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ghazi · Feb 6, 2024

Geography

The terrain consists of mountain ranges, undulating submontane areas, and plains surrounded by hills. In the north the mountain ranges generally run north-south; south of the Kābul River, which bisects the province from east to west, the ranges generally run east-west.

The Hindu Kush region in the north, long noted for its scenic beauty, is divided by the Kunar River into two distinct ranges: the northern Hindu Kush and the Hindu Raj. Tirich Mir rises to 25,230 feet (7,690 metres) and is the highest peak of the northern Hindu Kush. To the south of the Hindu Raj lie the rugged basins of the Panjkora, Swat, and Kandia rivers.

The Lesser Himalayas and the Sub-Himalayas are situated in the eastern part of the province and form definite ranges broken by hilly country and small plains. The region is seismically active, with frequent mild to moderate tremors. In 2005 a severe earthquake centered in nearby Azad Kashmir killed thousands.

The fertile Vale of Peshawar extends northward along the Kābul River. Though it covers less than one-tenth of the province’s area, this region contains about half of its total population.

The city of Peshawar lies in the western portion of the vale. West of Peshawar, the historic Khyber Pass is strategically important as the most easily negotiable route between Afghanistan and the Indian subcontinent. South of the Kābul River lies the east-west-trending Spīn Ghar (Safīd Kūh) Range. The Kurram, Tochi, and Gumal rivers drain the province’s southern region, and the Indus River forms part of the province’s eastern border.

The climate varies with elevation. The mountain ranges experience cold winters and cool summers, and temperatures rise markedly toward the south. Precipitation over the province is variable but averages roughly 16 inches (400 mm) annually, with much of this occurring during the period from January to April.

The mountain slopes in the north support stands of evergreen oak and pine. There are also extensive mountain grasslands. The hills to the south are sparsely covered with bushes, acacia, and grasses.

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa is inhabited mainly by the Pashtun, who are noted for their independence. The Pashtun comprise many tribes and clans, each taking great pride in its genealogy. Pashto is the main language in the province, except for some areas where Punjabi predominates, and virtually all of the population is Muslim. Only a small part of the overall population is urban. The province’s major cities include Peshawar, Mardan, Mingaora, Kohat, and Abbottabad.

Old School · Apr 25, 2024

Scotland's first minister, Humza Yousaf, is facing a no-confidence vote after the collapse of his party's agreement with the Scottish Greens.
Mr Yousaf hopes to continue in power, leading a minority government at Holyrood, after deciding that the partnership with the Greens has "served its purpose".
But Scottish Conservative leader Douglas Ross has described him as a "lame duck" first minister and says he will lodge a no-confidence motion.
So what happens next - and how big a threat is this for Mr Yousaf?

ghazi · Feb 23, 2024

ghazi · Apr 25, 2024

[H3]New evidence challenges the Pentagon's account of a horrific attack as the US withdrew from Afghanistan[/H3]

By Nick Paton Walsh and Mick Krever, CNN.
Video by Mark Baron and Christian Streib, CNN.
Wed April 24, 2024

CNN —

New video evidence uncovered by CNN significantly undermines two Pentagon investigations, the latest of which was released last week, into an ISIS-K suicide attack outside Kabul airport, during the American troop withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021.

The incident was a gruesome coda to America's longest war, leaving dead 13 United States military service members and about 170 Afghans who were desperately seeking US help to flee the Taliban takeover of Kabul. For two years, the US military has insisted that the loss of life was caused by a single explosion, and that troops who reported coming under fire and returning it were likely confused in the chaotic aftermath, some suffering from the effects of blast concussion.

But video captured by a Marine's GoPro camera that has not been seen publicly in full before shows there was far more gunfire than the Pentagon has ever admitted. A dozen US military personnel, who were on the scene and spoke to CNN anonymously for fear of reprisals, have described the gunfire in detail. One told CNN he heard the first large burst of shooting come from where US Marines were standing, near the blast site. "It wasn't onesies and twosies," the Marine said. "It was a mass volume of gunfire."

An Afghan doctor who spoke to CNN on the record for the first time said he personally pulled bullets from the wounded, and with his hospital staff counted dozens of Afghans who died from gunshot wounds.

Combined, the new evidence challenges the credibility of the two US military investigations and raises serious questions for the Pentagon, which has continued to dismiss mounting evidence that civilians were shot dead.

Afghans struggle to reach foreign forces in desperate attempts to flee the country before the blast outside Hamid Karzai International Airport, in Kabul, on August 26, 2021. Akhter Gulfam

The blast at 5:36 p.m. on August 26, 2021, outside Hamid Karzai International Airport marked the worst casualty incident for Afghan civilians and US troops in Afghanistan in over a decade.

For days, hundreds of desperate Afghans – military aged-men, women, children, and the elderly – had been standing in the blistering heat, hoping to persuade their way into the airport and onto a stream of US cargo planes that flew over a hundred thousand people out to safety.

The scene outside the airport's Abbey Gate, where crowds were densest, was gruesome even before the blast. Former translators and other Afghans who had assisted the near-20-year NATO presence waded in trash and knee-deep sewage water that filled a concrete drainage canal.

When an ISIS-K suicide bomber detonated a backpack device just above the densely populated concrete canal, the evacuation was drastically curtailed.

The Pentagon has insisted all deaths and injuries were caused by the explosive device and the ball bearings it fired into the crowd. Though it has acknowledged there was gunfire from American and British forces, it says that was limited to three bursts that were near-simultaneous – one of 25 to 30 warning shots from UK troops, and two bursts of fire from US troops aimed at suspected militants, which did not hit anyone.

The US Central Command ordered a supplemental review into the incident in September 2023, after criticism of its investigation's conclusions, particularly around whether the bombing could have been prevented – in harrowing emotional testimony from survivors on social media and to Congressional hearings.
Those results, which were released on April 15, reaffirmed that a lone ISIS-K bomber carried out the attack, and found that "new information obtained during the review did not materially impact the findings in the November 2021" investigation, and the review "did not recommend any modifications to those findings." The review did not pursue numerous reports from Afghan survivors of significant gunfire in the wake of the blast.

This image from a video released by the Department of Defense shows U.S. Marines at Abbey Gate before a suicide bomber struck outside Hamid Karzai International Airport on Aug. 26, 2021, in Kabul Afghanistan. The military investigation into the deadly attack during the Afghanistan evacuation has concluded that a suicide bomber, carrying 20 pounds of explosives packed with ball bearings, acted alone, and that the deaths of more than 170 Afghans and 13 U.S. service members were not preventable. (Department of Defense via AP)

The Marine's GoPro footage runs nearly continuously for many minutes before and after the blast. It shows 11 episodes of shooting after the explosion, over nearly four minutes. This is significantly more than the three "near simultaneous" bursts of gunfire that the Pentagon investigations have claimed occurred.
One sustained burst of about 17 gunshots comes just over 30 seconds after the bomb detonates, according to the video, with the other 10 bursts of two to three rounds each. At no point are Marines seen firing on camera or is anyone visibly hit by gunfire. It is unclear where the gunmen are or what they are firing at.

It shows Marines, some on their first deployment to a warzone, race for cover from gunfire, and choke from CS gas released when the blast tore open a canister on a Marine's flak jacket.

One Marine, presumably the cameraman, notes after the blast: "I got that on film, dude." Seconds later, as Afghans seem to race towards the airport walls to seek safety, another voice adds: "They're breaking through." The remainder of the footage shows the Marines swiftly getting accountability of their own units, struggling to come to terms with the blast's impact, and hearing a steady series of controlled, isolated bursts of gunfire close by.

Clothes and blood stains at the scene on August 27, 2021.
Wakil Koshar/AFP/Getty Images

Robert Maher, an audio forensic expert at Montana State University in Bozeman, who reviewed the footage for CNN, found at least 11 episodes of gunfire over a four-minute window, totaling a minimum of 43 shots. He added that the burst near the start contained at least 17 shots, with multiple weapons likely firing and overlapping. He said in two other bursts of fire, the rounds appeared to follow a "crack-boom" sequence – the crack of the bullet breaching the sound barrier recorded before the sound of the gunshot reached the microphone – indicating the bullet traveled over or across the camera.

Sarah Morris, a digital forensics expert from the University of Southampton in England, examined both the audio and video files for evidence of digital corruption, alteration, or manipulation, and found none. She said the location data and metadata of the two clips that lead up to and follow the blast showed they were filmed "very close to each other."

Separately, Morris used an algorithm to phase out predictable background noise on a GoPro from clothing or motion, and found in 16 instances where there were peaks in audio which she said were "unusual noises that appear consistent with a firearm." The 16 overlapped with the 11 episodes discerned by Maher.

While some Marines aid wounded Afghans, the video also shows that, 21 minutes and 49 seconds after the bombing, Marines fired a CS gas canister from inside the airport walls towards the area near the blast. It may have landed near injured and dead Afghan civilians, still gathered around the sewage trench that ran along the scene of the blast at that time, according to videos shared on social media.

The Pentagon's investigations have made no reference to the video, half an hour of which CNN obtained. It is unclear how much of it the Pentagon saw prior to publication of this story. It released four seconds of the video – the moment of the blast itself – as part of its initial investigation in February 2022, although the source of that brief clip remains unclear.

CNN described the full video and findings of this story in significant detail to the Pentagon ahead of publication. A spokesman said the Pentagon would need to see any "new, previously unseen, video out there" before assessing it. Army Lt. Col. Rob Lodewick, public affairs adviser to the supplemental review team, said the latest review supported the Pentagon's initial findings.

He said in a statement: "The 2021-2022 Abbey Gate Investigation thoroughly investigated the allegations of a complex attack", which would have involved gunfire from militants after the blast, "as well as allegations of outgoing fire from US and coalition forces following the blast. The Supplemental Review found no new evidence of a complex attack, and uncovered no new assertions of outgoing fire post-blast. Consequently, the Supplemental Review found no materialistic impact to the original findings of the Abbey Gate investigation."

