[🇵🇰] Pakistani nuclear forces
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Pakistani nuclear forces
Hans M. Kristensen, Robert S. Norris & Julia Diamond
Pages 348-358 | Published online: 31 Aug 2018
Pakistan continues to expand its nuclear arsenal with more warheads, more delivery systems, and a growing fissile materials production industry. Analysis of a large number of commercial satellite images of Pakistani army garrisons and air force bases shows what appear to be mobile launchers and underground facilities that might be related to nuclear forces.
We estimate that Pakistan now has a nuclear weapons stockpile of 140 to 150 warheads.
With several delivery systems in development, four plutonium production reactors, and its uranium enrichment facilities expanding, however, Pakistan has a stockpile that will likely increase further over the next 10 years. The size of the increase will depend on many factors. Two key factors will be how many nuclear-capable launchers Pakistan plans to deploy, and how much the Indian nuclear arsenal grows. Speculation that Pakistan may become the world’s third-largest nuclear weapon state – with a stockpile of some 350 warheads a decade from now – are, we believe, exaggerated, not least because that would require a buildup two to three times faster than the growth rate over the past two decades. We estimate that the country’s stockpile could more realistically grow to 220 to 250 warheads by 2025, if the current trend continues. If that happens, it would make Pakistan the world’s fifth-largest nuclear weapon state. But unless India significantly expands its arsenal or further builds up its conventional forces, it seems reasonable to expect that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal will not continue to grow indefinitely but might begin to level off as its current weapons programs are completed.
Nuclear policy developments
Pakistan is modifying its nuclear posture with new short-range nuclear-capable weapon systems to counter military threats below the strategic level. The efforts seek to create a full-spectrum deterrent that is designed not only to respond to nuclear attacks, but also to counter an Indian conventional incursion onto Pakistani territory.1 This development has created considerable concern in other countries, including the United States, which fears that it lowers the threshold for nuclear use in a military conflict with India.
In the Worldwide Threat Assessment for 2018, US Director of National Intelligence Daniel R. Coats said, “Pakistan continues to produce nuclear weapons and develop new types of nuclear weapons, including short-range tactical weapons, sea-based cruise missiles, air-launched cruise missiles, and longer-range ballistic missiles. These new types of nuclear weapons will introduce new risks for escalation dynamics and security in the region” (Coats 2018).
Pakistan’s National Command Authority, which includes all government agencies involved in the nuclear mission, held its 23rd meeting on 21 December 2017, under the chairmanship of then-Prime Minister Shahid Khaqan Abbasi. The group reviewed a study of “certain destabilizing actions” occurring in the region around Pakistan, including “the massive arms build-up in the conventional domain, nuclearization of the Indian Ocean Region and plans for development/deployment of [ballistic missile defense].” The National Command Authority had paid similar attention to conventional weapons development at its meeting in 2016.
At the 2017 meeting, according to a Pakistani Inter Services Public Relations press release, the command authority “reiterated Pakistan’s policy of developing and maintaining Full Spectrum Deterrence, in line with the policy of Credible Minimum Deterrence and avoidance of arms race,” while expressing confidence in the country’s “capability to address any form of aggression” (ISPR 2017d). The National Command Authority also reviewed the “Nuclear Security Regime” of the nuclear arsenal and expressed “full confidence” in both Pakistan’s command and control systems and existing security measures meant to “ensure comprehensive stewardship and security of strategic assets and materials.” It lauded the nuclear arsenal’s “high standards of training and operational readiness.”
The December 2017 meeting emphasized that Pakistan strives for “peaceful coexistence in [South Asia] and will endeavor to work with its neighbors to ensure strategic stability” there (ISPR 2017d). As in 2016, the National Command Authority’s latest statement on security and safety was, in part, a response to international concern that Pakistan’s evolving arsenal – particularly its growing inventory of short-range nuclear weapon systems – could lead to problems with warhead management and command and control during a crisis. Satellite images show that security perimeters around many bases and military facilities have been upgraded over the past seven years in response to terrorist attacks.
Over the past decade, the US assessment of nuclear weapons security in Pakistan appears to have changed considerably from confidence to concern, particularly as a result of the introduction of tactical nuclear weapons. In 2007, a US State Department official told Congress that, “we’re, I think, fairly confident that they have the proper structures and safeguards in place to maintain the integrity of their nuclear forces and not to allow any compromise” (Boucher 2007). In stark contrast, the Trump administration assessment in 2018 was: “We are particularly concerned by the development of tactical nuclear weapons that are designed for use in battlefield. We believe that these systems are more susceptible to terrorist theft and increase the likelihood of nuclear exchange in the region” (Economic Times 2017). Upon unveiling his South Asia strategy on 21 August 2017, Trump urged Pakistan to stop sheltering terrorist organizations, and noted the need to “prevent nuclear weapons and materials from coming into the hands of terrorists” (The White House 2017). US concern over the security of Pakistan’s tactical nuclear weapons precedes the Trump administration. In 2016, US Undersecretary of State Rose Gottemoeller told members of the US Congress, “Reinstate full original statement: “Battlefield nuclear weapons, by their very nature, pose [a] security threat because you're taking battlefield nuclear weapons to the field where, as you know, as a necessity, they cannot be made as secure” (Economic Times 2016).
Pakistani nuclear forces, 2018
The Nuclear Notebook is researched and written by Hans M. Kristensen, director of the Nuclear Information Project with the Federation of American Scientists, and Robert S. Norris, a senior fellow w...
