Bangladesh Defense
Date of Event:
Nov 30, 2025
State and politics: BNP has no interest in referendum, will the voters have any?
Among the steps the government has taken to implement the July Charter, the referendum is one; though it remains subject to political debate. Several parties, including the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), had demanded that the referendum be held after the general election. Jamaat-e-Islami, on the other hand, insisted that it must take place before the parliamentary polls. As a compromise between these two positions, the government has decided to hold the referendum on the same day as the general election and, last week, issued the Referendum Ordinance, 2025.
According to the ordinance, a single question will be placed before the electorate: “Do you consent to the July National Charter (constitutional reform) Implementation Order 2025 and to the following proposals relating to the constitutional reforms recorded in the July National Charter?” (Yes/No):
(a) The election-time caretaker government, the election commission and other constitutional bodies shall be constituted in accordance with the procedures set out in the July Charter;
(b) The next Jatiya Sangsad shall be bicameral, with an upper house of 100 members constituted in proportion to the votes received by political parties in the national election; and any constitutional amendment shall require approval by a majority of the upper house.
(c) The political parties victorious in the upcoming parliamentary election shall be obliged to implement the 30 issues listed in the schedule of the July National Charter on which consensus was reached, including increased representation of women in parliament, a deputy speaker from the opposition, election of parliamentary committee chairs, fundamental rights, judicial independence, local government, the prime minister’s tenure, and the president’s powers.
The BNP argues that the July Charter had recorded various objections or notes of dissent from political parties; yet the constitutional order issued to implement the Charter makes no mention of those objections. Therefore, they say, they will not shoulder the responsibility, which the interim government must take.
(d) Other reforms outlined in the July National Charter shall be implemented in line with the commitments of political parties.
There are four questions, but only one answer. If you support the measure, you must support all four; if you oppose it, you must reject all four. Some internal contradictions lie within these clauses. The final paragraph stipulates that outstanding reforms shall be implemented according to the commitments of political parties. But if the commitments of the victorious party contradict the first three clauses, the implementation of the July Charter could become difficult.
The BNP argues that the July Charter had recorded various objections or notes of dissent from political parties; yet the constitutional order issued to implement the Charter makes no mention of those objections. Therefore, they say, they will not shoulder the responsibility, which the interim government must take.
It is now evident that, despite the signing of the July Charter, significant differences remain among political parties concerning the constitutional order and the referendum. Leaders of Jamaat-e-Islami and their allied parties are campaigning vigorously to ensure the referendum’s success. They believe that the future of democracy depends on its outcome. The BNP and its allies do not share this conviction.
The headline of the Daily Star on 27 November read, “Polls strategy: Referendum not on BNP’s mind”. In essence, the report stated that the referendum, scheduled for the same day as the parliamentary election, ranks low on the BNP’s list of priorities, and the party has no plans to campaign for either a ‘Yes’ or a ‘No’ vote.
The Bangladesh Awami League (AL) is not in the field. The Jatiya Party’s (JaPa) participation in the election is still uncertain. Under these circumstances, there is no reason to assume that AL, JaPa or 14-party alliance activists and supporters will rally behind the referendum.
Even if Jamaat-e-Islami and all its allied parties deploy their full organisational strength to secure a ‘Yes’ victory, optimism remains limited. Had the referendum been held before the parliamentary election, voter turnout would likely have been even lower. Although turnout may now be higher because of the concurrent election, participation in the referendum itself is far from guaranteed. With the BNP indifferent, it seems unlikely that only Jamaat, the NCP and their supporters will be able to draw the electorate’s attention to the referendum.
Bangladesh has held three referendums so far. The first two were essentially similar in nature. Both military rulers who seized power by suspending the constitution sought legitimacy through referendums, Ziaur Rahman in 1977 and HM Ershad in 1985. Although only a small number of people actually turned out, the official figures claimed 88.1 per cent and 72.2 per cent turnout respectively; with 98.9 per cent ‘Yes’ votes in the first and 94.5 per cent in the second.