A spokesperson for the British Ministry of Defense said that its troops fired "warning shots above the crowd to prevent a surge," none of which were fired at people – the same position it held in 2022.

The bombing area at Kabul airport's Abbey Gate on August 26, 2021, prior to the explosion.
U.S. Central Command/AP

CNN has previously reported that 19 Afghan witnesses said they saw gunfire or were shot themselves.

"I saw people who were injured in the explosion trying to get up, but they fired on them," Shogofa Hamidi, whose sister Morsal was shot in the face, told CNN for an in-depth report published in February 2022. "They were targeting people," another, Nazir, 16, told CNN. "In front of me, people were getting shot at and falling down."

Noorullah Zakhel, whose cousin was killed, said that bullets appeared to hit those who tried to flee, and recalled soldiers standing in front of him, as he dropped to the ground below the canal wall. Their accounts were supported by that of a doctor and 13 medical reports which detailed bullet wounds among Afghans.

In 2022, Dr. Sayeed Ahmadi, director of the Wazir Akhbar Khan hospital in Kabul, spoke to CNN anonymously as he feared for his safety. He now has asylum in Finland, where he agreed to speak on camera about the harrowing scenes that night in his trauma unit.
"Explosion injuries come with severe injuries and lots of holes in the bodies," he explained. "But people who were shot had just one or two holes in the chest or head."

Ahmadi spent many years treating injuries across war-torn Afghanistan. "Of course, when you see the bullets, it's totally different from the ball bearing. Everybody knows if they are a soldier or a doctor."

Video obtained by CNN shows bodies piling up outside the hospital on the night of the attack. As they treated patients, Ahmadi said he received a threatening phone call telling him to stop his team from recording which patients had been shot and who had been killed or injured by the blast.

Afghan doctor: 'More than half were killed by gunshot'

"He spoke fluently Dari," he said. "He told me, 'What are you doing, Doctor? You love your life. You love your family. This is not good when you are collecting that data. It would make a big dangerous situation for you. You should stop that as soon as possible.'"

The man called another time to repeat the warning, and Ahmadi advised his team to stop recording data and destroy the evidence they had collected.

The Pentagon, in response to Ahmadi's initial anonymous statement to CNN in 2022 that he had treated gunshot wounds, said that he was mistaken. They said bullet and ball-bearing injuries are hard to distinguish – a claim disputed by multiple combat medics who spoke to CNN, and by Ahmadi himself.
Ahmadi said he was never approached by American investigators.

"I hope one day they ask me," he said. "Now I am safe. I feel well… Sometimes just this secret that I have in my mind haunts me."

Pentagon spokesman Lodewick said no Afghans were interviewed for the original AR 15-6 investigation "because its scope and focus on US operations did not demand it." He said the supplemental review was "even more refined" in its scope, focusing more on events before the blast and the bomber, "and again presented no overwhelming need for the pursuit of external Afghan-centric information."

A wounded patient is brought by taxi to the hospital in Kabul on the day of the attack.
Marcus Yam/Los Angeles Times/Getty Images

Accounts from US servicemen of the aftermath have often been dismissed by officials as the product of blast concussion, or Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI). As Marine survivors leave active duty and continue to struggle with their trauma and an official narrative that jars with their personal experience, their dissent has grown.

CNN spoke with about ten Marines anonymously, many of whom described hearing gunfire and feeling under attack from it. Some have reported seeing what they thought was a militant gunman. The Pentagon has insisted no other gunmen opened fire in the area at the time of the attack, bar US and UK troops. No American or Afghan witness has specifically stated they directly saw a militant open fire.

One Marine, who decided to speak out of conscience and requested anonymity, fearing reprisals for his account, has become the first American eyewitness to describe shots fired from where US personnel were located. He said that the burst of gunfire after the explosion – heard by witnesses on the ground and audible in the new video – came from the area around the Abbey Gate sniper tower, where US Marines were grouped.

While he could not be certain the Marines had fired directly into the crowd of Afghan civilians in front of them, he said: "They would not have fired into the air." Marines had been told to not fire warnings shots, he said, as these rounds fired in the air often landed later in civilian areas. "It wasn't a direct order," he added. "But it was a common understanding: no warning shots." He said he did not think any of the shots fired in the four-minute window of gunfire audible on the new video would have been warning shots.

A Marine eyewitness told CNN's Nick Paton Walsh (left) that the burst of gunfire after the explosion – heard by witnesses on the ground and audible in the new video – came from the area around the Abbey Gate sniper tower, where US Marines were grouped. CNN

Public orders issued in the Navy in December 2020 banned warning shots unless specifically permitted on deployment. The Pentagon's report said Marines from the 2/1 unit that made up most of those on the scene "did not use warning shots and only used flash bang grenades infrequently." The Marine said he did not see any US military open fire and did not fire himself.

The Marine calmly described key details of blast and its aftermath, but became emotional when discussing the Pentagon's investigations, including what he described as a lack of transparency about what happened, and the possible role Marine gunfire played in raising the Afghan civilian death toll.

But he defended the immediate response of his colleagues under attack. "The reaction that the Marines had was a reaction that I believe anybody trained to do in that scenario would have had," he said, suggesting they were in the first phase of the three-stage practice of RTR – Returning fire, Taking cover and then Returning accurate fire.

"You've got to think, these are kids," he said. "They're young. And they've only been taught what they've been taught. Some of these kids had been with the unit for quite literally two, three months prior to deployment. They didn't have the training to be able to recognize some of the things that, you know, might have occurred – nor could you have the training for what had happened on August 26. Or really what happened in Kabul."

He said the significant gunfire response from Marines after the blast was common knowledge among Marine survivors, even though it was not spoken of publicly. "It's incredibly weird," he said. "It's frustrating, you know? Why hide from what happened?"

Reacting to the Pentagon's dismissal of accounts from US personnel who recalled gunfire as the product of TBI, the Marine said: "It's a pathetic excuse. To say that every Marine, every soldier, every Navy corpsman on the deck has a traumatic brain injury and cannot remember gunfire is, is lunacy. It's outright disrespectful. And especially for it to come from somebody that wasn't there."

"To the Afghani [sic] families – I'm sorry that after 20 years of war, that that is the way that this (was) conducted. And that we weren't able to uphold a promise that we gave your people after removing the Taliban in 2001. And it should not have ended like that."

Evacuees aboard a US Air Force C-17 Globemaster III aircraft during the Afghanistan evacuation from Kabul on August 21, 2021.
Senior Airman Taylor Crul/U.S. Air Force/Reuters

Many of the 10 other Marines with whom CNN spoke anonymously also describe gunfire.

One told CNN that he ran through a hole in the fence outside the Abbey Gate in the minute after the blast to assist with the wounded. As he emerged, he said, he heard suppressed rifle fire nearby from another Marine. Many US Marines' rifles were fitted with suppressors, reducing the noise of their fire, according to footage from the incident.

"I would probably say five, 10 meters away from me, was where it was," he said. He said the Marine firing was not from his own unit, and after he had opened fire, "whoever was shooting at us wasn't shooting at us anymore."

Another Marine told CNN he was about 20 meters (65 feet) from the blast. "There was definitely, shooting," he said. "Snapping over our heads after the blast and it wasn't the Taliban." He said he used his rifle optic to look at the Taliban, who were some distance away on nearby shipping containers used to control access to the Abbey Gate area. "When I looked over at them, none of them were holding their guns. They looked just as shocked as us."

Other US servicemen who said they witnessed gunfire in the aftermath of the bombing have spoken out on social media.

Sgt. Romel Finley, who received a Purple Heart, said that another sergeant ordered US troops into position to open fire after the bomb blast. Finley told The Brrks YouTube channel, a social media account run by a former Marine and Master Barber which interviews active or former Marines, that he recalled, while being dragged from the scene, "My platoon sergeant running past us, saying 'get back on that wall and shoot back at those motherf**kers.' So I was like, we are in a gunfight too."

Finley, who sustained significant leg injuries in the attack, added that he did not witness Marines firing, or responding to the order. He declined to comment to CNN, as did his platoon sergeant. CNN is withholding the names of Marines who did not specifically consent to being identified in interviews.

Christian Sanchez, another Marine survivor, who was injured in his left arm, told the same Brrks Barber channel that he opened fire after the blast. "All I see is flashes. And all I could hear was ringing. Like all hear is ringing and f**king flashes going on. And I start hearing snaps. And I start realizing that that's a f**king dude shooting at me," he said. "And I just started shooting at the dude," he added, breaking down.

Sanchez also declined to speak to CNN about his recollections and it is unclear if he specifically saw the purported militant gunman open fire.

Significant gaps remain in the evidence presented by the Pentagon. Investigators have only released five edited minutes of drone footage from the aftermath, which they said supported their findings that no gunfire hit anyone.

A recent congressional hearing for the then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mark Milley and then-Central Command Gen. Kenneth "Frank" McKenzie ended with Congressman Darrell Issa presenting the two generals with a list of unpublished video that, under a Freedom of Information Act request, the Pentagon had admitted they held. The generals told the session they had seen the videos, and that it should be released to congressional investigators.

Another American military survivor who spoke to CNN said he had endured two years of "leadership saying what you saw was basically not the truth." He summarized the two investigations as: "Shut your mouth. We'll talk for you."

https://edition.cnn.com/2024/04/24/world/new-evidence-challenges-pentagon-account-kabul-airport-attack-intl/index.html

ghazi · Apr 25, 2024

Eagle Eye
@zarrar_11PK
Monitoring : 𝐀𝐦𝐞𝐫𝐢𝐜𝐚'𝐬 𝐅𝐢𝐫𝐦 𝐑𝐞𝐣𝐞𝐜𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐨𝐟 𝐑𝐞𝐜𝐨𝐠𝐧𝐢𝐳𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐓𝐚𝐥𝐢𝐛𝐚𝐧 𝐑𝐞𝐠𝐢𝐦𝐞

A recent report by the US State Department analyzed the devastation in #Afghanistan under the rule of the Taliban.