Taylor & Francis/Sep 3, 2018
Hans M. Kristensen, Robert S. Norris & Julia Diamond
Pages 348-358 | Published online: 31 Aug 2018
Pakistan continues to expand its nuclear arsenal with more warheads, more delivery systems, and a growing fissile materials production industry. Analysis of a large number of commercial satellite images of Pakistani army garrisons and air force bases shows what appear to be mobile launchers and underground facilities that might be related to nuclear forces.
We estimate that Pakistan now has a nuclear weapons stockpile of 140 to 150 warheads.
With several delivery systems in development, four plutonium production reactors, and its uranium enrichment facilities expanding, however, Pakistan has a stockpile that will likely increase further over the next 10 years. The size of the increase will depend on many factors. Two key factors will be how many nuclear-capable launchers Pakistan plans to deploy, and how much the Indian nuclear arsenal grows. Speculation that Pakistan may become the world’s third-largest nuclear weapon state – with a stockpile of some 350 warheads a decade from now – are, we believe, exaggerated, not least because that would require a buildup two to three times faster than the growth rate over the past two decades. We estimate that the country’s stockpile could more realistically grow to 220 to 250 warheads by 2025, if the current trend continues. If that happens, it would make Pakistan the world’s fifth-largest nuclear weapon state. But unless India significantly expands its arsenal or further builds up its conventional forces, it seems reasonable to expect that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal will not continue to grow indefinitely but might begin to level off as its current weapons programs are completed.
Nuclear policy developments
Pakistan is modifying its nuclear posture with new short-range nuclear-capable weapon systems to counter military threats below the strategic level. The efforts seek to create a full-spectrum deterrent that is designed not only to respond to nuclear attacks, but also to counter an Indian conventional incursion onto Pakistani territory.1 This development has created considerable concern in other countries, including the United States, which fears that it lowers the threshold for nuclear use in a military conflict with India.
In the Worldwide Threat Assessment for 2018, US Director of National Intelligence Daniel R. Coats said, “Pakistan continues to produce nuclear weapons and develop new types of nuclear weapons, including short-range tactical weapons, sea-based cruise missiles, air-launched cruise missiles, and longer-range ballistic missiles. These new types of nuclear weapons will introduce new risks for escalation dynamics and security in the region” (Coats 2018).
Pakistan’s National Command Authority, which includes all government agencies involved in the nuclear mission, held its 23rd meeting on 21 December 2017, under the chairmanship of then-Prime Minister Shahid Khaqan Abbasi. The group reviewed a study of “certain destabilizing actions” occurring in the region around Pakistan, including “the massive arms build-up in the conventional domain, nuclearization of the Indian Ocean Region and plans for development/deployment of [ballistic missile defense].” The National Command Authority had paid similar attention to conventional weapons development at its meeting in 2016.
At the 2017 meeting, according to a Pakistani Inter Services Public Relations press release, the command authority “reiterated Pakistan’s policy of developing and maintaining Full Spectrum Deterrence, in line with the policy of Credible Minimum Deterrence and avoidance of arms race,” while expressing confidence in the country’s “capability to address any form of aggression” (ISPR 2017d). The National Command Authority also reviewed the “Nuclear Security Regime” of the nuclear arsenal and expressed “full confidence” in both Pakistan’s command and control systems and existing security measures meant to “ensure comprehensive stewardship and security of strategic assets and materials.” It lauded the nuclear arsenal’s “high standards of training and operational readiness.”
The December 2017 meeting emphasized that Pakistan strives for “peaceful coexistence in [South Asia] and will endeavor to work with its neighbors to ensure strategic stability” there (ISPR 2017d). As in 2016, the National Command Authority’s latest statement on security and safety was, in part, a response to international concern that Pakistan’s evolving arsenal – particularly its growing inventory of short-range nuclear weapon systems – could lead to problems with warhead management and command and control during a crisis. Satellite images show that security perimeters around many bases and military facilities have been upgraded over the past seven years in response to terrorist attacks.
Over the past decade, the US assessment of nuclear weapons security in Pakistan appears to have changed considerably from confidence to concern, particularly as a result of the introduction of tactical nuclear weapons. In 2007, a US State Department official told Congress that, “we’re, I think, fairly confident that they have the proper structures and safeguards in place to maintain the integrity of their nuclear forces and not to allow any compromise” (Boucher 2007). In stark contrast, the Trump administration assessment in 2018 was: “We are particularly concerned by the development of tactical nuclear weapons that are designed for use in battlefield. We believe that these systems are more susceptible to terrorist theft and increase the likelihood of nuclear exchange in the region” (Economic Times 2017). Upon unveiling his South Asia strategy on 21 August 2017, Trump urged Pakistan to stop sheltering terrorist organizations, and noted the need to “prevent nuclear weapons and materials from coming into the hands of terrorists” (The White House 2017). US concern over the security of Pakistan’s tactical nuclear weapons precedes the Trump administration. In 2016, US Undersecretary of State Rose Gottemoeller told members of the US Congress, “Reinstate full original statement: “Battlefield nuclear weapons, by their very nature, pose [a] security threat because you're taking battlefield nuclear weapons to the field where, as you know, as a necessity, they cannot be made as secure” (Economic Times 2016).
Pakistani nuclear forces, 2018
The Nuclear Notebook is researched and written by Hans M. Kristensen, director of the Nuclear Information Project with the Federation of American Scientists, and Robert S. Norris, a senior fellow w...
Taylor & Francis/Sep 3, 2018
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