Both referendums relied heavily on the administrative machinery, which also conducted the mobilisation. Ziauddin Choudhury, who held a senior administrative position in 1977, described the absurd spectacle of the first referendum: “Whether due to the over-enthusiasm of Ziaur Rahman’s advisers and government officials, or for other reasons, the declared turnout figures and the astonishingly high ‘Yes’ votes generated negative reactions both at home and abroad.” (Prothom Alo, 6 January 2019)
Ziauddin Choudhury witnessed the first referendum firsthand, but he was denied permission by Ershad to return to the country to witness the second. The second referendum, too, was a farce.
The third referendum was held in 1991, after parliament passed the law shifting from a presidential to a parliamentary system of government. Turnout was 35.2 per cent. Some 18.3 million voters (84.38 per cent) cast a ‘Yes’ vote for parliamentary democracy. Another 3.39 million (15.62 per cent) voted ‘No’.
Though turnout was low, the referendum was transparent and credible. The Jatiya Party initially opposed the return to the parliamentary system, but eventually accepted it. If we assume that its supporters voted ‘No’, even then the present referendum gives rise to legitimate concerns.
Because the parliamentary election and the referendum will be held on the same day, voter interest will naturally be centred on the national polls. Candidates, too, will focus on securing their own victory. How much room the referendum will have in the minds of voters is therefore questionable. If the BNP remains entirely indifferent, this will have a negative impact on the referendum’s outcome. BNP leaders have stated they neither will urge anyone to vote ‘Yes’, nor to vote ‘No’. As a result, many voters may not even bother to take the referendum ballot. They may simply vote for their preferred parliamentary candidate and return home.
The law does not specify what percentage of voter turnout is required for the referendum to be valid. If the ‘Yes’ votes exceed the ‘No’ votes, the referendum will be legally binding. But without the support of a clear majority for the democratic transformation undertaken by the interim government born of a mass uprising, the moral legitimacy of the process will remain in question, even if it passes the legal test.
* Sohrab Hassan is a journalist and poet.
Among the steps the government has taken to implement the July Charter, the referendum is one; though it remains subject to political debate. Several parties, including the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), had demanded that the referendum be held after the general election. Jamaat-e-Islami, on the other hand, insisted that it must take place before the parliamentary polls. As a compromise between these two positions, the government has decided to hold the referendum on the same day as the general election and, last week, issued the Referendum Ordinance, 2025.
According to the ordinance, a single question will be placed before the electorate: “Do you consent to the July National Charter (constitutional reform) Implementation Order 2025 and to the following proposals relating to the constitutional reforms recorded in the July National Charter?” (Yes/No):
(a) The election-time caretaker government, the election commission and other constitutional bodies shall be constituted in accordance with the procedures set out in the July Charter;
(b) The next Jatiya Sangsad shall be bicameral, with an upper house of 100 members constituted in proportion to the votes received by political parties in the national election; and any constitutional amendment shall require approval by a majority of the upper house.
(c) The political parties victorious in the upcoming parliamentary election shall be obliged to implement the 30 issues listed in the schedule of the July National Charter on which consensus was reached, including increased representation of women in parliament, a deputy speaker from the opposition, election of parliamentary committee chairs, fundamental rights, judicial independence, local government, the prime minister’s tenure, and the president’s powers.
The BNP argues that the July Charter had recorded various objections or notes of dissent from political parties; yet the constitutional order issued to implement the Charter makes no mention of those objections. Therefore, they say, they will not shoulder the responsibility, which the interim government must take.
(d) Other reforms outlined in the July National Charter shall be implemented in line with the commitments of political parties.
There are four questions, but only one answer. If you support the measure, you must support all four; if you oppose it, you must reject all four. Some internal contradictions lie within these clauses. The final paragraph stipulates that outstanding reforms shall be implemented according to the commitments of political parties. But if the commitments of the victorious party contradict the first three clauses, the implementation of the July Charter could become difficult.