US State Department Secretary Anthony Blinken stated in his report that:

"They have no intention of recognizing the Taliban."

The Taliban have not altered their directives regarding women's employment and education in Afghanistan, according to the US State Department.

The US State Department reported that 90% of the incarcerated individuals are political leaders.

Since assuming power in 2021, the Taliban have instigated chaos and lawlessness in Afghanistan.

The Taliban's prohibition of women's education has fostered a climate of terrorism in the country.

Since the Taliban seized power in August 2021, Afghan media has encountered severe restrictions and challenges.

Journalism has been severely compromised within Afghanistan.

The Taliban's promotion of terrorism in neighboring countries has disrupted Afghanistan's economic system.

Afghanistan's populace is grappling with poverty, hunger, widespread disease, and starvation.

Following their rise to power, the Taliban imprisoned former government officials and forcibly seized control of the country.

Despite announcing amnesty, the Taliban persist in detaining oppressed individuals, the US State Department stated in its annual human rights report.

Individuals associated with the former Afghan government are currently incarcerated.

The Taliban unlawfully detain Afghan citizens and deprive them of legal assistance, as per the US State Department.

Nearly all cases of Taliban detention are unjustly prosecuted.

Following the Taliban's regime in Afghanistan, many former officials sought refuge in neighboring countries to evade detention and retaliation.

Despite the amnesty announcement, the Taliban continue to detain former police officers and personnel.

The US State Department's report highlighted that the Taliban's focus is not on the welfare of Afghanistan's people but on spreading terrorism in the region.

Experts noted that instead of uplifting the people, the Taliban regime exploits the country's resources to support organizations like 1S1S and TTP, spreading terrorism in the region.

Investigations into recent terrorist attacks in Moscow, Iran, and Pakistan revealed that the perpetrators operate from Afghan soil.

ghazi · Feb 7, 2024

ghazi · Apr 24, 2024

[h3]Pakistan nuclear weapons, 2023[/h3]By Hans M. Kristensen, Matt Korda, Eliana Johns,
September 11, 2023

The Nuclear Notebook is researched and written by the staff of the Federation of American Scientists' Nuclear Information Project: director Hans M. Kristensen, senior research fellow Matt Korda, and research associate Eliana Johns. The Nuclear Notebook column has been published in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists since 1987. This issue's column examines Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, which we estimate to currently include approximately 170 warheads and which could realistically grow to around 200 by 2025 at the current growth rate.

This article is freely available in PDF format in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists' digital magazine (published by Taylor & Francis) at this link. To cite this article, please use the following citation, adapted to the appropriate citation style: Hans M. Kristensen, Matt Korda, and Eliana Johns, Pakistan nuclear weapons, 2023, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 79:5, 329-345, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2023.2245260
To see all previous Nuclear Notebook columns, go to Nuclear Notebook - Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.

Pakistan continues to gradually expand its nuclear arsenal with more warheads, more delivery systems, and a growing fissile material production industry. Analysis of commercial satellite images of construction at Pakistani army garrisons and air force bases shows what appear to be newer launchers and facilities that might be related to Pakistan's nuclear forces.

We estimate that Pakistan now has a nuclear weapons stockpile of approximately 170 warheads (See Table 1). The US Defense Intelligence Agency projected in 1999 that Pakistan would have 60 to 80 warheads by 2020 (US Defense Intelligence Agency 1999, 38), but several new weapon systems have been fielded and developed since then, which leads us to a higher estimate. Our estimate comes with considerable uncertainty because neither Pakistan nor other countries publish much information about the Pakistani nuclear arsenal.

Table

1.Pakistani nuclear forces, 2023. (Click to display full size.)

With several new delivery systems in development, four plutonium production reactors, and an expanding uranium enrichment infrastructure, Pakistan's stockpile has the potential to increase further over the next several years. The size of this projected increase will depend on several factors, including how many nuclear-capable launchers Pakistan plans to deploy, how its nuclear strategy evolves, and how much the Indian nuclear arsenal grows. We estimate that the country's stockpile could potentially grow to around 200 warheads by the late 2020s, at the current growth rate. But unless India significantly expands its arsenal or further builds up its conventional forces, it seems reasonable to expect that Pakistan's nuclear arsenal will not continue to grow indefinitely but might begin to level off as its current weapons programs are completed.

Research methodology and confidence

The estimates and analyses made in the Nuclear Notebook are derived from a combination of open sources:
(1) state-originating data (e.g. government statements, declassified documents, budgetary information, military parades, and treaty disclosure data);
(2) non-state-originating data (e.g. media reports, think tank analysis, and industry publications); and
(3) commercial satellite imagery. Because each one of these sources provides different and limited information that is subject to varying degrees of uncertainty, we cross-check each data point by using multiple sources and supplementing them with private conversations with officials whenever possible.

Analyzing Pakistan's nuclear forces is particularly fraught with uncertainty, given the lack of official state-originating data. The Pakistani government has never publicly disclosed the size of its arsenal and does not typically comment on its nuclear doctrine. Unlike some other nuclear-armed states, Pakistan does not regularly publish any official documentation explaining the contours of its nuclear posture or doctrine. Whenever such details emerge in the public discourse, it usually originates from retired officials commenting in their personal capacities. The most regular official source on Pakistani nuclear weapons is the Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR), the media wing of the Pakistan Armed Forces, which publishes regular press releases for missile launches and occasionally couples them with launch videos.

Occasionally, other countries offer official statements or analysis about Pakistan's nuclear forces. For example, the US Air Force's ballistic and cruise missile threat reports include analyses of Pakistani missile forces. As Pakistan's regional competitor, Indian officials also occasionally make statements about Pakistan's nuclear weapons, although such statements must be taken with a grain of salt as they are often politically motivated. Similarly, Indian media sources often either exaggerate or minimize the characteristics of Pakistan's arsenal, depending on the desired effect and audience. Pakistani media is also prone to frequent embellishment when describing the country's arsenal. There are very few publications that researchers can turn to for reliable information about Pakistan's nuclear forces and every rumor must be carefully investigated.

Given the absence of reliable data, commercial satellite imagery has become a particularly critical resource for analyzing Pakistan's nuclear forces. Satellite imagery makes it possible to identify air, missile, and navy bases, as well as potential underground storage facilities. The greatest challenge of analyzing Pakistani nuclear forces with satellite imagery is the lack of reliable data with which to cross-check information revealed by images, particularly with regards to whether certain military bases are associated with nuclear or conventional strike missions, or both.
Overall, the lack of accurate data about Pakistan's nuclear forces results in a lower degree of confidence in this Nuclear Notebook issue's estimates relative to those of most other nuclear-armed countries.

Pakistan's nuclear doctrine

Within its broader philosophy of "credible minimum deterrence," which seeks to emphasize a defensive and limited nuclear posture, Pakistan operates under a nuclear doctrine that it calls "full spectrum deterrence." This posture is aimed mainly at deterring India, which Pakistan identifies as its primary adversary. The belief that Pakistan's nuclear weapons have been deterring India since the mid-1980s has solidified the value of nuclear weapons in the nation's security calculus (Kidwai 2020, 2).

In May 2023, Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Khalid Kidwai—an advisor to Pakistan's National Command Authority, which oversees nuclear weapons development, doctrine, and employment—gave a speech at the Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad (ISSI) where he offered his description of what "full spectrum deterrence" entails. According to Kidwai (2023), "full spectrum deterrence" implies the following:

"That Pakistan possesses the full spectrum of nuclear weapons in three categories: strategic, operational and tactical, with full range coverage of the large Indian land mass and its outlying territories; there is no place for India's strategic weapons to hide.
That Pakistan possesses an entire range of weapons yield coverage in terms of kilotons (KT), and the numbers strongly secured, to deter the adversary's declared policy of massive retaliation; Pakistan's "counter-massive retaliation" can therefore be as severe if not more.
That Pakistan retains the liberty of choosing from a full spectrum of targets in a "target-rich India," notwithstanding the indigenous Indian BMD or the Russian S-400, to include counter value, counter force and battlefield targets."

According to Kidwai, who previously served as the director-general of the Strategic Plans Division (SPD), the "full spectrum" aspect of Pakistan's deterrence posture encompasses both "horizontal" and "vertical" elements. The horizontal aspect refers to Pakistan's nuclear "triad" encompassing the Army Strategic Force Command (ASFC), the Naval Strategic Force Command (NSFC), and the Air Force Strategic Command (AFSC). The vertical aspect refers to three tiers of destructive yield—"strategic, operational, and tactical"—as well as a range coverage "from zero meters to 2750 kilometers," allowing Pakistan to target the entirety of India (Kidwai 2023).

Kidwai and other former Pakistani officials have explained that this posture—as well as Pakistan's particular emphasis on non-strategic nuclear weapons—is specifically intended as a response to a perceived India's "cold start" doctrine (Kidwai 2020). The "cold start" doctrine is an alleged intention by India to launch large-scale conventional strikes or incursions into Pakistani territory without triggering Pakistani nuclear retaliation. Pakistan has reacted to this perceived doctrine by adding several short-range, lower-yield nuclear-capable weapon systems specifically designed to counter military threats below the strategic level.

An example of such a low-yield, close-range nuclear capability is Pakistan's Nasr (also known as Hatf-9) ballistic missile. In 2015, Kidwai stated that the Nasr was specifically "born out of a compulsion of this thing that I mentioned about some people on the other side toying with the idea of finding space for conventional war, despite Pakistan['s] nuclear weapons" (Kidwai 2015). According to Kidwai, Pakistan's understanding of India's "cold start" strategy was that Delhi envisioned launching quick strikes into Pakistan within two to four days with eight to nine brigades simultaneously: an attack force which would involve roughly 32,000 to 36,000 troops. "I strongly believe that by introducing the variety of tactical nuclear weapons in Pakistan's inventory, and in the strategic stability debate, we have blocked the avenues for serious military operations by the other side," Kidwai (2015) explained.

