were fighting against, and not surprisingly, these words soon came to permeate the entire popular discourse on the uprising. Evidently, in trying to reflect the spirit of "July uprising," the proposed Preamble also captured the most ubiquitous vocabulary that came into currency along with that spirit.

It is nonetheless a mistake for the Preamble to use that vocabulary. Two kinds of error are involved here—one conceptual and the other political. The conceptual error is that, strictly speaking, the term fascism is not a correct description of the oppression meted out by the last regime. And the political error is that by describing Hasina's regime as fascist, we are unwittingly granting it a somewhat elevated status it does not deserve. The latter error is more important for practical reasons, since, as I am going to argue, it amounts to watering down the ugliness and barbarity of the Hasina regime.

But let me begin with the conceptual error, from which the political error follows as a logical corollary. The root of the problem lies in an inadequate appreciation of what the idea of "fascism" actually stands for. Like most other "isms" such as communism, nationalism, liberalism, conservatism, etc, fascism is essentially a political ideology that has a distinct ideal—a conception about the kind of society worth striving for. The core of this ideal is the conviction that the objective of politics (in the broadest sense) should be to serve the interest of the "collective entity" of the state or the nation, as opposed to the interest of the "individual persons" who constitute the state. In other words, it is the "greatness" of the collectivity called state, rather than the "well-being" and "freedom" of individual persons, that is the supreme goal of all activities of a fascist regime.

This ideology leads inevitably to a number of pernicious consequences that have historically been responsible for giving fascism the bad name it has, rightly, acquired. First, in search of "greatness" of the state, fascist rulers have tended to engage in "militarism" and "expansionism," leading to disastrous military conflicts in Europe in the 20th century. Second, since individual persons are supposed to exist only to serve the interest of the collective called state, fascist rulers have found it fit to ruthlessly suppress all kinds of individual freedoms, such as freedom of speech, freedom to dissent, etc, so as to prevent anything that could be even remotely deemed to be subversive of the state. The same ideology also paves the way for rule by a "great" dictator, who is supposed to be a human embodiment of the "collective," and who usurps the responsibility of pursuing the greatness of the state, at whatever cost of the well-being and freedoms of individuals. On the economic front, the faith in the supremacy of the collective tends to create a highly regimented and state-controlled economic system, where private initiatives are viewed with deep suspicion. A fascist regime is thus characterised by the following features: inherently militaristic in its outward orientation, unashamedly authoritarian in its political system, and strictly regimented in its economic institutions.

It is now easy to see why the term fascism does not correctly describe Sheikh Hasina's regime. For one thing, her regime was not militaristic in its outward orientation. Secondly, the economic system was far from being state-controlled and inimical to private entrepreneurship. On the contrary, it was an utterly rotten case of crony capitalism in which Hasina's cronies were given a free hand to loot public resources for private gain. Apparently, then, the only similarity with fascism was the authoritarian political system, but there is a fundamental difference here, which is the main focus of my argument.

As noted above, the authoritarianism of a fascist regime stems from a political ideology that eulogises the collective over the individual. In contrast, one can argue that Hasina did not have any ideology at all. It was her megalomania and an unquenchable thirst for personal power, rather than the interest of the "collective state," that motivated her brutality.

The gist of the matter is that while all fascist regimes are authoritarian, not all authoritarian regimes are fascist. An authoritarian regime can be called fascist only when it is driven by the political ideology of the supremacy of the collective over the individual. Hasina was not driven by any such ideology; hence, it's a mistake to use the term fascism to describe her regime.

At this point, one might be tempted to ask: does this semantic issue really matter for practical purposes? What's the problem if we continue to use the word "fascism" in its popular meaning of "brutal authoritarianism" so long as everyone understands that this is what it means? This is where the matter of political error comes in.

Recall that fascist authoritarianism stems not from personal greed for power (although in some cases such greed may accentuate the brutality of fascist rule), but from an ideological reverence of the collective over the individual. There is thus an element of "selflessness" associated with the ideology of fascism—and this element can by default impart a degree of respectability to any regime described as fascist. True, it would only be a limited respectability since fascism has itself fallen into disrepute because of its association with militarism and suppression of individual freedoms. Nonetheless, its association with "selflessness" does leave room for a modicum of respectability, which a non-fascist authoritarian regime, based on selfish greed, cannot claim. So, if we describe Hasina's regime as fascist, then whether we intend it or not, we are implicitly giving the regime a veneer of respectability by suggesting that she was driven by a selfless political ideology rather than by purely selfish greed for power.