The BNP argues that the July Charter had recorded various objections or notes of dissent from political parties; yet the constitutional order issued to implement the Charter makes no mention of those objections. Therefore, they say, they will not shoulder the responsibility, which the interim government must take.
It is now evident that, despite the signing of the July Charter, significant differences remain among political parties concerning the constitutional order and the referendum. Leaders of Jamaat-e-Islami and their allied parties are campaigning vigorously to ensure the referendum’s success. They believe that the future of democracy depends on its outcome. The BNP and its allies do not share this conviction.
The headline of the Daily Star on 27 November read, “Polls strategy: Referendum not on BNP’s mind”. In essence, the report stated that the referendum, scheduled for the same day as the parliamentary election, ranks low on the BNP’s list of priorities, and the party has no plans to campaign for either a ‘Yes’ or a ‘No’ vote.
The Bangladesh Awami League (AL) is not in the field. The Jatiya Party’s (JaPa) participation in the election is still uncertain. Under these circumstances, there is no reason to assume that AL, JaPa or 14-party alliance activists and supporters will rally behind the referendum.
Even if Jamaat-e-Islami and all its allied parties deploy their full organisational strength to secure a ‘Yes’ victory, optimism remains limited. Had the referendum been held before the parliamentary election, voter turnout would likely have been even lower. Although turnout may now be higher because of the concurrent election, participation in the referendum itself is far from guaranteed. With the BNP indifferent, it seems unlikely that only Jamaat, the NCP and their supporters will be able to draw the electorate’s attention to the referendum.
Bangladesh has held three referendums so far. The first two were essentially similar in nature. Both military rulers who seized power by suspending the constitution sought legitimacy through referendums, Ziaur Rahman in 1977 and HM Ershad in 1985. Although only a small number of people actually turned out, the official figures claimed 88.1 per cent and 72.2 per cent turnout respectively; with 98.9 per cent ‘Yes’ votes in the first and 94.5 per cent in the second.
Both referendums relied heavily on the administrative machinery, which also conducted the mobilisation. Ziauddin Choudhury, who held a senior administrative position in 1977, described the absurd spectacle of the first referendum: “Whether due to the over-enthusiasm of Ziaur Rahman’s advisers and government officials, or for other reasons, the declared turnout figures and the astonishingly high ‘Yes’ votes generated negative reactions both at home and abroad.” (Prothom Alo, 6 January 2019)
Ziauddin Choudhury witnessed the first referendum firsthand, but he was denied permission by Ershad to return to the country to witness the second. The second referendum, too, was a farce.
The third referendum was held in 1991, after parliament passed the law shifting from a presidential to a parliamentary system of government. Turnout was 35.2 per cent. Some 18.3 million voters (84.38 per cent) cast a ‘Yes’ vote for parliamentary democracy. Another 3.39 million (15.62 per cent) voted ‘No’.
Though turnout was low, the referendum was transparent and credible. The Jatiya Party initially opposed the return to the parliamentary system, but eventually accepted it. If we assume that its supporters voted ‘No’, even then the present referendum gives rise to legitimate concerns.
Because the parliamentary election and the referendum will be held on the same day, voter interest will naturally be centred on the national polls. Candidates, too, will focus on securing their own victory. How much room the referendum will have in the minds of voters is therefore questionable. If the BNP remains entirely indifferent, this will have a negative impact on the referendum’s outcome. BNP leaders have stated they neither will urge anyone to vote ‘Yes’, nor to vote ‘No’. As a result, many voters may not even bother to take the referendum ballot. They may simply vote for their preferred parliamentary candidate and return home.
The law does not specify what percentage of voter turnout is required for the referendum to be valid. If the ‘Yes’ votes exceed the ‘No’ votes, the referendum will be legally binding. But without the support of a clear majority for the democratic transformation undertaken by the interim government born of a mass uprising, the moral legitimacy of the process will remain in question, even if it passes the legal test.
* Sohrab Hassan is a journalist and poet.