After Kidwai's (2015) statement, Pakistan's Foreign Secretary Aizaz Chaudhry publicly acknowledged the existence of Pakistan's "low-yield, tactical nuclear weapons," apparently the first time a top government official had done so (India Today 2015). At the time, the tactical missiles had not yet been deployed but their purpose was further explained by Pakistani defense minister Khawaja M. Asif in an interview with Geo News in September 2016: "We are always pressurized [sic] time and again that our tactical (nuclear) weapons, in which we have a superiority, that we have more tactical weapons than we need. It is internationally recognized that we have a superiority and if there is a threat to our security or if anyone steps on our soil and if someone's designs are a threat to our security, we will not hesitate to use those weapons for our defense" (Scroll 2016). In developing its nonstrategic nuclear strategy, one study has asserted that Pakistan to some extent has emulated NATO's flexible response strategy without necessarily understanding how it would work (Tasleem and Dalton 2019).

Pakistan's nuclear posture—particularly its development and deployment of tactical nuclear weapons—has created considerable concern in other countries, including the United States, which fears that it increases the risk of escalation and lowers the threshold for nuclear use in a military conflict with India. Over the past decade-and-a-half, the US assessment of nuclear weapons security in Pakistan appears to have changed considerably from confidence to concern, particularly because of the introduction of tactical nuclear weapons. In 2007, a US State Department official told Congress that, "we're, I think, fairly confident that they have the proper structures and safeguards in place to maintain the integrity of their nuclear forces and not to allow any compromise" (Boucher 2007). After the emergence of tactical nuclear weapons, the Obama administration changed the tune: "Battlefield nuclear weapons, by their very nature, pose [a] security threat because you're taking battlefield nuclear weapons to the field where, as you know, as a necessity, they cannot be made as secure," as then US Undersecretary of State Rose Gottemoeller told Congress in 2016 (Economic Times 2016).

The Trump administration echoed this assessment in 2018: "We are particularly concerned by the development of tactical nuclear weapons that are designed for use in battlefield. We believe that these systems are more susceptible to terrorist theft and increase the likelihood of nuclear exchange in the region" (Economic Times 2017). The Trump administration's South Asia strategy in 2017 urged Pakistan to stop sheltering terrorist organizations, notably to "prevent nuclear weapons and materials from coming into the hands of terrorists" (The White House 2017).

In the 2019 Worldwide Threat Assessment, US Director of National Intelligence Daniel R. Coats said, "Pakistan continues to develop new types of nuclear weapons, including short-range tactical weapons, sea-based cruise missiles, air-launched cruise missiles, and longer-range ballistic missiles," noting that "the new types of nuclear weapons will introduce new risks for escalation dynamics and security in the region" (Coats 2019, 10). The Defense Intelligence Agency appeared to tone down its language slightly in its 2021 and 2022 Worldwide Threat Assessments, stating that "Pakistan very likely will continue to modernize and expand its nuclear capabilities by conducting training with its deployed weapons and developing new delivery systems…" but not explicitly noting the inherent escalation risks (Berrier 2021; 2022, 50)."

Pakistani officials, for their part, reject such concerns. In 2021, then-Prime Minister Imran Khan stated that he was "not sure whether we're growing [the nuclear arsenal] or not because as far as I know … the only one purpose [of Pakistan's nuclear weapons] – it's not an offensive thing." He added that "Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is simply as a deterrent, to protect ourselves" (Laskar 2021).

Nuclear security, decision-making, and crisis management

After years of highly-publicized US concerns over the security of Pakistan's nuclear weapons—including the Pentagon reportedly making contingency plans for their rendition in the event of a crisis—Pakistani officials have repeatedly challenged the notion that the security of their nuclear weapons is deficient (Goldberg and Ambinder 2011; MacAskill 2007). Samar Mubarik Mund, the former director of the country's National Defense Complex, explained in 2013 that a Pakistani nuclear warhead is "assembled only at the eleventh hour if [it] needs to be launched. It is stored in three to four different parts at three to four different locations. If a nuclear weapon doesn't need to be launched, then it is never available in assembled form" (World Bulletin 2013).

Despite Pakistan's recent upgrades to the security of its military bases and facilities, at a Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee reception in October 2022, US President Joe Biden commented that Pakistan was "one of the most dangerous nations in the world" due to the lack of "cohesion" in its nuclear security and command and control procedures—a comment that Pakistan quickly and forcefully rebuked (Khan 2022).
Nuclear policy and operational decision-making in Pakistan are undertaken by the National Command Authority, which is chaired by the prime minister and includes both high-ranking military and civilian officials. The primary nuclear-related body within the National Command Authority is the Strategic Plans Division (SPD), which has been described by the former Director of the SPD's Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs as "a unique organization that is incomparable to any other nuclear-armed state. From operational planning, weapon development, storage, budgets, arms control, diplomacy, and policies related to civilian applications for energy, agriculture, and medicine, etc., all are directed and controlled by SPD." Additionally, SPD "is responsible for nuclear policy, strategy and doctrines. It formulates force development strategy for the tri-services strategic forces, operational planning at the joint services level, and controls movements and deployments of all nuclear forces. SPD implements NCA's employment decisions for nuclear use through its NC3 systems" (Khan, F. H. 2019).

The National Command Authority was convened after India and Pakistan engaged in open hostilities in February 2019, when Indian fighters dropped bombs near the Pakistani town of Balakot in response to a suicide bombing conducted by a Pakistan-based militant group. In retaliation, Pakistani aircraft shot down and captured an Indian pilot before returning him a week later and convened the National Command Authority. Following the meeting, a senior Pakistani official gave what appeared to be a thinly veiled nuclear threat: "I hope you know what the [National Command Authority] means and what it constitutes. I said that we will surprise you. Wait for that surprise. … You have chosen a path of war without knowing the consequence for the peace and security of the region" (Abbasi 2019). In his memoir published in January 2023, former US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo mentioned the February 2019 crisis saying that India and Pakistan came "close" to a "nuclear conflagration" (Biswas 2023).
On March 9, 2022, India accidentally launched a BrahMos cruise missile, which crossed the border into Pakistan and traveled approximately 124 kilometers before crashing near the town of Mian Channu (Korda 2022). This was an extremely rare occurrence of a nuclear-armed country launching a missile into the territory of another nuclear power. A subsequent Indian inquiry found that the incident resulted from a deviation from standard operation procedures during a "routine maintenance and inspection" exercise. India made a public statement announcing these findings and terminated the three responsible Indian Air Force officers. However, Pakistan was not satisfied and rejected India's "purported closure of the highly irresponsible incident," insisting on a joint probe into the circumstances of the accident (Pakistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2022). A year after the incident, on March 10, 2023, Pakistan reiterated its standing request for a joint investigation, citing concern about the reliability of India's command and control systems (Pakistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2023).

In addition to India's opacity regarding the incident in the days immediately following the missile launch, it is notable that Pakistan may not have tracked the missile correctly during its flight. In a press conference following the missile launch, Pakistani military officials displayed a map showing their interpretation of the missile's flight and noted that Pakistan's "actions, response, everything … it was perfect. We detected it on time, and we took care of it" (ISPR 2022b). The flight path that Pakistan presented, however, included some discrepancies over where the missile had been launched, as well as its perceived target, and was publicly disputed by Indian sources (Korda 2022; Philip 2022).
According to one Indian news source, in the absence of clarification from India, Pakistan Air Force's Air Defence Operations Centre immediately suspended all military and civilian aircraft for nearly six hours, and reportedly placed frontline bases and strike aircraft on high alert (Bhatt 2022; Philip 2022; Korda 2022; ISPR 2022c). Pakistan's military sources stated that these bases remained on alert until 13:00 PKT on March 14th. (The Pakistan Standard Time (PKT) is typically 30 minutes behind of India Standard Time (IST).) Pakistani officials appeared to confirm this, noting that "whatever procedures were to start, whatever tactical actions had to be taken, they were taken" (ISPR 2022b).

While the US Air Force's National Air and Space Intelligence Center Ballistic and Cruise Missile Report lists India's BrahMos missile as conventional, this incident could potentially have escalated had it taken place during a previous period of notoriously tense relations between the two nuclear-armed countries (National Air and Space Intelligence Center 2017, 37). Moreover, Pakistan and India do not have robust transparency and crisis management mechanisms: Since 1988, the two countries have annually exchanged an annual list of nuclear facilities, and there is a high-level military hotline between the two countries; however, Pakistani officials noted that during the seven minutes of the missile's flight India did not use the hotline to alert Pakistan of the accidental launch (ISPR 2022b). The two countries' initial responses to the incident suggest that regional crisis management mechanisms may not be as reliable as intended.

Fissile materials production and inventory

Pakistan has a well-established and diverse fissile material production complex that is expanding. It includes the Kahuta uranium enrichment plant east of Islamabad, which appears to be growing with the near-completion of what could be another enrichment plant, as well as the enrichment plant at Gadwal to the north of Islamabad (Albright, Burkhard, and Pabian 2018). Four heavy-water plutonium production reactors appear to have been completed at what is normally referred to as the Khushab Complex some 33 kilometers south of Khushab in Punjab province. Three of the reactors at the complex have been added in the past 10 years. The addition of a publicly confirmed thermal power plant at Khushab provides new information for estimating the power of the four reactors (Albright et al. 2018).