That's the political error. The student leaders might have thought that by describing Hasina's regime as fascist they were condemning it more strongly than they could by describing it simply as authoritarian or autocratic or tyrannical, but they failed to realise that they were actually doing the opposite.

I suspect the dynamics of language are such that brandishing of the terms fascism and fascist will continue to pervade the popular political discourse in Bangladesh, no matter who says what. Perhaps, one can live with that. The layperson may be excused for not appreciating the fact that not all authoritarian regimes are fascist. The students should have known better, but perhaps they may be excused too.

But the same cannot be said for the members of the Constitutional Reform Commission. The constitution of a nation is a sacred document—one that will be preserved for posterity. We must not allow its pages to be desecrated by the misuse of language that involves conceptual and political errors of grievous nature. We should, therefore, delete all references to fascism in this document and describe Sheikh Hasina's fallen regime for what it was—a brutally tyrannical autocratic regime built upon megalomania, selfishness, and unbridled greed for power.

S. R. Osmani is professor of economics at Ulster University in the UK.​
 

NBR launches customs risk management to address money laundering
UNB
Published :
Mar 09, 2025 16:58
Updated :
Mar 09, 2025 16:58

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The National Board of Revenue (NBR) has issued a notification introducing the “Customs Risk Management Regulations, 2025” aimed at addressing economic risks such as money laundering and terrorism financing.

According to the notification, “economic risk” also refers proceeds of crime, other illegal financial activities, customs and tax evasion, and transnational organised economic crimes.

As part of this initiative, a dedicated Customs Risk Management Commissionerate (CRMC) will be established.

The CRMC will be responsible for collecting, analysing, and reviewing risk-related information to identify and categorise customs risks. It will create and manage risk profiles, update online risk registers, and classify goods consignments into risk-based lanes — Red, Yellow, Blue, or Green — using targeting intelligence, artificial intelligence (AI), and advanced data analysis techniques.

It will determine risk trends and nature by collecting data from national and international sources and analysing them, collect data for the purpose of monitoring and reviewing economic conditions, geographical conditions, customs duty rates, customs valuation, customs duty exemptions, regional and international agreements, market arrangements and other aspects that affect the duties and functions of customs, conducting necessary surveys and research activities and providing advice in taking remedial measures and formulating customs policies.

It will determine the criteria for the selection of consignments on the basis of random selection for all Customs Stations and Bond Commissionerates and to update the said criteria from time to time, monitor and supervise the effectiveness of risk management activities, to inform the Board and make necessary adjustments and to review the results of the activities taken against the Key Performance Indicators.

The CRMC will collect information and data from any government, semi-government and autonomous organization, any person or institution related to import and export, banks, financial institutions and other organisations and take the assistance of other organisations in analysing the information if necessary.

It will maintain confidentiality in the storage and use of confidential and sensitive information, sign any agreement or memorandum of understanding related to the functions of the Customs Risk Management Commissionerate on behalf of the National Board of Revenue, with the prior approval of the National Board of Revenue.

It will Issue risk warnings to all concerned departments, Identify the risk areas and, where appropriate, advising the concerned Customs House or Customs Station VAT Commissionerate to take timely steps to resolve them, Review the necessary information related to risks on a regular basis and updating the risk management indicators.

It will exchange information and regularly communicate and coordinate with various national and international organisations and institutions involved in risk management related to inter-country border trade, Prepare annual reports and presenting them to the Board; and Perform other duties assigned by the Board from time to time.

For the purpose of establishing proper customs control, the Customs Risk Management Commissionerate shall use ARMS (Automated Risk Management System) or a suitable automated electronic system to determine selectivity after analysing the risks related to cargo, passengers, agents and banks.

The Customs Risk Management Commissionerate shall collect the relevant data for risk management from the customs computer system.

Any information received from inside or outside Bangladesh or through confidential informants shall be collected, analysed and, if necessary, verified on-site and used as a risk management criterion.

The CRMC may follow and use the World Customs Organization Risk Management Model or International Best Practices or any risk management model approved by the Board and may establish a risk register and risk assessment database accordingly.

In order to monitor the effectiveness of the selectivity system, CRMC shall prepare an annual evaluation report from the data stored in the customs computer system or ARMS or any system capable of identifying the effectiveness of the selectivity system and the results of the risk mitigation measures adopted on its basis.​
 

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