The New Labs Reprocessing Plant at Nilore, east of Islamabad, which reprocesses spent fuel and extracts plutonium, has been expanded. Meanwhile, a second reprocessing plant located at Chashma in the northwestern part of Punjab province may have been completed and become operational by 2015 (Albright and Kelleher-Vergantini 2015). A significant expansion to the Chashma complex was under construction between 2018 and 2020, although it remains unclear whether the reprocessing plant continued to operate throughout that period (Hyatt and Burkhard 2020). In June 2023, China and Pakistan signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) for a $4.8 billion deal to construct a new 1,200-megawatt reactor at Chashma (Shahzad 2023).

Nuclear-capable missiles and their mobile launchers are developed and produced at the National Defence Complex (sometimes called the National Development Complex) located in the Kala Chitta Dahr mountain range west of Islamabad. The complex is divided into two sections. The western section south of Attock appears to be involved in development, production, and test-launching of missiles and rocket engines. The eastern section north of Fateh Jang is involved in production and assembly of road-mobile transporter erector launchers (TELs), which are designed to transport and fire missiles. Satellite images regularly show the presence of TEL chassis for a variety of ballistic and cruise missiles: In June 2023, TEL chassis were visible for Nasr, Shaheen-IA ballistic missiles, and Babur cruise missiles (Figure 1). The Fateh Jang section has expanded significantly with several new launcher assembly buildings over the past 10 years, and the complex continues to expand. Other launcher and missile-related production and maintenance facilities may be located near Tarnawa and Taxila.

Figure 1.Pakistani missile TEL visible at expanded National Development Complex near Fateh Jang. (Image: Maxar Technologies/Federation of American Scientists). (Click to display full size.)

Little is publicly known about warhead production, but experts have suspected for many years that the Pakistan Ordnance Factories near Wah, northwest of Islamabad, serve a role. One of the Wah factories is located near a unique facility with six earth-covered bunkers (igloos) inside a multi-layered safety perimeter with armed guards.

A frequent oversimplification for estimating the number of Pakistani nuclear weapons is to derive the estimate directly from the amount of weapon-grade fissile material produced. As of the beginning of 2023, the International Panel on Fissile Materials estimated that Pakistan had an inventory of approximately 4,900 kilograms (plus or minus 1,500 kilograms) of weapon-grade (90 percent enriched) highly enriched uranium (HEU), and about 500 kilograms (plus or minus 170 kilograms) of weapon-grade plutonium (Kütt, Mian, and Podvig 2023). Assuming each first-generation implosion-type warhead's solid core uses 15 to 18 kilograms (kg) of weapon-grade HEU or 5 to 6 kg of plutonium, this fissile material would theoretically be enough to produce a maximum of approximately 188 to 436 HEU-based single-stage warheads and 55 to 134 plutonium-based single-stage warheads if fully expended. However, Pakistan's warhead designs may have undergone some iteration and have become more efficient.
It is important to note that calculating stockpile size based solely on fissile material inventory is an incomplete methodology that tends to overestimate the likely number of nuclear warheads. Instead, warhead estimates must take several other factors into account in addition to the amount of weapon-grade fissile material produced, including the warhead design choice and efficiency, warhead production rates, number of operational nuclear-capable launchers, number of launchers with dual-capability, and nuclear doctrine.

Nuclear warheads estimates must assume that not all of Pakistan's fissile material is used for weapons. Like other nuclear-armed countries, Pakistan most probably keeps some fissile material in reserve. Pakistan also does not have enough nuclear-capable launchers to accommodate several hundreds of warheads. Moreover, all of Pakistan's launchers are thought to be dual-capable, which means that some of them, especially the shorter-range systems, may serve non-nuclear missions. Finally, official statements often refer to "warheads" and "weapons" interchangeably, which leads to ambiguity as to whether they are referring to the number of launchers or the warheads being assigned to them.

The amount of fissile material in warheads—and the size of the warhead—can be reduced, and their yield increased, by using tritium to "boost" the fission process. Pakistan's tritium production capability is poorly understood due to a lack of reliable public information. One study in early 2021 estimated that Pakistan could have produced 690 grams of tritium by the end of 2020, sufficient to boost over 100 weapons. The study assessed that warheads produced for delivery by the Babur and Ra'ad cruise missiles and the Nasr and Abdali missiles almost certainly would require a small, lightweight tritium-boosted fission weapon (Jones 2021). If Pakistan has produced tritium and uses it in second-generation single-stage boosted warhead designs, then the estimated HEU and weapons-grade plutonium would potentially allow it to build a maximum of 283 to 533 HEU-based warheads and 66 to 167 plutonium-based warheads, assuming that each weapon used either 12 kg of HEU or 4 to 5 kg of plutonium.[1] These calculations, however, produce results that are highly likely to be several hundred warheads more than Pakistan currently possesses, for the same reasons mentioned above.

We estimate that Pakistan currently is producing sufficient fissile material to build 14 to 27 new warheads per year, although we estimate that the actual warhead increase in the stockpile probably averages around 5 to 10 warheads per year.

Nuclear-capable aircraft and air-delivered weapons

The aircraft most likely to have a nuclear delivery role are Pakistan's Mirage III and Mirage V fighter squadrons. The Pakistani Air Force's (PAF) Mirage fighter-bombers are located at two bases.[3] Masroor Air Base outside Karachi houses the 32nd Wing with three Mirage squadrons: 7th Squadron ("Bandits"), 8th Squadron ("Haiders"), and 22nd Squadron ("Ghazis"). A possible nuclear weapons storage site is located five kilometers northwest of the base (Kristensen 2009) and, since 2004, highly guarded underground facilities have been constructed at Masroor that could potentially be designed to support a nuclear strike mission. This includes a possible alert hangar with underground weapons-handling capability.
The other Mirage base is Rafiqui Air Base near Shorkot, which is home to the 34th Wing with two Mirage squadrons: the 15th Squadron ("Cobras") and the 27th Squadron ("Zarras"). On February 25, 2021, Pakistan's President, Dr. Arif Alvi, visited the base for the ceremony of 50th Anniversary of Mirages and Colours Award, which displayed at least 11 Mirages (President of Pakistan 2021).

The Mirage V is believed to have been given a strike role with Pakistan' small arsenal of nuclear gravity bombs, while the Mirage III has been used for test launches of Pakistan's Ra'ad air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM), as well as the follow-on Ra'ad-II. The Pakistani Air Force has added an aerial refueling capability to the Mirage, a capability that would greatly enhance the nuclear strike mission (AFP 2018). Several of the Mirages displayed at the award ceremony at Rafiqui Air Base in 2021 appeared to be equipped with refueling pods.

The air-launched, dual-capable Ra'ad ALCM is believed to have been test-launched at least six times, most recently in February 2016. The Pakistani government states that the Ra'ad "can deliver nuclear and conventional warheads with great accuracy" (ISPR 2011a) to a range of 350 kilometers (km) and "complement Pakistan's deterrence capability" by achieving "strategic standoff capability on land and at sea" (ISPR 2016a). During a military parade in 2017, Pakistan displayed what was said to be Ra'ad-II ALCM, apparently an enhanced version of the original Ra'ad with a new engine air-intake and tail wing configuration (Khan 2017). The Pakistani government most recently tested the Ra'ad-II in February 2020 and stated that the missile can reportedly reach targets at a distance of 600 km (ISPR 2020a). All test launches involving either Ra'ad system have been conducted from Mirage III aircraft.
There is no available evidence to suggest that either Ra'ad system had been deployed as of July 2023; however, one potential deployment site could eventually be Masroor Air Base outside Karachi, which is home to several Mirage squadrons and includes unique underground facilities that might be associated with nuclear weapons storage and handling.

To replace the PAF's aging Mirage III and V aircraft, Pakistan has acquired more than 100 operational JF-17 aircraft—which are co-produced with China—and plans to acquire around another 188 JF-17s (Aamir 2022; Gady 2020; Quwa 2021; Warnes 2020). These aircraft are being continuously upgraded with new technology "blocks." Pakistan reportedly inducted the first batch of 12 JF-17 Block III aircraft into the 16th ("Black Panthers") squadron in March 2023 (Tiwari 2023). Several reports suggest that Pakistan may intend to incorporate the dual-capable Ra'ad ALCM onto the JF-17 so that the newer aircraft could eventually take over the nuclear strike role from the Mirage III/Vs (Ansari 2013; Fisher 2016; PakDefense 2020). In March 2023, during rehearsals for the 2023 Pakistan Day Parade (which was subsequently canceled), images surfaced of a JF-17 Thunder Block II carrying what resembled a Ra'ad-I ALCM, the first time such configuration was observed (Scramble 2023).

The nuclear capability of the PAF's legacy F-16 aircraft is uncertain. Although Pakistan was obligated by its contract with the United States not to modify the aircraft to carry nuclear weapons, multiple credible reports subsequently emerged suggesting that Pakistan intended to do so (Associated Press 1989). In September 2022, the Biden administration agreed to a $450 million deal to help sustain Pakistan's F-16 aircraft program (US Defense Security Cooperation Agency 2022).

The F-16A/Bs are based with the 38th Wing at Mushaf (formerly Sargodha) Air Base, located 160 kilometers northwest of Lahore in northeastern Pakistan. Organized into the 9th and 11th Squadrons ("Griffins" and "Arrows" respectively), these aircraft have a range of 1,600 km (extendable when equipped with drop tanks) and most likely are equipped to each carry a single nuclear bomb on the centerline pylon. If the F-16s have a nuclear strike mission, the nuclear gravity bombs attached to them most likely are not stored at the base itself but are potentially kept at the Sargodha Weapons Storage Complex, located 10 km to the south. In a crisis, the bombs could quickly be transferred to the base, or the F-16s could disperse to bases near underground storage facilities and receive the weapons there. Pakistan appears to be reinforcing the munitions bunkers, adding new tunnels, and installing extra security perimeters at the Sargodha complex.

The newer F-16C/Ds are based with the 39th Wing at Shahbaz Air Base outside Jacobabad in northern Pakistan. The wing upgraded to F-16C/Ds from Mirages in 2011 and, so far, has one squadron: the 5th Squadron (known as the "Falcons"). The base has undergone significant expansion, with numerous weapons bunkers added since 2004. As for the F-16A/Bs, if the base has a nuclear mission, the weapons attached to F-16C/Ds most probably are stored elsewhere in special storage facilities. Some F-16s are also visible at Minhas (Kamra) Air Base northwest of Islamabad, although these might be related to aircraft industry at the base. The F-16Cs were showcased in the 2022 Pakistan Day Parade.
Despite the reports about F-16s and the recent image of a Ra'ad ALCM loaded onto a JF-17, there are still too many uncertainties associated with these two aircraft to confidently attribute a dedicated nuclear strike role to either one. As a result, the PAF's F-16s are omitted from Table 1 in this Nuclear Notebook, and the and JF-17s are listed with significant uncertainty.

Land-based ballistic missiles

Pakistan appears to have six currently operational nuclear-capable, solid-fuel, road-mobile ballistic missile systems: the short-range Abdali (Hatf-2), Ghaznavi (Hatf-3), Shaheen-I/A (Hatf-4), and Nasr (Hatf-9), and the medium-range Ghauri (Hatf-5) and Shaheen-II (Hatf-6). Two other nuclear-capable ballistic missile systems are currently under development: the medium-range Shaheen-III and the MIRVed Ababeel. All of Pakistan's nuclear-capable missiles—except for the Abdali, Ghauri, Shaheen-II, and Ababeel—were showcased at the Pakistan Day Parade in March 2021 (ISPR 2021g). The Nasr, Ghauri, Shaheen-IA and II, as well as the Babur-1A and Ra'ad-II were featured during the 2022 Pakistan Day Parade (ISPR 2022c).

The Pakistani road-mobile ballistic missile force has undergone significant development and expansion over the past two decades. This includes possibly eight or nine missile garrisons, including four or five along the Indian border for short-range systems (Babur, Ghaznavi, Shaheen-I, Nasr) and three or four other garrisons further inland for medium-range systems (Shaheen-II and Ghauri).[3] In 2022 and 2023, Pakistan conducted significantly fewer public missile test launches than in earlier years, which may be related to Pakistan's ongoing political instability and countrywide protests following the ousting and subsequent arrest of former Prime Minister Imran Khan in mid-2022.
The short-range, solid-fuel, single-stage Abdali (Hatf-2) has been in development for a long time. The Pentagon reported in 1997 that the Abdali appeared to have been discontinued, but flight-testing resumed in 2002, and it was last reported test-launched in 2013. The 200 kilometer-range missile has been displayed at parades several times on a four-axle road-mobile transporter erector launcher (TEL). The gap in flight-testing indicates the Abdali program may have encountered technical difficulties. After the 2013 test, Inter Services Public Relations stated that Abdali "carries nuclear as well as conventional warheads" and "provides an operational-level capability to Pakistan's Strategic Forces." It said the test launch "consolidates Pakistan's deterrence capability both at the operational and strategic levels" (ISPR 2013); however, the Abdali—Pakistan's oldest ballistic missile type—has not been tested since 2013 and was not displayed at the Pakistan Day Parades of 2021 and 2022. This could potentially indicate that the missile has been superseded by newer systems.

The short-range, solid-fuel, single-stage Ghaznavi (Hatf-3) was test-launched in 2019, 2020, and twice in 2021—its first reported test launches since 2014. In an important milestone for testing the readiness of Pakistan's nuclear forces, the 2019 Ghaznavi launch was conducted at night. After each test, the Pakistani military stated that the Ghaznavi is "capable of delivering multiple types of warheads up to a range of 290 kilometers" (ISPR 2019c, 2020b, 2021b). Its short range means that the Ghaznavi cannot strike Delhi from Pakistani territory, and Army units equipped with the missile are probably based relatively near the Indian border (Kristensen 2016).

The Shaheen-I (Hatf-4) is a single-stage, solid-fuel, dual-capable, short-range ballistic missile with a maximum range of 650 km that has been in service since 2003. The Shaheen-I is carried on a four-axle, road-mobile TEL like the one used for the Ghaznavi. Since 2012, many Shaheen-I test launches have involved an extended-range version widely referred to as Shaheen-IA. The Pakistani government, which has declared the range of the Shaheen-IA to be 900 km, has used both designations. Pakistan most recently test launched the Shaheen-I in November 2019 and the Shaheen-IA in March and November 2021 (ISPR 2019d, 2021c, 2021d, 2021f). Potential Shaheen-1 deployment locations include Gujranwala, Okara, and Pano Aqil. The Shaheen-I was displayed at the 2021 Pakistan Day Parade, but it was replaced by the Shaheen-IA at the 2022 parade, indicating the latter system's potential introduction into the armed forces (ISPR 2021g, 2022c).

One of the most controversial new nuclear-capable missiles in the Pakistani arsenal is the Nasr (Hatf-9), a short-range, solid-fuel missile originally with a range of only 60 km that has recently been extended to 70 km (ISPR 2017c). However, its range being too short to attack strategic targets inside India, Nasr appears intended solely for battlefield defensive use against invading Indian troops. According to the Pakistani government, the Nasr "carries nuclear warheads of appropriate yield with high accuracy, shoot and scoot attributes" and was developed as a "quick response system" to "add deterrence value" to Pakistan's strategic weapons development program "at shorter ranges to deter evolving threats," including evidently India's so-called Cold Start doctrine (ISPR 2011c, 2017a, 2017c). More recent tests of the Nasr system—including two tests in the same week in January 2019—sought to demonstrate the system's salvo-launch capability, as well as the missiles' in-flight maneuverability (ISPR 2019b, 2019d, 2019e).

The Nasr's four-axle, road-mobile TEL appears to use a snap-on system that can carry two or more launch-tube boxes, and the system has been tested in the past using a road-mobile quadruple box launcher. The US intelligence community has listed the Nasr as a deployed system since 2013 (National Air and Space Intelligence Center 2013), and with a total of 15 tests reported so far, the weapon system appears to be well-developed. Potential deployment locations include Gujranwala, Okara, and Pano Aqil.

The medium-range, two-stage, solid-fuel Shaheen-II (Hatf-6) appears to be operational after many years of development. Pakistan's National Defense Complex has assembled Shaheen-II launchers since at least 2004 or 2005 (Kristensen 2007), and a 2020 US intelligence community report states that there are "fewer than 50" Shaheen-II launchers deployed (National Air and Space Intelligence Center 2020). After the most recent Shaheen-II test launch in May 2019, the Pakistani government reported the range as only 1,500 km, but the US National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC) continues to set the Shaheen-II's range at 2,000 km (ISPR 2019a; National Air and Space Intelligence Center 2020). The Shaheen-II is carried on a six-axle, road-mobile TEL and can carry a single conventional or nuclear warhead.

Pakistan's newer medium-range, two-stage, solid-fuel Shaheen-III was displayed publicly for the first time at the 2015 Pakistan Day Parade. Following a third test launch in January 2021, the Pakistani government said the missile could deliver either a single nuclear or conventional warhead to a range of 2,750 km, making it the longest-range system that Pakistan has tested (ISPR 2021a). Its latest test launch took place in April 2022 (Figure 2), which the Pakistani government said was "aimed at re-validating various design and technical parameters of the weapon system" (ISPR 2022a). The Shaheen-III is carried on an eight-axle TEL reportedly supplied by China (Panda 2016). The system may still require more test launches before it becomes operational.

Figure 2.The Pakistani army test-launched a Shaheen-III medium-range ballistic missile in April 2022. (Archive image from 2015 via Pakistani military).

The range of the Shaheen-III is sufficient to target all of mainland India from launch positions in most of Pakistan south of Islamabad. But the missile was apparently developed to do more than that. According to Gen. Kidwai, the range of 2,750 km was determined by a need to be able to target the Nicobar and Andaman Islands in the eastern part of the Indian Ocean that are "developed as strategic bases" where "India might think of putting its weapons" (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2015, 10). But for a 2,750-km range Shaheen-III to reach the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, it would need to be launched from positions in the very Eastern parts of Pakistan, close to the Indian border.
Pakistan's oldest nuclear-capable medium-range ballistic missile, the road-mobile, single-stage, liquid-fuel Ghauri (Hatf-5), was most recently test-launched in October 2018 (ISPR 2018c). The Ghauri is based on North Korea's Nodong medium-range ballistic missile. The Pakistani government states that the Ghauri can carry a single conventional or nuclear warhead to a range of 1,300 km. However, NASIC lists its range slightly lower at 1,250 km and suggests that "fewer than 50" Ghauri launchers have been deployed (National Air and Space Intelligence Center 2020). The extra time needed to fuel the missile before launch makes the Ghauri more vulnerable to attack than Pakistan's newer solid-fuel missiles. Therefore, it is possible that the longer-range versions of the Shaheen may eventually replace the Ghauri. Potential deployment areas for the Ghauri include the Sargodha Central Ammunition Depot area and the Khuzdar Garrison, which expanded its perimeter in late 2017 to include three additional TEL garages.

On January 24, 2017, Pakistan test-launched a new medium-range ballistic missile called Ababeel that the government says is "capable of carrying multiple warheads, using multiple independent reentry vehicle (MIRV) technology" (ISPR 2017b).[5] The three-stage, solid-fuel, nuclear-capable missile, which is currently under development at the National Defense Complex, appears to be derived from the Shaheen-III airframe and solid-fuel motor and has a range of 2,200 km (ISPR 2017b; National Air and Space Intelligence Center 2020). After the test-launch, the Pakistani government declared that the test was intended to validate the missile's "various design and technical parameters," and that Ababeel is "aimed at ensuring survivability of Pakistan's ballistic missiles in the growing regional Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) environment, … further reinforc[ing] deterrence" (ISPR 2017b). Development of multiple-warhead capability appears to be intended as a countermeasure against India's planned ballistic missile defense system (Tasleem 2017). Its status remains unclear as of July 2023.

Land-based missile garrisons

The total number and location of Pakistan's nuclear-capable missile bases and facilities remains unknown. In particular, it is highly challenging to discern between Pakistani military bases intended to serve conventional-only strike roles and those intended to serve dual-capable or nuclear-specific strike roles.

Analysis of commercial satellite imagery suggests that Pakistan maintains at least five missile bases that could serve a role in Pakistan's nuclear forces. Very little has changed with these bases since our most recent overview in 2016 (Kristensen 2016).
Akro Garrison (25.5483, 68.3343)

The Akro Garrison is located around 18 kilometers north of Hyderabad in the southern part of the Sindh Province, and around 145 kilometers away from the Indian border. The garrison covers an area of approximately 6.9 square kilometers, and it has undergone gradual expansion since 2004. The Akro Garrison consists of six missile TEL garages that appear to be designed for 12 launchers. Under the TEL garage complex, there is a unique underground facility, the construction of which can be seen through past satellite imagery. The underground facility has two cross-shaped sections connected by a central corridor that leads to two buildings on either side via covered access ramps.
Analysis of a vehicle training area in the northeast corner of the garrison shows what appear to be five-axle TELs for the Babur cruise missile weapon system.

Gujranwala Garrison (32.2410, 74.0730)
The Gujranwala Garrison is one of the largest military complexes in Pakistan (Figure 3). It covers nearly 30 square kilometers in the northeastern part of the Punjab Province and is located about 60 kilometers from the Indian border. Since 2010, the Gujranwala Garrison has added what appears to be a TEL launcher area immediately east of a likely storage site for conventional munitions, which became operational in 2014 or 2015. The TEL area consists of two identical sections, each of which contain several launcher garages as well as a possible weapons loading hall with reinforced embankments connected via covered passageway to what appears to be a reinforced weapons storage bunker. There is also a technical area slightly south of the main TEL area for servicing the launchers. The security perimeter seems to be designed for potentially adding a third TEL section.

Figure 3.Similar design of TEL areas at Gujranwala and Pano Aqil Garrisons. (Image: Maxar Technologies/Federation of American Scientists). (Click to display full size.)

Several trucks that strongly resemble the Nasr short-range missile system can be seen on satellite imagery. Although it is impossible to be certain, these trucks appear to have a twin box launcher similar to that of which can be seen on Nasr test launch photos. The Nasr's estimated range is the equivalent of the garrison's distance from the Indian border.

ghazi · Apr 24, 2024

[H3]Pakistani Armed Forces ORBAT[/H3]
[H3]Part 1: Structure of Pakistani Army[/H3]
March 17, 2021
Jaidev Jamwal

We're going to start with basic army structure which has remained mostly unchanged from colonial times. Following is true for most armies of commonwealth nations though there are a few exceptions. Indian and Pakistani armed forces still follow largely similar structures with a few variations. Many of more powerful armies like American, Russian and Chinese have changed this quite a bit and operate under a different Combined Arms command structure. Certain units like Armour and Artillery may have somewhat different structure and manpower even within the same army. Additionally, most of this information is on a need to know basis and command and location of units keeps on changing which makes keeping a proper record or even having a somewhat detailed ORBAT of armed forces quite difficult for amateurs.

Tables in this post have a bit more details than map in the bottom. I'll keep on updating it whenever possible.

If you're a newbie, read this section about basic structure of an army like corps, Divisions, Battalions etc. first. If you're already familiar with this, then you can skip this section.

BASIC UNITS OF AN ARMY

CORPS:
Commanded by a 3 Star Lt General, a Corps may comprise of 2 or more divisions plus some independent brigades and other units. It's the biggest fighting arm in all big armies and have specific roles in a geographic area like attack, defence or reserve. For example, India has Pivot and Strike Corps, where as Pakistan has Holding & Strike Corps for defence and attack roles respectively.
All Corps signs in Indian and Pakistani armies are red with a white stripe and a design in middle.


Pakistani II Corps	Pakistan V Corps

IMAGE 1: Some Pakistani army Corps insignia (globalsecurity.org)

DIVISION:
A division is commanded by a 2 Star Major General and comprises 2-4 brigades, though 3 is a more common number. There are multiple types of divisions depending upon their role and deployment. For example there are Armoured Divisions, Infantry Divisions (Mechanised, Motorised, Mountain, Special Operations), Artillery Divisions, Engineer Divisions and Missile Divisions along with some composite arms divisions like Indian RAPIDS (Reorganised Army Plains Infantry Divisions). Infantry and Armoured divisions usually have at least one armoured and infantry brigade respectively along with some artillery units. Infantry divisions usually have more manpower than artillery and armoured divisions.


41st Division, Pakistan Army	17th Division, Pakistan Army

IMAGE 2: Some Pakistani army division insignias. (globalsecurity.org)

BRIGADE: A brigade is commanded by a 1 Star Brigadier and usually has 3 or more battalions plus some support units. A brigade can be a part of a division along with 2-3 other brigades or commanded directly by a Corps in case of an independent brigade. Like divisions, brigades too can be of multiple types.

BATTALION: A battalion is commanded by a Colonel and usually has 4 Companies. It is the smallest unit capable of independent combat operations. Most of infantry units and certain support arms like Supplies are organised in battalions.

COMPANY: A company is usually commanded by a Major or sometimes a Captain and can have 80-250 soldiers in three to six platoons. Certain types of specialised companies like air defence, medical, transport can be attached to a brigade or a division.

PLATOON: A platoon is the smallest military unit commanded by a commissioned officer, usually a Lieutenant or a junior commissioned officer (JCOs). It may have 30-40 soldiers.

SECTION: It is the smallest fighting unit for infantry and comprises of 10 soldiers with a NCO like Havildar in charge.

REGIMENT: This is a slightly confusing term, as it is both a fighting unit in case of most arms like armour, air defence and artillery and an administrative one in case of infantry which has multiple battalions under each regimental HQ. These are usually numbered in the order they were raised, although some of the older ones may have names. For example, Indian 2 Dogra means 2nd Battalion of Dogra Regiment, 7 Sindh means 7th Battalion of Pakistan's Sindh Regiment.

Armour Corps regiments have 45-50 tanks (42-44 in case of Pakistan) are commanded by a Colonel, also called Commandant. Such a regiment may have 3-4 squadrons including one HQ squadron. Artillery and air defence regiments usually have 2-4 batteries ( 3 is most common) of multiple guns and launchers depending upon their type and role. All regiments have their own insignia, center and a fierce pride in their history and honours.

[H4]ORBAT OF PAKISTANI ARMY[/H4]
This section details about about all army corps and some other units. Next post will have information about other aspects such as air defence , armour and regiments.

IMAGE 3: Basic Command Structure of Pakistani Army
[H4]I Corps[/H4]

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UNIT	SUBORDINATE UNITS	BRIGADES	LOCATION	REMARKS
I Corps			Mangla	AOR: Chicken Neck in Jammu & border areas around it.Strike Corps oriented towards Jammu & Pathankot
	6th Armoured Division		Gujranwala
		9th Armoured Brigade
		7th Armoured Brigade
		1st Armoured Brigade??		Assigned to some other division
		Army Aviation Brigade?		Wartime holding only
		SP Artillery Brigade?
	17th Infantry Division		Kharian
	37th Mech Infantry Division		Kharian
	11th Armoured Brigade (I)??			allocated to 6th Div in war
	?? Infantry Brigade			Partially mehcanised
	??Air Defence Brigade (I)??
	8th (I) Armoured Brigade?		Kharian	X or I Corps
	?? (I) Infantry Brigade
	?? (I) Artillery Brigade
	106th (I) Air Defence Brigade?
	?? (I) Signals Brigade Group
	314th Assault Engineers

TABLE 1: I Corps

[H4]II Corps[/H4]

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UNIT	SUBORDINATE UNITS	BRIGADES	LOCATION	REMARKS
II Corps			Multan	AORunjabStrike Corps, Punjab region
	1st Armoured Division		Multan
	14th Infantry Division		Okara
	40th Infantry Division		Okara
	13th (I) Armoured Brigade?
	44th (I) Mech Infantry Brigade		Bahawalpur
	?? (I) Artillery Brigade
	?? (I) Air Defence Brigade
	?? (I) Signals Brigade Group
	5 MLRS Regiment
	WLR Regiment

TABLE 2: II Corps

[H4]IV Corps[/H4]

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UNIT	SUBORDINATE UNITS	BRIGADES	TYPE	LOCATION	REMARKS
IV Corps			Corps	Lahore	AOR: Narowal to Sulemankie, PunjabHolding Corps, Punjab region
	2nd Artillery Division		Artillery Division	Gujranwala
	10th Infantry Division		Infantry Division	Lahore
	11th Infantry Division		Infantry Division	Lahore
		21st Infantry Brigade	Infantry Brigade
		52nd Infantry Brigade	Infantry Brigade
		106th Infantry Brigade	Infantry Brigade
		?? Artillery Brigade
	212nd (I) Infantry Brigade		Ind Infantry Brigade	Lahore
	?? (I) Artillery Brigade
	3rd (I) Armoured Brigade ??
	?? (I) Signals Brigade Group

TABLE 3: IV Corps
[H4]V Corps[/H4]
[H4]

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[/H4]

UNIT	SUBORDINATE UNITS	LOCATION	REMARKS
V Corps		Karachi	AOR: SindhHolding Corps
	16th Infantry Division	Pano Aqil
	18th Infantry Division	Hyderabad
	25th Mechanized Division	Malir
	105th (I) Infantry Brigade
	?? (I) Artillery Brigade
	?? (I) Armoured Brigade Group??
	?? (I) Signals Brigade Group

TABLE 4: V Corps

[H4]X Corps[/H4]

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UNIT	SUBORDINATE UNITS	BRIGADES	LOCATION	REMARKS
X Corps			Rawalpindi	AOR: J&KAttack role in north and POK60000 Mujhaid 40000 Janbaz Force irregulars
	Northern Areas Command		Gilgit	AOR: Dnasum, Khapalu, Siari and Skardu4 infantry brigades (12 inf battalion and 4 Mujahid battalions) + NLI DivApproximate location
		32nd Infantry Brigade ?	Kel
		62nd Infantry Birgade	Skardu
		80th Infantry Brigade	Minimarg
		323rd Infantry Brigade	Dansam
		150th Infantry Brigade ??	Gilgit	No source to confirm
	12th Infantry Division		Murree	15 Regular and 13 Mujahid battalion
		75th	Mandal, Lipa
		1st POK Brigade	Domel
		2nd POK Brigade	Rawalkot
		5th POK Brigade	Bagh
		6th POK Brigade	Bagh
	19th Infantry Division		Mangla
		?? Infantry Brigade
		?? Infantry Brigade
		?? Infantry Brigade
	23rd Infantry Division		Jhelum
		66th Infantry Brigade	Jhelum
		3rd POK Brigade	Kotli
		4th POK Brigade	Bhimber
		?? Armoured Regiment	Bhagowal
		1 R&S Battalion
		1 Missile Company
	Special Security Division		Chilas	9 regular army and 6 paramilitary infantry battalions?
	31st (I) Armoured/Mech Brigade?		Malir
	?? (I) Artillery Brigade
	111st (I) Infantry Brigade		Rawalpindi	Westridge, RawalpindiX Corps for VIP security & coups3 infantry battalions, 2 light artillery regiments, SSG battalion and 1 armoured regiment
	?? (I) Signals Brigade Group

	IRREGULARS
	Northern Light Infantry			17 Battalions. involved in Kargil. 35% from Baltistan, 55% Gilgit18% Sunni, 49% Shia
	Azad Kashmir Regiment			32 infantry battalions in 8 brigades, irregular
		1st AK Brigade	Muzaffarabad
		2nd AK Brigade	Rawalkot
		3rd AK Brigade	Tatta Pani	AOR: Rajouri, Poonch, Naushera and Sunderbani
		4th AK Brigade	Bandli
		5th AK Brigade	Dhani
		6th AK Brigade	Bagh
		7th AK Brigade	Bhimber
		32nd AK Brigade?	Kel

	Mujahid Force			640, 641, 647, 652, 654, 655, 656, 815, 834, 841, and 886 Battalions
		656th Battalion	Bhimber

TABLE 5: X Corps

[H4]XI Corps[/H4]

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UNIT	SUBORDINATE UNITS	BRIGADES	LOCATION	REMARKS
XI Corps			Peshawar	AOR: NWFP, Balochistan
	7th Infantry Division		Peshawar
	9th Infantry Division		Kohat
	?? (I) Armoured Brigade?
	?? (I) Artillery Brigade
	?? (I) Signals Brigade Group

TABLE 6: XI Corps

[H4]XII Corps[/H4]

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UNIT	SUBORDINATE UNITS	BRIGADES	LOCATION	REMARKS
XII Corps			Quetta	Reserve for V Corps in Thar area
	33rd Infantry Division		Quetta
		29th Infantry Brigade	Zhob
		60th Infantry Brigade	Sibi
		205th Infantry Brigade	Loralai
		Divisional artillery	Zhob
	41st Infantry Division		Quetta
	?? (I) Artillery Brigade
	?? (I) Armoured Brigade?
	?? (I) Mech Inf Brigade
	?? LAT Regiment
	?? (I) Signals Brigade Group

TABLE 7: XII Corps
[H4]XXX Corps[/H4]

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UNIT	SUBORDINATE UNITS	BRIGADES	LOCATION	REMARKS
XXX Corps			Gujranwala	AOR: Between Jhelum and Narowal,South of IV Corps boundary, Shakargarh bulge
	8th Infantry Division		Sialkot
	15th Infantry Division		Sialkot
	?? (I) Signals Brigade Group

TABLE 8: XXX Corps

[H4]XXXI Corps[/H4]

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UNIT	SUBORDINATE UNITS	LOCATION	REMARKS
XXXI Corps		Bahawalpur	AOR: Punjab
	26th Mechanized Division	Bahawalpur
	35th Infantry Division	Bahawalpur
	101st (I) Infantry Brigade
	10th or 13th (I) Armoured Brigade
	105th (I) Brigade group??
	?? (I) Artillery Brigade

TABLE 9: XXXI Corps

[H4]Air Defence Command[/H4]

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UNIT	SUBORDINATE UNITS	BRIGADES	LOCATION	REMARKS
Air Defence Command/Corps			Rawalpindi	AOR: Pakistan
	3rd Air Defence Division		Sargodha
		3rd Air Defence Brigade	Sargodha
		4th Air Defence Brigade	Lahore
	4th Air Defence Division		Malir
		109th Air Defence Brigade	Multan
	105th (I) Air Defence Brigade
	?? (I) Signals Brigade Group

TABLE: 10: Air Defence Command
[H4]Strategic Forces Command[/H4]

UNIT	SUBORDINATE UNITS	BRIGADES	TYPE	LOCATION
Strategic Forces Command			Missile Corps	Rawalpindi
	21st Artillery Division		Missile Division	Pano Aqil
	22nd Artillery Division		Missile Division	Sargodha
	2nd Missile Group		Missile Group	Sargodha
	?? Missile Group,		Missile Group	Hyderabad?
	?? (I) Signals Brigade Group

TABLE 11: Strategic Forces Command for nuclear roles.

[H4]Special Services Group[/H4]

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UNIT	SUBORDINATE UNITS	BATTALIONS	LOCATION	REMARKS
Special Service Group			Cherat	8 battalions (with ~700 men), each has 4 companies? + 3 independent companies. Each company has 3 platoons and each platoon has 3 10 man sections.50 Airborne Division?
	?? SSG Brigade		Cherat
		5 Commando Battalion		Zilzaal
		6 Commando Battalion		Al-Samsaam
		7 Commando Battalion		Babrum
	Tarbela SSG Brigade		Tarbela	50 Airborne?Musa, Iqbal Buland Companies & Special Operation Task Force (SOTF)
		3 Commando Battalion	Powindah	Powindahs
		8 Commando Battalion	Islamabad	Al-Azb
		Zarrar Company
	11 SSG Brigade		Attock
		1 Commando Battalion ??	Tarbela, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	Yaldram
		2 Commando Battalion	Rawalpindi,	Rahber
		4 Commando Battalion		Yalghar
	Janbaz Force		Peshawar, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
	Akbar Company			Combat diver
	Zarrar Company			Counter Terrorism
	Iqbal Buland Company			Communications
	Airborne school		Peshawar
	Para Training School SSG		Grand Trunk Rd, Tahkal, Peshawar,	HQ SSGBasic Airborne , Jump master and Airborne Operation, High Altitude and Low Opening , Pathfindee and Parachute Packing and Maintenance Courses
	35 Light EME Battalion		Tarbela, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
	10 Light Commando Battalion ?		Mehfooz Shaheed Garrison Lahore
	Powindah SSG center?

TABLE 12: Special Service Group, Special forces

[H4]Frontier Corps[/H4]

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UNIT	SUBORDINATE UNITS	LOCATION	REMARKS
Frontier Corps			Paramilitary with 30000 troops.Commanded by Inspector General equivalent to Major General. Each unit commanded by Col/Lt Col
	Zhob Militia	Fort Sandeman	4 Wings at Zhob, Sambaza, Muslim Bagh and Qamardin Karaz
	Sibi Scouts	Sibi	contingents at Mach under the command of a major, 71 Wing at Dera Murad Jamali for protection of Chinese engineers
	Kalat Scouts	Kalat
	Makran Scouts	Turbat	Wing at Panjgur, Detachment at Sur-e-aab, Company at Grawag, Contingent at Kech, Wing at Mand
	Kharan Rifles	Lad Gasht	Mashkhel 84 Wing, Wing at Nokkundi
	Pishin Scouts	Pishin Fort
	Chaghai Militia
	Maiwand Rifles	Barkhan Town	Contingent at Kohlu
	Ghazaband Scouts
	Bhambore Rifles	Dera Bugti	Wing HQ at Sui
	Loralai Scouts	Sarduki	a company at Musakhe

TABLE 13: Frontier Corps, Paramilitary

Pakistan Army Divisions Insignias (globalsecurity.org)

Pakistani Armed Forces ORBAT, Part 1: Structure of Pakistani Army - अरे यायावर रहेगा याद?

“Most countries have an army, but Pakistan’s army has a country” is a popular saying which to be fair, is also somewhat true for many other unstable countries in Africa and the Middle-east. What makes Pakistan unique is how it’s armed forces have successfully controlled all aspects of the...

jjamwal.in

Old School · Apr 24, 2024

Announced today, Snapdragon X Plus is based on the same Oryon CPU as Snapdragon X Elite, just with a bit less power. The chip has 10 cores to the Elite's 12, and is also clocked down from the Elite's 3.8GHz to 3.4GHz.

In a multi-threaded CPU benchmark, Snapdragon X Plus fell about 2,000 points lower than the Snapdragon X Elite, but still managed to outdo Apple's M3 chip by about 10%. It's also still considerably more power efficient compared to traditional x86 chips, using approximately 54% less power at peak performance compared to Intel Core Ultra 7155H.

Qualcomm explains:

Snapdragon X Plus features the state-of-the-art Qualcomm Oryon CPU, a custom-integrated processor that delivers up to 37% faster CPU performance compared to competitors, while consuming up to 54% less power. This remarkable advancement in CPU performance sets a new standard in mobile computing, enabling users to accomplish more with greater efficiency.

Snapdragon X Plus also matches the Elite on NPU performance, which should be a big boost as "AI PCs" continue to be a big focus on Windows

ghazi · Apr 5, 2024

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